THE MEETING OF COMMUNIST PARTY LEADERS IN MOSCOW, 14-19 NOVEMBER 1957 ANALYSIS OF THE SIGNIFICANCE FOR FREE WORLD COMMUNIST PARTIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00246A073800570001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 41
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 31, 2014
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 1, 1957
• Content Type: REPORT

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NOFORN
50X1 -HUM
THE MEETING OF COMMUNIST PARTY LEADERS
IN MOSCOW, 14-19 NOVEMBER 1957
December 1957
Analysis of the Significance
for
Free World Communist Parties
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NOFORN
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S-E-C-R-E-T
BRIEFS ON INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM
1957
THE MEETINGS OF COMMUNIST PARTY LEADERS
IN MOSCOW, 14719 NOVEMBER 1957
Analysis of their Significance
for
Free World Communist Parties
December 1957
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50X1 -HUM
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THE MEETINGS 'OF COMMUNIST PARTY LEADERS
IN MOSCOW, 1449 NOVEMBER 1957
Analysis of their Significance
for
Free World Communist Parties
December 1957
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CONTENTS
Page
Introduction ? ? 1
? a a a ?st e?a a?a?
The Meetings and their Internal Utility
for the CPSU . ? 0 4000 04 *4 0 ? 4
The Meetings a . ? . 4 004 0 0 ? 0 9??0 8
Mechanics and Agenda? 8
O 0 0? ?0
Organizational Integration of the
International Communist Movement. ? . 13
Organizational Principles and Procedures a a? 15
A Theoretical Journal and Future International
and Regional Center . ? ? 21
The Tactical Program of the Declaration ? 23
Outlook. ?0 0?RP00.0 OP 000 00 00 40 33
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THE MEETINGS OF COMMUNIST PARTY LEADERS
IN MOSCOW, 14-19 NOVEMBER 1957
Analysis of their Significance for Free World
Communist Parties
1. Introduction. The following observations are based
largely on Communist press and radio coverage of the events
under discussion. Although reliable information indicates
that the Communist leaders had agreed not to publish detailed
accounts of the meetings, points of general significance are
clearly discernible in the published statements. Further
analysis and amendment will, however, be necessary in the
future.
The practice of publishing only partial or slanted accounts
of international Communist meetings is, of course, standard.
For example, statements published after the founding meeting
of the Cominform (September 1947) concealed completely the
severe criticism to which CP Italy and CP France had been
subjected by the Soviet, Yugoslav, and other delegations. They
gave figures representing Communist Party strength an upward
slant. The general direction prescribed by the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) for the International Com-
munist Movement was, however, clear: the Free World
Communist parties were to organize maximum pressure and
violent assaults on local political structures while, at that
period, the Soviets were about to complete the subjugation of
Eastern Europe and the Chinese Communists aimed at gaining
total power.
2. The Declaration issued after the meeting of twelve Bloc
Communist parties * (14-16 November 1957) and the Peace Mani-
festo issued after the meeting of Communist party representatives
Those of Albania, Bulgaria, China, Czechoslovakia, East
Germany, Hungary, Mongolia, North Korea, Poland, Rumania,
Soviet Union, Vietnam.
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from sixty-five countries (16-19 November 1957) ** reflect the
intention of the CPSU and the Bloc Communist parties to efface
the after-effects of Khrushchev's secret speech in February 1956,
the June and October 1956 events in Poland, the revolt in Hungary,
etc., in order more closely to integrate the activities of the entire
International Communist Movement in the Free World with Soviet
and Bloc policies and interests. This attempt is being made at
a time when the Soviet Union and China are ambitiously endeavoring
to outstrip the capitalist countries in per capita production. "with-
in ten to fifteen years, " and by this means as well as through their
foreign policy operations, hope to achieve a shift in the balance
of power. It is evident in the documents of the November meetings
that the general direction prescribed for the International Com-
munist Movement in this period is intended to contribute to and
accelerate this shift through a variety of united front tactics
adapted to local circumstances: for example, direct action or
political maneuver, insurrection or parliamentary methods,
united action or popular fronts. In adjustment to a new set of
circumstances, this general directive line is aimed militantly
at increasing disunity, conflict and polarization within the Free
World, the tempo of this increase obviously being contingent -
upon local factors such as the strength and status of the local
Communist party.
