SOVIET MILITARY ORGANIZATION AND DOCTRINE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00246A046100150001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 64
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 18, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 19, 1958
• Content Type: REPORT

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INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This material contains Information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the 19tplon?ge Laws. Title
18. U.S.C. Sees. 793 and 794. the transmission or revelation of which In any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
S-E-C-R-E-T
COUNTRY USSR
REPORT
SUBJECT Soviet Military Organization and Doctrine DATE DISTR. 19 December 1958
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NO. PAGES 1
REFERENCES RD
DATE OF
INFO.
PLACE &
DATE ACQ.
m i ary organization and doctrine
report-on various aspects of SnviA+
ncludes.seven charts, depicting
the organization of various military units with brief accompanying
explanatory notes.
STATE lX ARMY EV X NAVY X AIR X FBI
(Note: Washington distribution indicated by "X";
I N FORMATION REPORT I N FORMATION REPORT
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The Soviet Army
The following survey attempts to describe the princi-
on the treatment of this subject
pal elements of Soviet military organization and
doctrine. It is recognized that the presentation
in the form of a report imposes severe limitations
No attempt has been made to compile
a comprehensive study; instead, emphasis has been
placed on those features which are essential for
understanding Soviet military organization and con-
cepts. The greater part of the following informa-
tion refers to the period immediately preceding the
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SHIFT
introduction of nuclear weapons, a step which
resulted in certain changes in organizational
structure, tactics, and operational approach.
Soviet Military Doctrine
1. One of Communism's ideological doctrines is that each war
waged by the Soviet Union is a struggle between social classes
and, by virtue of this characteristic, uncompromising. This
fact explains the reason of one of the main principles of the
Soviet Military Doctrine, which requires that the main objective
of every operation should be the annihilation of enemy manpower.
The occupation of territory is relegated to a place of secondary
importance, being easily achieved after the attainment of the
main objective. For example, this principle is stressed in
the Military Doctrine which states thaVthe chief means of
attaining superiority in the air is the annihilation of the
maximum number of enemy pilots, that is, the manpower serv-
ing the aircraft. The destt.on of enemy aircraft in the
air and on the ground is a secondary objective. This is
probably the reason for the emphasis put by the Soviet mili-
tary leaders on the development of fighter aircraft.
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2. In conformity with the above rule, the offensive is the major
type of warfare. Only by means of an offensive can the enemy
order of battle be destroyed and his forces destroyed. The
primary purpose of the defensive battle is, likewise, the
destruction of a maximum number of the attacker, and secondary
is the destruction of his armament and equipment, thereby
gaining time and changing the ratio of strength. The defensive
battle primarily creates suitable conditions for the defender,
in order to enable him to pass to the offensive or to protect
an offensive from another direction.
3. To be victorious in every battle and expressly the offensive
battle, depends on the correct selection of the direction of
the main effort.1 However, an operational decision at all
levels of command includes an indication of the main effort
as well as of the vital spot in an enemy-defended sector or
position, in other words: those areas containing the major
concentrations of manpower and military supplies. !long the
direction of the main effort, the ratio of strength in an
3:1
attack must not be less than 1 in favor of the attacker
as far as infantry and armor are concerned, and an even
10:1
greater ratio for the artillery (up to).
4. Attack as well as defense require a high degree of continuous
maneuverability and flexibility. The chief objective of
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annihilating the enemy manpower, is attained by the use of
all kinds of maneuvers in order to contain the enemy order
of battle and destroy his military potential. The Soviet
Military Doctrine distinguishes between three types of ma-
neuvers:
a. The frontal attack.
b. The outflanking maneuvers.
co The encirclement.
Outflanking means the attack on a flank of the enemy's dis-
position or in his rear, whereas part of the attacking forces
simultaneously carries out a frontal attack, supporting the
flanking force with their fire. he term "outflanking" is
given to a flanking maneuver, tactically combined with a
frontal maneuver. Encirclement is carried out by attack on
a flank, or, primarily, on the rear of the enemy's disposi-
tions, without fire-support by the force which carries out the
frontal attack. No tactical cooperation exists therefore be-
tween the force maneuvering on the flank and that attacking
the front. The combination of these three maneuvers should
result in the subsequent cutting-off of the enemy formations
and their destruction. This movement does not rank as a separate
maneuver, but rather as a certain execution of an engagement
or an operation, and is generally carried out by a simultaneous
maneuver against the two flanks of an enemy disposition.
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5. Each of the various battle and operational objectives are to
be attained by exact and continuous cooperation between the
different arms and services, as well as between adjoining
units and formations. Distinction is made between tactical
and campaign (operational and strategic) cooperation. Opera-
tional cooperation is the cooperation maintained at the
campaign level as applied to a specific operation executed
at any stage of the campaign. Strategical cooperation means
primarily inter-service cooperation within the framework of
the entire war operation, as well as cooperation between opera-
tional formations, carrying out, simultaneously or consecu-
tively, certain operations in different operational or strategic
directions. Cooperation is always organized to support the
ground forces as a whole on the strategical level and the
infantry on the operational and tactical level.2
6. Each military operation, and particularly an offensive, must
be carried out with strong support by artillery fire and air-
craft, from the beginning of the battle and until its conclusion.
This fire support must be concentrated and fliexible in order
to open a breach for the infantry and armor from the starting
line until the attaihment of the battle objectives. In the
defensive battle, too, the mission of supporting fire, especially
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by artillery is to contain the attack of the enemy. In the
layout of defended localities or positions the antitank fire-
plan is the framework of the entire defensive fire-plan and
the disposition of the antitank units serves as the outline
of the entire defended locality or position. During World
War II the Soviets created the concept of "artillery offensive".
The essence of this term is the continuous transfer of artil-
lery fire from one target to another and the support of the
advance of infantry and armor from the starting line and until
the completion of the mission. The "artillery offensive" is
carried out in three stages:
a. Artillery preparation.
b. Support of assault by infantry and armor.
c. Support for operations inside the enemy perimeter by
laying down a barrage.
7. The offensive battle has the following stages:
as Destruction of the enemy's dispositions which lie in the
path of the attacking force (the breakthrough).
b. The pursuit.
c. The cutting-off and annihilation of the enemy's forces
in the rear of his dispositions.
d. The preparation of suitable conditions for new operations.
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The attack commences from the starting line which is the line
of contact. The terms "assembly area" and "forming-up area"
are applicable only to the armor and the artillery and then
only during the preparatory stages. For the infantry the
forming-up area is at the line of contact and the line of
the forward defenses is actually the starting line. An
assembly area for the infantry is solely designated for units
preparatory to changes in the line.
8. For the offensive battle every unit (up to brigade level) is
allotted from its higher echelon of command a primary task,
(the "near task"),a subsequent task (the "next task"); as well
as the direction of attack after the execution of the latter.
Formations (divisions and corps) are allotted, in addition
to the first and second task, a "mission of the day", namely,
which portion of the enemy's forces is to be annihilated by
the end of the day, which line is to be reached by evening, actions
to be carried out during the night and plans (along general
lines) for the following day. Higher levels (armies and
army-groups) are allotted only the lines to be occupied at
the end of each day of operations.
9. Thus the duties allotted to a brigade-group during an offensive
battle may be the following:
a. First duty: destruction of enemy forces in their bat-
talion-defended localities.
