POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INFORMATION ON THE ARMENIAN SSR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00246A042700090001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 24, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 12, 1958
• Content Type: REPORT

_ - -- I _ -L.- 1 _ 1 - 1 I I!. I .1117.! - 1- - ! [I . I L JII I I. 1.___ . I
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INFORMATION REPORT I N FORMATION REPORT
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title
18, U.S.O. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
C -0 .-N -F - I-D-E -N -T - I-A-L
COUNTRY LM SR (Armenian SSR)
SUBJECT Political and Economic Information on DATE DISTR. 12 June 1958
the Armenian SSR
NO. PAGES
DATE OF
INFO.
PLACE &
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PROCESSING COPY
A seven-page report dealing with political and economic conditions in the
Armenian SSR
STATE
[(N_Z_.
ARMY
NAVY FAIR
SI
I IAEC
0
LI
I N FORMATION REPORT I N FORMATION REPORT
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Yi USSR (Armenian SSA)
SUBJECT: Socio-Political and Economic Information
on Armenian SSA
PLACE AIRED:
1. U the showdown between Khrushchev and his most powerful rivals in June
1957, which ended with the ous -- of Malenkov, Molotov, and Kaganovich
from the Presidium, was a climax to a ew 25X1
which had been goj.ng on in the Kremlin for sometime. 25X1
this struggle for' power was intensified following IChrus ev a e orts
nr r~r'1 I . , I
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to superimpose and implement his virgin land development program and
decentralization plan, which were strongly opposed by the Stalinst faction.
Moreover, this faction, headed by Malenkov, Molotov and Kaganovich, was
highly suspicious of Khrushchev's motives, despite the outward semblance
of collective leadership ostensibly operating in the context of the Soviet
hierarchy. Bulganin's elevation to the Premier's position,
after Malenkov was forced to step down, was a temporary compromise
between these two factions to keep Khrushchev's personal ambitions in check.
Following the elimination of his bitter rivals in the Soviet Presidium, the
was that Khrushchey was now in the driver's seat and would in all probability
extend his domination and control over the Communist Party. Bulganin was
generally considered to be Khrushchev'a mouthpiece, particula ly after the
3?
relations between the Armenian population and Russians
res ding n erevan were friendly and amicable. Soviet Air Force personnel
stationed is Yerevan were well disciplined and conducted themselves
theme was no discernible impact of the de-Stalinization drive
In the Armenian SSR, nor ~any demonstrations
for or against this movement. living conditions
appeared to be generally improve r Stalin's death. This was particularly
evident during the period Malenkov served as Premier. This improvement in
living standards was reflected in a more abundant supply of consumer goods
in various Soviet shops and in reasonable. .food prs.After Malenkov's
ouster as Premier living conditiOns? for the average
Armenian family gradually deteriorated. Apart from a critical housing
shortage due to the scarcity of building materials and Soviet emphasis on
the construction of plants and factories, living costs had risen faster
than wages. Additonally, there were continual shortages of consumer
goods, which were quickly bought up b speculators a-- resold to the people
at a considerable profit. here was widespread
dissatisfaction among the an workers and peasants with the present
Communist regime for failure to meet their needs for a better and freer
life.
Despite the fact that the Armenians intensely dislike the Communist regime,
properly at all times. Whatever administrative or military control
existed in Yerevan was largely exercised over the military personnel a
lar airfield, and military facilities located in the city proper*
this administrative control by the military authorities did not extend
civilian population. Conversely, Yerevan tag, ,by and large, adminis-
tered and controlled by Armenian nationals. Shen Tomasyan, a Communist
of long standing, heads this administration in Yerevan. Key positions were
usually occupied by Armenians w tubers of the Communist Party. 7some Russian nationals held minor
positions in the administrationT
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The causative factors which precipitated a riot during a soccer match in
Yerevan in September 1955, largely stemmed from an intense rivalry
between a Russian soccer team from Sverdlov and an Armenian team repre-
senting Yerevan. This was a final season play-off match to decide which
team would go to Moscow as a regional representative in the championship
soccer play-offs. prior to the start of the game,
a rumor had been circulating among the Armenian spectators that some-
one in Moscow had directed that the Yerevan team was not to be permitted
to go to Moscow, that the Russian team representing Sverdlov must be the
winner of this final match. The fact that Russian officials were sent
from Moscow to officate this play-off match added considerable credence
to this rumor from the spectators' point of view. As the game got under-
way, it was evident that both t earns w r 9Jv
ice wel At tie
Prer a 3V d e ran a a ~ /s.
, leoa
end of the first peri&"'botft,Nteams were tied twi two fieldm goalswo. P3he
were disallowed W the Moscow officials, who claimed that fouls were
committed by a Yerevan player each time a field goal was scored. At this
point.,[ feelings were running high, not only among the
Armenian players who protested these decisions,, but the Armenian spec-
tators as well. Towards the closing minutes of the soccer match,
with the score still tied at two all, the officials penalized a Yerevan
player for committing a personal foul (ostensibly his hand was struck
by a kicked ball near his ova goal). A free kick was granted to the
Sverdlov team, which was successfully converted into a goal. The score
then was 3-2 in favor of Sverdlov. A few minutes later the game ended.