3. Reports have been received since mid-1956 indicating that
several Communist parties have repeatedly requested the Soviets
to improve procedures and techniques for the coordination of the
movement. In March 1957 Communist circles rumored consi-
tently that the CPSU would render a decision on international
problems. In 1957 there were also evident CPSU attempts to
strengthen the Foreign Section of its Central Committee (here-
after CC) and to encourage regional consultations of Communist
parties in Europe and Latin America. On 1 July 1957, prior
?to the announcement of the Malenkov-Molotov
** The official listing is misleading. The Icelandic CP did not
sign the Peace Manifesto, probably because it was repre-
sented by a Party functionary who is also a member of the
government. Other parties such as those of Iran, Egypt,
and the Sudan may have been represented but were omitted
from official lists.
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Kaganovich purges, various Communist parties abroad were given,
through the local Soviet Ambassadors, the CPSU version of the
purge. This unusual procedure suggested that the CPSU recognized
the need for improved international coordination. It is, however,
not unlikely that the Soviets postponed attacking this complex and
thorny problem on an international scale until they were in a position
to galvanize the international Communist leadership into action with
their achievements in rocketry and space travel. The November
meetings were apparently staged to deal with the problems of co-
ordination, as well as the confusion and ideological dislocations
created by the 20th CPSU Congress and its aftermath, in an atmos-
phere benefiting from these scientific achievements and from the
celebration of the 40th Anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution.
Gomulka, on his return from the Moscow meetings, admitted that
the "Declaration and Manifesto / issued at the meetings! contain
ideas expressed before" but stressed that "their great importance
consists in the fact that the ideas are assuming increasing practical
significance." The atmosphere of great optimism flowing from
Khrushchev's 6 November speech enhanced the galvanizing effect.
The result has been to formalize the basic outlines of global
Communist tactics and to create the foundation of a new structure
for the International Communist Movement within and outside the
Bloc--in brief, to weld together the Communist Movement in the
spirit, although not in the form, of the prewar Third Communist
International (Comintern). The Soviet press and Soviet functionaries
reporting the Moscow meetings described them as "the most repre-
sentative in Communist history," adding, "There has been no event
like it in the Communist movement for more than 20 years." The
7th (the last) World Congress of the Comintern, with which the
November 1957 meetings of Communist leaders were obviously
being compared, took place in July-August 1935.*
*
The 7th World Congress raised the tactics of the united and popular
front, with all their revolutionary and insurrectionary aspects in
the struggle against Fascism, to the global level. The November
1957 meetings parallel this policy.
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Judging from the text of the Declaration and the Peace Manifesto,
Gomulka's characterization of these documents appears quite cor-
rect. They are restatements of previously published formulas and
even cliches. The accent at the November meetings must clearly
have been upon action, and the discussion of action problems. In
Communist parlance, these documents a-re meant tcti exert a "mobil-
izing and organizing force." Soviet Marshal Chuikov, at the plenary
session of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist
Party on 2 December, emphasized exactly this aspect of the docu-
ments.
4. The Meetings and their Internal Utility for the CPSU. Khru-
shchev's aim has been to replace the one-man dictatorship of Stalin
by the dictatorship of the Communist Party which is also the basis
of his personal strength. It has been argued by many competent
observers that this aim is not necessarily realistic and that
Khrushchev and the CPSU may yet have to retreat before the growing
pressure of social forces. The propagandistic treatment of the
November meetings in the Soviet Union indicates that a strenuous
effort is being made to "sell" the CPSU and to strengthen its au-
thority internally on the grounds of the increased international
stature and prestige gained at the November meetings. A cardinal ,
point in this effort is the leading role of the CPSU in the International
Communist Movement, acknowledged, at least on paper, at the
November meetings.'