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b. Second duty: occupation of those areas held by the bri-
gade, reserves of the enemy and the deployment areas of
his artillery as well as preparations to attack in any
required direction.
According to Soviet regulations, the completion of the first
duty is allotted to the forces in the advance order of battle
without employing forces of the second echelon or the general
reserve. The second echelon (or the general reserve) will be
committed to the battle after the first duty has been accom-
plished, this being the main force allotted for the carrying
out of the second duty. (The term "reorganization" is unknown
to the Soviets, since it clashes, according to their Military
Doctrine, with their principle of maintaining momentum.)
The introduction into battle of the second echelon must not
delay the attack. Each commander after engaging his second
echelon, must once more set up a new second echelon or a gen-
eral reserve from among the forces employed in the first stage.
10. This unit or formation (mainly from brigade level and above)
will be deployed in depth mainly in two echelons: 2/3 of the
forces in the first echelon and the remainder in the second.
For a brigade this works out in such a manner that two bat-
talions with the major part of the supporting forces will
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constitute the first echelon and one batia1ion practically
without support, the second. The general reserve is allotted
practically the same tasks as the second echelon. In addition
to the second echelon and the general reserve, other kinds of
reserves are organized: antitank artillery reserve, antitank
pioneer reserve and armor reserve.
11. The same plan, approximately, which characterizes the offensive,
applies to the defensive battle. This procedure results in
the great depth specific to the Soviet Order of Battle - one
of the main principles in Soviet Military Doctrine. It must
be emphasized, however, that the depth of the plan does not
signify that the army fights in "relays" (i.e. with a small
part of the total of the assaulting forces); on the contrary,
the rule is that nearly all the supporting arms, even those of
the first echelon, including those of the echelons in the rear
of the disposition up to and including those, of the army-
group, take an active part in the support of the advanced
echelons.
12. It must be stressed that both the great depth of the dispo-
sition and the manner of support by artillery fire accompany-
ing the infantry and armor in the assault must serve to carry
out the application of one of the principles of the Soviet
Military Doctrine at the tactical and operational level,
namely the continuity of movement.
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13. The disposition of troops in the defensive battle is, as
previously stated, characterized by deployment in depth.
A reinforced battalion holds a defended position of up to
2 km., whereby two of its companies are deployed in the first
line, approximately 1.5 km. from the forward positions. A
brigade group is deployed for defense in a position of 4-5
km. width and a depth of approximately !t km. A division de-
fends a position of 10-12 km. width and a depth of approxi-
mately 6 km. Depth of deployment is attained by the position-
ing of a part of the force (generally one third) in the second
echelon. In the case of a brigade the latter prepares a de-
fended position with a depth of 4-5 km., and having the same
layout as the battle defended positions of the first echelon,
that is, consisting of three lines of defense. Each such
position is organized for all-round defense. The second
echelon of the division organizes a defensive position at
a depth of 5-6 km. in the same manner.
14. The division-defended locality includes in its final form
three lines of defended positions at a distance of 1.5-2 km.
from each other, each position consisting of at least three
lines of entrenchments. The second echelons are allotted
the following main tasks:
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a. To be prepared to execute a counter-attack.3
b. To defend the rear positions and to check enemy forces
which may have penetrated into the defended area.
15. A considerable part of the combat doctrine is devoted to
the encounter battle. Such an engagement usually takes place
in the depth of the disposition ( as a result of a counter-
attack by the enemy) or in the depth of the defended area
(as a result of counter-attack by defending forces). An en-
counter battle may also develop as a result of the engagement
of enemy forces dropped from the air. The success of the en-
counter battle goes always to that force which first passes
from the advance formation to the assault formation, that is,
to the force which overtakes its adversary in deployment and
opens fire first.
16. Only recently have the Soviets started to show an interest
in the withdrawal battle. Use of the term "withdrawal" had
until lately been regarded as prejudicial to the morale of
the army. Only since 1956 have there appeared in Soviet
military literature some articles on the 'Withdrawal maneuver".
It may also be noted that until the present no definite views
exist4on this subject. The principles of the "withdrawal
maneuver" are not, however, different to those employed by
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Western forces, except that the Soviets greatly emphasize the
wide activities of the retreating forces, especially of those
covering the withdrawal. This activity consists primarily in
the execution of as many counter-attacks as possible, this
being the most important expression of the defensive activity.
The accepted view is that the main principle of the defensive
battle requires the development of a large measure of initia-
tive, namely, the execution of counter-attacks against an
enemy who has occupied a defended area or part of it.
17. Much space is allotted in Soviet Military Doctrine to battles
fought by forces which are encircled and how to break out of
such encirclements. The reason for this may be found in the
lessons learned by the Soviet army as a result of many en-
counters on the eastern front during the first years of
World War II.
18. Extreme centralization characterizes the control of troops
and especially the staff work. This centralization is ex-
emplified, among other things, by the fact that subordinate;
units (formations) are always told their disposition as well
as the direction of their main effort by superior command
without regard to display of initiative by subordinate com-
manders. Another fact indicative of the above is the trend
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to centralize the artillery in one authority: according to
regulations artillery units are allotted only for "general
support!, and only a small part, mainly antitank guns, are
allotted "under command" for reinforcement of infantry and
armored units, be it directly or for attached support. Be-
sides this, a superior command (task force or division) is
authorized to order artillery on the T/O of infantry units
to execute fire-missions in support of another unit. On
the other hand there exists a definite trend within the Soviet
any of setting-up6ombat teams (on the battalion level) with
a larger degree of independence. It is believed that these
tendencies are the result of projected changes in organiza-
tion relating to the use of nuclear bombs and shells which
will find their expression in the future in a modified
structure of the army in the field.
19. Unit or formation headquarters are always positioned in the
rear, on the lines of the second echelon or the general re-
serve. During combat the unit commander operates from an
observation post situated in a location enabling him to ob-
serve the battle field or at least the direction of the main
effort. Together with the commander are the officers in
charge of operations, intelligence and communications, and
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the observation post of the artillery commander supporting the
unit (formation) is located nearby. Staff work is divided into
the following stages:
a. State of preparedness, according to conditions prevailing
in the theater of operations.
b. Issuance of warning orders.
c. Work of the R. Group:
d. Work of the 0. Group
e. Issuance of written battle orders.
f. Organizing of cooperation.
g. Control and support of subordinate. units.
Soviet regulations require the commander to carry out three
terrain reconnaissances: the first reconnaissance for the
collection of facts which will enable him to arrive at a
decision; the second reconnaissance - the issuance of orders
in the field and the third reconnaissance for the purpose
of organizing the cooperation and the coordination of units
in the field during battle. The latter is the most important
and the most necessary reconnaissance of the three.
20. Orders are divided into battle orders and executive orders.
The first are issued at the tactical level (up to, and includ-
ing, the corps) whereas the second apply to the operational
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level (army and above). Commanders at lower levels of com-
ipand will give verbal orders only. There exists no standing
operating procedure (SOP), its place being taken, according
to Soviet views, by Field Service Regulations. Battle orders
are divided into two main parts: operational battle orders
and "rear" orders, that is, logistics. In addition to orders,
several appendices are published, such as: tables of the
plan of battle (coordination of fire and movement), the organ-
ization of antitank defense, organization of antiaircraft de-
fense, intelligence appendix (table of intelligence procedure),
communications, (communication orders, communications by wire
and radio, signals, and runners).
