ECONOMIC SITUATION IN POLAND

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00246A056400290001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 25, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 5, 1960
• Content Type: REPORT

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the seplonsge laws, Title
18, U.B.O. Secs. 799 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which In any manner to an unauthorized person Is prohibited by law.
SUBJECT Economic Situation in Poland,
REPORT
DATE DISTR. 5 OCTM
0. PAGES 1
FEREN C S~ RD
DATE OF
INFO.
PLACE &
DATE ACQ.
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economic situation in Poland
includes information on directives sent to the Planning Commission by
the Central Committee of the Party concerning economic targets, as wel,, r
as comments on past and planned rates of growth in major industries.
Charts illustrating the text are included.1 T
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STATE X ARMY
x r"vr
I N FORMAT I ON RE PORT I N FORMAT I ON R F PORT
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L
J SECRET I
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Fromw what has been learnt rece*tly of the trends in Poland,
major importance is attached to the economic problems. This.,
however, as all the signs snout t~ prove, has its roots in the
over-all change of politics, which t ook place during the last
few months, and which manifested itself with sucha violence during
the Summit conference.and* during the recent disarmaient debates
in Geneva.'
The proof of such a supposition bears its sorces from the fact,
that the proposals to change the targets of the Five-.Year Plan for
1961-1965 have not come, as it may have been supposed, froi! Ministries
and such planning boards as the Commission for The Eeenemic Planning,
but have been directly emanated from the Central Committee of the
Party.
Directives, which have 'been transmitted to the Planning CA salon-
have been short and ran along the following lines:
a. Economic targets for Poland seen to be lower (in index value of
growth) then the economic targets of other socialist countries of the
by the existance among those mostly reponsible for the new Plan,
sole liberal economists brought up in the teynesian School of ee
sition that such a formulation of the Plan targets have been pr
bloc (to this suggestion a separate table have been attached, confirmiay
the idea
b. Productive investments in heavy industry are not sufficiently stressed
in relation to the non-productive inwestmoits and there exists a suppo
(it in supposed, although not explicitly stated that the hint
SFrP r r
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? (,_SI_I_IUIVI
Y_
to Professor Micheal Kslec#i, who was mostly responiible for
the targets of the Plan 1961-65, theoretically and practically
c. Link with investments in other countries of the socialist bloc
is rather weakly stressed and there is but a limited field for
cooperation in this domain
d. Agriculture is supposed to develop in a greater part due to the
private initiative of individual peasantso
e. Defense and administawtive outlays are to low and do not reflect
the necessary tendency towards military strnght, understood as the
only possible factor to stop the "imperialists' appetite"..
f. Housing plans are too liberal and concentrate the whole responsabi-
lity for the residential construction in-the hands of public sector,
Cutting out such an important tool of etc drainage of the
market (brake on inflation) and source of saving (resources for
further investments) as is the privatel"- financed constructions,
g. A rajiid rise in productivity and an approaching inflow of the
asp high ebb of young labor force creates the danger of unemployment,
which may be desastrous both for the political prestige of the
Government inside the country and abroad.
Judging these points, which have been directly transiitted by the
President of the Planning Commission to the benior Staff of the
Commission , a disposal was given to change the Plan targets as soon
as possible.
Some tables have-been exposed as a proof to the stipulation and *kmy
there are reconstructed herein (see exhibits I and 2)
The ideas have been keenly absorbed b- the staff of the Planning
Commission as well as by the respective staff of the Ministries.
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The explanation given to the fact Of unexpected satisfaction
of these employees is found in the insecure position of the
planners and officials in Government organs and economic administs
ration,based on the weakening of the administartive scope of power
and activity, narrowing of their field of influence.
Planning Commission and the Ministries, which until some time
kept in hand almost all the string leading to every detail of
econoniic acti**t*y and especially this of the investments,
felt suspended in vacuum, their staffs severely cut in number, the,
their services superflaus, their cotnaels unnecesary, their decisioi
not required. Thus the news brought by Mr Jedrychowski as to the
change in plan targets revoked cherished hopes of increasing cen-
tralization and many voices have been demanding how the control
of newly established and more rigid tarrets be effected.
(the diminishing scope of central planning given in exhibit 3)
Rough proposals as to the changes of Five Aor Year Plan have been
elaborated in two weeks and submitted to the Central Committee.
There are included into the exhibit 4 and 5, annexed to this
document.
Annexed exhibits stress following majot factors:
- the take-off of the industrial production of strategic importance
(under strategic is not only meant a defence potential or attack
potential but also and even foesostly the drive towards getting
nearer the West level of production) is much quicVier in other bloc
countries than in Poland especially after the period of lessening
of control and "internal coexistence" i.e. meeting of the aspiratiot
of the population
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- a steep wave of new labor force hangs over the pft )61ish
economy on the treshold of 1962 (end 1961)
the strictly planned investment, fixed and controlled by the
Central Plan have fallen within a year from 69 to 62 percent of
the total
so much for the past, which ha'#e laid as basis.
The proposal of the Planning Commission, submitted to the
Politbureau and wound up additionnnally there show the
following regularities:
- xzxm*nrs considering the rate of growth in investments outlays,
compared by periods, it can be noted, that only the strategic
tt~x items show higher rates of growth then in the precedent
quinquennium . Other items have a rate of growth mach W*M
weaker,
And so grew:
1951-1955 1956-1960
190 -1965
industry
loo
126,9
14496
transporta-
tion and
communica-
tion
too
1o7,4
160,8
defense&
adminatr.
loo
54,9
loo
agriculture
and dip downwards: ,
too
216,3
183,5
forestry
100
21o,4
157,6
construction
loo
215,8
14o,o
housing
loo
199,6
150,5
municipal services
184,3
148,8
trade loo
Ito
98,8
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txhibi i
l
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Dis)r.rsion of Production per capita Indexes
Production per ca pit