THE POLISH-EAST GERMAN BORDER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00246A048000500001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 37
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 20, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 15, 1959
• Content Type: REPORT

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INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION R,EPCRT
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title
18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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COUNTRY East Germany-Poland
SUBJECT The Polish-East German Border
DATE OF
INFO.
PLACE, &
DATE ACQ.
SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITI
the Polish-East German border, including security measures and border
police organizations on both sides.
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STATE X ARMY NAVY X AIR X FBI AEC NSA X
(Note: Washington distribution indicated by "X"; Field distribution by ".#".)
INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT
REPORT
DATE DISTR.
NO. PAGES
b APR
1
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COUNTRY: East Germany-Poland
SECRET
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DATE: 12 March 1959
NO, OF PAGES- 36
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Description
Ao Boundary Lines. (See Annex A.)
1. The border between East Germany and Poland begins in the north at the
Baltic Sea between Ahlbeck, East Germany, and Swinoujscie (Swinemu,_rde`,
Poland, and runs generally south in a fairly direct line to the East
German town of Zittau on the Czechoslovakian border. Although basically
a land boundary, it passes at intervals through bodies of water..
2. The border line has the following sectors:
a. From the Baltic, the border runs south for a relatively short dis-
tance over level terrain and then crosses Szczecin Bay, a fresh water
lake. The western part of this lake, the Kleiner Haff, belongs to
East Germany; the larger, eastern part, the Grosser Haff, with its
entry to Swinoujscie (called in Polish Piastowski Kanal, in German
Kaiserfahrt), belongs to Poland. The water boundary is indicated by
buoys with the appropriate city insignia.
b. From the southern edge of the Haff, the border runs in a southerly
direction through the Neuwarper See (Polish Nowowarpienskie Jezioro)
and then is formed by the Beeck, a stream which flows from the Gross
,1..tzelburger See (Wielkie Jezioro Mysliborskie) into the Neuwarper
See.
c. South of the Gross Mftzelburger See, the border returns to land, run-
ning through woods and meadows.
d. Further south, the border continues on land, except where it crosses
the Stolzenb,rg (St-_lec.` and Blanken Lakes.
e. The border reaches the Oder River just below the village of Gartz in
East Germany. The center of the Oder forms the boundary from there
through Frankfurt an der Oder; above, it is the center of the Neisse
River through &,-~e~litz to Zittau, which is at an angle where the bound-
aries of East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia come together.
B. Border Security Measures. (See Annex B.)
to The border from the Baltic to Zittau was secured by border guards,, on the
German side members of the East German Border Police (Grenzbereitschaft),
on the Polish side soldiers of the Polish Frontier Defense Troops (WOP -
Wojsko Ochrony Pogranicza).
2. Both Germans and Poles employed a series of security measures or the border.
These consisted, in addition to patrols, of:
(1,
Border stakes marked with numbers and city insignia.
(2j Observation towers and observation posts in trees.
(3) Barriers on roads and railroads leading to the border.
(4) Technical devices e.g. acoustic signals and rockets connected to
tripwires.
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b. On the Polish side:
(1) Border stakes marked with numbers and city insignia.
(2) Wire fences of various heights.
(3) Observation towers and observation posts in trees.
(4) Barriers on roads and railroads leading to the border.
(5) A plowed control strip, usually 10 meters wide.
(6) Various technical devices- tripwires connected to rockets,
lights, etc.
3. Equipment of the troops on both sides consisted of weapons, field glasses
(usually former military equipment), and special clothing for various
seasons. Both sides used vehicles of various sorts, including motorcycles,
with or without sidecars, and, for the river sectors, boats. The German
boats were built at the yacht works in East Berlin and were much faster
than the Polish, which were always old craft purchased from fishermen.
Patrol craft on the Oder normally traveled at 40 to 50 kilometers per hour.
Both sides had both guard and tracking dogs.
4. A completely functional telephone network was maintained on both sides of
the border in each company area; no connection was permitted with units out-
side the area. The network consisted of a simple military field cable, run-
ning along the border at a distance of about 200 meters from it. The cable
waq secured to trees, with a connection to each observation tower and plugs
attached to the trees at intervals of about 300 meters. Each sentry carried
a telephone headset, so that he could telephone from whatever point he had
reached. The network on the German side was established by Wollweber when
he was Minister of State Security and covered all the East German borders,
5. Both Polish and East German border guards used tripwires connected to rockets
and acoustical devices. Tripwires were usually placed parallel to the border
and RO to 100 meters back from it, depending on the terrain.
a. Rockets were used at night primarily in wooded areas where visibility, for
example from observation towers, was limited. Hidden tripwires were con-
nected directly with the rocket launchers; the wire was about as thick as
horse hair and ran 50 to 100 meters between launchers. It was not uncommon
to have acoustical devices, such as pieces of iron, suspended from the
tripwire, which clanged when the wire was touched. The East German rocket
launchers were believed better than the Polish, but the Polish tripwires
connected to light poles were very good, turning on strong lights and
illuminating the whole area where the wire was hit. (See Annex C.)
b. The East Germans also had tripwires connected to concealed earth observa-
tion bunkers; there were about six such bunkers on the Polish border,
When touched, the wire triggered a red light in the bunker, Two border
guards manned each bunker about six to eight hours a day.
co Different colors were used to indicate whether the flares were sent up
on the East German or Polish side. The colors used for a given month
were coordinated at a monthly meeting. Special colors and combinations
were used to indicate the detection of a crosser, the need for an
officer, the need for an NCO, and an emergency.
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6. Before the fifteenth of each month, usually about the twelfth, Polish
and East German border guard representatives at regimental level held
a meeting to coordinate security measures for the coming month. At
this time they arranged the deployment of personnel and the color of
signal flares and designated sensitive border areas. If the Poles were
short of men in a particular sector, the East Germans would cover it,
and vice versa.
East German Border Security (between East Germany and Poland)
A. Border Sectors. (See Annex D.)
The northern part of the border on the German side was divided into areas
under two border police commands, the Greifswald Border Police Regiment and
the Loecknitz Border Police Regiment. The Greifswald Regiment was subordin-
ate to the Rostock Brigade, which was responsible for the northern water
frontier. Greifswald was responsible for the area from the Baltic to the
Kalkbergen (Chalk Mountains), north of Rieth Island (Wender). The area south
to Zittau was under the Frankfurt/Oder Brigade, which was broken down into
the Loecknitz and Goerlitz Grenzbereitschaften (Regiment). (The,land border
covered by the Loecknitz Regiment was only about 50 kilometers in length, the
rest being water border.) The border and its defenses included the following
sectors:
1. From the Baltic to the village of Caminke on the Haff, controlled by a
border police company of the Greifswald regiment, at Ahlbeck. This was
primarily a land border, running from the Haff about three kilometers
south over level terrain through an area that was all meadows and then
further south through an extensively wooded area. The land border was
equipped with sentry posts, and the police company had about four, dogs.
No alarm devices were known to exist there. The entire Baltic beach
area was guarded. Both the Poles and the Germans considered the security
of this area important.