21. The main part of the battle order is, of course, the first
part designated as "operational part" (OP). It is divided
as follows:
a. The enemy.
b. Mission of unit as formulated by the higher echelon.
c. Missions of adjoining forces and dividing boundaries.
d. Commander's decision (how mission will be carried out,
direction of main effort, general order of battle, and
timing of operation).
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e, f, and g. Definition of missions of subordinate units,
allotment of support and its composition, which part
of it is placed under local command end which part is
allotted to general support.
h. Artillery missions.
i. Organization of the armored reserve and its tasks.
3. Tasks of air force allotted to force carrying out mission.
k. Mobile antitank reserves: location, organization and duty.
1. General duties of engineers troops.
m. Location of headquarters, OP of commander and axis of
leap frogging. Orders relating to supply, maintenance
and evacuation are appended to the second part of the
battle order, that is, the rear order (logistics).
Besides the commanding officer, the battle order is signed
by the chief of staff. The latter is the first deputy of
the commander and is the only offic9:- in the unit (formaticr`
authoriged to issue orders in the name of his commanding of-
ficer.
22. Soviet Military Doctrine emphasizes the fact, that the ulti-
mate success of any operation or battle depends largely on
exact and practiced rear service (logistics) work. This
does not imply, however, that the quartermaster or his duties
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are in any way highly regarded, especially at the lower
echelons of command. It may be noted that defects in the
working of the rear services, especially where the supply
of rations and personal equipment is concerned, are largely
compensated for by the Russian soldiers inherent ability to
fend for himself as well as by his being used to difficult
living conditions.
Functions of Arms and Services
23. The infantry is the foundation of the Soviet Army. This
arm is capable of fighting on every type of terrain, under
any climatic condition, whether it is day or night; it is the
only arm capable of holding ground for an extended length of
time. All other arms support the infantry, and the commander
of an operation is always the infantry commander. He and his
staff plan and determine inter-arms and inter-service coopera-
tion. Whereas the organization of infantry units from the
battalion up to the larger units, includes other arms as well,
it will be found that the infantry units and formations are
composed of combined arms. Consequently, the infantry officer
is also termed "combined arms officer", this fact being one
of the reasons for the high prestige and seniority accorded
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24. For purposes of combat the infantry battalion constitutes the
main tactical unit, the same applies to the infantry division
from the operational point of view. Various types of infantry
are known to exist: mechanized infantry units and formations,
armored infantry, airborne, mountain and marine infantry-6
all infantry units are organized on the principle of three,
i.e., three sections to the platoon, three platoons to the
company, three companies to the battalion. The brigade is
composed of three battalions, and the division of three bri-
gades. From the corps up, this formation is not necessarily
maintained. Thus there are corps comprising two or four
divisions, even though the majority of Soviet corps during
World War II consisted of three divisions. Infantry corps
are normally composed of two mechanized and one armored in-
fantry division.
25. All infantry units have recently been issued with automatic
weapons (submachine guns and self-loading rifles) which enables
an infantry battalion, defending a position of a width of 2 km.
to cover each meter of front with a density of 9-10 rounds per
minute. (During World War II this ratio did not exceed 5-6
rounds.)
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26. The following qualities of the armored force are constantly
being emphasized by the Soviets:
a. Great shock power stemming from the fire or organic
weapons and the thickness of armor.
b. Speedy movement; large mobility.
c. Maneuverability.
These characteristics of armor may be utilized, according
to the doctrine, either by combining the action of tanks
with infantry (for example, when assaulting an eneny-held
position) or by independent action, carried out, for in-
stance, in the depth of the enemy's dispositions. Armored
units are consequently divided in two main groups:
a. Units whose mission is close quarters support to the
infantry.
b. Units intended for independent action.
In the first group belong all armored units on the T/0 of
infantry brigades and divisions as well as armored units
proper, such as tank battalions and brigades, medium and
heavy self-propelled artillery mounts (54) belonging to
general headquarters reserve.
27. Tank units which belong to the second group are organized in
tank and armored divisions, including armored corps and armies.
The main task of these formations is penetration into a breach
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in the enemy's defense positions during the first stages of
the assault and the utilization of the success for a break-
through in depth. These armored formations and combat teams
are called "Fast Task Forces". Tanks detailed for direct
infantry support are generally placed under the command of
the infantry commander for a predetermined time, usually
until the completion of the first ("near") task of the unit
concerned. During battle the methods of support by tanks
nary frequently be changed by the officer commanding with
parts of them being allotted to units of the second echelon,
thrown into battle at the appropriate moment.
28. The standard support given to an infantry battalion during
offensive actions amounts to one medium tank battalion.
Generally the tanks are out in front of the infantry, their
task being to pave the way. The typical assault formation
is as follows: the first wave is composed of medium tanks,
followed at a distance of 400-600 meters by the second wave,
consisting of heavy tanks and tank destroyers. These are
followed immediately, at a distance not exceeding 100 meters,
by the infantry. During the assault of an especially heavily
fortified position, the heavy tanks will move in the first
wave. When attacking a fortified or built-up area, "storm-
teams" are organized, composed mainly of one heavy tank platoon
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(two tanks),7 supported by one assault-gun, one towed anti-
tank gun, one group of riflemen, one group of assault pioneers,
and flamethrowers.
29. It is apparent that the main function of tanks in the assault
lies in the utilization of their shock-power, and not only
their fire-power. The use of tanks as a firing base is very
uncommon. Sometimes, part of the armor is assigned a fire
mission proper but this will only happen during the stage of
artillery-preparation. Tanks operating in the field keep a
distance of 30-50 meters between each other, resulting in a
density of a first wave assault of 20-30 tanks per km. of
front line.
30. In the defensive battle tanks are also used although in
smaller numbers, by infantry units of the first echelon.
Great importance is attached by the Soviets to the presence
of tanks in the defense line of the infantry in order to raise
their fighting spirit. Such tanks are used as stationary
fire positions. They are dug in and alternative positions
are prepared for them. By this method the antitank disposi-
tions are strengthened by the presence of the tanks in the
first echelon. Tank support, characteristic to a battalion
in defense, is composed of one medium tank platoon or assault
guns (2-5 tanks LK.O).
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31. The remainder of the tanks under command of infantry units
or formations holding a defended area are concentrated in an
"armored reserve" which constitute the main force for the
execution of pre-planned counter-attacks, or the reinforce-
ment of the mobile antitank artillery reserve. An armored
reserve will usually plan and prepare ambushes on the possible
avenues of approach of enemy armor. Armor, as in the case with
other arms, is subject to the rule of concentration of the
tank force in the direction of the main effort, which means
that infantry units assaulting in secondary directions may
be left with a very limited degree of armored support, or none
at all.
32. Proceeding from the assumption that continuous fire by tanks,
if unaimed, is more effective than the exact aiming of single
rounds, medium tanks of the T-34 type usually fire on the move
without stopping to aim. The heavy tanks, however, and the
assualt-guns are forced to fire when stationary because of
the technical limitations of their construction.
