SOVIET MILITARY TACTICS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00246A046700510001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 127
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 7, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 6, 1959
• Content Type: REPORT

IN FORMATI ON REPORT I N FORMAT ION REPORT
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This material oontains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the mewing of the ispianage Laws, TWO
18. U.S.C. Secs. 794 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorised person is Prohibited by law.
COUNTRY USE/Poland
SUBJECT Soviet Military Tactics
REPORT L_
DATE DISTR.
NO. PAGES
REFERENCES
6 February 1959
2
RD
DATE OF
INFO.
PLACE &
DATE ACQ.
E glish-language repor' on Soviet military tactical
Att. 1
Soviet Military Tactics = Attack by Three.-Az q;cna otg?a100t11~,1omsttir..ftont
This 36-page report poses the problem, and offers a solution for an attack along
a 100 kilometer front by two general army groups of three armored infantry
divisions, and one tank division each; one armored army group of four tank
divisions; one paratroop division; one air army of 1000 fighters and 200 bombers,
all supported by tactical nuclear weapons,akaLnst an enemy force of three infantr,
divisions deployed along the entire front, supported by two tank divisions
deployed at a depth of 50 kilometers, and tactical nuclear weapons.
Att. 2 Soviet Military Tactics - Movement to Contact and Quick Attack,
This six-gage report poses the hypothetical case of an attack by a combined army
of three armored infantry divisions and one tank division against an enemy con-
sisting of-ono infantry division with one tank division in reserve. The report
briefly touches on the attacking procedures in the case of two problemss'(1) when
the defenders are retreating, and (2) where the defenders are entrenched.
Att. 3 Soviet Military Tactics - River Defense
'`This 22-page report represents.in.,general terms Soviet methods and guiding
principles at the headquarters lever for river defense. Attention is invited
to the t - co nt' which- stab ' T difY. not of '_opdnion Lbi a ' ao1ro tioi
offered by informe}atf .in ac, tia#ie on . rim-dete~ss, 'and A aa-whi,cI
was offered by Soviet Generdl Yankovskiy, of the. Obshchiy Voyskiy Ko>mnand.
sTATc [a ARMY
a MR EV Z ?
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a
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itt. 4 Soviet Military'Tactics - Attack by Tee Army groups on a1 00
1 ome r Front, This eight-page report offers a solution by another informant to the proble
posed in attachment 1. The information submitted iin thiq report includes
those points which are at variance with the solution offered in attachment
1. Informant in his comment lists the composition of heavy tank regiments
in the Polish Army as of 1952.
itt. 5 Soviet Military Tactics - Attack N The-' Ai Gsoup_
s on a 2100
on
This 43 page report represents informant's solution to the basic problem
posed in attachment'l. The report includes solutions for (1) aspaults
on a fortified area, and (2) controlling and breaching of a passage.
Informant also presents various data on the Soviet AjWj
Att. 6 Soviet Military Tactics - Attack-by Thy .4rsiv Ib"anins on 41
0D Hiloma#.r
Von
This 11-page report represents another informant's solution to the basic
problem posed in attachment 1. Informant's-solution was essentially
similar to that presented in attachment-5,, and consists only of.those --
points where ,there was a difference of opinion between this informant and
the author of the solution in attachment 5? Informant also includes data
on the deployment of forces as a result of exercises held in northern
Poland in'l955, and some of the experiences gained as a result of these
exercises. Ammunition tables of allowance, fuel allowances for tanks and
other vehicles, food ration allowances,, are also included.
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ml dsviat ton (reflorred to as "oar fo rees'"
thressott tLe ta~iLsrind rspe-rt) is orsa~ised
as follows:
25X1
fi
(1)
Ue*
dovist Mi1ltarr 'ltoties - Atts by Three Apr
We Oswral Armor Qzeaps (Mdwbtv*
VsJs1mva3a Arwgu) of ttsw taw a -it
tfant y divisl.sr? sMd aw toast
division east.
(2) cme Araoe+sd Arq QTOep of four tank
divisi s.
(3) Ow Parats'.op Division.
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(b) One Air Arip of 1#000 fighter air?
oreft and 200 bombers.
(5) Tacti.a n vsspon..
b. Its defending for.s, to organised as folloirss
(1) Three iafantsf divisions doplaW.d along
the entire front.
(2) Two tonic divisions d.pleq+ed at a depth
of 50 itm.
(3)
T'a.tiaal aoelear ...pons.
a. The imial distamee between the opponents is
80 to 200 b. # osbseq a.nt]7 decreasing to 50
to 70 bms to adeenee elements of the defender.
Datream bath farces is a Aver (300 meters
vide, 5 astero deep, moth! carreot)o
d. Diagram of forossi
Ob3eetime
Widths 3Elo aster. RIM Depth: 5 asters
50-70
Ian. C) A CAC Q !
350 9rR.
l
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(b)
(1) stirs - is Peembu for wow,*
(2) Front *at be brrsaobod at a rddIb of
100 Ziae an].
(3) ?adc is the oeoopatisn of an laportant
road juatiea at a depth of 10 ha. and
aabseq.ant 1l p with fa s'eea of the
aoesad "fears".
There oriata a abaaa of approrciuate]y
80 ha. a. the 6oitet two" wore pw*mJAg
a retraatiop aa!!7. $.viot forty" twra
left rithest fool. Tad es
passed tbaadh a terse wo31 organised
for defarue In fortified poultl~eaa (the
seiei.).
30 flotsr d:tvuleaaj-
f b sr MASiaao
Aunts Ilempow
00hshW* Vo j.ksw ra
-a
ieVIOt tearsea --~
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1. 1L. Soviet forces (our fors..) is pursuit of the retreating
anew are spearheaded by the tank arw as the first echelon,
with the remaining amiss 6040 km. behind, as the second
echelon. In front of the forces of the first echelon, there
are advance groups (Podviswmy Otriad ? PO), also serving as
connecting elements between the fore" of the first and second
?oh1lo -a. The responsibility of d~tapateMag the PO rests with
the point division of both echelons and they are generally
organised as fellowst eons armored infantry battalion plus
onto battalion which includes me 80 battery and one 122 not
howitser regiment and elements of engineers (equipment de.
ponds upon type of terrain to be traversedf for river cros-
sings bridging equipment will be earried). Dw ^Lsd em of
the PO is the occupation of important to grain feature. for
the follow-up divisions In order to ensure the minterrupted
movement of the main boo.
2. As the armored arq advances rspid]y without stopping, it
operates within a limited sector,, preswaabll on a width of
50 lea. (50 percent of the entire sector of operations).
Behind the armored arW fellow the PO of the two other armies,
advancing along the entire width of the front and followed by
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their Baia costtia~ants, 'mss sit*ation tlsrtni the purwsit
is of follows
t I t T I ~ ~ I ~ ~ 1~
Ms siteatioo afar the Torso has halted for teaseling s
x m Un.
So paretrsop ditisiam is located about 200 km* from the
fPont has and at a di starve of a- ppr m i tel,T 50 kwa from
25X1
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3. The Soviet Arnw does not generally undertake major operations
with a force of less than two "fronts". At least three weeks
of preparation are required for the storage of audition,
Niel and the reorganisation of units into formations of that
sise. During this long period of preparations the entire
disposition will be of a defensive nature. The Poo will
advance and reorganize for defense in expectation of a pos?
sible assault by the eneagr. This transition to defense is
carried out in the following stagesn
a. The POs of the general arxW group (Obehchaya Voiskovaya
Arga) leap-frog into a position in front of the armored
arQ and take over the first line*
be After refuelling, the armored army moves to approximately
100 kin* behind the front line.
CO Your armored infantry divisions (each division consisting
of one tank brigade and three armored infantry brigades
plus one tank battalion per infantry brigade) deploy on
a width of 100 km.
d. The reorganization order of the "front* will be given in
a general manner only, such ass with effect from.......
dsy,......hour.......?until date......hanr......the aNq
vin organize for defense in the following sectors......etc.
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e. Roads in the front sector will be determined and clas-
sifted as follows:
(1) Divisional approaches.
(2) Army approaches - a specified road reserved for
arpr movement and planning.
(3) "Front" approaches - a specified road reservsd
for "front" movement and planning.
On a sector of the abovfeentioned width there will be at
least two main axes of movement rd one or two railroads.