Spectators immediately swarmed out on the field shouting their anger at
the Russian officials. A barrage of stones, bottles, and other objects
were thrown at the officials, who were trying to duck out of the way
of the mob. The local militia took the Russian officials under their?
protective custody when it became apparent that the mob set out to do
bodily injury to them. When the mob of angry spectators refused to
disperse, the militia was forced to open fire, killing several people
and wounding many others. A large number of spectators were al
injured by flying stones and other objects during this riot*
this soccer match had strong nationalistic overtones,
ose final outcome resulted in considerable bitterness between the
Armenians and the Russians.
5?
the population in Yerevan
ZOOK c n ev s s ~e,, ;even a seriously in connection with an imminent
outbreak of hostils=between Syria and Turkey in fall 1957. Inasmuch
as Syria was being "supported by the USSR and,Tarkey had the backing of
the US, many Armenians felt that an outbreak of hostilities between these
two countries would automatically draw these two major powers into such
a conflict. Many secretly welcomed
the prospects of such a war, since they fe&t that their only hope of
liberation from the Communist yoke lay in a major war between the Soviet
Union and the US. this feelingmas shared by a
large majority of the people living in the Armenian SSR.
there was no anti-Turkish feeling engendered at the time',oo~.his war
scare over Syria, despite the fact that historically, the Armenians had
many reasons to dislike the Turks.
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6. In the postwar period between 1947-1948, approxi-
mately 8,000 to 10,000 Armenian nationals were repatriated by the Soviets
to the Armenian SSR from France, Greece,and the US. After being exposed
to adverse living conditions under the Communist regime, the large
majority would have returned to their former places of residence had the
Communist authorities permitted them. When Foreign Minister Pineau of France
visited Armenia in 1956, many former repatriates from France discussed
with him the possibilities of returning to France again.. As an outcome
of these discussions, Pineau promised to take up their request with the
Communist authorities in Moscow. Being hopeful that he would be success-
ful, many former repatriates sold their homes and personal effects in
preparation for their imminent [ontemplate departure from the Soviet
Union. When it was subsequently learned that Pineau's request was
categorically rejected by the Soviets, these Armenians found themselves
in a dilemma. many were apprehensive, fearing that
the Soviet authorities would take some drastic action against them for
desiring to leave Armenia. Others who had sold their houses and other
personal effects were faced with the problem of looking for other living
quarters. When the Communist authorities took no action against these
Armenians, many drifted back to their former status, utterly discouraged
and embittered by the turn of events. Former repatriates from Greece and
the US were not affected by Pineau's visit, having given up all hope of
ever returning to their former places of residence in the West.
7?
there.
were three Armenian churches in Yerevan. Religious services were largely
attended by women and members of the old Armenian generation. Few, if
any, of the younger generation went to church, as a result of Communist
f is to discourage religious practice among the youth.
many Armenian Communists reportedly have their children baptized at
home by the priests, since they fear their standing in the Communist
Party would be seriously affected if they openly brought their children
to church for this purpose. Young priests were trained in a seminary.
which was located in Echmiadzin N 40-10 B 44-18 .
8. Historically, the small Armenian minority, which settled in the Georgian
provinces prior to the Russian Revolution, never got along well with the
Georgians. A feeling of mutual distrust and a strong antagonism gradually
developed over a period of years which marred relations between these two
conflicting national elements. As a consequence, many Armenian families
pulled up stakes after the Revolution and either settled in the nian
SSR, or emigrated to countries in the West. in
1931, the Georgians literally forced many Armenians still living in
their midst to give up their homes and business enterprises. The large
majority of those ejec territory were subsequently
resettled in Armenia. this action only served to
intensify the inherent feelings o te, distrust, and animosity between
the Armenians and Georgians, which persists to this day.
~tiY'I
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Anastas Mikoyan was generally held in high
esteem by memers or the Armenian Communist Party. He was considered
to possess a brillant intellect, the shrewdness of a horse trader,
unrivaled experience in economic administration, and a decided flair
for political maneuver. Some have even speculated that Mikoyan
provided much of the initiative and planning in the drives within the
Communist Party and for this reason, his future tenure among the
ruling members of the Soviet hierarchy was relatively secure. Con-
versely, Mikoyan was generally disliked by the
Armenian peasant and working classes, because he has done so little
to improve their living conditions. Many feel that he was essentially
an opportunist, who has used his talents to further his personal 25X1
aggrandizement, rather than those of his own people.
All efforts on the part of the authorities to curtail and eliminate
speculation in Yerevan have been relatively unsuccessful.