33? Fire power constitutes one of the basic elements in warfare-8
As the chief dispenser of fire, artillery is the most important
among the supporting arms. Armor and infantry are unable, ac-
cording to Soviet doctrine, to carry out their tasks without
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previously destroying or at least neutralizing, enemy weapons
and personnel. Indeed during the entire course of the fighting,
artillery is the main arm continuously laying down fire on the
enemy and his positions.
34. Since its inception the Russian artillery has enjoyed a tradi-
tion of technical excellence. Its basic equipment is organized
as follows:
Be 76 mm. field gun adapted for indirect fire as well as for
direct laying*
b. 122 mm. howitzer.
Co Mortars of the following caliber: 82 mm., 120 mm., and
132 mm., ("Katyusha").
Recently 85 mm. and 100 mm. guns have been put into service
in great numbers, mainly as antitank guns. In addition
to the above there are 57 mm. guns in the battalion antitank
platoon. Artillery on the T/0 of units and formations up to
army level, constitute approximately 50 percent of the entire
Soviet artillery strength. The other 50 percent, organized
into artillery - including mortar - battalions, regiments,
brigades and divisions, constitute the artillery reserve of
general headquarters. Those artillery units are placed
"under command" of infantry and tank formations for the execu-
tion of combat assignments and other missions. In accordance
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with the principle of the concentration of force in the direc-
tion of the main effort it is evident that units and formations
instrumental in carrying out the latter are supported by a
greater concentration of artillery than those allotted secondary
missions.
35. From the organic artillery and units of the general headquarters
reserve, regimental and divisional artillery teams, as well as
corps and army teams are organized during combat. The chief
fire power of these teams is allotted to the support of units
operating in the direction of the main effort. The artillery
fire plan is planned at a high level- chiefly at army level,
and distributed to all army units together with the appropriate
code for requesting all types of artillery fire. Commanders
of lower echelons are, however, allowed a fire reserve to be
employed according- to their on plans in case of necessity.
The greatest concentration of fire operations planning and
control exists during the initial stages of the battle. During
the later stages a considerable amount of dispersion is pre-
valent and commanders of units and formations revert to nearly
complete control of both the organic and supporting artillery
units.
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are
36. The main types of artillery fire/as follows:
a. Area fire: The Soviets maintain that in order to destory
or neutralize dug-in enemy personnel or weapons, an area
fire of 20 minutes duration will be required. The fire
of a battery of 122 mm. howitzers serves as the main basis
for calculations (12 barrels whose beaten area covers ap-
proximately 200 by 300 meters).
b. SOS fire: This is a linear fire concentration laid
down directly (100-200 m.) in front of positions or
entrenchments occupied by Soviet infantry or armor.
The calculation basis is the 122 mm. battery (four
guns) capable of laying down such fire over a width
of 100 meters. SOS fire is generally planned for a
battery and the length of the linear concentration is
300 meters.
c. Point concentration: For the destruction of specific
targets, such as: tanks, pill boxes, etc. This task
is carried out by guns fired point-blank. Great im-
portance is attached to this type of fire and even
during the preparatory stages allowance is made for
a certain period of firing for the destruction of
enemy weapons by direct laying. Such fire is also
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applied during an assault and after a breakthrough by
guns operating in conjunction with infantry and armor9
for the destruction of point targets at point-blank
range. It is self-evident that these guns play a vital
part in antitank defense.
37. The fire plan in the offensive battle operates in the follow-
ing manner: EveVthing included within the activities of the
artillery during an offensive battle is termed "artillery
offensive" and divided into three stages:
a. Artillery preparation.
b. Supporting the assault of infantry and armor.
c. Supporting the fighting in the rear of the enemy's
positions.
The duration of the artillery preparation depends on the
amount of available guns and ammunition, the deployment of the
enemy and the strength of his defenses. As previously mentioned,
the destruction of entrenched enemy forces requires an area
fire of 20 minutes' duration by artillery. This fire is
planned to cover all enemy entrenchments, observation posts,
artillery positions, and headquarters. Taking into consid-
eration the deployment of Western forces of 200-220 guns per
km. of assault front (in the direction of the main effort)
will require an artillery preparation of approximately 60-90
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minutes' duration. This density of concentration is attained
by the participation during the artillery preparation of every
gun and mortar arrayed in depth of all echelons, up to army-
group level.
38. The artillery preparation commences and terminates generally
with a volley of rocket launchers; these volleys also.%rve as
conventional signs (the first for the start of the preparation,
the second for its termination). The end of the artillery pre-
paration also introduces the second stage of artillery offensive,
as well as "H" hour (the time of the infantry and armor assault
on the front lines of the enemy's defenses). Depending on the
availability at this stage of sufficient guns and ammunition,
the artillery fire usually is planned in the form of a moving
barrage ("leapfrogging"). This fire ("mopping-up fire") pre-
cedes the assaulting infantry and armored columns by 100-200
meters, and is planned as a linear barrage along the frontal
sector, where those forces which are carrying out the main
task are engaged. It advances in bounds of 100-meter intervals.
Differentiation is made between main lines and intermediate
lines, depending on the enemy's deployment and fortifications.
The following system applies: The first line is generally
identical with the second line of the defense positions and
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constitutes the main line of fire. On this line a barrage
of 7-10 minutes' duration is laid down and after the giving
of a conventional sign the fire is automatically advanced
from an intermediate to a preplanned line in the rear of the
former (2-3 minutes fire on the intermediate line). On the
arrival of the barrage at a new main line, the fire is con-
centrated on the latter for another 7-10 minutes. If it is
necessary, fire is reverted to the main lines by a conventional
sign. The depth of the leap-frogging barrage is generally
identical with the depth of the first objective (the first
task) of the assaulting division, i.e., the occupation of the
deployment area of the enemy artillery, computed at a depth
of 3 km. approximately. On an area where a leap-frogging
barrage is not laid down, preplanned fire concentrations and
bursts are directed. During the third state of the'h.rtil-
lery offensive" only fire bursts are employed, including fire
concentrations, and in case of necessity, SOS fire, applied
in this case to stop any possible counter-attack.
39. The main tasks of the corps and army-group artillery consists
in counter-battery fire and long-range shelling, laid down
on the depth of the enemy dispositions, on the possible lines
of approach of his reserves. The standard artillery
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support accorded an infantry battalion in battle consists of
a battery of field artillery (12 guns), a heavy mortar battery,
an antitank battery, in addition to the organic antitank guns
of the battalion. In addition to the above, brigade and division
artillery teams are employed in the direction of the battalion
attack. The brigade is supported by 3-5 artillery batteries,
2-3 of them directly supporting infantry battalions and the
remainder for execution of the brigade objective.
40. The following fire tasks are planned for the defensive battle:
a. Long range fire on the enemy's approaches and his assembly
area,
b. Fire concentrations (defensive fire), on the enemy's
forming-up areas, as well as on selected area targets
within the defended sector.
co SOS fire, in front of the positions and inside the de-
fense perimeter.
d. Point-blank fire on all guns inside the defense perimeter,
constituting, as already stated, the outline of the anti-
tank fire plan as well as the basis for the entire defense
fire plan.
e. Retreating barrage, employed similarly to that in the
offensive but in a different direction, in order to con-
tain attacks by enemy armor, or at least to separate the
infantry from their tank support in the assault.