No man's land is termed Elie.
li. The following is the organisation of the defensive layout:
as Each first-line division sets up a combat team, the
strength of a reinforced battalion; generally the di-
visional reconnaissance battalion plus one tank company
plus one engineer compa W. This force advances up to
50 km. from the first line and thereupon sends out
patrols moving up to 201n. in front of its main body,
i.e., altogether there will be a screen of 70 km. in
front of the first line.
be The advance battalions in the first line send out an
infantry platoon to a distance of 2-3 km. in front of
the first line in order to forma protective screen.
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c. The entire area between the advance screen to the poo?
tective screen is patrolled by troops of the first line.
The organisation of ground for defenses
Fat
t~Q
advance !Srogg
Security screen
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5. The movement of the tank .x to the r ear and the forward
movement of the combined aregr is carried out as follows:
a. In principle this operation is solely executed during
the lugs of darkness# while the divisions of the second
echelon despatch elements to occupy the first line.
Since previously, during the pursait, the arse held a
line of 130 lase, width and is now being replaced by the
deployment of two divisions only two brigades will be
up front, whereas the third Fill be in the second line,
so that six armored infantry battalions will move up
during the first night. ISsch division will move up on
at least two axes. The speed of advanee at night will
be 15 kph. Daring the now night, part of the rear
elements of the tank arq will move to the rear and
the major part of the artillery of the first-line
divisions will move up*
b. The change-over of the supporting first-line forces will
be carried out be retaining the rebeving support forces
for one day with the force moving to the r ear in order
to make them familiar with the layout of the terrain,
and the artillery target plan. This procedure will
increase the confidence of the troops In the line.
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c. During the second night, the reminder of the forces
will move up*
d. Combat forces are trsuported by rail only when the
distance to be covered eroeeds 200 kit. In our specific
case, only the supporting farces will be transported
by rail. (Votes During the Second World War, 18 trains
of 100 axles each were required for transportation of
one infantry division.)
6. Whereas in the past the width of unit sectors in defense be-
tween battalions was 100 asters, it has now been increased
to 1,000 asters because of nuclear warfare.
a. The battalion disposition is bead on three lines,
first line, second line at a distance of 200 meters
from the first line, and the third line at a distance
of 1,000 meters from the first line or 800 asters from
the second line. The first and second line are held
by two, companies of infantry. An infantry battalion
in defense holds an area of 2 kne width, its fire
controlling an area of 3 km. Area in depth controlled
by the battalion is 1.5 law.
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Dispodtion of a battalion in defenses
km
j,6 k'"
1,5 Km
I K
Sro 0r
The above battalion diagram is based an the oalaulation that
a "noatinal" atomic bad in the 20 kiloton range destructive
pawar extends over a radius of 2 ku. from point sere,
b. A brigade defensive lgcut eztenda over an area of 6..
7.5 ku. at a depth
f oc 'C-6k ku.
5-4KI
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C# A divisional defensive layout occupies a width of 12-
15 km. at a depth of 10-12 km.
j`?11
IC rr%
d, An Arpr in defense holds a sector with a width of 30-
40 km. and a depth of 25 kn,where the remainder of the
arq'a divisions are deployed- mostly the tank divisions.
e. Width of the sector held by a 'front" is 100 km. at a
depth of 100 km. In the offensive,, a force of four di-
visions will be concentrated in the first line for the
penetration, with two divisions holding the remainder
of the front and two tank divisions as second echelon
forces at a depth of 25 km. The tank army will be lo-
cated at a depth of l5 ks. The breakthrough will be
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plwnwd according to the following clutch:
fig
'1: A'>
This plan is the accepted solution, =less ground con-
ditions require a different approach,
f. Doctrine requires, that vhen defensive dispositions
prior to the offensive ? are taken up, units will or-
ganise in accordance with the pattern of the subsequent
offensive, i.e., each unit in its own sector.
7. One of the principal concepts of.tcaic warfare requires that
contact with the anew must not be lost, Should this occur
in our case, local operations with liadted objectives will
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l4-,akin with the aft of regaining contact with the eneay.
atien of the intermediary defenste phase will be limited
i time required for refuelling, and replaniataaent of esw
After this the advance will be resumed and positions
mn up along the river as described in Par&gMh 60 above*
.t effort will be made to transport platoons to the other
side.
8. Until the and of 1956 two or thaw atomic bombs in the 20
kilotons age were prescribed for a corps attack. In addi-
tion employment of atomic artillery shells (below this stands
ard) was eonside4red. In case of the anemp occupying well
fortified positions, a double allotment of four to six 20-
kiloton bombs may be authorised.
9. In con3mction with the principal of continuous advance the
above..deseribed plan of develepabut must be considered. The
POs of the advance screen (a reinforced recovasissamce bat-
talion) will iumediately attempt to break the resistance of
the scarp's advance force (Operating 50.70 ki. in front of
the river). Should their strength prove insufficient to
re
ov+eroMe the opposition, our PO forces will be/inforced In
order to enable thecae to achieve this objective 2-4 daces
at the lattest. An advance to the point of contact will be
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carried out in brigade cola, with the lading battalions
moving in battle formation and the remainder following in
line in the Made column.
10. Data on the length of oolmse e s
a, Battalion oo1u - 5 km. on one axis*
b. Brigade *)lm - 12.15 km. an one ands.
Co Divisional column - 120 k:n, on one axis,
d. Intervals between elements within the cob=&
Between companies - 100.150 meters.
Between battalions - up to 2 km.
Between brigades - up to 34 km.
Between divisions - up to 5.6 km.
Between armies - up to 20-30 ke.
no Principles of mounting an attacks
a. Depth of operations of a "front" is approximately 250
km., operations lasting appro duste]7 5.6 days,
b. WW nuclear warfare conditions the width of a divisional
sector during an offensive amounts to 6 km. (as compared
with a width of 1-2 km. under conventional warfare con-
ditions).
a. In order to achieve a breakthrough, mechanised infantry
and armored infantry divisions must be employed to pene-
trate the tactical depth. This latter term signifies
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an area where the snug- has prepared a defensive layout.
In the majority of operations this will count to the
divisional depth of the first echelon divisions (i.e.,
under current conditions the tactical depth will be 15
km.).
d. The tank ay will be employed only after the1ctical
depth of the enoW has been penetrated in order to ad-
vs~nae towards the objective and for operations within
the operational depth of the eneegr, The .nag's resistance
to this penetration of his operatiensl depth vill take
the form of committing his reserves or aerial bombard-
ment. Our forces, however, have attained freedom of
maneuver (capability of outflanIldnK the enamy)s opera-
tions against a fortified position which cannot be out-
flanked should not be undue.
e. As a rule an attack will not be directed against an
entire front line but a suitable sector for the break-
through will be selected to be used as a pivotrpoint.
The width of the breach must be sufficient to allow for
the tank sre r to be pushed forward and advance to a
depth of 50-60 km, at one thrust.
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f. In order to permit the advance of the tank aregr, the
width of the breach must be at least 20 km. (this pre-
supposes entering the breach with two armored divisions
in the first line and two in the second line; or three
armored divisions in the first line and one in the sec-
ond line). This calculation is based upon the following
considerations:
(1) Sixteen kilometers are required for the introduction
of the tank a rmpr.
(2) Two kilometers are required at each flank of the
breech, in order to enable the armor to operate
outside the range of the enapr's antitank guns and
to prevent its outflanking until suit from the
tactical depth is secured*
g. At all sectors other than the breakthrough point a di-
vision is cable of holding a frmt of at least 12.
15 taeo during the course of the offensive (the division
may ocoW defensive positions or constitute part of
the secondary effort). Such a layout is in accord with
the principle of ecoanowpr of force.
h. Pentration of the present layout requires the "acl nvenct
of four divisions (gapsiitnting a breach of 24 km, width)
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and for this purpose the following solutions ma prove
asselrle:
11? I Ax
When cosaand over the breakthrough is given solely to
one ocubined arW which is reinforced by two divisions
and one i"qrow the second combined aru y, the two
tank divisions of ocublued armies vill again be in the
second line.
i. In every solution the tank arapr will be positioned in
such a wanner as to enable it to traverse the tactical
depth of the eneawy i>medietely after the conclusion of
the operation during the first night.
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3. The sector to be breached and with it the pivot point,
will be determined in accordance with the following
considerationsI
(1) Task of the forces available including morale, or-
ganisation, quantity and quality.
(2) The enagy and his deployment - including the layout
of the terrain.
(3) Nature of terrain ? obstacles, tranvtrsability.
(y,) Time at your disposal.
