ATTITUDES AND ORIENTATION OF THE POLISH MILITARY OFFICER CORPS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00246A062000290001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 19, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 8, 1962
• Content Type: REPORT

. CENTRAL, INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
COUNTRY Poland
SUBJECT
.Attitudes and Orientation of the
Polish Military Officer Corps
REFERENCES
DATE OF
INFO.
PLACE &
DATE ACQ
50X1-HUM
8 MAR 1969
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
A report containing the views
on the attitudes and orientation of the Polish
officer co s
ARMY I X I NAVY
11
X OCR
(Note: Washington distribution indicated by "X"; Field distribution by
o~ m~ ~aa~ooa a~peoa oo~r?i AToo
N
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Polands Attitudes and Orientation of Powlitary Office Co
Higher Traininx Standards in
Polish Armed Forces
In the last five years the educational system in the Polish armed forces has
allegedly undergone sweeping changes. Whereas formerly the teachers had been a
rar+do , unselective group,, nowaays a considerable proportion of then is at the
university graduate level. There are "lots of psyohologistsa" The faculty
of the army's Political Academy (presumably the Peliks Dsiersynski ltilitarry Po
lileal Academy in Warsaw) is "a professional political and propaganda eorrps."
In the Bevy, the Westerplatte Higher Naval School in Gdansk for offiews, which
the sowaree attended, has established high-level chairs of various se eness and
LBo
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the degree of loyalty to Polish national
policy and the Party in the Polish officer corps depends to a great extent upon
which service is considered. For example, political loyalty in the Internal
Security Corps (UrviA Hem ieozenstwa Wewnetrzne XBW) is high, as it is
among the ;order wards Wo sko Ochro Po iota - WOP). There are fairly
obvious reasons for this. In the first place, many of the "alumni" of the late,
unlamented Security Polio* (Urzad Bezpieozenstwa c UB) are now in the ranks of
the iBi! and the WOP. very few former US members went bac'50X1-HUM
into civilian 11foo despite the auchmpublioized reports tea that effect appearing
after October 1956. Secondly, as the IN and WOP are the forces primarily co eerned
with internal security and the integrity of the national borderaa it is only
natural that a high degree of political loyalty is a prerequisite for service In
these troop organizations.
The "least revolutionized" services are the air force and the navY. Too a
great extent, the heroes of the air force are the ]Pons who fought in the NAF
or the Polish forces in exile. Perhaps for this reason, there is still consid?
arable residual Western orientation among air force officers. The navy, tars
ditto ally a conservative arm enjoying more frequent contests outside of Poland,
is also difficult to restrict to the Party line. These political differences
are heightened by a high degree of
inter-service rivalry and even antagonism. 50X1-HUM
Exploitation of Soviet Pro2jLanda.
Dissemination and exploitation of pro-Soviet propaganda
are "treaendous,o" Interestingly enough, whereas at one time this barrage met 50X1-HUM
with comparative indifference, particularly on the part of the officer corps,
today it is easy to assemble an audience, particularly
when the then of a meeting is Soviet astronautics or some similarly up-to-date
topic o Indeed, there is little difficulty even. in recruit-
ing listeners for talks or meetings on such subjects as Soviet agricultural 50X1-HUM
a. F
QVAKUM of Officer ]Loyslty.
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CONFITIAD
rabic aTrWl
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(proportion of the officer corps in the various
services was m e up o -core believers in o sm,
isoy.
site for Army Officer Cor
Since 1959, l great changes have come about in the 50X1-HUM
mbmp of the Polish Army officer corps. Before that time, it was enough that
an officer was not against the government." Now, one of the primary conditions
for officer status is that the individual be a Party member, or at leant a 50X1-HUM
candidate. In thean WOP organization, of 400 officers,, only 20 were not
Party members or c s (and these presumably had been officers before 1959),
50X1-HUM
In contrast to the army, a greater proportion of air force and naval
officers is non-Party. Nevertheless, each Party member in the latter services has
the specific duty of urging and pressuring his follow officers into Party candi-
only one in ten believed in the
arty and its policies, and 0 there was in fact still considerable anti-Russian
and derivatively anti Soviet sentiment. The majority of the officers, however, can
bent be described as "neutral" - neither especially anti- aammist nor pro- omn
monist.