At the meeting of the MOSCQW Party Aktiv (leading Party func-
tionaries) on 26 November the CPSU Presidium member, Furtseva,
stressed this point at least five times. Soviet leadership of the
world movement, she reportedly said, "is very important to em-
phasize because revisionists in certain foreign Communist parties
applied much effort to discredit the successes of the Soviet Union,
undermine the authority of our party . . . This is why the position
put on paper in the Declaration about the leading role of the Soviet
Union in the family of Socialist countries, about the need to defend
and support the Soviet Union as the first and most powerful Socialist
power, is so important for further strengthening of the whole
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Communist movement." /Evening Moscow, 27 November.!
Pravda, 28 November, carried an account of a similar meeting
of the Leningrad Party A.ktiv at which Kozlov called the CPSU the
"leading force of the world revolutionary movement."
On November 30 several Soviet papers reported the speech
of the Czech CP leader, Hendrych, made in Prague upon return
from the Moscow meetings. Hendrych said that it was .,ery im-
portant that the Communist Movement have a solid center and
that this center be the CP of the Soviet Union,
A. Pravda editorial, "Great Unity' broadcast on 6 December,
quotes the Chinese Peoples Daily as stressing "the consolidation
and strengthening of the camp of Socialism led by the Soviet Union,
the consolidation and strengthening of the international Communist
movement with the CPSU at its head , ?" / supplied!
The actual text of the Declaration contains, indeed, the formu-
lation so typical of the Soviets, i. e? "the indivisible camp of
Socialist countries headed by the Soviet Union," Although language
is no substitue for reality, the CPSU obtained a net gain by
inserting the formula into the Twelve-Party Declaration
Note: From the point of view of historical accuracy it should
be noted that there are some indications that Gomulka.
who has had an aversion for using the term "the Socialist
camp led , ?" or "headed by the Soviet Union," may
have objected to the language of the Declaration referring
to the leading role of the Soviet Union, The SED Politburo
member Friedrich Ebert, in his report on the 'iwelve -
arty meeting, related that Mao Tse-tung stated at the
meeting that "like any small party group, we too must
have a head." Mao said that the Chinese Communist Party
was not worthy of this function because China was not yet
fully industrialized. The Soviet Union, however, was power-
ful, could protect the other Communist countries, and had,
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since Stalin's death, improved its working methods. Mao
said, reportedly, "From all this results the leading role
of the CPSU in the community of the Communist and
Workers' Parties and the leading role of the Soviet Union
at the head of the states of the Socialist camp." Following
this statement, Ebert reported, "Old Ho Chi-minh, Com-
rades Enver Hoxha, Albania; Hendrych, Czechoslovakia;
Zhivkov, Bulgaria; Dashim Damba, Mongolian Peoples
Republic; Stoica, Rumania; and Kim Il-sung, Korea;
unanimously agreed with Mao Tse-tung that only the CPSU
can be at the head of the Socialist camp." /Underlining
supplied.!
Strangely absent from the list of those who unani-
mously agreed are Gomulka, Poland, and Kadar, Hungary.
The significance of these presumable abstentions, however,
should not be overrated. Gornulka's possible abstention
did not refer to the entire document. Further, his reluc-
tance to employ the term "leading role" does not indicate
a reluctance to acknowledge the reality of Soviet leader-
ship. On one previous occasion in Poland, as was reliably
reported, he replied to his Stalinist-Natolinist critics that
Mao, being a powerful leader, could admit openly that the -
Soviet Union had a leading role, and at the same time preserve
an independent policy and remain free of attacks from inter-
nal opposition for subservience to the Soviet Union. Gomulka
stated that he would possibly acknowledge the leading role of
the Soviet Union, but not until "our party in Poland will be
carrying out its leading role," i.e., not until the Soviets would
have something to lead. At the same time he said, "We know
what is the role and place of the Soviet Union in the Socialist
camp. No Socialist nation, not one, would be able to exist if
it were not for the Soviet Union since everyone would be too
weak to struggle against the threat of external attack even if
at times we had at our disposal adequate forces to destroy the
internal enemy of Socialism." Kadar's possible abstention re-
mains puzzling. Representing a regime of little power, he may
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not have attended the Twelve party Meeting. In a broad-
cast of 22 November recording Kadar's speech on his
return there was no reference to his attending the meeting
although he described several other gatherings which he
attended. Rumors concerning a possible replacement of
Kadar have been received since the broadcast.