(5) Logistical problsws.
k. For breakthrough tanks belonging to all the units of
the first and second lines stnould be used, but not those
of the second echelon of the *front,* which is to be re-
served for rapid advance. This is motivated by the con-
sideration that in breaking through an anew disposition
(until the tactical depth is reached) losses will be in,-
curred= but, whereas loss of momentam at this phase is
permissible for second line units which do not have to
exploit the success, the tank sr must execute its
threat at full strength.
1. Organisation of a combined az (Obsbch a Vojskava3a
Armin) includes eight or aim divisions, consisting of
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two-thirds aechsaised infantry and one-third armored
infantry or tanks.
^. There m=ists the possibility of putting together one
or more combat teams whose task will be to advance at
arsgr level more repid37 than the remainder of the force.
This teen will be termed "Armsyskaya Podvistuuya Grrupa",
At "fwnl S levels it will be termed *F'rontovaya PodvisA ra
axga". Within the.. teams,, the percentage of tznk for-
mations is relatively higho
n. Another solution which is favored by the Soviets for
breaching the frontal sectors is as follows:
This weans carrying out a bre* k - gh in conjunction
with the sabaidiary encirclement of part of the ensv "a
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defensive disposition is order to protect the flanks of
the force breaking out.
12. Support in attack*
a. Preparations and serial supports Following are the wds'r
stone of the air sr , generally placed under the command
of the front headquarttsrs in order of priority:
(1) Local air superiority is attained by i erical
superiority? destruction of the anwmy flying po-
tential especial y by incapacitating his pilots,
boo lilo eat of airfields and destruction of convoys
and trains parrying supplies to the theater of opera-
tions.
(2G Under certain circumstances destruction of enemy
steregs dumps of nuclear Sr.. till be given top
priority.
(3) Immediate preparation will be carried out (in con-
jsmction with preparatory artillery fire) from H
hour minus 90 vilnutes until H hour sinus 20 minutes.
On the average this stage of preparations will com-
mence at H mites. Included in this stage is
the harassing of on" ids during the night of
D minus or svea prior to this dateep with the object
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(4)
(5)
of depriving thew of rest for a number of nights
before oo aceewsaft of the attack, The guiding
principle at this stage is that aircraft will de-
stroy targets located beyond the range of artillery
fire and nvmt the latter's sngagt of the
main fortified positions to be breached.
Aircraft targets during the preparatory stage in
order of priority are the main artillery deploy`.
teem positions, mostly at a depth of 3.6 kw., cow-
wind posts, and isolation of the battle field
(Isolataya PolsbWo) .
Close air support of tank and infantry acnenoos
Immediately following H-hour. The type principally
e41oyed for this purpose was the Stunaovik. (Motes
During 1956 Polish military circles cansi4ered re-
plssseeeent of the piston-angined Stursovik by jet-
propelled aircraft but they finally retained the
Stnreovik. Close serial rapport is based on the
principle of one squadron (20612 aircraft) being
contlnu~slj air-borne over the battle surest of one
division (a circle of 2 )or* diameter) In order to
nestrelise swW points of reistance. Pistca-engined
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aimraft are protected bir jets of the Istrebitelnaya
Aviatga.
CIO
Aerial support during the breakthrough is cancan-
trated on the support of the formes carrying out
this operation. At a later phase .. iradiat s y
after the breaktluvw4gh has been achieved, aerial
support will be shifted to the support of the
forces breaking out or executing the pursuit ?
in our oases the tank arup.
b. Allocation of air supports
(1)
Ywber of sorti.. to be made is divided between the
areies in advance and aircraft will not be placed
under cam and. of armise nor will arp- other form of
support be authorised.
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On
(2) A R front" is gensrel],7 allotted air support by
air arq of 1,000 aircraft, composed of ten air
divisions. This force generally consists of two
air divisions of close support bombers, four air
divisions of Stu rnoviks and four air divisions of
Interceptor aircraft.
(3) Allocations for the four divisions (100 aircraft)
for
day,
of dturnoviks are/four or five mortise per
operating for sppro tritely 20 minutes over a radius
of 2 kilonwttors. Per a breakthrough of a width
of 16 kno adnin+an require eats are for eight
sgasdrens operating siwaltaeiecusly, ise., 60
aircraft at a time.
c. 8ipport by nuclear weaponsa
(1) Preparatory support by nuclear ve pons begins tow
gather with the artillery preparation, not later
than 60 motes before fi.J ur.
(2) An am will normally be allocated ap praadmately
10 atomic bass (in the 20-kiloton range or less)?
six or seven of which will be employed during the
preparatory phase while three or four will be held
for use against mmW oovat.rattacks..
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d. Artillery support s
(1) For the neutralisation and destruction of a yell
dug-in enw@-, a rapid 20-miute barrage by all
guns is required according to doctrine. If a
wfiialastt number of guns is available this fire
is laid dawn at one tiune. If not, the firs is
laid down gradually and by bounds. Tatprovem mts
in earth-works, designed to urithatand atomic blasts
require a greater fire volume or an increased rate
of fire. The Soviets salved this problem by in-
creasing the caliber of guns, thereiby increasing
the amount of explosive.
(2) The timetable of artillery support consists of
artillery preparation, assault support for infantry
and tanks to a depth of 3-4 kilometers in the direc-
tion of the main effort (ge eralay, this phase ~-i11
be executed by a moving artillery barrage, either
single or dauble),# and support of advance in the
depth of the enemy disposition. The preparatory
phew of artillery fire is concluded by extremely
heavy fire on the first line trenches. H-hour
signifies the termination of the artillery prepara-
tion, tbilorsd Ineediatenly by the assault of in-
fantry and tanks can the first line trenches.
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(9)
The area of e?sepr defenses is divided by parallel
lines spaced at 100 meter intervals. A line passing
over an aneq entrenchtent is taursed a main line
whereas a line covering an unoccupied area is known
ass subsidiary line.
AW battalion defense positions.
saw defense
positions
secondary lin e-
The reason for the interval of 100 asters between
the fire lines stow from the fact that each turn
of the elevating knob equals I loo, corresponding
to a 100-meter increase of range. A mobile screw
consists in each gut of leap-frogging from a primary
to a secondary line and onwards in the direction of
a r r o w . (Shova In diagram above.)
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(4) Firing procedure an a main line proceeds at the
maxima rate of all guns, during eight to ten
minutes. Fire is not advanced beyond the main
line unless by order of the supported forces.
Fire on a secondary line is laid down at belt the
rate of fire of the guns, during two or three
minutes. Fire on a secondary line is moved auto-
matically without requiring an order by the sup-
ported force.
(5) The term "double screen" is employed when an artil-
lery group lays down its fire eamm*ently on two
lines. This barrage requires double the number of
grans and an increase of 50 percent in emition.
The first part of the artillery operates as usual
and provides a single moving screen. The remainder
of the artillery force m gages sol.3y the wain lines,
always selecting the next msdr- line. Towards the
and of 1956, the introduction of a triple screen
being considered.
(6) Aa ition regn1renantss For artillery support
during all phases of the offensive, particularly
on D-day, a battle supply of 3-3.5 units of muni-
tion per gm must be stored now the gm emplaceaeents.
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Battle supply of 81 en. caliber ? 120 shells,
Battle supply of 122 wa. caliber ? 80 shells.
Battle supply of 152 est. caliber > 60 shells.
During an artillery bombardment, all barrels are
firing including those aimed by direct laying (in-
cluding tank gam), for 5-10 minutes.
(7) A complete moving a rtillery screws is not mandatory
along the entire length of the frontal secterj gen-
erally, however, the entire length of the front is
bombarded, in order to prevent theI,y from guessing
the direction of the main effort. A coWlete moving
screen is obligatory in the directions of the main
and subsidiary efforts.
(8) Objectives previously engaged by atomic weapons 'will
not be shelled by artillery.
(9) In order to lay down an ordinary moving barrage to
a depth of 3-4 kw. daring the artillery preparation
220 pieces are required (including 81 me. mortars)
per kilometer of frontage. In the event of atomic
weapons being epplcQred, this none will decrease.
In order to obtain the required concentrations, as
mentioned above, all organic supporting artillery
of second line mite as well as the second echelon
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will be employed. (In our specific ease, the organic
artillery of the tank crape viii also be brought for-
ward for this purpose.) 'When the tank army will
advance after conclusion of the assault support
posse, it viii be rejoined by its organic artillery.