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f. Fire bursts and concentrations for supporting'preplanned
counter-attacks.
L?. The number of artillery units employed in supporting the de-
fensive battle normally average one quarter of the number
mentioned as required for the offensive, that is, the infantry
battalion is as a rule directly supported by one battery of
field artillery and one battery of antitank guns. The density
of artillery in defense amounts to 40-50 guns to one km. of
front line at tactical depth (depth of deployment of a corps
in defense).
L2. The antitank artillery is allotted the main tasks for all
types of fighting in the antitank disposition. Part of the
antitank guns are positioned in the front line echelons and
the remainder is organized into mobile antitank artillery
reserves. The following formula is employed for calculating
the requirements of antitank guns: The amount of estimated
enemy armor divided by three (the Soviets claim that one anti-
tank gun is capable of destroying or disabling three enemy
tanks). The tasks of the mobile antitank reserves, organized
both in defensive and offensive operations, include the strength-
ening of density of the required antitank artillery in those
frontal sectors where the main direction of effort of enemy
armor has been detected. The main tasks of the antitank
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reserves in the offensive are the stopping of enemy armored
counter-attacks. The strength of these reserves is on the
average: one battery to an infantry brigade, one battery (12
guns) to the division, one regiment (24 guns) to the corps
and one brigade to the army.
43. The importance of the antitank reserve in the defense may be
demonstrated by the lessons of such operations by the Red Army
in the Kursk region during July 1943. Against the main effort
of the Germans, attacking with armored support at a density of
100 tanks per km. of frontal sector, the Soviets established
at the tactical depth of their defensive front an antitank
concentration of about 18 guns per km. of front line. However,
as early as the end of the first day of this operation, the
Soviet antitank concentrations, by activating the antitank
reserves of the operational echelons and by switching anti-
tank reserves from the passive sectors of the front line,
attained a density of 81 guns per kilometer of front line.
This successful operation brought about the containment of
the German offensive and the destruction of the major part
of its attacking armor.
44. The standard composition of the antiaircraft artillery division
anti
consists of two light/aircraft brigades (37 mm.) and one medium
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antiaircraft brigade (85 mm.) or alternatively, of two light
and two heavy brigades. Antiaircraft artillery units are
already found at the brigade level, but because of their
limited capabilities their main task is the defense of the
headquarters area. The main tasks of antiaircraft defense
are carried out by antiaircraft artillery divisions on the
T/0 of armies and army-groups. The actions of these divisions
are planned at high level, their mission being the antiair-
craft defense of forces operating in the direction of the main
effort, with priority given to the artillery deployment areas.
45. Engineer units are found at the brigade level, (platoon or
company) and at the divisional level (a battalion consisting
of 3-IL companies). At army level there is a field engineers
brigade of 14-6 battalions. The main tasks of the engineers
are:
a. Mining and demolition.
b. Engineering support to infantry, armor and artillery for
the crossing of rivers.
co Breaching of enemy obstacles (minefields).
46. One of the special tasks of the engineers is the combat1ng
of enemy armor. For this purpose mobile engineers reserves
are organized at all levels, commencing from the brigade,
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which are allotted transport and whose tasks in the defense
include the mining of enemy armor approach lines if the latter
have penetrated the depth of the defense positions. In the
offensive, engineer reserves operate against armor carrying
out counter-attacks. The tasks of these 'eserves are, of
course, carried out in close liaison with the mobile anti-
tank artillery reserves and all other forces engaged in com-
bating enemy armor.
17. The density of mines in Soviet laid minefields is remarkable,
amounting to a rate of 1,000 to 3,000 antitank and antiper-
sonnel mines per km. of front line (at the tactical level) 10
The breaching of enemy minefields during the offensive is
the task of groups of engineers (one group to each lane of
clearing), carried out during the night preceding "H" hour -
one lane of a width of six meters to each infantry platoon
in the first wave. For tanks these lanes are widened to 10
meters. During the assault proper, teams of engineers whose
tasks are the breaching of enemy fortifications, are attached
to infantry and armored units.
48. In all infantry and armored units from the brigade level up-
wards there are chemical warfare units whose duties are:
a. The organization of antigas defensell
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b. The organization of antinuclear defense.
co The organization and operation of smoke screening.
d. The organization and operation of flame throwing devices.
49. Antigas defense includes the following activities: intelli-
gence, observation, combating the enemy's gas launching
facilities and countering the results of enemy gas attacks.
The same applies to nuclear defense activities.
50. The operation of smoke screens is planned by chemical warfare
officers, in addition to smoke laying activities carried out
by the infantry, armor, mortars and aircraft. Devices for
the laying of smoke screens include hand grenades, smoke
candles, smoke bombs and shells, special installations in
aircraft and ground installations called "fumators" (on the
organization of chemical warfare units allotted to armies
and above). During World War II, temporary improvised means
were utilized by the Soviets, such as the burning of trees,
undergrowth, etc. The use of colored smoke is not developed.
51. Flame thrower units are set up at army level and above. They
are equipped with two main types of flame throwers:
a. Light flame throwers, used as one of the means of combatting
fortified positions.
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b. Heavy flame throwers - one of the means employed against
enemy armor.
The fuel for the light flame throwers is pack-carried by
soldiers. The heavy flame throwers are barrels containing
inflammable liquid dug into the ground and operated during
attacks by enemy armor. The effective range of a heavy flame
thrower is up to 100 meters.
52. Aircraft used by the Soviet army consists of the following
types:
a. Fighter aircraft.
b. Assault aircraft.
c. Light bombers*
d. Heavy bombers.
e. Reconnaissance aircraft.
f. Transport aircraft.
g. Medical aircraft.
Aircraft are organized into regiments, brigades, divisions,
and corps, according to type. The highest formation is the
air-army, composed of variable number of units and formations
of aircraft of different types. The average number of aircraft
in the air-division is about 100 planes. In every amy-group there
is one air-army (occasionally there are two).
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53. As already noted, permanent inter-arms and inter-service co-
operation is one of the principles of Soviet military doctrine.
Their assault aircraft ("Sturmovik") is a typical example for
this tendency. The main task of the assault aircraft is the
support of ground forces, primarily during attack. The assault
aircraft was created at the beginning of World War II, primarily
for destroying the large number of tanks employed by the Germans.
This is an armored, twin-seater piston-engined aircraft with
an operational speed of about 350 kph. It is armed with two
20 mm. or 37 mm. cannon, three medium machine guns of 14.5
mm. caliber, 8-10 rockets and space for about 200 antitank
bombs1'2 with a weight of approximately 2 kg. each, or alter-
natively HE or other bombs, Te!ith a weight totalling 300 kg.
54. During World War II assault aircraft of several makes were
utilized (IL-2, IL-9, IL-10 and IL-10P) as support aircraft
in conjunction with infantry and armor and this type of air-
craft has lasted until the present. In view of the relatively
low speed of the assault aircraft its main task is tactical
support.
55. During the offensive assault aircraft operate on the average
in teams of ten, flying in front of the infantry and armor
attacking on the ground, at a safety range of 500 meters in
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advance of the troops. The turning radius of any one group
of aircraft is about 2 km. thus enabling each group to support
one infantry division on an average sector of 2 km. width.