2. From Caminke through the Haff and the Neuwarper See, controlled by a
border police company of the Greifswald Regiment. The company was small
because it was responsible only for guarding the Haff and the adjacent
lake and left the land border to adjacent companies. BoELs, usually
manned by three policemen, were used; the men had one machine pistol per
boat. Technical aids were less important than guards. The entire Haff
was observed by day from both observation towers and boats.
3. From the Kalkenbergen through the Gross Muetzelburger See, controlled
by a company of the Loecknitz Border Police Regiment, with headquarters
at Rieth.
a. The village of Rieth had about 400 inhabitants. About 50 were
owners of large fishing businesses, about 1.00 of small fishing
businesses; there was a small percentage of independent craftsmen;
the rest of the community were farmers. The SED was one of the
smallest political parties in the town; most citizens belonged to
to the NPDP. The attitude of the population toward the East German
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government was not very good, because fishermen had no opportunity
to fish their old waters, in many cases inherited from their
ancestors. When an attempt was made to force them to construct
communal landings, they refused, saying they would rather stop fish-
ing. The one tavern in the village, the Blauer See, was run by a
wom
Relations between the population and the border police were generally
poor because the police fined the fishermen for the slightest offense.
The Gross Muetzelburger See was managed by a master fisherman, Werner
b. The border in this area was difficult to observe; from the Neuwarper
See it ran for a short distance through a forest, then across open
meadow land. The border there was the Beeck, a stream about two
meters wide. About one kilometer from the Neuwarper See an unused
railroad track, raised somewhat above the surrounding terrain, crossed
the border. There were no definite roads. A road was once constructed
south from the Muetzelburger See to the town of Mysliborz (Muetzelburg),
on the Polish side; it was still called Holzstrasse but could not be
traveled because it had greatly deteriorated.
c. A sentry post, occupied day and night, was maintained on both the
abandoned railroad and the Holzstrasse. There were other individual
observation posts in towers and trees along the border. These were
not always all occupied; they were manned under assignments from the
company staff according to the points considered critical at the
moment because of the number and location of border crossers. At
least three sentry posts were maintained on the border by day and
four at night; this arrangement was not expected to change before 1960.
d. Patrols were sent through the area during each 24-hour period. These,
and the constant changes of sentry posts, would give an observer the
impression that the area contained a large number of border police.
Patrols and observation posts were both active within a distance of
about 800 meters from the border.
e. Acoustical and visual signal devices were used. The wires that set
off the signal devices ran for a distance of some 40 meters inland
from the border; with a little attention, they could be discovered.
4. From the south end of the Gross Muetzelburger See south to the village
of Glasshuette, controlled by a company of the Loecknitz Regiment, with
headquarters at Hintersee.
a. The village of Hintersee had about 800 residents, of whom about 200
were farmers. The SED was the strongest political party but carried
on no political activity; since the FDJ (Freie Deutsche Jugend)
(Free German Youth) leaders provided no activities, most of the
membership had gone to the "Young People's Community." The other
parties, CDU, NDP, and NDPD, were very small and had no influence.
The community had a bicycle club, which has been in existence since
about 1938; although its members were not political party members,
they actively opposed the East German regime. There had been several
investigations by the State Security Service, the Intelligence Ser-
vice of the border police, and the criminal police, but nothing had
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been proved against any of the members,
b. Most of this part of the border ran through a large forest, with
only occasional meadows. A fence, two and a half meters high?
and Y-shaped, ran along the Polish side of the border. Security
on the German side was handled by patrols and observation posts in
towers and trees and on the ground. There were four posts, each
manned day and night by two sentries, but sentries were often drunk
or asleep. A road ran from;the village of Hintersee toward Poland,
but there was no traffic on it. It passed the Border Police head-
quarters and was closed by a barrier and trench at the border, with
a sentry permanently on guard.,
ca Visual and acoustic signal and alarm devices were used. The trip-
wires extended from the fence a distance of about 40 meters; they
could be seen by close inspection.
do There was much poaching in this area, pince most of the border
police were corrupt and could be bribed.
5. From near the village of Hintersee to about 500 meters beyond the Pam-
power See, controlled by a border police company of the Loecknitzz Regi-
ment with headquarters at Pampow0
ao The village had about 500 residents, of whom the majority worked on
farms. The SED was the strongest party but carried on little polit-
ical activity. Most of the young people belonged to the FDJ, which
had a number of assistance groups that, when needed, supported the
border police in searching for illegal border crossers0 Relations
between the population and the border police were generally good.
bo Half of the border ran through woods, the rest through meadows; near
the village of Stolzenburg, it ran through the Stolzenburger See.
The lake was leased by a fisherman from the village of Blankensee
and was not fished on the Polish side A destroyed railroad line,
south of the Stolzenburger See, crossed the border into Poland; the
right-of-way was easily observable grom any point in the vicinity,
A road running south to Daber was In use on the Polish side.
co The border was guarded by observation posts in the trees and in
towers; by ground observation and listening posts; and by patrols.
d. Visual and acoustic alarm devices were used, the tripwires running
some 40 meters inland from the fence. Between 1952 and 1958, these
devices were not in very good condition; sometimes the wires were
broken or there were no flares in the visual alarm devices,
6. From about 500 meters south of the Pampower See to an area near Daber,
Poland, controlled by a company of the Loecknitz Regiment, with head-
quarters at Blankenseeo
ao The village had about 500 inhabitants, mostly farmers; a collect-
ive farm there was one of the poorest in Pasewalk Kreiso The SED
was the strongest party in the village but almost completely inactive
politically; some members joined other organizations. Among these
were CDU, relatively strong; DBD, relatively weak; NDP, relatively
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weak; NDPD, relatively strong; FDJ, relatively strong; And the DSF,
FDGB, and DPF. The minister in the community was expert at bringing
young people into the church; a number of FDJ members joined the
"Young People's Community." During the 1958 elections, however, the
minister's appeal to the citizens to refrain from voting was disre-
garded by the majority.
b. The border in this area was for the most part visible, at least in
the southern area, where it.ran.moatly through a.sandy region; the
northern part ran through a large forest. There was a road, passable
almost to the border on the German side, but blocked at the border,
where it had been dug up by the border police. A path lying north of
the road, also crossing the border, had a trench dug across it at the
border line.
c. The border in this area was guarded by ground observation posts,
tower observation posts, and patrols, which continually changed their
routes.
d. Visual and acoustic alarm devices were used, but only in the northern
part of this sector. Dogs were used by the border police, in a vary-
ing pattern of patrols; the company had four dogs,
7. From near Daber, Poland, to the border check point on the railroad at
Grambow, controlled by a company of border police of the Loecknitz Regi-
ment with headquarters at Neu Lienken. The railroad line was supposed to
be the sector boundary, but changes were constantly made; one month the
line was guarded by the Neu Lienken company, the next by the adjacent
company at Ladenthin.
a. The village of Neu Lienken had only about 30 residents, almost all
farmers or members of the border police. There was little political
activity. Relations with the border police were good. Some residents
in the town, the farmers from their fields, and residents along the
road could see the border, When they observed anything suspicious, they
reported it to the border police.
b. In the southern part of the sector, the border, which was quite easily
visible, ran through a wooded area as far as the former main highway
between Szczecin and Loecknitz. This road was still in use, under
certain conditions, by vehicles from both East Germany and Poland,
nrimari1v by the border police in East Germany and the WOP in Poland;
25X1
This road was always guarded by a two-man posh A main highway
paralleled the border on the German side; this was open to civilian
traffic, and identification was never checked. The border could be
seen very well from this road. Smaller roads were trenched at the
border.
c. South of the Szczecin-Loecknitz road was a railroad line from Szczecin
to Grambow, used by repatriation trains and freight trains traveling
through East Germany to other countries. The railroad line was always
guarded by a two-man post.
d. The border in the north of the sector was not easily visible. Alarm
devices were used for security, which was not done in the southern
part.