13. Actions prior to the attaaki
a. fl-hour signifies the acowt of assault of the first line
of the enemy's trenches by tanks and infantry.
b. During the night preceding the assault, reconnaiseance
will be carried out along the entire front. (In case
of the assault being wonted during daylight hours, re-
conu dssanae will be surds at dawn.) Such reconnaissance
will be of an offensive aharscter. In each divisional
sector it will be carried out by a force corresponding
to a reinforced battalion task force, supported by two
or three field artillery battalions. auras will fire
in this case from secondary positions only and not from
positions reserved for the support of first line wits.
This reooiwsissanee force is commanded from the rear by
the divisional der.. The tasks of this combat re-
connaissance are as folleveI
(1) To find out wbethear the euespr has retreated or
thiwed"out his disposition (one of the lessons
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from the Owman method of mobile debase in World
war II.
(2) To obtain the latest information on the ena w layout
and the location of his supporting area (including
the capture of prisoners).
(3) To occupy dominating gromd on the line of contact.
c.ineering preparations prior to contacts
(1) The breaching of nervy ainsfields will be carried
out during the night preceding D-day, generally
by silent aeons.
(2) For each platoon of the first were, a lane through
the minefield most be prepared. On one kilometer of
frontage at least eight to tea saes are made. Width
of a lone for infantry is 6 mmeters, for tanks 10
meters.
14. River crossing problems t
a. When plamOag an operation whose final objective is lo-
cated 5-7 ka. from a river, fulfilment of the mission
includes the establiabmeat of a brides on-the other
side of the river. This latter task is allotted to the
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b. Means of crossing a Avert
(1) APO Mons taankst which will be found in the first
vsve of the armored units.
(2) Boats (wood or rubber) in the engineer companies.
(3) The divisional engineer battalion includes a DLP
eomp=W (Derevyaty Liokhky Park). An infantry
division was capable of constructing a pontoon
bridge of 50 meters length,
(!t) Included in the frene ork of armies are brigades
of engineers (Reserv Glavoovo Kcnsandovania - FAE)
holding pontoons of various types, ash as NZP and
TPP (heavy). Each brigade bolds 30 pontoons, suf-
ficient for the construction of a bridge of 300
meters length.
(5) At one time a corps of armored infantry maintained
one-third of such a pontoon park (a pontoon bridge
100 meters long), After the digit of corps,
this equipment was transferred to the tank divisions.
(6) In addition to the above there was a tendency to
equip armies with amphibious units.
o. The main difference between an ordinary attack and an
attack i cluding a river crossing Use in the fact, that
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in the first case the entire first echelon may be cos-
ts
mitttd at once, vborowVo river crossing it will be
divided as tollo s t
(1) The first or assault warn, in the strength of one
co parq of each battalion of the first line, r+hose
task is the occupation of the opposite river bank
and to prevent the eneq from laying down flat-
trajectory fire on the river. The crossing will
be made by the assault wave during the night pr.-
coding H hour or during the day. In the latter
case a aeeke screen will be laid, moss width will
stcteed that of the creasing proper. This wave win
cross to the other bank in vessels of various de-
soription (raw boats, boats pulled by ctls or motor
boats). Each crossing as described above will be
carried out at the minima width of 3 key.
(2) The remaining me-third of the battalion will cross
over in the returning boats, thereby enlarging the
bridgsbead perlater, whereupon boats win return
arse more.
(3) At the same time construction of a pontoon bridge
will be started in order to facilitate the passage
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of tanks. In each divisional sector there will be
at least one pontoon bridge. The army will have a
separate bridge.
(4) After the second wave has crossed, antitank guns
will be ferried across on floating pontoons (the
importance of this has diwdaished with the issue
of recoilless rifles to infantry battalions). The
principle is, that each offensive defensive layout
requires a strong antitank disposition.
(5) Issediately after caVietion of the pontoon bridges
special gun-boats will begin to operate up-stree
with a view of destroying floating nines.
(6) Transfer of a division of the first line, in our
oase, wilt require 24 hours at least.
(7) The crossing of the tank srspr will oosnence at H
plus 36 hoursd it will regaire four divisional
bridges plus one armq bridge plus one "front"
bridge.
(8) The amber of radio sets will be increased by 50
percent in the event of a river crossing. The
reason for this is, that a special net is not up
for the "front" (commanding) engineer officer, who
is in charge of the technical aspects of bridge
construction.
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15. Tian table for operations in our cases
a. Trsnafer of the first waves will require one or two hours.
b. Breaching the unsay+s laist at tactical depth will re-
quire, eight to ten hours, at the rate of 1-1.5 kpho
c. The seek ax will begin river crossing at H plus 36
hours.
16. Combat methods after river crossings
a. As previously described, each wove occupies a bridge-
head which is deepened by consecutive waves until the
entire force of the first echelon is located within
the bridge1ead.
Subsidiary wave
Assault wave
X
iF--- sector of breech
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403
b. bu ediately upon enlargement of the bridgehead, all
antitank weapons are moved to the other bank where they
will be positioned at the flanks in order to prevent
attacks by tanks and elimination of the bridgehead from
the flanks.
C. Within the brigade sector of the defensive layout at
the bridgehead, the third battalion, constituting the
second echelon, will be deployed at a depth of 3-4 km,
d. Its such a bridgehead is amble to nuclear attacks,
the tank army will, be deployed for a forward thrust
when no signs of an enear attack are evident.
e. Liquidation of the operational reserves of the enerq in
the took of the tank arsy. However, it will engage them
only in the event that these reserves dany attainment
of the objectives Otherwise the tank ariyr will advance
rapidly to achiew,the mission by way of maneuver and
will avoid unnecessary combat.
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f. Employment of air-borne troops:
(1) Paratroops will be employed solely within the
operational depth and will not be dropped on
the fortified tactical disposition of the enemy.
(2) Paratroops will be dropped an locations where a
linker may be effected within 24 hours at the
latest.
(3) The implication is that a paratroop division
looks the strength and the quality of the stand-
ard infantry division, with a resultant temporal
limitation of its power to hold a position.
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Soviet Military Tacticst Movement to contact
and Quick Attack
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The Problest
1. SnoW l4aut of one infantry division is deployed ovear
an 80 krA front surrounded by nabarsl and artificial
obstacles. The ewW holds one tank division in reserve.
2. Our forors, i.e., Soviet, consist of the Ccabiated Armors
a. Three armored infantry divisions
b. One tank division
3, Distance between the two forces is 60 km.
The Objective t
To pass through no ms's land (60 kin), possessing no
exact information concerning the enemy layout.
z~r 1.9ir_I_
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Sketch of the Forces:
Antitank
obstacle
Line of Soviet forces
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UP=
Mov"WAt to 223&."t
1. At a distance of 60 km from the enaas, knowledge of his presence
in the area may be taken for granted. On the other hind?
intelligence may have no indications of the enemy' s strength?
his exact layout, or of the nature of his deployment.
2. It may be assuaa d that on a frontal secotr with a breadth
of 80 kaa there exist at least three main a zes of advance,
or six exec? each division advancing on two axes in regimental
aolsaanns.
36 There exist two possibilities of movement to contact in accord-
ance with conditions prevailing at the fronts
a. In the event of the Soviet farces being in pursuit and the
an=y In retreat, the tank division will advance in the
center with two adored infantry divisions at its Planks;
the third armored infantry division will be at the second
echelon, at the rear of the tank division.
~~
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b. In the event of the situation being static and the Soviet
forces passing a sego line in order to advance (:movement
of forces into enW territcary), the three armored infant&7
divisions will move in the first echelon, each division on
two axes of advance, and the armored division will move in
the rear of the center armored infantry division. (Allow-
ance must be made for the fact that, owing to the lack of
mater, no limitations of the terrain have been considered.)
b. In any events the advance will p aved in such a w W that the
units will move in front of the main body up to
a distance of 50 km; each division will be preceded by a
reconnaissance battalion, reinforced according to cirwmastars+cee.
The force proper Will advance as follows
a. The first battalion will move in comebat formatioasa.
b. The res-aiaW w of the force will move in files.
Ar+s;lt onian C .te .?
5. Since in this case the aragr ocumuwdr's objective is to move
forward to a distance of 100 km in a certain direction,
without exact intelligence information, the commander of the
advance echelon, after assessing the situation (battalion
and regiment) will f cnvilate his plans and attack at once,
sZL~.c~~_L
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6. It the attack tails, the divisional cmnander will carry out
an attack in order to determine the dividing line bogs the
sneop- units. Should this sueoeed, the main army bad will
pass through this breach and Conti. au to advance in accordance
with its mission.