Armed t rx?esa Discipline.
AiI,.~Y..l Ir I r ~.
The younger the officers are, the more receptive they are to ?oomwnisa. 50X1-HUM
This is a fairly recent than and is borne out by the
fact that at least 50% of now officers can be described as "soft on ommunism.?
was law ("Doctrine 01-02"). For a few years in the mid-1950's,
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Traditionally, discipline in the Polish armed forces had always been rip -d
("corporal's discipline*). Officers could not be criticized, and their word 50X1-H U M
Finnish war. In the recent past,, the old, stricter discipline has been reinstituted.
Today, for instance, officers are allowed to deprive soldiers of their furloughs,
a device described as an "excellent form of punisbmsnt. 00
Offenses are harshly dealt with as they used to be in the days of Doctrine 01-02.
50X1-HUM
fraternization attempted by the Soviets until the disastrous lessons of the Soviet-
this changed to I ""soldier's disoiplinee" presumably
the Polish version of the somewhat relaxed discipline and officer-enlisted man
p LWERNA Cor?roadene.
In the years imieediat.. preceding 1956, the personal oorrespondence of
Polish soldiers had been controlled by "spot-cheek.". The life of the soldier
was so narrowly restricted that - - traits by civilian photographers were not
allowed. After 1956, a period of some three years, personal correspondence
was relatively free. R.'oday, however, it is "regulated by norms;" every second
letter is now reviewed.
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tant positions."
Surveillance of Sensitive Personnel.
At the spae time, steps have been taken to provide closer, vdry discreet
surveillance of persons in the army holding "impor-
Emergency Control of Civilians.
In case of war or other national emer,eney,l lit is
foreseen that control of the Polish civilian populace will be imposed under WOP
and 1T, according to present planning. In all probability, the Citizens' Militia
(Militia Dqwatelstwa - NO) would also be pressed into use at such time for
internal control of the public. Each geographic area of Poland is divided into
special commands for these purposes. As an example of internal security mobil50X1-H U M
nation, in the spring of 1960 army units were alerted a..
though for an emergency. Nothing was given out as to the reason for the move, and
it was not until after the event that it could be divined. It seemed that the
Polish government was planning an overall in meat prices and, presumably
because of hardships this might create, feared popular demonstrations or even
an uprising., Accordingly an alert was called to deter any such contingency. After
it had been determined by the government that there was no serious popular reac-
tion, the alert was called off. No public announcement accompanied any phase
of this action.
,` entries in the official dossier of any Polish citizen.
Listening to Western Radio,
With respect to official attitudes toward the fairly common Polish practice
of listening to Western radio programs, matters are now the way they were before
October 1956. Youth organizations and, in a general way, the armed forces are
interested in the listening habits of the public. it could be
assumed that excessive attentiveness to Western programs wou result in dero 50X1 -HU M
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special
lectures on the subject of the role of Western embassies and consulates in
At
Western Diplomatic Posts in Poland as Spy Centers.
training curriculum as "centers of espionage,
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Anti-German Propaganda.
prom 195; o.i, thorough armed forces indoctrination in anti-Western propaganda
became a primary Polish goal. Detailed charges were made against the Adenauer
government, and old es well as newly discovered horrors of World War !I were
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CONFIIZNTIAL
5
dragged out and stressed to the soldiery. Some attention was devoted to the "war
impetus of the United States" but without great detail.
until 1959 most Poles, even in the armed forces, 50X1-HUM
were almost ready to forget their formerly ingrained hatred of Germans. The
ha mering of pmpaganda since 1959, however, has successfully whipped up new
fears.. On the subject of the Soviet 'Onion, armed forces indoo'-Ination courses
have ceased to try " put over "big brother" friendship, which had si dfioantly
failed to gain adherents, and now have substituted the more practical considera-
tion that the Soviet Union is the only bulwark against German revanahists and re-
-.onisIa who want to take back Polish lands.
today eat tlye Micah: n of the infa~wus 7n massacre in army circles brings
the reaction:: "ss ::h -t1' The Soviets have the only force in being ospabie of 50X1-HUM 11 defeating the Kest Germans;".
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