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e. This sector of the border was considered critical for illegal border
crossing and was accordingly under strict security. The best and
most capable border pQLice were assigned to it, although the sector
was small. Observation towers were always occupied, and at night
five two-man petrels covered the area; one of them always had a dog.
8. Grambow Border Control Point (KPP), manned by a company of border police
of the Loecknitz Regiment. The command post was just across from the
railroad station and was easily seen. The personnel spent the day at the
railroad station checking trains coming in from Poland. (See Annex E.)
a. Each transport of repatriates had an escort, who carried a list of
all passengers. When the train arrived in the control post area,
the escort turned over the list to the border police. Loudspeakers
in the area informed travelers that they must remain in the train.
Three border police guarded the far side of the train so that no
one could get off. The remaining guards entered the train with the
customs officials and collected exit permits. These they took to the
administration building and compared with the list received from the
escort. After it was determined that a name was on the list, a
transit visa was stamped in the permits, which were returned to the
travelers. Meanwhile, customs officials searched the entire train
for unauthorized persons and undeclared items. Af ter the Ars'nection
was completed, the train was permitted to proceedi
b. The border police also inspected all trains to and from Loecknitz
and inspected the identification of all passengers.
c. Grambow had about 500 inhabitants. The leading political party was
the SID. Good relations existed between the border police and the
local population, especially the local railroad employees, Railroad
employees living in the huts along the railroad line earned more
bounty by turning in illegal border crossers than the amount; of their
regular salaries.
9. From the Szczecin-Grambow railroad line to the Szczecin-Berlin Autobahn,
controlled by a border police company of the Loecknitz Regiment stationed
at Ladenthin.
a. The border was completely visible, and the number of illegal. border
crossers was much smaller than, for example, in the Neu Lienken
sector.
b. The first road south of the railroad line, called Bobliner I?amm, was
trenched at the border so that vehicles could not be taken across.
The second road, from Ladenthin to Bedurgowo (Mandelkow) in Poland,
called Kirschallee, was also trenched on the German side to halt
vehicular traffic. The next five paths crossing the border were like-
wise trenched.
c. The Autobahn, which carried freight traffic between Poland and other
countries and East Germany, was not guarded on the German side, but
there were permanent sentry posts on the Polish side, with two guards
on duty day and night.
10. From the Szczecin-Berlin Autobahn to the Oder River, controlled by a
border police company with headquarters at Rosow; this was the last land
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sector controlled by the Loecknitz Regiment.
a. The border in this sector was generally quite visible and therefor
easy to secure. It was not considered critical, and few illegal
crossings there were reported between 1952 and 1958.
b. The border was secured primarily by observation towers and ground
posts, and by patrols. Few alarm devices were used on the German
side, except where the border was not visible.
c. Students at the Storkow border police school, although not usually
engaged in operational border duty, might be ordered out to help
search if an illegal border crossing occurred in the area.
11. The Oder River, controlled by companies of the Loecknitz Regiment.
a. Companies along the Oder included:
(1) Section II, Oderberg, with headquarters at Guestebiese, Oder-
berg, Schwedt, and Gartz and a border control point at Gartz.
(2) Section I, Kietz, with headquarters at Kietz and Kienitz and
two other points.
b. Border security measures were the same in all sectors. The primary
security was by boats, the secondary by patrols and observation
towers. Bridges across the Oder were manned 24 hours a day by a
double guard. Alarm devices and dogs were not used,
B. German Border Police 0rgani^at1on.
1. The East German border police was organized in brigades with subordinate
regiments (Grenzbereitschaften) divided into battalions. The over-all
organization for East Germany included the following unitsa
a. Perleberg Brigade.
(1) Schoenberg Regiment.
(2) Wittenburg Regiment.
(3) Grabow Regiment.
(4) Wittenberge Regiment,
b. Magdeburg Brigade.
(1) Salzwedel Regiment.
(2) Gardelegen Regiment.
(3) Oschersleben Regiment.
(4) Marienborn Regiment, KPP.
(5) Halberstadt Regiment
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c. Erfurt Brigade.
(1) Nordhausen Regiment.
(2) Muehll-airen Regiment.
(3) Sondershausen Officers'School.
(4) Eisenach Regiment.
(5) Meiningen Regiment.
(6) Hildburghausen Regiment.
d. Karl-Marx-Stadt (Chemmitz) Brigade.
(1) Sonneberg Regiment.
(2) Plauen Regiment.
(3) Klingenthal Regiment.
(4) Pirna Regiment.
e. Rostock Brigade.
(1) Greifswald Regiment, with battalions at Stralsund, Bergen,
Wolgast, and one other place.
(2) Rostock Regiment.
(3) Two other regiments.
f. Potsdam Brigade, with two regiments.
g. Frankfurt/Oder Brigade.
(1) Loecknitz Regiment, with battalions at Loecknitz, Storkow,
Oderberg, and Kietz.
(2) Goerlitz Regiment, with battalions at Frankfurt/Oder, Forst,
Weisswasser, and one other place.
h. Border Guard Schools.
(1) Berlin, drivers' school.
(2) Doemitzle, NCO school.
(3) Erfurt, administration school.
(4) Leipzig, medical teehnicians'(Feldscher) school.
(5) Ruegen, radio school.
(6) Sondershausen, officers' school.
(7) Tetrow, intelligence school.
(8) Wittenberg, unidentified school.
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2. A regimental headquarters consisted of the following:
a. Commander (Kommandeur).
b. Chief of staff (Stab-chef), responsible for:
(1) Border Service (Grenzdienst), planning and cartography,
about five men.
(2) Communications (Nachrichten), about 12 men.
(3) Cryptographic Section (OP-VII).
(4) Judge Advocate (Staatsanwalt).
(5) Message Center, including couriers and control of classified
documents (VS Abteilung and Kurier).
(6) Engineer Detachment (Pionierzug), about 20 men.
(7) Headquarters Company (Stabskompanie), about 30 men.
(8) Enlisted personnel (Mannsch. Kader).
(9) Officer personnel (Offz. Kader).
(10) Training (Schulung), about five men; this might include weapons
training, with one man.
c. Deputy commander for political and cultural matters (Stellvertreter
Polit), responsible for:
(1) Party matters (Partei), about two men; another two men might be
assigned to Party agitation.
(2) Youth matters (Jugendfragen) (FDJ), about two men.
(3) Propaganda (Propaganda), about two men.
(4) Library (Bibliothek).