7. It this attack also fails, the army ooansaander will for late
his plan and attack at once. A quick attack by an army
consisting of four to seven divisions should not require
more than five or six hours in the preparatory stage.
S. A planned attack will be mounted only it the quick attack of
the arm also fails and it beocinas apparent that the enemy
occupies fortified defensive positions. In this case the
time table will be as described above.
9. With regard to timing calculations, it is possible to make
preparations for a quick attack by an army in such a short
ties becnae of the existence of a standing operational
proc~ed~sre which is adapted to such an exigenoly. The
grouper for instances at all levels, will
be organised in such a manner as to include at the news,
tine the orders groups.
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SECRET
10. The principles of attack, as stated above, will also apply in
case of a quick attack by divisions, each division in its own
sector attempting to establish a pivot point to breach the
encase line., and the same applying to the mW. O rally,
the entire length of the front will not be attacked by
dispersed farce..
snow ~Jvmmm
U. If the easy reinforces his troops by employing his reserves
(his a 'ed diriaion), the entire way will be oa ittid to
breach the erwgr 1 gout, tanks or tank dsartroyers being
allotted the task of creating antitank barriers.,
PQ,
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Soviet Military Tactics: River Defense
25X1
1. All ranks, from the individual soldier to the division, acre
trained to awphasise aggressiveness in an kinds of oambat.
Aggressiveness in defense is wcpreseed in the form of counter.
attacks. Counterattacks, however, may be carried out only
on authorisation from the superior headquarters, and this
sEr,~~r
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rule applies up to and including the division. The reason
for this is that units up to the divisional level are capable
of executing only tactical counterattacks, which may prove
undesirable. For example,, in the event that the enter breaks
through the two main lines, the subordinate commander mW
decide to close the breaches, thereby completely exposing the
third line and enabling the envy to penetrate it more easily.
2. Defense around a river obstacle is based on the following
principles e
a. First line - a chain of dominant ground features from which
flat trajectory fire may be directed at the opposite bank,,
the river itself and our beak.
be Line of advanced positions will not be on the river bank,
but at a distance of OOM600 meters from it, depending on
topographical factors. This distance will constitute the
killing ground of light machine guns in conjunction with
medium machine gums.
o. The entire force must be deployed behind the obstacle
(river) in such a mannrr that the enemy will be prevented
from carrying out landings or ca sings. In the event
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SFCRFT
the enomy succeeds in so doing, he must be repulsed by
the introduction of all forces of the second lines or
echelons into the first lines. The tank division also
may be deployed in the first line if sufficient other
forces for the defense are not available*1
d. As defense against river crossings, special forces we
set up whose task is the destruction of the enemy river.
crossing potential (Protivdesantrw Reserve). In our can
this form will be composed of three antitank artillery
regimments.
3, On open (exposed) ground a division will occupy a frontal
seget* 15 lee rids and 12 km deW. Amor will be positioned
behind the center of the front, at a distance of 35-11 km
from the river beak. Mechanised or armored infuntary divisions
of the second line will be positioned at a distance of 24-25 km
from the first line. The exact location of the second echelon
force win be determined in accordance with the available
road-net and the natural cover offered by the ground,
it* In case the eneaey does not hold the for river bank, or retreats
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after an uniuoessstul atta npt to cross the river, the disposi-
tion of troops will be as follows r
a. Frew each first line armored infantry division, a
battalion combat teem, reinforced by tanks, will be
sent forward to a distance of 106.12 lase The tasks
of tbase unite area
(1) To force the enemy to deploy and fight.
(2) To fight a withdrawal battle. (It is for this reason
that they are reinforced by armor.) During the
withdrawal of the armored infantry, tanks will lapr
mobile ambushes.
b, One or two tank battalions will be placed between the
battalion and the rivers
o. At least two bridges will be maintained across the river
and bridgeheads will be held by forces up to regimental
strength. The task of the bridges' protection force is
to prevent their capture by paratroops, partisans (denoli e.
tion), or even the penetration of fast en*pr armor. All
other bridges will be blown up and a pontoon reserve will
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25X1
be maintained on the other bank at the river in order to
erect an improvised pontoon bridge, if require&
d. Divisional reconnaissance battalions w311 operate in front
of the battalion oo bat teaasr, up to a distance of 50 km,
in order to farm a screen. The tasks of the screen we i
(1)
(2)
To report information on the strength of the enemy and
direction of the main effort.
To fares the en my to deploy ;. and fight.
e. Should the battle on the enrey bank be inconclusive, no
forces will be drawn from the main defense line (PeredrW
gray Oboko r) to repulse enemy attacks.
Main line of
resistance
Reserve pontoons
in case of
emergency
u
kl~ klf---A ell~ kl?-:~
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5, Support in Defense
a. Responsibility of organising support in defenses
(1) At battalion level the ceding offt ar is responsible
for planing battalion fire. He also checks the location
of each weapon, particularly of the medium machine guns,
including their field of 'fire.
(2) At regimental level, the regimental casesnde r Organises
and is responsible for high taraj4mtoty fire. Actual
ezeution, however, rests with the regiment artillery
group c cannda (Resaanduishche Artilerisljr Grupe ),
including the medium and field artillery, and all
82 as awrtars. The artillery commander of the regiment
(Nas-alnik Artilerii Polka) is responsible for the
flat trajectory fire, including antitank defense. (The
regiment sector is termed *Uchartokl) Supporting the
regiment in defense is the artillery regiment (two or
three field artillery battalions) of which two or three
batteries may be allotted as general support to an
armored infantry battalion.
SEGRQ
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(3) At the divisional level, flat trajectory fin is planned
and controlled by the oc hander of the divisional
artillery group ($achalnik Artilarii Divisii) and on
the field proper by, the operations officer (Nachalnik
Operativno Otdsla). High-trajectory fire is the
responsibility of the IM (Aonanduishchi Divisii
Artileriskiy Qrups). If, as mW frequently occur, the
division is allocated support of less than two
artillery regiments, it will be under orders of the
artillery group oossoaander,
b, Categories of defensive first
(1)
Linear fire. This is firs laid dawn in front of the
Soviet positions. In cave of yell clog-in troops, the
safely range will be 100 meters; otherwise the
safety range will be 200 meters. All ve pons are laid
on these lines, unless employed on other fire tasks.
The purpose of linear fire is to prevent' the enesy
from attacking the forward positions, i.e., danger fire.
It is called dawn by special cede and will be applied
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at the maxim m firing rate of all weapons. A group of
122 an howitsers is allotted a line of , meters (in
view of the fact that the destruction radius of a
shell is 25 meters), whereas 120 a heavy mortars are
allotted a line of 500 meters (the destruction radius
of a bomb being 45 "tars). The accepted calculation
for the planning of a divisional sector in defense
(division of the first echelon) is 25 pieces per
kilometer of frontage; this calculation includes
82 rasa and 12D mm mortars, artillery of all echelons,
as well as antitank guns. Organic artillery of the
second echelon will not be taken into consideration
for this purpose. Tanks are not included as they are
principally regarded as assault weapons and not as
a static fire polar,
(2) Danger fire (Wepodvishnoy Zagraditelzy Ogon; NZO), laid
down as a rmis by the entire battalion. According to
calculations a 122 mm battery covers an area of six
hectares, at a safety range of 3004400 a. Time of
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operation is two minutes at rapid rate and three
minutes at slow rate (ecatetimes tamed ZO ).
(3) Defensive Tire (Podvonhnoy ZagraditslrAr Ogoni; Pzo )
is a barrage moving to the rear, beginning at approx.
mately three km from the front line and shifting by
bounds of 300-500 meters; its task is to isolate tares
from serf entry.
(l~ } Harassing fire (Dalnare Ognovoy Napad r ; DON).
Medina and heavy artillery (122 nm guns, 152 mm guns
and howitzers) hit selected targets.
(5) Disruptive (?) fire Nepos Redstvst a Ogoni; 140) in
applied by direct laying and employed for the breaking-
up of enoW attacks.
(6) Counterattack fire by Soviet forces will be laid down
(T)
by battalion concentrations. A barrage will seldom be
used.
Preparatory counter-batteeey f#re (Protiv Artileriakaya
Podgotovka) is preventive fire against enemy artillery
attacks. It is planned to be laid down, immediately
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prior to the erase y's artillery preparation, on a
narrow sous and on the assumed snwAy assault disposition.