Each group of assault aircraft is capable of tactically sup-
porting ground forces for a period of 20 minutes, after which
it is relieved by another group. The task of these groups
is the destruction or neutralization of enemy weapons impeding
the advance of the ground forces. A group of these aircraft
is eapable of strafing with their armor-piercing shells the
forming-up area of a tank battalion, thereby delaying the
timing of operations by 2-3 hours.
56. Ground-air coordination is carried out by the attachment of
air force liason officers to the infantry divisions of the
first echelon or to the armored units and formations operating
in the depth of the enemy dispositions. By means of their
radio transmitters, these liaison officers are capable of:
a. Establishing contact with airfields in order to launch
the aircraft.
b. Establishing contact with aircraft aloft directing them
to ground targets*
c. Contacting their superior air force headquarters.
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The air liaison officer's position is close to that of the
supported infantry or armored formation commander and he also
serves as the commander's technical adviser.
57. The planning of air force operations is concentrated at the
highest command levels, at armies and even army-groups. The
entire complex of aerial operations during the offensive is
termed "aerial offensive" and consists of three main stages:
a. Stage of primary aerial preparations - to secure local
control or, at least, superiority in the air. This stage
operates for some days prior to "D" day.
b. Stage of direct aerial preparations - carried out con-
currently with the artillery preparation. This stage
is mainly marked by the activity of bomber aircraft,
whose task is the neutralization of hostile artillery
positions and the main points of enemy resistance.
(Safety margin - 1,000 meters from the line of contact.)
c. Stage of support of infantry and armor, carried out by
assault aircraft, as described above.
All these operations are, of course, supported by jet-propelled
fighter planes.
58. Although the Red Army was the first to possess a paratroop
unit and to carry out investigations concerning their
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utilization, the Soviet paratroopers lack battle experience.
During World War II paratroopers were only employed sporadically
in small units for intelligence and harassing purposes. This
may be explained by the fact, that duties normally assigned to
paratroopers were carried out by the numerous bands of parti-
sans operating in the rear of the Germans. Only at the time
of the Manchurian operation during August 1911513 were paratroop
units employed, mainly of battalion strength, primarily in
order to occupy vital points abandoned without fight by the
retreating or surrendering Japanese troops. At the present
time, paratroopers are organized in divisions of three bri-
gades with the main task of occupying vital points at the op-
erational depth of the enemy dispositions and holding these
points until relieved by troops attacking frontally.
The Navy
59. The Soviet navy lacks substantial experience in naval opera-
tions proper. Its main task is the defense of coastal com-
munications and this cooperation expresses itself in landing
operations and fire support by warships.
60. During World War II a part of considerable importance was
played by the river flotillas. Their tasks consisted in:
a. Supporting with their fire assaults carried out along
the river course.
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b. The transporting of combat teams ordered to execute
landings in the rear of the enemy's positions.
c. Logistic transportation.
d. Ferrying troops from one river bank to another (support-
ing river crossings).
61. Services of the rear is a term given to those echelons employed
in all types of logistic work. Following are the main features
of Soviet logistic organization.
a. The brigade is the smallest logistic accounting unit.
b. The maintenance echelons are: the supreme command, the
army-group, the army, the division and the brigade (the
corps does not constitute a logistic maintenance unit).
co At these levels there operates an assistant commander of
rear services. This officer is not subordinate to the
unit (formation) chief of staff but solely coordinates
his activities with the latter.
d. Logistic operations in the battalion are the responsibility
of the officer in charge of the quartermaster (services)
platoon.
e. At all levels of command the issuance of quartermaster
supplies from the higher to the lower level is mandatory.
The same principle applies to maintenance. With regard
to evacuation, the principle is the reverse from the
lower level to the higher one applies.
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f. The problem of operational movements is dealt with at
unit (formation) headquarters by the "G" Branch, whereas
logistic movements are the responsibility of the unit
(formation) second in command in charge of rear services.
g. A't army level and above a military transportation depart-
ment exists at formation headquarters, charged with the
planning of all kinds of movements by rail.
h. The maintenance, construction and repairing of roads
are dealt with by the rear services. At levels from
the army and above, there exists on the staff of the
second in command in charge of rear services, a road
department, under whose command are two or three engi-
neer battalions, specialized in road construction and
bridging.
i. The ordnance service is subordinate to the artillery
commander of the formation. The formation ordnance
officer solely coordinates his operations t,,ith the
staff of the second in command of the formation in
charge of rear services. (The organization of ammuni-
tion transport and the preparation of ammunition dumps.)
J. The medical service is subordinate to the second in
command in charge of rear services.
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Trends of Military Doctrine and Existing Organization
62. Soviet military thinking is at present influenced by the
changes introduced in the armies of the Western powers.
Until 1951 the official Soviet position regarding the use
of nuclear arms was based on the assumption that the enemy
would employ nuclear weapons, whereas the forces of the
Eastern Bloc countries would not use the newuvapons. At
the time emphasis was laid on the defensive battle in general
and. on antinuclear defense in particular. With the necessity
of the dispersion of troops in nuclear warfare, changes were
introduced in the traditional disposition of Soviet defense.
Sector boundaries of formations were enlarged by about 50
percent in length and depth. In addition, the depth of de-
fended areas, allotted to higher echelon, was considerably
increased. If, for example, the second defended area of the
infantry corps was located at a distance of 10-15 kms. from
the line of advance positions, this distance has at present
been increased to 25 km.
63. The existence of nuclear weapons has forced the Soviets to
devote more attention to the subject of fortifications.
Digging-in, fortifications and other kinds of field works
are now given a larger scope than during World War II. It
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was stressed that a much larger amount of attention must be
given to the mechanization of digging-in operations.
6b. Soviet military doctrine maintains that one means of protec-
tion against nuclear weapons consists in maintaining permanent
and close contact with the enemy in the front line, thus im-
peding the latter's use of nuclear weapons. In about 1952
changes were also introduced into the chapters of the military
doctrine dealing with the offensive and any other form of
battle. n the Soviet' army's search for new methods the
following changes, applicable to the present time, were made:
a. The importance of the maneuver has been increased, as
veil as the importance of adaptability and mobility,
together with the emphasis put on the necessity of
displaying initiative by every commander irrespective
of rank.
b. The employment in the offensive of nuclear weapons de-
creases the need for artillery fire. The density of
artillery in the offensive has consequently been reduced
to 100-120 guns per km. of frontal sector.
c. The need for speedy action has made imperative the em-
ployment of armored formations already in the first
echelon and during the first stage of an operation.
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The general number of armored units and formations has
been increased accordingly and armored units were intro-
duced in infantry formations.
d. The need has been admitted for a dispersal of forces on
the battlefield and in the theater of operations. The
necessity of decreasing the echelons of command is now
being contemplated by the Soviets. Proposals were made
for the elimination of the battalion level, or the bri-
gade level as well as the corps level. Part of these
proposals are already being carried out in various units
and formations at the experimental stage. In rdcition,
it has beer suggested to organize combat teams on the
Western pattern (without admitting this fact) and to in-
crease the number of units under the command of any one
headquarters (a transition from the key figure three to
that of four and five in unit organizations).
e. At the present time the Soviets emphasize even more the
increase in the speed of operations and the need for
surprise action as well as the need for shortening the
preparatory stages before battle. New command methods
are being taught accordi4y, and stress is put on the
brevity of orders, improvements in communications and
the weeding-out of staff personnel.