(5) Political training (Schulung), about 10 men.
d. Deputy commander for supply (Stellvertreter Versorgung), also called
deputy for rear services (Rueckwaertige Dienste), responsible for:
(1) Furniture and equipment (Innenausruestung), including weapons
and armament, with about three men.
(2) Rations (verpflegung), about 10 men.
(3) Uniforms (Bekleidung).
(4) Finance (Finanzen), about four men.
(5) Medical care (Kranken Revier or Gesundheitswesen), about
three men.
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(1) MfS Subsection 1/6 representatives, usually two, responsible for
personnel security in the border police.
(2) Border police intelligence (Aufklaerung) representatives, usually
two.
(3) Special services, such as the Chemical Service (Chemische Dienste),
with one man.
3.- A battalion headquarters had the following organization:
a. Commander (Leiter), deputy commander (Stellvertreter), political deputy
(Stellvertreter Polit), border guard operations deputy (Stellvertreter
fuer Grenzdienst), intelligence aide (Aufklaerungsmitarbeiter) and MfS
aide (MfS Mitarbeiter).
b. A guard force (Wache) of 10 men.
4. A border guard company was organized as follows:
a. Commander, deputy commander for operations,deputy commander for politi-
cal matters, and a company clerk (Innendienst Leiter).
b. Company group leaders (Grupruiiehrer), five to eight,and 30 to 60 guards
(Soldaten).
5. The border police were all well armed, with Soviet Army weapons of World
War II types. The normal armament for a company consisted of:
About 40
About 20
About 5
44 machine pistols )
44 carbines )
T-33 pistols )
7.62 calibre
3 44 light machineguns )
About 10 flare pistols
According to order No. 100 issued by the East German Minister of Interior,
many changes in armament were to be made by 1960.
C. East German Border Police Organization on the Polish Border. (See Annex F.)
1. The East German-Polish border was controlled by three border guard regi-
ments: Greifswald, Loecknitz,'and Goerlitz. They had each approximately
1200 to 1500 men, organized in battalions of about 300 men and companies of
from 40 to 70 men. Regiments on the Western border were smaller, with
about 800 men, and therefore each covered a smaller border sector.. Accord-
ing to East German Ministry of Interior Directive No. 100, the border
police on the eastern border were to be organized by 1960 into a more mili-
tary structure. In the new organization, each border brigade was to have
four regiments, each regiment four battalions, and each battalion four com-
panies. The regiments on the Polish border were to be stationed at Anger-
muende (or Eberswalde); Cottbus, Forst, or Stalinstadt; Loecknitz; and
Goerlitz. No changes were planned for the western border organization.
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2. The Greifswald Regiment had two companies on this border:
a. At Ahlbeck, on the Baltic opposite Swinoujscie. This company
occupied a massive concrete structure somewhat outside the
village. Its primary responsibility was the land border between
the Haff and the village of Caminke, but it also assisted the
adjacent company by observing persons attempting to cross the
Baltic illegally. The authorized strength of the company was three
officers, an administrative chief, five operational and two admin-
istrative NCOs, and 20 chief and 25 ordinary sentries, the latter
including two motorcycle riders and two to four dog handlers. The
unit was usually up to strength, although there were constant shifts
of individual personnel because of leave, illness, or official
business. Armament was about the usual amount.
b. At Caminke. This company was very small. It depended on boats
rather than technical devices. Boat crews of three men, armed with
one machine pistol, carried on patrols; they were relieved individ-
ually by a prearranged schedule.
3. The Loecknitz Regiment controlled an area from the Kalkenbergen almost
to Frankfurt/Oder, divided into four sections:
a. Section I, Kietz, with companies at Kietz and Kienitz.
b. Section II, Oderberg, with companies at Guestebiese, Oderberg,
Schwedt, and Gartz.
(1) Company at Rosow, under a commander, Lt. Fleischer (fnu).
Personnel included a deputy for operational and a deputy
for political matters, an administrative chief, about four
operational and two administrative NCOs, about 15 senior and
15 ordinary sentries, a driver, and about three dog handlers.
Armament consisted of five anti-tank weapons, 10 flare pistols,
and the following 7.62 calibre weapons: twenty-four 44 machine
pistols, fifteen 44 carbines, three light machineguns, and five
33 pistols. Field glasses were used as technical equipment.
(2) Company at Ladenthin. The commander was Lt. Kadur (fnu); he
had a political and an operational deputy and an administrative
chief, with the usual unit composition.
(3) The border control point unit (KPP) at Grambow. This unit,
which had no border security duties beyond checking trains, was
commanded by Sgt. 1/C Sonntag (fnu) and included three NCOs and
five privates. Its armament consisted of five machine pistols
and five pistols; no other weapons were used in control point
units. The unit was composed of selected border police and had
very good discipline.
(4) The border control point at Gartz.
(5) The border police training school at Storkow. This school,
located on the Autobahn, gave three-month courses, with an
average class of about 150 students, to new men just assigned to
.the border police. Students were sometimes called out to help
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in searches for illegal border crossers (see above), although
normally they did not participate in operational border duty.
The trainees made it difficult for an illegal border crossing
to succeed because they were always eager and alert and did
not sleep on duty.
(1)Company at Neu Lienken. The commander was Senior Lt. Otto
Sehmidtke, his political deputy Lt. Karsten (fnu). Other
personnel were an operational deputy, an administrative chief;
five operational and two administrative NCOs; about 20 senior
and 25 ordinary sentries; two drivers; and four dog handlers.
Discipline was good, with no punishments for infractions and
no sleeping on post. The best and most capable border police
were assigned to this company. Armament included 7.62 calibre
weapons: about thirty 44 machine pistols, thirty 44 carbines,
three 44 light machineguns, and five 33 pistols; 10 flare pistols,
and five light anti-tank weapons. Technical equipment consisted
of about 10 pairs of field glasses, five company telephones, and
10 telephone receivers at individual border posts.
(2)Company at Blankensee. The commander was Lt. Jawoscheck (fnu);
his political deputy was Lt. Schade (fnu) and his operational
deputy Lt. Braun (fnu). The company included an administrative
chief; four operational and two administrative NCOs, about 15
senior and 15 ordinary sentries, two drivers, and four dog
handlers. Discipline in this company was almost the poorest in
the regiment; much drinking went on, unit members were insub-
ordinate, and sentries were frequently reported asleep at their
posts. There were also many instances of fighting with civilians
in the villages. The company was armed with about 20 machine
pistols, fifteen 44 carbines, five 33 pistols, and three 44
machineguns, all of 7.62 calibre; five light anti-tank weapons;
and 10 flare pistols.
(3)Company at Pampow. The commander was Lt. Rudi Stutzke; other
personnel were a political and an operational deputy, both
lieutenants, an administrative chief; four operational and two
administrative NCOs; about 30 sentries, half chief and half
ordinary; a driver; two dog handlers; And two women cooks,
civilian employees subordinate to the administrative chief.
Discipline was good, thanks to the company commander. Very few
punishments had to be imposed; sentries did not sleep at their
posts; there was no drunkenness or fighting; and the police
could not be bribed.
(4)Company at Hintersee< The company was commanded by Senior Lt.