There also exist alternative plans which do not allow,
however, for major changes to be introctaed. Such fire
will only be planned for the layout of one of the divi-
sions .sr,1aysd in the main effort. Calculations call
for 100 pieces per kilometer of frontage for 30 minutes.
Planning responsibility for this type of fire rests with
the arrgy c omander. Firing is only from secondary and
adjacent positions. &x.cution is by all artillery
groups located in this direction (divisional, army, and
"Front .
co Lagiass~eiag support in defenses
(1) Zach first-line division will be reinforced by engineer
troops whose tasks are to lay mine fields and conduct
engineering reconnaissance. The latter task will be a
major one if there is a river obstacle behind which a
defensive layout is planned. Specifically the tasks
of the engineering rooonnaissame are as follows s
(a) To become familiar with the nature of the river
and its fords.
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(b) To conduct intelligence reconnaissances reconnaissance
and observation of obstacles. This reconnaissance
will also set up independent observation posts in
order to collect information on eneW preparations
with regard to the type of pontoon or other types
of bridges which will be constructed and where;
which types of mines are used, etc,
(2) Mimes
(a)
The object of a mine field is to prevent the en i
from penetrating the parInoter. Mine fields are
differentiated according to the type of mSne, i.e.,
an antitank mine field, an ant3.-personnel mine field,
or a field with both types of mines. Mine fields
are also differentiated according to phases of
alerts
Alert I Mine field is ccmplete3y rea4,
(Gotovnoet) camouflaged in front of defense
line as well as inside the
defense perimeter.
Alert II - Mdes for mine are dug and the
mines are plsoedwith detonators
beside them.
Alert III Mines are dumped in the area to
be rained and holes are dug.
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~CI,QL_I_
(3)
(b) Mines will be laid in a number of rows, never lase
than tan. The norm for laying a mine field: one
engineer platoon ('?) lays one square kilometer in
five hour.
(c) In a divisional defense sector, 3000 mince per
one km of frontage are laid, at an average depth
of 100 meters (approximately four rows), Antitank
mines are laid at a distance of five me tares from
each other, with anti-personnel mines in the gaps
between them.
(d) When the area is organized for defense, mine-
laying is given top prioritzy.(Raboir Psrvcy
Kolaynost ).
First priority assignment are carried out by the first.
line division, supported by two engineer battalions for
five or six days, and by motor transport (MT). (This is
true on the average ground encountered in Poland and
the Ukraine.) Such assignments are carried out in the
following order i
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(5)
(a) Clearing of firing lanes
(b) Minefields
(a) Barbed wire fences
(d) Drag-outs (individual and platoons)
(a) Observation posts
Second priority assignments (Raboty Vtoroi Koleyncsty)
are carried out in the following orders
(a) Communication trenchers
(b) Mining in depth
(a) Command posts for all echelons
Motes Up t4 and including,, the battalion level,,
observation posts are identical with command
posts,
Camouflage
(a) Tactical caseoutlage (Taktich.yskaura Mankirovka),
which is carried out at all levels, from the
individual soldier up to the unit level.
(b) Operational camouflage (Operativneya M askirovta )
or deception (Dssinformatayya). Deception plans
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are prepared at WW level, at the minimum. They
are prepared by the air operations officer
together with the c andor of engineers of the
arm and coordinated with the eaamting troops.
There exist du oo1 cans (Stasokhodndre Voy aka )
adapted to mobile operational troops. A11 deception
plans are coordinated with the Military Transsporta-
tion Dapartaent (Vcienniyye Soobshcheniya; VOSO ),
which includes railroads and inland waterxgs.
6:. Positions of Cis and Headquarters
a. The battalions the battalion oacaander, together with the
forward cca d group which includes the 00mm' der of 8rtillszy
allotted for supports are at one point which constitutes both
cam and and observation post*
b. The regiments in defense, the regimental caeesandsr will be
positioned 1.5 ? 2 ha from the that Line. Ordinarily he is
not permitted to be in the first line; however, in the event
that direct participation of the coneanl r is essential to
success, then he aq move to the first line. The observation
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post of the regimental meander must be suitable in respect
to the followings
(1)
It met enable him to be located in the direction of
his main effort (ekcring an attacks one km from the line
of contact).
(2) It must be located near the regiment reserve (the
battalion and other elements of regiment second
echelon).
(3) The commander of the artillery team must be within
trailing distaneo.
(!,) It must afford visual observation of the battlefield.
A oannand post will alwo rs be located within the
perimeter of the second echelon battalion.
c. The divisions
(1) LAu-Ing an attack the divisional commander will be
positioned at a distance of two km from the line
of contact.
(2) In defenses the divisional oomeasuder will have amain
observation point on vital ground, approximately two -
2,5 km from the first line of defense. The cow
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of the divisional artillery group will be in the
mediate vicinity of the divisional comundwo
either within, hailing distance, or at the seise
observation point.
(3) The ocaasaand poet is located in the second echelon
with the divisional reserve.
d. The Ar,y and "7ront"
AArar and "Front" commanders have observation points prepared
in advance or use those of divisional commanders. These
observation points will generally be occupied during the
decisive stages of the battle; in an attack, mainly at the
beginning of the assault or during the repulsing of a
counterattack; in defense, during a counterattack by Soviet
fare". The user commander will stag at these observation
poets together with his staff. The cowand posts are
located in the second echelon of the arm or "Front".
7. Division ILawntei in Defenses
a. First echelon units.
b. Second a&elon units or general reserve.
co Mobile antitank reserve (Podviahnoy Protivtrankovo Rea+erv),,
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VILURET
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which includes towed or self-propelled antitank guns, mostly
one battalion of 100 OR antitank guns (12 pieces).
d. Armored reserve (Tandoovy Raser, ), which will be coae-posed of
~epprorSmately one tank battalion (up to one tank regiment).
e. Engineer reserve (Podvishnoy Otriad Zagrashdez a).
In defense, this consists of up to one engineer battalion,
also termed "mobile obstacle group". It is composed of
assault pioneers with a supply of APC mines. One such
engineer oompatcW is normally allocated a damp of 2,000
3,000 antitank and anti-personnel mines, and it operates
in conjunction with the mobile antitank reserve.
f. Artillery reserve (Artilariskii Reserv), which includes
one to two field artillery battalions. This reserve does
not engsge in firing during aq stage of operations and
its position is well camouflaged. Its mission is to
o000tence operations if the enema destroys az support
elements by nuclear attack.
g. Anti-paratroop reserve (Protivo Dssantnii Reserv). In
defense, this consists of the divisional reconnaissance
battalion, reinforced by tanks. (arid an offense,
NPUR9
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no such reserve is set up.) The Soviets do not believe
that an snout will drop paratroops on their lines of
ccumnsunioationj should this happen they will be dealt
with by the rear services.
he Anti-river crossing reserve (Protiv Kula Oborona),
composed of an antitank battalion aid tank destroyers.
i. Chemical warfare reserve.
d. An oblique line of positions is laid in front of the first
line positions (Riglanaya Positsya)s
First line defenses
Oblique defense line
Its functions arei
a. To prevent the eneny from breaking through at the flanks.
b. To draw eneW fire at a line hold thinly by Soviet troops.
The enegy will waste aenuhition on this line and will
arrive in a weakened condition at the real main defense
position,
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9.
c. To form a position for mounting a counterattack.
Communications in Defenses
a. Communications in defense will be mainly be telephone, the
lines for which will be laid underground. Radio will be
used only if the use of telephone communications is not
feasible,
b, The responsibility for establishing communications rests with
the higher ***Ion unit, which will set up emmudcations
with the lower echelon (the caenmunications officer and
personnel in the regiment belong to the divisional signals
battalion), and between adjacent units, from left to
rat. Communications with technical units are established
by the infantry to the technical units except for artillery
which provides cosannications with infantry units formations
(personal and egnipwent).
c. The principle of "lowering" communications, as described
above, means that in an infantry regiments for exaarples
the cownunioation s officer ( halaik NapravleWa Sviasi)s
who belongs to the divisional signals battalions will
see to it that oasmauniaation with his headquarters, i.e.s
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the division, will continue to function during an movements
of the regiment.
10. Storage Dumps in Defense
a. Aaeunition. The objective is to push aeenunition forward.