Additional endorsement of Mao's statement was forth-
coming on 20 November from the official organ of the Lao
Dong (Communist Party of Vietnam), which added editor-
ially that "being the first socialist country whose exper-
iences constitute valuable lessons for other countries
which are building or will build socialism, the Soviet
Union is a worthy leader of the socialist camp,"
5. The increase in prestige which resulted from the November
meetings was publicized by a number of leading Soviet figures. The
Soviet writer Korneychuk spoke in this vein at the 2 December
plenum of the Central Committee, CP Ukraine. At the same
meeting Soviet .Marahal Chuikov stressed that "Soldiers, non-com-
missioned officers, officers and generals of the Okrug are studying
the Declaration and Manifesto with a feeling of great pride in the
dear Communist Party. -"
The activities conducted during the Afro-Asian Solidarity ''.Ieek
held in December in the USSR fall into the same pattern. So does
the highly unusual presence of Khalid Bakdash, Secretary Gen-
eral of the CP Syria and Lebanon, at a recent meeting of the Aktiv
of republic and Yerevan city party organizations in the Armenian
SSR. This meeting was devoted to a discussion of the two docu-
ments issued by the November meetings. A Soviet Armenian re-
gional broadcast to Armenians abroad (3 December) stated, "Those
present at the meeting warmly greeted the speech delivered by
Bakda.sh, Chief Secretary of the Central Committee of the Syrian
and Lebanese Communist Parties."
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The internationalization of CPSU internal propaganda for the
purpose of raising the prestige and authority of the Party is
only one aspect of the "leading role" of the Soviet state and the CPSU
in international Communist affairs. The other is the commitment
inherent in the claim to leadership, i.e,, to guide, assist, and
strengthen Communist parties abroad. The CPSU is now irrevocably
committed to undertake actions which are bound to conflict with
, the posture of "peaceful coexistence" and non-interference in
the internal affairs of the Free World countries.
6. The Meetings. The series of meetings of Communist
party leaders which ended in the late afternoon of 19 November
in the "festively illuminated George's Hall in the Kremlin" with
the singing of the "Internationale" did not, however, solve all
problems and disagreements with which the International Com-
munist Movement has had to cope since the 20th CPSU Congresr.
These meetings were first, although exceedingly important, steps
toward achieving real unity and effective international coordination.
As Friedrich Ebert put it, "the consultations . . created the pre-
requisites for the continuation of the discussion with a view to
clarifying all fundamental problems . After two decades
the first step was made toward a closer and more comprehensive
cooperation among the Communist and Workers' Parties." The
SED delegation under Walter Ulbricht claims credit for the for-
mula which enabled the representatives to agree upon a common
starting program, i.e., to achieve and formulate maximum agree-
ment, get on ;with the job, and work out remaining disagreements
at a later date.
7. Mechanics and Agenda. Available data on the mechanics
and organization of the meetings suggest, first., that the problems
Walter Ulbricht stressed the need to adopt "a concerted document
concerning the principal problems where there may be certain
questions on which some representatives of a party still enter-
tain certain doubts. Although opinions vary on many a problem,
the future experiences of life and of the struggle will lead to
the clarification of these problems."