Heinz Wendler, Other personnel were a deputy for political
matters; a deputy for operational matters, Junior Lt. Schmidt
(fnu); five operational and two administrative NCOs; about 20
chief and 25 ordinary sentries; one driver; and three dog her-
dlers. Some of the company were always on leave, sick, or under
arrest. Discipline was very poor, since all border police who
committed offenses in any of the other companies were trans-
ferred into this one. It had the largest number of cases of
sleeping on post, fighting, and drinking. Poaching was very prev-
alent in the company's sector, since most of the police were
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corrupt and would take bribes. The number of good men in the
company was too small to be considered. The company's armament
consisted of machine pistols, carbines, TT-33 pistols, flare
guns, light machineguns, and light anti-tank weapons.
(5) The company at Rieth. This company, commanded by Lt. Bahnke
(fnu), included a deputy for political matters, an administra-
tive chief, five operational and two administrative NCOs, and
about 20 chief and 20 ordinary sentries, including drivers and
dog handlers. Company discipline was very good, thanks to the
commander. Armament was normal.
4. The border. police was responsible for cooperation with the appropriate
agencies in their border sectors.
a. Agencies with which relations were maintained included:
(1) The People's Police (Volkspolizei): District (Bezirk)
and Kreis officials, stations, and sector representatives.
(2) The State Security Service (MfS): District administration,
principally 1/6, HA II, Section XII, and Section XIII; Kreis
offices, particularly Section II 5.
(3) The SID: District and Kreis offices and individual factory
groups.
(4) The FDJ: District and Kreis offices.
(5) Government offices: The District and Kreis Councils.
(6) The Natior,a,1 Front, to a limited extent.
(7) The National People's Army: Local agencies and offices.
(8) The Soviet Army: Agencies in the area.
b. So-called "security conferences" were held once a month with the
SID. These were at two levels, district and Kreis,
(1) District conferences included the commander and deputy com-
mander for political matters of the Border Police Regiment and
the chief of the Border Police Intelligence Section; the
district Party secretary and security section chief; the MfS
district administrative chief; the district People's Police
chief; and the chief of Section K of the district authority.
When matters concerning Poland were to be discussed, the proper
representative from Poland was invited; this would normally be
the chief of the appropriate WOP border brigade. If matters
concerning the Soviet Army were discussed, the highest ranking
local Soviet military representative attended. At these con-
ferences, all matters affecting the security of the district in
any manner which had occurred in the previous month were dis-
cussed: defections to the West, espionage cases, sabotage cases,
and possible diversionary acts; major investigations of the
People's Police; details of illegal border crossing questions; and
border police matters such as offices, morale, provision of tech-
nical aids, and employment of new policemen. These conferences
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usually began in the morning and ended in the evening, lasting
about 20 hours. There was no fixed schedule; the next meeting
was set each time by the participants.
(2) Kreis security conferences were held monthly, but not on a fixed
date. They were attended by the chief and political deputy of the
border police section and the responsible case officer of the
Intelligence Section; the Chief of the MfS Kreis office; he Kreis
Party secretary; the chief of the Kreis People's Police office and
the chief of his K Section. The same matters at Kreis level as
those discussed in the district conference formed the agenda, ex-
cept that matters concerning Poland and the Soviet Army were not
discussed at Kreis level.
c. In case of alerts of Condition I or Condition II, previously designated
liaison officers were sent by the Border Police Regiment to the individual
People's Police offices to support them. Aid was given in every conceivable
form, including personnel and vehicles. The liaison officers were also em-
powered to use the trained search groups for the People's Police. Border
police companies maintained their own liaison with local representatives of
the People's Police.
A. Polish Border Sectors
The East German-Polish border had three critical points for illegal border
crossings: the area west of Szczecing the highway and railroad control points
at Frankfurt/Oder, and a short stretch of land border between the Oder and
Neisse Rivers. The border was divided into the following sectors.
1. The Haff and the Neuwarper See, controlled by the Neuwarp WOP company, with
headquarters in the Polish side of Neuwarp (Nowe Warpno)0
a. The Polish shore of the Haff and the Neuwarper See had a plowed strip
10 meters wide; there was no fence. Technical devices were apparently
used to protect the border, and there were observation towers and
boats. This sector was considered particularly sensitive because of
the army installations in Szczecin.
b. A restricted area ran about five or six kilometers back from the border;
strangers required a special pass to enter. This area was called the
second security belt. All roads were closed off and guarded by sentries.
Persons living or working in the restricted area had permanent passes,
permitting them to enter it at any time; they were valid only for six
months and had to be renewed ytt the appropriate WOP office. Persons
from other parts of Poland wishing to visit relatives in this area had to
apply to the militia office at their place of residence, submitting with
the application an approval from the mayor of the place they wished to
visit, certifying that the community had no objection to the visit.
Special passes for such visitors were issued with a specific date of
expiration. The holder had to report personally to the local WOP office
on arrival at his destination and on departure.
c. The Haff and the Neuwarper See were closed to tourists and *o special
passes were issued for the area. Individual boat landings of the Polish
fishermen were guarded day and night by WOP personnel. Fishermen were
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allowed on the water only from sunrise to sunset and)when they
went out in a boats must leave their papers with the WOP sentries,
in exchange for a pass authorizing them to move about on the water.
If a fisherman did not turn in his identity document and was later
checked by a WOP water patrol, his fishing license was withdrawn
and he was barred for fishing for some time. If he was not on good
terms with the authorities and was known to oppose the Polish govern-
ment, his license was revoked.
d. Each community near the border contained a large number of recruited
sources working for intelligence and counterintelligence agencies.
These individuals had the mission of watching visitors.
2. From the Neuwarper See to and through the Gross Muetzelburger See, con-
trolled by a WOP company with headquarters at Mysliborz Maly (Klein
Muetzelburg).
a. The communities of Mysliborz Maly and Mysliborz Wielki (Gross
Muetzelburg) were inhabited by civilians, mostly woodcutters. Some
fishermen fished in the Klein Muetzelburger See; fishing in the Gross
Muetzelburger See was forbidden on the Polish side. The forest house
in Mysliborz Wielki was manned by Germans, who said very little about
themselves and gave the impression they were recruited sources of
Polish intelligence agencies. The chief forester was a German who
formerly belonged to the Nazi Party but had currently no party affil-
iation.
b. Part of the border was formed by the Beeck, a stream with an average
width of about two meters and a depth of from one half to one meter.
In normal seasons, a reasonably practiced Jumper could leap the
stream without difficulty. When a strong north wind rose in the
Baltic, however, the Beeck became full of water and the surrounding
meadows were completely flooded; under such circumstances, it would
be difficult for an illegal border crosser to get through.
c. In the northern part of the sector there was a railroad embankment
from which the line had been removed. At the border, the embankment
led to a bridge, which was under continuous guard by a hidden German
border policeman; on the Polish side the embankment was guarded only
at the second security belt, with no sentries actually on the border.
Farther south, the road which formerly ran between Mysliborz Maly and
Rieth, also on an embankment with a bridge across the Beeck, was
guarded at the bridge by Polish sentries, but there were no guard posts
directly at the bridge on the German side.
d. The northern part of the sector border ran through meadowland. The
southern part ran through a thick deciduous forest, where the trees
were close together and there was a heavy growth of underbrush.