Infantry positions will receive i battle supply and at
each gun position 3/I. or one c znplete battle supply will
be cued. On battalion fighting echhelon transport d battle
supply will be provided. On regiment fighting echelon
transport J battle supply will be provided. At the division
there will be J battle supply,
be Fuel. The division will hold three battle supplies: one
on MT, one at the regiment, and one at the division.,
c. Food supplies. There will be a total of five rations:
one onmbat ration with the soldier, one ration at the
battalion kitchen, one ration at the regiment, and
two rations at the division*
U. Air Support in Defense
a. Only the 'Front" is allotted an air army and will allocate
sorties to armies.
sir
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b. Lii son officer to the air fonrce will only be at the
divisional level*
c. Allocation of sorties. The distribution list by priority
is as follow:
(1)
(2)
(3)
The armor portion of sorties will be allocated for
the counterattack phase.
geaonnaissance.
Air defense.
{!t) According to the new tables of organisation, one
reconnaissance squadron will be included in the
tank and arwo red infantry division. This, however,
was still in the planning stage.
~ t The graduation exercise
included the defense of a river for which he was allotted
sufficient forces of armored infantry units. Since the
terrain included ground which was i passable for armor,
he concentrated his tanks at a distance of five to ten lac
behind the river. The emission awarding the degree
included, aetong others, the Chief of the Polish General
sir
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Staff and the Soviet General Tankovsky of the "?behchaya
VoyMovoy I wand". The latter was displeased with the
offered solution and, instead of awarding the informant
a "nark 5" (excellent), he proposed to award only a b.
Gen, 2ankovuky was of the opinion that all forces should
be deployed in the first line of defense, and that a
eoneenttration of reserves should not even be considered.
Only when the Polish Chief of the General Staff threatened
to bring the matter to the attention of the Polish Minister
of Defense did the general admit that the offered solution
was excellent and agreed to award a "mark 50.
sir
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U&WPOIUW
Soviet Military Tactics - Attack by Three Army
Oroupe on a 200-gilareter Front
1.
At least two artillery divisions - one to each r racy executing
the breakthrough - should be added to disposition of Soviet
attacking foresee There in no vacuwi between the forces. All
remaining fuel is issued to motorised elements which omtinue
the pursuit of the eneq.
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2. Continuation of the advauos to the river is atecuted only by
one arq *ioh advances with three divisions. The tank division
of the general army (obshchaya atmiya) fors the second echelon.
The ar,gr continues up to the river, where it attempts to estab-
lish at least two bridgeheads. (There is almost no operation
or exercise in which the Soviet forces have advanced more than
100 kilometers without establishing at least two bridgeheads;
in the advance from the Deeper to the Des, for example, a
bridgehead as established south of Kiev.)
The any in pursuit is given the assignment of broaching a
river obstacle (forsirovat' reku a khods). Since only one
arXV is in pursuit, two armies at the rear fuel up and con.
time the momentum when the pursuing araq is halted (because
of the anaW has employed atomic weapons against the bridge-
head) and executes quick defense (poapeabnaya oborona).
!i. Preparations for the planned attack of a fret take at least
a fortnight. After three to four days the front commander
issues an operational order and convenes a meeting of command
groups so that army commanders have two-thirds of the period
for issuing orders and practical attack preparations.
5. A aeehalsed division in pursuit occupies a front of up to
50 kilomaeters, depending upon the terrain.
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6. T s advance of a Usohanised division is executed on at lea at
three to four axes.
7. Each formation or unit is given a 24 or 48-hour task which
appears in the operational order in the following form: "at
the and of....(day) you should reach....(a reference) and
break through (or stay behind) line....of defense belt....
of the eosaqs within the limits of.... (snap reference)".
8. The tank ssvq is not employed to break through the enesq line
until a breach has been made. The calculation is that the
tank annq will advance 20 kilometers on the first day, 30 to
40 kilometers on the second and third days? and at least 50
kilometers after the fourth day.
9. The first dab's assignment (conditional upon the strength of
the mass layout) includes the entire first belt or two lines
within the first belt of the envoy.
10. The second day's assignment consists of the entire second
belt or part of it.
3.1. Forced breaching of a river is executed in such a way that
the first wave of tanks cross on 60-ton pontoons. Construc-
tion of a (water level - niskovockgy) bridge over a river
300 meters wide takes at least 48 hours, and a normal bridge
is built within the ensuing four or five days. The front
builds at least one bridge for each division. The pontoon
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battalion of At tank division has a pontoon bridge 50 to 60
meters long. The bridges are partially assembled in woods
near the river about a week befor' breakthrough.
12. Small (five-kiloton) tactical atomic weapons have a destruc-
tive radius of 300 meters for tanks, 1,000 meters for troops
not in trenches, and 1400 meters for troops in trenches. A
20-kiloton atomic bomb has a destructive radius of 4400 to
500 meters for tanks, and 1,500 meters for infantry not in
trenches. Atomic weapons are only employed in the face of
strong resistance.
Nyrnent to Contact
13. Order of movement as in the aforementioned solution: mech-
anised infantry divisions in front, only two for the f rontal
width, and one mechanised infantry division and one tank
division as second echelon. There is a quick attack at
divisi.amal level, and the army commander allots second
echelon reserves to each division anoontering difficulties
or resistance.
Det ss
Ile. The defense is based in the main on a double defense belt,
each belt of which is composed of three defense line.:
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depth
First belt
Second belt
Operstional
Description
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nrnnr,r
?6?
15. Tanks of infantry formations mar be placed from the first
line of defense back to a maximum of one kilometer from the
front, terrain permitting.
16. A tank regiment has 85 tanks.
17. A mechanised division has the following composition:
a. Two to three mechanised regiment, each of which is cont.
posed of a tank battalion of 21 taskse
b. One medium tank regiment which has 85 tanks.
a. One heavy tank regiment, strength unknown.I
18. In the mechanised corps, which in most cases comprise three
mechanised divisions, there was a special heavy tank regiment
directly subordinate to corps headquarters, which had 120 to
130 tanks and heavy assault guns.
19. In the USSR, tank divisions were subordinated to General
Headquarters and were allocated or attached to each front.
Occupation of a Town Junction
20. The tanks attack at night or twilight, while reconnaissance
units overcome listening posts and ambushes and try to break
through without atomic weapons. Field artillery battalions
attack anemq guns.
1. Source Co~^ tt Following was the composition of heavy tank
regiments in the Polish army-: one heavy tank (JS?2) company
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mm&
with 16 tavks j one 311-110 company equipped with (10 ?) tazik
destrwersj one SU-122 compa w equipped with (10 ?) guns;
and one SU-152 company with 10 gene. The latter cosparW did
not exist in all heavy brigades.
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Soviet M.]Stary Tactics ? Attack by
Three AnW Groups on a 104-[ildrtsr
lent.
Assaults on a Fortified Areas
M*v t to Coctwtis Doftnes, AM Problem No. 2
CoaR.rolliag sad wing of a Passage.
Miscellaneous data ee the Soviet Ar has also
been provided.
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tssaur~ltaf Forts tia~d Area
QQ~,~,,~.d a, `y~11 I~Irl~iI~1~~
'taled ~u of S A e
1. The tank exV (tadkov. a aria) is composed of three or four
tint divisions, including atq port and services.
2. The ombt ed army (obsbehaya voiskovays armia) is composed of
the followings
a. Poor or five divisions of armored or mchanissd
innfantry.
b. One or faro tank divisions,
as On or two artillery divisions (approximately
3W guns to the division.)
d. On or two antiaircraft artillery divisions.
There are t rsgluentis to the division, with
each regiment consisting of two medium anti.
aircraft artillery battalion and one heavy
antiaircraft artillery battalion.
e. Oft heavy tank regiment.
S. One engineers regiment.
I. Oa pontoon regiasnt.
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h. Cds atasda artillery battalion.
U Ons guided waponc battalion.
3. In pasaral s%spsrts One or too air divisions,
k. In general supports Tlaerst atmde boobs of
s0 kilotorss (for orates ep rat in the
direction of the giro effort.)
3. In addition to the above, thieve exists the air emir ( + na a
gratis), shish is part of the Air Force.
b. Parachute divisions are not part of the front proper. Th.G are
subordinate to the High Cawood (Olavno,o Xoasndovo) and are
allocated for specific support missions only.
5. Dirrsherre does there exist a vowtut of 80 kilt steers between the
Soviet forum and the em" a large feroatioars run out of
fwa (as isnsnstrated in this ease), rid meets are &t once
bit up to the wool unjts to enable tbow to coa-
ti mes their advanos and regain ooatast with the ensny.
