1. POPULAR ATTITUDES IN POLAND 2. OPINIONS OF A NON-COMMUNIST CIVIL SERVANT
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP80T00246A046600090001-5
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
C
Document Page Count:
5
Document Creation Date:
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date:
July 20, 2010
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
January 26, 1959
Content Type:
REPORT
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
![]() | 196.02 KB |
Body:
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/04: CIA-RDP80T00246A046600090001-5
INFORMATIO.N R,EPO.RT I N F: O,~R,M AT I b'N", R E P 0, R T
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title
18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794. the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
SUBJECT 1. Popular Attitudes in Poland
REPORT
DATE DISTR.
25X1
NO. PAGES REFERENCES
RD
DATE OF
INFO.
PLACE &
DATE ACQ.
1.
SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
attitudes in o an
enera Zygmunt ng.,
report containing information on (1) nomilar
U J". 195.
Inc-Luded in the report is ragmen Drina on on
TATE I #x ARMY ift NAVY I#X AIR
Ih81
AEC
NFORMATIO'N REPORT IWFIORMATION REPORT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/04: CIA-RDP80T00246A046600090001-5
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/04: CIA-RDP80T00246AO46600090001-5
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/04: CIA-RDP80T00246AO46600090001-5
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/04: CIA-RDP80T00246A046600090001-5
CONFIDENTIAL
-1-
Polish Popular Attitudes:
IGomulka was as much
subJect.to Soviet domination in his internal policies as in foreign
affairs
90 percent of the non-Pare people who at first rallied
to Gomulka?s side had since deserted him, so that he was forced to
rely more and more upon the established apparatus of the Polish
United Workers? Party (Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza - PZPR).
The PZPR, in turn, was able to control the Polish political situation
only because it had Soviet support.
the Communist regime w r
succeed In reconstituting th &n1lective fa s.
less than half of e Poles in the
Soviet non would ave been repatriated before the expiration of the
current agreement. not only were the Soviets unwill-
ing to release too many people who could bear witness to the defects
of their political and economic system, but the Polish government
itself was unwilling to accept more repatriates than it could con-
veniently find jobs and housing for.
Appraisal of the PZPR
The "old Communists" though relatively few in number, were closer
to the people than other
wi with thp wnrelrima t*1 rasa _
tained by the'Personnel Directors, 25X1
abolished.
the labor
blacklist, which was one of the worst abuses of the pre-Gomulka period,
might be revived.
ri?is a s on coming to power was direct a removal of most of the
unpopular officials holding such posts in enterprises and factories.
These key-positions were then filled with more friendly and accommo-
dating individuals. At the same time, the secret lists of politically
disaffected or otherwise troublesome workers, which had been main-
Declassified Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/04: CIA-RDP80T00246A046600090001-5
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/04: CIA-RDP80T00246A046600090001-5
CONFIDENTIAL
m2o
Gomulka e s attempt to reorganize
ann rejuvenate the FZFR"a failure. Though many undesirable in-
dividuals were weeded out-,-not many energetic and intelligent new-
comers were recruited to take their places,
there was no such thing as a group of "Young PZPF9 the younger members were either Centrists or Natolinists.
CONFIDENTIAL
qq
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/04: CIA-RDP80T00246A046600090001-5
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/04: CIA-RDP80T00246A046600090001-5
General Zygmunt Berling
e r . ng remained behind in the U.S.S.R.
n organized a Foliah army there because it seemed to him the most
direct way of getting back to Poland9 in contrast to the route taken
by General Wladyslaw ANDERS and his men. When the Polish-Soviet forces
approached Warsaw Berling ordered his men to attack against the
wishes of the Soviets, U.S.S.R. F e 25X1
Berling exercised, little or no political influence
CONFIDENTIAL
After his return to Poland9 Berling refused any appearance of
collaboration with the Communist regime until about 19529 at which time
he consented to serve as Fourth Undersecretary of the Ministry of State
Farms, This was a relatively unimportant administrative post in which
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/04: CIA-RDP80T00246A046600090001-5