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-45-
f. More attention than previously is now being paid by the
Soviets to the subject of night operations, the crossing
of rivers during the advance and the encounter battle.
65. All these changes are at the present in the research str-.ge.
It is believed therefore for the assumption that forces or-
ganized and instructed according to Soviet military doctrine
will, under conditions termed at present "limited warfare",
operate as described in this report.
66. Attached for your information and action are the following
diagrams:
a. Principal Elements of the Supreme Command (Diagram L).
b. Principal Elements of the Army-group, Army and Infantry
Corps (Diagram M).
c. Principal Elerri nts of the Infantry Division (Diagram N).
d. Principal Elements of the Armored Division and the Tank
Division Combat Units (Diagrams 0 and S).
e. Principal Elements of the Infantry Brigade (Diagram P).
f. Principal Elements of the Infantry Battalion (Diagram Q).
Please return the attachments to CI/SPD upon completion of
your action.
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-li6-
1. Warfare is not determined by objectives, but rather by direc-
tions and lines of terrain. The objectives are always certain
reservoirs of enemy manpower.
2. As "tactical cooperation" may also be designated the action
of a single arm, or part of the campaign forces directly in-
fluencing the actions of another arm or unit. (For example,
the laying down of artillery fire on an objective impeding
the assault of infantr-Ar armor.) "Operational cooperation"
may also include a situation wherein the action of one arm
or parts of an operational force indirectly influence the
actions of another part (such as, the dropping of paratroops
in the deep rear of the enemy or an aerial bombardment of
supply bases in the depth of the enemy's dispositions thus
impeding the logistic potential of the enemy organization as
a whole.
3. Each counter-attack must be authorized by higher command. The
reason for this rule lies in the doubts of the higher echelon
as to whether sufficient forces will be left in the depth of
the defended locality in order to ensure its defense (battalion
or brigade position). There exists even a tendency at all
levels up to, and including, the division, to avoid carrying
25X1
25X1
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-147-
out a counter-attack and to employ for this purpose the re-
serve or the second echelon of the corps or army. Neverthe-
less, commanders at all levels, from the section upward, are
instructed that in the event of the breach of any defensive
positions a counter-attack is imperative in order to rout
the enemy forces which have penetrated and to restore the
former defensive line.
!i. Thoseterms are not used by the Soviets. The literal trans-
lation would be: "Reconnaissance Group" - " procedure fol-
lowed by the commander and his staff prior to the decision",
and the translation of "Orders Group" - "issuing of the de-
cision by the commander."
5. According to Soviet regulations, all officers belonging to
arms other than infantry are required to salute an infantry
officer of equal rank first.
6. The Soviet army plans to mechanize the entire infantry but
this process is as yet incomplete.
7. A medium tank platoon consists of five tanks, whereas a heavy
tank platoon has only two tanks.
8. During World War II the artillery was termed by Stalin "The
God of Battle".
9. A 76 mm. towed field gun is used in assaults in conjunction
with infantry, operating openly at point-blank range.
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u I
10. In a defense layout several minefields are to be found one
behind the other.
11. Soviet regulations do not mention the fact that chemical units
may also, when required, carry out poison gas attacks.
12. An aerial bomb with fins and percussion fuze.
13. The Soviet army marched into Manchuria at the end of World
War II at the time of the Japanese surrender.
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Explanation of Diagram L
1. The Military Council is an advisory body to the Minister of
Defense. Its members are the Minister of Defense, his deputies
headed by the chief of the general staff, the head of the per-
sonnel department and the representative of the Central Committee
of the Communist Party.
2. Matters concerning military instruction are not controlled by
one person. At the beginning of each school year a military
training order is issued by the Minister of Defense regarding
the policies to be followed which serves as a guide for the
training authorities in making specific schedules. The yearly
training plan is compiled by the operations branch. In addi-
tion to this, the latter organizes formation exercises from
the corps level upward, as well as map exercises for the
headquarters of commands and the Supreme Command. The military
training program for all arms and services of the army is
compiled and planned by the staffs concerned.
3. The ordnance branch is subordinate to the chief inspector of
artillery and charged with the supply and maintenance of
weapons and ammunition for all arms and services.
4. The intelligence branch engages in espionage and in field
intelligence training. Matters pertaining to counterespionage
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are concentrated in the counterespionage service, whose of-
ficial representatives operate at all levels down to battalions.
Besides this, a special branch in the Ministry of the Interior
(MVD) is concerned with espionage.
5. The head of the signals branch serves also as the commander
of the signal corps.
6. The transportation branch (railroad) is charged with military
movements by rail and with the operation of a transportation
network for military needs. Representatives of this branch
operate at the headquarters of all armies and army-groups as
well as at the major railroad stations.
7. In wartime the chief task of the Historical Branch consists
in studying the lessons of the war and their publication.
Within the framework of this branch there is a publications
section which edits and publishes all military regulations.
8. The roads section plans the operation and maintenance of roads
for military purposes.
9. The organizations branch is primarily concerned with the pre-
paration and arrangement of the T/0 and equipment in peace and
war.
10. The manpower potential branch deals exclusively with the affairs
of the enlisted personnel (officer affairs being handled by
the staff/branch "personnel branch"). It publishes orders
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for the call-up of recruits and the discharge of soldiers
after completion of their compulsory service.
11. The mobilization branch is in charge of mobilization war plans.
12. The technical potential branch plans the mobilization of the
national technical resources and the preparation of civilian
industry for war.
13. The topographical branch executes topographical surveys of
the country for military purposes and publishes all types of
military maps.
14. The Deputy Minister of Defense for political affairs is under
the Minister of Defense, as iyell as the Central Committee of
the Party. The commander is the chief of the entire political
officer personnel, distributed throughout the command echelons
down to companies (sometimes even platoons). The political
staff is charged with the dissemination of propaganda, the
maintenance of morale and with the organization and supervision
of Communist Party and Komsomol cells in the army.
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Explanation of Diagram M
1. The framework of army-groups. The organization of the army
and the corps does not conform to a fixed pattern and is liable
to variations according to strategical and operational exigencies.
The T/0 of headquarters and equipment are, however, determined
in advance.
2. From time to time armies are set up which are not subordinate
to any army-group headquarters, but to the Supreme Command.
This instance may occur in the event of independent operation
by an army as a result of limited operational space in its
sector. (As, for instance, the independent army "Primorskaya",
which operated during 19)41 on the Black Sea coast).
3. A corps is not allotted units or rear installations and its
logistics are maintained by channels leading from army rear
to division rear. A corps headquarters deals solely with
operational matters; the rear services of formations under
the command of corps are only supervised by the latter.
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N k7E" +,*.. is
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Explanation of Diagram N
1. The chief of staff is the first deputy of the commander and
the only one authorized to issue any orders whatever in the
latter's name.
2. The operations branch is also charged with training.
3. The manpower branch deals with matters pertaining both to
officers and enlisted men.
l,.. The administrative department serves the headquarters in
all kinds of maintenance matters.