6. An easrgr foe ee, composed of three infantry divisions and two
hark divisions in reserve, id= deployed behind a river on a
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freest 100 kilorstsrs in width obile saslier units and
observation posts are asintainsd 50 to 70 kileaeters from
the river viii: according to Soviet concepts, be laid out
as fellow On a sector of the frontage there will be at
least two bridges, which a.y be hold by any of the following&
a. The lain fom in the south,
b. Bridgeheads held by a force corresponding to
a reinforced armored infantry regiment., while
the gain force is deployed an the other river
banko
oo Bridgehead held by a force corresponding to
We ar ored infanta. regirnte and one tank
battalion, with advanes forces sent out as
a screen and defense in depth on the other
river bank.
7. The defended area is eonstrscted of severity belts (in Polisht
paspse sloniaoi). 111 infantry units are concentrated within
the sane belts, and the tank divisions occuff defensive positions
to the rear, ready to countearattac*.
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8. lto : nt to oontaets Within the giwae width (and laet3dag saps) r
imsediate~ly after ref aiiag has been caspleted, forces will
advance. There will be fens divisiaos abreast at the entire
widths two tads diWaiaa in the center, and two armored
infantry divisions advancing on the flanks. IiaAh dishiest
will am along two ajn =m j the length of the divisional
oole will therefore be approac3sttely 60 ldlaretere. Nowo et
will be ands In colts of regimente,and the interval. between
regiments or to toe hears or approadsste?y 15 to 3a k loueters.
*s ti es M ant Aetl err*
'I
I1
Y
V
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9. In the present situation, with a Yocum of 80 kILUmeters and
an additiaaal space of 50 to 70 kilometers from the location
of the advance forces to the obstacle (river), the four
divisions of the point Will start out at 2000 hours, and
contact with the advance torsos of the sommy will be estab-
lished at 0200 hours. AOOW*Mg to plaemaing, encounter will
last from 30 to 60 minutes and advance will be resumed in the
direction of the rimer. Troops will reach the river at about
0500 hours and will manage to establish a bridgehead.
10. Length of colrmwas
a. A battalion column of tanks roving along
11.
ors axis - b kilertoa*
b. A regimental os] of tanks moving along
ewe axis ? 20 kilometers.
Specification of method of movement to contact of the four
advancing divisions, by order of movements
a. Advance guard - ewe tank or armored infantry
battalion.
b. Antitank reserve - one company (1-2 batteries)
of type SII?100.
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a. $'l dgii material + - pontoon battalion
(pontoon bridge of 300 meters' length only.)
d. #inssri reserve - am compoW of engineers
(for the repair of roads, bridgesO eto.)
S. Tank regiments,
f. Armored infantry tents.
no armored infantry division will trove in such a manner that
the tank battalions of the armored infantry regiments will
mow at the same level as, or among, the tank regiments of
the tank divisions, on their own axis of advance of course.
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bled" of AQ'. ,
3.P. The fore.. Will advance isacdi ate3y, j a the formats oss as
described above, and contact with advance elements of the
enwq- will be Waft by the screening fore.. The battle which
will tee plans will be cads by eve rr arcing, with the major
part of the fords cetirming to advanos, eves attempting to
outflm* the sn.q's forces without fighting thee. The
object is to get to the riv r, to either ospbas an .naW
bridgehead or to establish their a mu
13? To carry this out, movement will be at night and all encounters
will be fought &ring the uightttee, tmtil the first light of
dam, so that der bridge bead at least will. be established
acre" the river by 0600 boors.
36 In the erswt of an initial attack, as described above, is a
failure, another attack Will be wade within four or five hours,
ev= if this requires a daylight battle mod all that it implies
In respect to atemie danger, During the nooses of this battle,
advanas will be maistaiesd in the dlxecticn of the river shill
attempts are ands to establish a bridgehead.
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Pap 9
15. Tinting csloulatioos for a hasty attack by a front require
a spen of 1.2 days. 'flail timing is determined by time
required to prepare the artillery positions and that required
to range the guns.
16. Preparations for a normal attack by a front require 7-14 des
according to the rsq is of ammunitions to be brotmbt ups
tbs retwlinu the siting of artilleays *to*
17. Calculations and a playarnt of mnalear vesponss to assault
by one oar weapons will be delivered at a distance of 540
ld~lra^asterss in order not to endanger its on forces. Sines
by hasty plasp s battle will be fought during nighttiass
tese atomic bombs will be allocated to each brealatbrwugh arapr.
'lhras?feur hs of the atomic bombs will be delivered an targets
at the tactical depth and one.tsurth will be delivered on
targets at the operational depth*
le. (Arg*dsat3os of forces for a plumed attack, The brei uthrougb
sector of an uW is usually 15 kilrowsters of the frontage. The
brsab through sector of a division is usually 6 kilometers of the
frontage. The regiment is also o ga ised in depth for the assault
as follows
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Pop ID
A ditisioa is oa gmxU od roar the assault as toll+oas s
to610.
In accord With th. statad p1+r the front Will carr7 out
a taa-*mtthrouo an a f o,ital aaotor of four divisia m gout:
i o-. 21.45 bo of #2' t.Eaa
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Paps u
19. In the sent of a prsplanasd aasault1 of the k L d which requires
extensive preparations,, break throw viii be executed uo~laor
the oaas=d of ifrost hest* sarsa axis of breakthrough being
in the center. A reserve or second echelon win be set up which
win include the tank divisions of the oo bind assiesa as wan
as an armored infantry reserve fros both of the combined and",
!0. The tank aaraw will be located at a distance of !p to 60 Wooster
from the front, to be out of songs of emog atcaic a tillery.
no The tank of the two tank divisions frog the seated echelon of
the front will be the 1 diate penetration - after the bre*b-t*V24gh
qF'
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of the arwwr d infantry dividons and of the flacks of the
bnake.throqh, sines the eneny will iewsediately o it its
two armored divisions to ooenterattack to eliainate breach.
This will be done to secure the flanks, to hold down the
tier eeewy- at cored divisions, and to enable the task s:W to
pass tbraadh the breach and contireo to advance to the final
front objective,
22. The depth of operatione is calculated at 300 to 500 kilometers.
ydv.aos during the first dap will be 25.30 ktlarterra, during
for second =4 posai ba y, the third day advaesrr will be appracx
iestely 40 kiloaaters, and during the ressdnin days of the
operation it will be 50.60 kilometesrs. An operation by an
asp lasts 6 to 8 days.
4,%t"hed to lonslttioa ltraai urtsrs
23. At cash formation headquarters of and" and fronts, there are
three representatives of General tisadgna tsra (OHQ), with their
staff (predstavitil stavld. Haves kowat dsvaai), The represents.
times are for operations,, admdadstration, and policy and politics.
Oaring 11 r14 War n. Marshal aeorpy Pskov and Tolbuichin (fon)
Here now these rspreaentati"a.
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alt. The task of than represevytatiws, *o are generals and marshals,
is to support and supervise foruatioo cars in the eooacutinn
of their tasks. Each operation order of the asap or font must
be confirmed by the representatives, who are in direct contact
with the gene Command. tQ has also attached liaison officers
(in Polish = otiser kiruk wd) down to the divisional level, If
an arq disposes of four divisions an offiosz representative
of operations is attached to each axis. A liaison offioer may
also appear at the regimental level if an important task has
been assigrd to a certain regiment and/or faulty execution
there would Impede the entire operation,
AirM
25. There will be allocated an Air Jag,, rhich will consist of ton
divisions of fighters and two divisions of bosbars. Two reglasnts
will be allotted during the might of advanee to contest until the
arrival at the river and the a steblishm nt of a bridgsheadi oat
squadron will be per arssnUy alrborms (in Polish Zwwa-6 8 aircraft).
26. planing of air support is rude at front headquartrs. Factors
intlaeneing the planaac3ng are the :member of sorties allotted each
unit or mission, the types of bombs to be carried (for exauple,
$E ET
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500-k11ogr'R bombs for bridges of heavy Iran construction,,
.kilogram bombs, eta.) and the types of aircraft.
27. The major part of aircraft is committed an the first day of
operations. A front (in this exaapie) will be allotted six
Jet aircraft divisions and t m bomber divisions. Among these
there will be one special bomber divisions for atomic bombs.
the range of bombing aircraft is up to 2,500 kiloimstera. This
includes range to target (airfield to front), 700 kilometers,
and operational depth of f'soat, 300 kilometers, constituting
an operational radius of 1,000 to 1,200 kilmosters. From this
allocation of six divisions of Jet aircraft and too bomber
divisions, allotnente will be ss