1. POPULAR ATTITUDES IN POLAND 2. OPINIONS OF A NON-COMMUNIST CIVIL SERVANT

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP80T00246A046600090001-5
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
C
Document Page Count: 
5
Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
July 20, 2010
Sequence Number: 
1
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
January 26, 1959
Content Type: 
REPORT
File: 
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PDF icon CIA-RDP80T00246A046600090001-5.pdf196.02 KB
Body: 
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/04: CIA-RDP80T00246A046600090001-5 INFORMATIO.N R,EPO.RT I N F: O,~R,M AT I b'N", R E P 0, R T CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794. the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law. SUBJECT 1. Popular Attitudes in Poland REPORT DATE DISTR. 25X1 NO. PAGES REFERENCES RD DATE OF INFO. PLACE & DATE ACQ. 1. SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE. attitudes in o an enera Zygmunt ng., report containing information on (1) nomilar U J". 195. Inc-Luded in the report is ragmen Drina on on TATE I #x ARMY ift NAVY I#X AIR Ih81 AEC NFORMATIO'N REPORT IWFIORMATION REPORT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/04: CIA-RDP80T00246A046600090001-5 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/04: CIA-RDP80T00246AO46600090001-5 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/04: CIA-RDP80T00246AO46600090001-5 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/04: CIA-RDP80T00246A046600090001-5 CONFIDENTIAL -1- Polish Popular Attitudes: IGomulka was as much subJect.to Soviet domination in his internal policies as in foreign affairs 90 percent of the non-Pare people who at first rallied to Gomulka?s side had since deserted him, so that he was forced to rely more and more upon the established apparatus of the Polish United Workers? Party (Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza - PZPR). The PZPR, in turn, was able to control the Polish political situation only because it had Soviet support. the Communist regime w r succeed In reconstituting th &n1lective fa s. less than half of e Poles in the Soviet non would ave been repatriated before the expiration of the current agreement. not only were the Soviets unwill- ing to release too many people who could bear witness to the defects of their political and economic system, but the Polish government itself was unwilling to accept more repatriates than it could con- veniently find jobs and housing for. Appraisal of the PZPR The "old Communists" though relatively few in number, were closer to the people than other wi with thp wnrelrima t*1 rasa _ tained by the'Personnel Directors, 25X1 abolished. the labor blacklist, which was one of the worst abuses of the pre-Gomulka period, might be revived. ri?is a s on coming to power was direct a removal of most of the unpopular officials holding such posts in enterprises and factories. These key-positions were then filled with more friendly and accommo- dating individuals. At the same time, the secret lists of politically disaffected or otherwise troublesome workers, which had been main- Declassified Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/04: CIA-RDP80T00246A046600090001-5 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/04: CIA-RDP80T00246A046600090001-5 CONFIDENTIAL m2o Gomulka e s attempt to reorganize ann rejuvenate the FZFR"a failure. Though many undesirable in- dividuals were weeded out-,-not many energetic and intelligent new- comers were recruited to take their places, there was no such thing as a group of "Young PZPF9 the younger members were either Centrists or Natolinists. CONFIDENTIAL qq Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/04: CIA-RDP80T00246A046600090001-5 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/04: CIA-RDP80T00246A046600090001-5 General Zygmunt Berling e r . ng remained behind in the U.S.S.R. n organized a Foliah army there because it seemed to him the most direct way of getting back to Poland9 in contrast to the route taken by General Wladyslaw ANDERS and his men. When the Polish-Soviet forces approached Warsaw Berling ordered his men to attack against the wishes of the Soviets, U.S.S.R. F e 25X1 Berling exercised, little or no political influence CONFIDENTIAL After his return to Poland9 Berling refused any appearance of collaboration with the Communist regime until about 19529 at which time he consented to serve as Fourth Undersecretary of the Ministry of State Farms, This was a relatively unimportant administrative post in which 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/04: CIA-RDP80T00246A046600090001-5