All special staff officers of a command (intelligence, communi-
cations, engineers, chemical, artillery, and medical) are co-
ordination officers as well as being in charge of the units
of various arms. In addition to this, any such unit has its
own commanding officer, the exception to this being the of-
ficer commanding the divisional tank unit, who is a specialist
as well as a coordination officer.
the
6. The staff of/artillery commander conducts the divisional sup-
port center. To him are subordinate all artillery units allotted
to the division for combat. Artillery headquarters comprises
the following departments: operations, intelligence and com-
munications.
The veterinary officer iszesponsible for the inspection of
meat in the mess halls.
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-54-
Explanation of Diagrams 0 and S
1. Armored and armored infantry divisions are intended to serve
as fast combat teams, operating either independently or within
the framework of corps and armored armies.
2. The main difference bet1teen the two formations consists in
the proportion between the number of tank units and the num-
ber of armored infantry units.
3. Thereare transport battalions in all armored infantry brigades,
transporting the entire unit, their weapons and supplies. A
characteristic vehicle is the BTR-152, which is an armored
personnel carrier.
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Explanation of Diagram P
The organization of the infantry brigade (regiment) resembles the
division in its main features. There is also a resemblance in the
functions of the staff officers, the exception being the brigade
artillery officer, who does not organize the brigade support center
and during battle solely deals with those artillery units set up
for point-blank firing. The brigade support center is operated by
the commander of the brigade artillery team and his staff, who are
also the commander and staff of the main artillery unit (formation)
in this team.
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031
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Explanation of Diagram Q
1. Only two types of machine guns exist in the Soviet infantry:
the light machine gun (RKM) as the sectional machine gun and the
heavy machine gun, 7.89 mm. tripod-mounted, serving as company
and battalion machine gun. The 12.7 mm. and 14.5 mm, are termed
"super-heavy machine guns".
2. There is no weapons section in the platoon. There exists the
tendency to ballance the fire power of the section by two
light machine guns, but there exists also the opposite trend,
to reduce the number of soldiers in the section.
3. The transportation section is intended to transport one quarter
of the battalion ammunition supply. The supply section operates
the battalion mess hall and carries two supplies of battalion
rations.
4. The term "first line transport" is not known in the Soviet
army.
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 DIAGRAM
Principal Elements of the Supreme
Command
~rirae
Deputy Minist-
er of Defense
Comm. Air
Force
Deputy Minist-
er of Defense
Comm. :Naval
forces
Chief Arti
Inspector
Coinrr~nds ~~1 lta
Districts)
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a. Moscoa
u. Leningrad
c. Baltic
d. Bicelorussian
e. Kiev
perations
ranch.
Intelligence
Srancr
~ommunica~
Lions Braneh
Minis tei
Manpo~aer
(Potential
branch
Array Groups ---I
(!Fronts_ in warti
-------------.----- J
f. Naval (Black and Caspian Sea)
g. Far East
z. Occupation Troops
in Eastern Germany.
Deputy Minister of
Defense, Director of
Supply Branch
:De~artm4 eat of
Planning and
Or,~an~,~~tlon ~
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i
Central Committee o'
the Cor~ru~ist Party
 DIAGRAM
Reconnai
sauce
om apany
iJnal
Battal
ion
Ilai oon
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?ice-ipal Elements of the Infantry
Di vi s i on
Ad.juant
Persona
Ordnance,
rms, am-
ilunition
and repairs
section
oPerations
L
eputy Commander for
oliticai A~Fairs
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1~~ledica
Battaliofl
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DIAGRAM 'P'
SECRET
Principal Elements of tine In
Personal Brigade
adjutant __ Cormnander
3econn-'
lssan-'
ce Sec
lion
'l;;naI`i
"orlpany
,~~"~rief/of :Staff
Operation
officer,
rite~~? ~;~:nr
e Officer
orrimuni ca
ions Off-
icer
'adjutant
Sece-
rity and
Codes
Officer
Artillery
Officer
n~ineer,5 chemical 'jar- .putt' Cord
Officer J . fare Officer pander fore
Political
affairs
nti-t'ank
Battery
rnr,1
~feavy mor-
~ry 120 rnrc
raft
attery
Po1itica_
Section
Depaty Comtriander
rear service.
1ezerina-
rian
i Cheuica
y darfare
nineerplatoon
Jpla;oon w-
'- Supply of eapons, arnnunition, enineerin
l pproxir ately
2000 rnen
30 tanks and SP.uns
13 anti-tank t pia suns
0 120 ram mortars
27 32 mm mortar.
stores and fue1,6
Trarlsporta
lion }
1'ankv~a`t%aion
Co r~lediun tanks
and SU
iIodica~
orpany
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8EUrE-11
Principal Elements of tiie Army Group,
Army and Infantry Corps.
Army Group
(Front)
Units
and
forma-
tions
of
otter
arms
~Ir
reties
Uineers
nits and
Formations
I
Units and
formations
of other
army
Fnits of n -air-
ther arms craft ar-
tillery
ivision
r ery
nits and
formations
rngineers for-
ations and
units
nti- an
rtillery
rizade
Independent Armies of
rrnd red t..e Land
ormations r'orces.
Artillery
formations
and units
)2 mm
rtillery
riade
rmored
formations
end units
rm reo
ivisions
nfan ry
ivisions
There are 'O rear services ;vithin the corps.
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SECtitl
DIAGRAM +' 0't
Principal Elements of the
Armored Vivision.
(combat units only)
Headquarters
Communications
attalion
Multi-barrelle
Rocket launcherttalion
upport
n 10
tanks
i
gineers
oattalio 20 mm
Arta ery
brigade
36 ao,ait-
zers 122
min
par brigade
Heavy tank
rigade, E5
tanks and
20 JSU
Total: 15,000 men, 235 tanks and SP guns.
Me di um tan
brigade
55 tanks
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DIAGRAM rrBrr
Principal Elements of the
Infantry Battalion
(Approx. 0-00 men)
Communica-
tion Pla-
toon.
20 men
Medical
Platoo
Transport
Section
Adjutant
Commanding
Officer
dm n / T Gun
Platoo1 latoon
:x57 in,
20 men
Supply
Section
puty Comm.
Political Counter es-
- - - - - - - - - 1pionat;e
officer
ediuln MG
oy 12 P11
9mm (35
men
--
Rifle Coy.
(125 men)
3 g mm mortar
Icoy 1( 9 Mb1?ta rs
imn ~9 men)
nti Tank Medium Rifle
Rocket laun MG Pln men
cla. Pla. (3 (2 MNIGs
projectors)
Rifle Section
Rifle Rifle Rifle Runner Scout No.2 A, T ire- No.2 2Section
man roan man Sniper nade lau. leader
ncher
* Likely to be replaced by recoilless rifles.
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4y3._ijfii 1
DIAGRAM "S"
Principal Elements
of the Tank Division Combat Units Only (excluding
supply services).
Rocket
Launcher
attalio
ecennai-
ance
battalion
I rmo& e d In-
antry Bri-
ade, 25 tan
10 s.u.
00-61-152
Tan lc bn
2
1 T-.-LI
E
rtillery
n 20 nuns
U-100
rmaj red
Infantry
attalion
Total: 12,500 men, 235 tanks and SP ;ans.
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