E the Armenians were basically "capitalistiey at heart, s
i rent tendency for profit making was something the Communists would Inver 25X1
be able to change or suppress among their people. Up to October 1957, a
large bazaar was centrally located in Yerevan, where people could buy,
sell, or exchahge merchandise freely without being molested b the
authorities. this
bazaar was sudd ;,y closed by the city government, in view of the large-
scale aDeculations being carried on by certain elements of the population.
speculation had assumed such gigantic proportions that
in essence, it had a capitalistic flavor which was becoming obnoxious to
the authorities in Yerevan. The extent and type of speculation varied,
depending on the supply and demand of specific
consumer goods. The common practice of speculators was to buy up
merchandise, such as sewing machines, radios, cameras, refrigerators,
and other consumers items, available on the local market. Purchases
were usually made by inside contacts with employees working in the state
stores, who were paid off accordingly. These products were then hoarded
by the speculators until such time as they were unavailable in state
stores. Speculators would then proceed to sell these items to prospective
buyers, gaining as much as 50 percent profit on these deals. These
transactions were carried on covertly between individuals, now that the
bazaar had been closed down. Many of the so-called "big timer operators
have grown wealthy by speculation and black-marketing in Yerevan.
there was widespread dissatisfaction among the
population in Yerevan in connection with the lack of suitable housing
construction. In some respects, this had assumed critical proportions
among certain segments of the Armenian population, who, were forced to live
in one room with their families. Although there was a great impetus given
to construction in the early postwar period, this construction was largely
confined to the building of new plants and some apartment houses for
workers and managerial personnel. F'or example, the construction
of a huge cable panufacturing plant, which ennp oye several the ueand
workers in Yerevan. The construction on this plant began about 1954; it was
still being expanded and enlarged Hence,
a great deal of the building materials were being allocated to similar
government construction projects on a priority basis, despite the critical
housing shortage for the working population in Yerevan.
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A. Individuals who attempted to build their own homes were faced with the
problem of securing necessary building materials, such as cement, bricks,
lumber and other supplies, which were usually unobtainable through
normal channels. As a consequence, many were forced to resort to
bribing Soviet construction officials or go to speculators on the black-
market for these materials. The usual blackonarket.procedure was to
contact a construction engineer working on some government construction
project. Once the necessary financial arrangements were effected, the
engineer delivered the required building materials to the individual's
place of residence. This was accomplished by a truck driver from the
engineer's construction project, who loaded up at a government supply
depot and dropped off some of this materiel at the individual's
residence before proceeding to the construction project. This
illegal channel was frequently used by private individuals, and
although the local authorities were aware of such dealings, they
seldom attempted to interfere with such transactions.
many of the administrative officials in Yerevan had built their
own homes in this manner and were therefore prone to sympathize with
those who were forced to resort to illegal channels to secure the
required materials for building their homes.
B. New housing construction in the form of large apartment buildings were
generally assigned as follows: About 20 percent was allocated to the
large contingent of Soviet Air Force personnel and their families
stationed in Yerevan; 15 to 20 percent for workers in various city
plants; and over 50 percent to administrative and managerial personnel,
who belonged to the Communist Party.
11. Work assignments on specified construction projects where carpenters
(plotniki) and bricklayers (kamenshchiki) were needed were delegated by the
local city building directorate which worked closely with the trade union.
Although a master carpenter or master bricklayer usually had workers
assigned to his project by the directorate, he did have some latitude in
accepting or rejecting such workers who did not meet the skill specifi-
cations required to accomplish his own task as supervisor on a given
assignment. A good carpenter or bricklayer was seldom unemployed. Apart
from their regular employment on government projects,, many used their free
time on weekends to earn additional money. some
skilled craftsmen have been known to earn as much as 500 to 1,000 rubles
a month in addition to their regular salaries. Carpenters and bricklayers
were classified by the trade union of the particular locality in which the
employment took place. The approximate wage scales for the workers in
Yerevan was as, follows:
Salary Scales for C nters and Brick ers
(Monthly and approximate)
Category
Carpenters
Bricklayers
rubles)
rubles
7th
1,500(Mester carpenter)
2,000 (Master'; bricklayer)
6th
750 to 800
1,000 to 1,500
5th
600 to 650
800 to 900
4th
500 to 550
500 to 600
3rd
400 to 450
400 to 450
2nd
300 to 350
300 to 350
lst
200 to 250
200 to 250
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were widely listened to by the Armenians who have radios in their possession.
However, these VOA broadcasts were continually jammed by the Soviets,
making many of the programs unintelligible. Similarly, broadcasts
emanating from Turkey were also heavily Jammed by the Soviets. The heaviest
Soviet jamming was concentrated on the large city areas in the Armenian
SSR, with Yerevan serving as a focal point. The heaviest concentration of
Jamming occured on VOA broadcasts at 1930 and 0115 hours. The least amount
of Jamming vds between 01100 and 0700 hours.
VOA broadcasts were relatively free from Soviet
jammniag, and reception was generally good. The program content was
generally favorably received by the Armenians. Many feel that this was
their only channel for receiving accurate information on conditions in the
outside world. Despite Communist efforts to prevent people from listening
to "capitalistic propaganda", as more radios were made
available on the market, more people will listen to foreign broadcasts.
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