Although illegal border crossers could arrive at the border unseen,
there was a 10-meter plowed strip, where trees and underbrush had been
removed. In the northern part, an embankment on a solid base through
the swampy parts of the land carried the plowed strip, which consisted
of sand about 30 centimeters deep, regularly raked over by hand. The
strip was in excellent condition and unusually well cared for. The
border fence was two and a half meters high and Y-shaped. It was not
certain whether the fence in this sector had been reduced in height.
Visual and acoustic signal devices were also used.
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e. No visitors were allowed in this area; residents of Mysl-iborz Maly
and Mysliborz Wielki could visit relatives outside the area but
could not receive return visits. Persons leaving the area had to
report to WOP authorities.
f. In both communities there were opportunities for illegal border
crossers to hide in collapsed houses and barns, where they were not
easily detected. Security in this area was very lax, as was learned
from illegal border crossers apprehended in East Germany.
3. The Stolec sector, controlled by a WOP company with headquarters at Stolec
(Stolzenburg).
a. The only water border in this area was the Stolzenburger See, near
the town. The 10-meter plowed strip, in very good condition, ran
around the Polish side of the lake. Fishing in this lake was pro-
hibited by both Germans and Poles, except that once a month permis-
sion was granted one fisherman from Blankensee to fish under the
supervision of a German border policeman.
b. A dismantled railroad line connecting Poland and East Germany ran
south of Stolec. This and the road which ran close to it were torn
up on both sides of the border.
c. The first Polish security belt extended 300 meters from the border,
which was marked with stakes and followed by a Y-shaped fence two
and a half meters high. The fence was supposed to be reduced to a
meter and a half, but this had not been done by May 1958. Beyond
the fence was a continuous line of alarm devices, such as tripwires,
which were interconnected and fired a flare when triggered, Three
tripwires were placed at approximately two-meter intervals between
the fence and the 10-meter strip. The strip was well cared for and
closely checked. The first belt ended with a series of observation
towers and tree platforms.
d. The second security belt was at the fringe of the restricted area,
about five kilometers from the border. Sentry assignment varied;
it was coordinated each month by the German and Polish border
commands. Visitors were not allowed in the restricted area; resi-
dents could go out to visit relatives but could receive visits only
from area residents who had special passes. Visits of residents with-
in the area did not have to be reported to the WOPO
e. The sector was not considered critical for illegal border crossing;
between 1952 and 1958, only two illegal border crossings were known
to have occurred there, and one of the crossers was apprehended in
East Germany. In the area north of the Stolzenburger See, however,
the forest was so thick and full of undergrowth that the Polish
sentries could not secure it completely.
4. The Blankensee sector, controlled by a WOP company at kzedziny (Nassen-
heide).
a. The border ran through the Pampower See, which was almost completely
dried up and was overgrown with reeds. From there it ran through a
meadow, very wet but never flooded.
b. The border was marked by stakes, with a meter-and-half high fence
beyond them. Beyond the fence were alarm devices- three tripwires,
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installed about 30 centimeters above the surface of the ground,
at intervals of about two meters; each released an alarm independ-
ently. Beyond the tripwires was the plowed strip, about eight
meters wide in this sector, over sandy terrain and in very good
condition. It was not known whether there were further alarm devices
beyond the strip.
c. Observation towers, observation posts, and patrols were used. In the
first security belt, observation towers were manned only during the
day. At night sentries manned hidden observation and listening posts,
which were frequently moved, and there were patrols. The second
security belt, about five kilometers from the border, marked a re-
stricted area. All roads leading into it were guarded by permanent
sentry posts.
d. In the southern part of the sector, near Boelninghof, there were tall
masts with lights which went on when a knee-high tripwire between the
masts was broken. This system ran south continuously to a point
opposite Ladenthin on the German side.
e. The road that crossed the border from north to south near Bankensee
was dug up on both sides of the border to close it to vehicular
traffic. A road parallel to the border on the Polish side was open
to traffic if the driver had a special pass.
f. This sector was not considered critical for illegal crossings and
security was not strongly emphasized. Guard discipline was not good,
and there was extensive illegal dealing with German border police.
5. Daber sector, to the Neu Lienken-Alt Lienken road, controlled by a WOP
company with headquarters at Daber.
a. The 10-meter plowed strip in this sector was not in particularly good
condition because the soil was poor. The border ran through a wooded
area.
b. Many communities in this area issued permits for visitors from out-
side the restricted area. Many agricultural workers who were employed
in this sector lived in or near Szczecin ?r d held special permanent
area passes.
c. The Neu Lienken-Alt Lienken road was torn up on both sides of the
border so that it was closed to vehicular traffic.
d. This sector was considered critical for illegal border grossing, and
security was strict. Persons who came to Szczecin seeking a way out
of Poland usually made their attempts in this sector.
6. From the Alt Lienken-Neu Lienkex road to Szczecin-Grambow railroad line,
controlled by a WOP company with headquarters at Do].uje (Neuenkirchen).
a. The border in this sector ran through mostly dry terrain but with a
few wet areas. Since the sector was considered critical, security
measures were very well organized.
b. The border in this sector was indicated by stakes, numbered from
south to north'in an 800 series. Beyond the stakes was the Y-shaped
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fence, two and a half meters high, and not scheduled to be made
lower. Beyond that was the 10-meter plowed strip, kept in excel-
lent condition and checked every half hour by a patrol, accomp-
anied by a responsible officer. Beyond it were three tripwires,
about two meters apart, operating independently of one another.
Beyond that was a line of masts at 80-meter intervals. A thick
evergreen forest began about 400 meters from the border on the
Polish side. Just in front of it was a line of observation
towers (but no observation posts in the trees), manned from dawn
to dark; patrols operated between them at night.
c. The Szczecin-Loecknitz road crossed the border in this sector.
The 10-meter plowed strip, not equipped with alarm devices, crossed
the road. Sentries were permanently on duty at the border crossing
point and immediately re-raked the strip after a vehicle had passed.
On the German side were two movable barriers, always locked; the key
was held by the sentry posted at the nearest observation tower. On
the Polish side was an unlocked and unguarded barrier, which a
traveler raised for himself, on the border edge of the _10-meter
plowed strip. About 200 meters inland from the first barrier was
another, at the entrance of the road to Daber. All vehicles travel-
ing to Daber and beyond were checked by the guards at this barrier
to see that drivers had the necessary papers for the restricted
area. On the south side of the road was a small stone guardhouse,
normally manned by two soldiers and an officer. The latter was
responsible for control of the 10-meter strip and issuance of per-
mission to proceed to persons with valid permits. This officer
normally spoke more than one language, since the road was the legal
crossing point for German security agency officials with valid
border permits and Western consular and diplomatic representatives.
Farther along the road, just outside DoluJe, was another WOP guard-
post where both through travelers and persons entering and leaving
the restricted area were checked.
d. The Szczecin-Grambow railroad line ran through an area covered with
bushes about two meters high. A railroad workers? hut stood about
400 meters from the border. A two-meter high superstructure of
glass had been added to this hut, from which sentries on duty could
observe the entire surrounding terrain. A very strong movable search-
light, which burned all night, installed here, permitted guards to
check the surrounding area for about 600 meters. From the Grambow
railroad station almost to the Stobno (Stoeven) station were lights
on masts on each side of the railroad embankment; they burned all
night, illuminating the embankment with daylight intensity. A
second railroad workers? hut stood on the eastern edge of Stobno; it
was modified like the other but did not have a searchlight. Three
sentries, one of whom remained outside at all times, were on duty at
each of these huts. Another sentry was on duty all night at the
point where the 10-meter strip crossed the railroad, and a pair of
sentries patrolled the railroad embankment day and night between the
border and the Stobno railroad station.
e. The second security belt was more heavily manned than the first or
the border itself. Its limit was beyond the village of Doluje. The
extra strength was intended to relieve the burden on the border guards
in this area of many illegal border crossing attempts.
f. The restricted area received from outside many workers, who had per-
manent passes, and residents were allowed to receive visits at any
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time from relatives who had obtained the necessary permits.
Additional checkpoints for entry and exit at Wolczkowo (Voelschen-
dorf) and Stobno had border troops who checked all permits, includ-
ing those of laborers employed in the area.
From the Szczecin-Berlin railroad line to the village of Barnislaw
(Barnimslow), controlled by a WOP company with headquarters at Bedargowo
(Mandelkow).
a. The border was marked by a line of stakes; beyond it was a fence
a meter and a half high, beginning at the railroad line. Beyond that
were three tripwires, operating independently, and beyond them the
10-meter plowed strip, which was here in very good condition because
the soil was sandy; even in wet weather the soil was spongy enough to
retain footprints. Beyond the strip were lights on masts; they
lighted when the tripwire was disturbed. Just beyond them was the
first security belt, made up of observation towers, used for daytime
control; not all towers were occupied. The area was patrolled at
night, the routes changing every 24 hours.
b. The second security belt was beyond the villages of Smolecin
(Schmellentin) and Kolbaskowo (Kolbitzow).
c. Individual paths and roads crossing the border in this sector were
torn up and not open to vehicular traffic.
d. Villages in this sector were open to visitors who had valid entry
permits. Anyone entering the area without a permit was considered
to be trying to cross the border illegally and was punished under
the appropriate laws.
e. This sector was not considered a critical security area, since the
border was easy to observe. From 1952 to 1958, only five illegal
border crossings were known to have occurred in the area between
the railroad line and the Autobahn, and all the crossers were cap-
tured. The possibility was not excluded that individuals might
have crossed undetected.
8. From the Barnislaw road to the Oder River, controlled by a WOP company
with headquarters at Kolbaskowo (Kolbitzow).
a. The border in this area was easily observable, with a sandy terrain.
All roads except the Autobahn were torn up on both sides of the
border to deny passage to vehicles. The Autobahn was guarded by two
sentries day and night. The railroad line was also dismantled, but
only on the Polish side.
b. The border was marked with stakes, then a meter-and-a-half high fence,
then three independently operating tripwires. Beyond these was the
plowed strip, 10 meters wide and in good condition because of the
sandy soil. On the far side of the strip was a line of alarm lights
on wooden masts, but these had been poorly installed and did not
function well. Observation towers, beyond that, were of standard
types.
9. Along the Oder, controlled by a WOP company, with headquarters at
Gryfino (Greifenhagen).
a. There was no fence on the Polish side of the Oder, but the plowed
strip ran along the bank and was well kept up. The border was
secured during the day by observation towers and at night by both
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stationary and patrolling boats. Dogs were not kept, since they
were of little use in the river sectors.
b. Outsiders were allowed to visit communities in this area if they
had valid permits; they had to report in and out in the villages
visited. Issuance of passes to this area was not as strictly con-
trolled as in some others; a person indicating a desire to find
work in the area could obtain a pass without difficulty.
c. Polish fishermen were not allowed to fish in the Oder. The Polish
government forbade them because of the large amount of smuggling
carried on between Polish and German fishermen.
d. This sector was typical of all the Oder boundary sectors. On the
river, sectors averaged about 10 kilometers, somewhat longer than
the normal land sector.
B. The Polish Border Forces. (See Annex Go)
1. Polish border forces were under the Ministry of Defense,. which was
under the influence of the Central Committee of the Polish United
Workers' (Communist) Party (PZ ?R). An office within the ministry was
responsible for border security The Polish border troops (WOE' -
Wojsko Oehrony Pogranieza - Frontier Defense Forces) were organized in
border brigades of about 1400 men each, divided into four to six
battalions, having in turn four to six companies (Kommando) of three
officers and 40 to 50 men each. A brigade headquarters had about 300
men, a battalion headquarters about 60 men. There was also an Intelli-
gence Section, subordinate to the individual unit chiefs. Counter-
intelligence activities in WOP units were carried on by the C,zurter-
intelligence Section of the Militia; the individual unit chiefs- had no
jurisdiction over counterintelligence agents. Battalions controlled
the deployment of sentry posts, patrols, alarm devices, and "rgani.za-
tional. sub-units, and company cimmanders were subordinate to them in
all matters.
2. Two WOP brigades,totaling about 3000 men, controlled the Polish-East
German border. The Szczecin Brigade controlled the area from the
Baltic to Frankfurt/Oder, the Frankfurt/Oder Brigade the territory from
there to Zittau on the Czech border.
3. The Szczecin Brigade had several battalions and the following units-
a. Stolec Battalion, with heqdquarters at Stolec (Stolzenburg),~
This battalion had six companies subordinate to it. Its head-
quarters personnel consisted of a commander, a political deputy,
a border service officer, three control officers (inspectors), a
counterintelligence officer, about five NCOs, about eight enlisted
men, three drivers, and a tracking dog handler. Its arms included
TT-33 pistols, machine pistols, and flare guns.
(1) Company at Nowe Warpno (Neuwarp).
This company had quarters In the middle of the town. It
consisted of a commander, a deputy for political and a
deputy for operational matters, an administrative chief, five
to eight NCOs, about 40 to 50 enlisted men, and about five
guard dogs.
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(2) Company at Mysliborz Maly (Klein Muetzelburg)o
This company consisted of a commander, a political and an
operational deputy, an administrative chief, five to eight
NCOs, 40 to 50 enlisted men, and three to five guard dogs.
It was armed with 44 carbines, TT-33 pistols, flare pistols,
and Polish-manufactured machine pistols. Discipline in this
company was not very good.
(3) Company at Stoleco
The company consisted of a commander, a political and opera-
tional deputy, an administrative chief, about eight NCOs,
40 to 50 enlisted men, about five dog handlers, and two
drivers. It was armed with 44 carbines, TT-33 pistols, flare
pistols, and Polish-made machine pistols. It had +~?o m,'.,tor-
cycles with sidecars.
(4) Company at Rzedziny (Nassenheide)0
This consisted of a commander, a deputy ff-r political and
for operational matters, an administrative chief, about five
NCOs, about 30 enlisted men, one driver, and about five dog
handlers. Discipline In this unit was lax. Sentries were
frequently absent from their posts or slept on duty. The men
were corrupt and had many illegal dealings with the German
border police opposite, exchanging geese and ammunition f-r
clothing and other items.
(5) Company at Daber.
This company consisted of a commander, a political and an
operational deputva an administrative chief, about five NCOs,
about 30 to 40 enlisted men, about five dog handlers, and a
driver. Discipline in the unit was very good; no soldiers
were punished for guard duty infractions.
(6) Company at Doluje (Neuenkirchen)0
This company consisted of a commander, a political and an
operational deputy, an administrative chief, about eight NCOs,
about 40 to 50 enlisted men, about five dog handlers, and two
drivers. It was armed with carbines, machine pistols, pistols,
and flare pistols. Under this company were two subunits:
(a) At Wolczkowo (Voel..schendorf), with a commander, a deputy,
a control officer, about three NCOs, about 10 enlisted
men, and a driver. Weapons were the same as for the com-
pany; there were no dogs.
(b) At Stobno (Stoeven), with the same composition and weapons.
b. The Oder Battalion, with headquarters at Gryfino (Greifenhagen)o
(1) Company at Bedargowo (Mandelkow).
This company consisted of a commander, a political and an
operational deputy, an administrative chief, about five NCOs,
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about 30 to 40 enlisted men, a driver, and about five dog
handlers. It was armed with 44 carbines, machine pistols,
pistols and flare pistols.
(2) Company at Kolbaskowo (Kolbitzow).
This company consisted of a commander, a political. and an
operational deputy, an administrative chief, about eight
NCOs, about 30 to 40 enlisted men, about five dog handlers,
and a driver. There may have been sub-wilts under this com-
pany.
(3) Company at Gryfino (Greifenhagen).
This company, one of the Oder River units, consisted of a
commander, a political and an operational deputy, an admin-
istrative chief, about eight NCOs, about 30 to 40 enlisted
men, and two drivers. Weapons were the same as those in the
other units. Some patrol boats were armed with a light
machinegun mounted on deck. There were no dog handlers, since
dogs were not very useful along the river.
e. The Swinoujscie (Swinemuende) Battalion.
d. The Kolobrzeg (Kolberg) Battalion.
e. The Ognica (Nipperwiese) Battalion.
f. The Kostrzyn (Kuestrin) Battalion.
g. The Frankfurt/Oder Battalion.
Border Control Techniques and Problems
A. Fences.
1. No fences were used on the German side of the border. The Polish
side, however, except in some of the water border areas, and across the
main railroads, had a continuous Y-shaped fence two and a half meters
high.
2. At the beginning of 1957, the Central Committee of the Polish United
Workers' (Communist) Party ordered the Polish border brigades to cut
down the high fences along the border with East Germany to a height of
1.50 meters. The fence posts were to be sawed off and the raw tops
were to be treated with wood preservatives. Commanders of individual
units were left to determine where the fence should be reduced in height
and where preserved. After a conference of the East German border police
from Loecknitz and the Polish border guards from Szczecin, it was decided
in the first half of 1958 not to tear out the fence in the Neu Lienken
sector (from Daber to Grambow) since the greatest number of illegal
border crossings had occurred there. In all other sectors, the fence was
to be cut down to the new height during 1958. There was a popular semi-
official belief in East Germany that the reduction of the height of the
fence was aimed at destroying the idea of an "Iron Curtain" between two
"people's republics," although the curtain continued to exist.
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B. Dogs.
Both Germans and Poles used two types of dogs: guard dogs and trackers.
Each dog had his own handler, who was completely responsible for the animal
in all matters; the number of dogs and dog handlers in a unit was always
equal. On the German side, both dogs and handlers were trained at the
Central Dog School of the border police unit at Bautzen. In the Loecknitz
area, all dogs used were German shepherds. Dogs never performed more than
eight to twelve hours' duty a day.
1. Guard dogs.
These dogs, which were unable to follow tracks by scent and were only
for the protection of sentries, were assigned at about the rate of four
per company of border police. On order, they would attack a man by
springing at him from the front, grip the clothing on his chest, and
throw him to the ground, where they would hold him until a release sig-
nal was given by the dog handler. In most cases, dogs would not attack
a man in uniform because they were beaten for this. Use of dogs in the
company was planned by the company staff. All dogs in the company might
be used during the day or all at night, depending on the decision of the
company commander.
2. Tracking dogs.
These dogs were kept with the regimental staff or at an appropriate border
division, being assigned -normally three to a regiment. When an illegal
border crossing was reported, the dog and his handler were taken by
vehicle to the spot. Tracking dogs could usually follow a scent up to
eight kilometers. Standard procedure for the use of tracking dogs would
follow approximately this schedule:
a. An illegal border crossing was discovered on the Polish side at 2200
hours and the tracks preserved if possible. The next higher head-
quarters was notified at 2210 hours and the German border police by
2215 hours. The German dog handler was waked by the duty officer at
2220 and a vehicle was dispatched for him at 2230 hours.
b. Both Polish and German dog handlers arrived with their dogs at the
crossing point about 2250 hours. Permission was immediately granted
for the Polish handler to search for the crosser on German soil. The
fence was cut (unless it was so low as to make this unnecessary) so
that the dog and handler could enter East Germany uninjured.
c. The Polish handler, armed with a pistol, went through the fence first,
leaving the dog, on a 20-meter line, on the 10-meter plowed strip.
His assistant in Poland set the dog on the scent, and the dog then
came through the fence. Polish dog handlers always had to be accom-
panied while in Germany by a German officer and an NCO. During the
pursuit the dog was kept on the line.
d. When the Polish dog had run itself out, the first German dog took
over and the succession continued until the crosser was apprehended.
If the border crosser was picked up by a vehicle or rode off on a
bicycle, the dogs were called off and the Berlin Ring was immediately
sealed off.
e. After the pursuit of a crosser was completed, the fence was repaired
by engineers from the Polish border troops.
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C. Pursuit of Border Crossers
1. Border police activity following an illegal border crossing may be
illustrated by the following example:
At 2200 hours, it was determined that a set of distinct tracks existed
across the plowed strip at border marker number 0. The tracks were
protected. At 2210 hours, the successful border crossing was reported
to the next higher headquarters. At 2215 hours, the WOP Brigade report-
ed the crossing to the duty officer of the East German border police
office responsible for the sector.
By 2200 hours, the operational border police duty officer had informed
the proper official in the Intelligence Section, who came by car to
the crossing point, a trip usually requiring about 30 minutes. Be-
tween 2220 and 2240 hours, the operational duty officer gave the alarm
within the unit and notified the unit staff of the measures that had
been taken. He established a special staff, which was responsible for
all subsequent handling of the crossing incident. From the border,
the Intelligence Section official telephoned the border police office
and informed the special staff that the alarm was valid and the
forces assembled could be put into action and gave the estimated direc-
tion of the flight. An average of 500 men was put in motinn to cordon
off the border and search the area in East Germany.
By 2250 hours, the Polish and German tracking dogs were 8t t+.e border
and a tracking search got under way as descrf.bed abcve0 By 2130, the
German special staff had completed the deployment of its forces; all
important through roads, paths, and bridges had been occupied. up to
10 to 15 kilometers from the border. By 2230 hours, the special staff
informed the appropriate Kreis or People?s Police offices and the
Transport Police of the border crossing. By 2350 hours, the People's
Police Kreis office had manned all streets in the main t