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of International Communism received a thorough airing, and secondly,
that the CPSU had distributed key roles to reliable delegations
and leaders in order to keep the meetings on the desired track,
The CPSU, it was reliably reported, did not give general adviLnce
notice of the agenda of the meetings, probably in order to -Dre-
vent delegations from preparing their positions.
The preparatory stage took place in Moscow. Prior to the
formal sessions a "comprehensive exchange of opinions within
and among delegations" was held for about one week. Commu-
nist accounts also refer to "commissions established by Commu-
nist and Workers' Parties" in connection with the meetings.
According to Communist practice these "commissions" may have
concerned themselves with the drafting of the documents published.
They may also have dealt with more specific problems of doctrine
and organization.* In any case this preparatory work appears
to have been under the control of the CPSU and the Bloc parties
which in this fashion assumed policy-making powers. Accord-
ing to Ebert's account, the "sister parties from the capitalist
countries" (i.e. , from the Free World) were only "consulted"
in these preliminary discussions. These discunsions centered
around the drafting of the Twelve-Party Declaration, which
contains a general directive for Communist parties in the Free
World. There is, however, no indication that the Free World
Communist parties had a direct vote in this matter affecting
their operations.
8. The meeting of the twelve Communist parties in power
was opened by Khrushchev. Mao Tse-tung was the first speaker
on the draft of the Declaration, which had been prepared jointly
by the CPSU and CP China. Walter Ulbricht closed the debate.
* A. "commission" chaired jointly by the CPSU and CP China may
have existed. The Twelve-Party Declaration was drafted by the
CPSU and the CCP. A meeting attended by all Latin American
delegates, as well as by Soviet and Chinese representatives,
apparently discussed area problems (e. g., the strengthening or
reorganization of the Confederation of Workers of Latin A.merica
(CTAL), the Latin American regional organization of the WFTU).
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The Declaration was adopted unanimously, although Gomulka, and
possibly Kadar, as already noted, may have had reservations on
language concerning the leading role of the Soviet Union. Yugo-
sJavia did not attend this meeting. The twelve-party meeting
represented in effect the session of a .small but powerful policy-
making executive?an international Politburo or Presidium.
9. The meeting of Communist representatives from sixty-
five countries was a plenary session on the order of an inter-
national Central Committee. It met Pa few hours after" the con-
clusion of the twelve-party meeting, "in the same place." 1,t was
again Khrushchev who opened the meeting with a speech which em-
phasized that "consolidation and preservation of peace (is) a prin-
?cipal task of the present time," Suslov welcomed the meeting
briefly. A. bulky written report by Suslov had been circulated
earlier in order to speed up the discussion and may also have been
considered by the twelve-party meeting. Allotments of speaking
time were reduced to twenty minutes, but not all the delegates
were permitted. to speak. The French and Italian delegates (Thorez
and Togliatti?) made lengthy speeches. Mao Tse-tung talked for
two to three hours, apparently about the internal problems of China.
Because of-poor health he remained seated while speaking. Repre-
sentatives from Argentina, Chile, Brazil, Cuba, and Guatemala
also spoke --the last-named on behalf of Mexico and the _Caribbean
area.
The meeting centered about the draft of the Peace Manifesto
which had been drawn up "upon the initiative of the CPSU and the
Polish Workers'Party," as Ebert reported. Gomulka himself,
however, claimed exclusive credit for the initiative. In a 28 November
speech to the Warsaw A.ktiv he claimed, "As far as the Peace Mani-
festo is concerned, we were its initiator. In common with the
CPSU, we submitted a draft of_ the Manifesto to the general con-
ference of all the parties, which adopted this draft unanimously
after it had been supplemented by other parties." The task of
preparing the final draft of the Peace Manifesto was handled by a
thirty-or-forty-member editorial committee assisted by inter-
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preters. One reliable source reports that at least four rough drafts
were in circulation. It was reliably reported that during the
process of drafting the Peace Manifesto the World Peace Council
was severely criticized for inefficiency.* The Manifesto indicates,
indeed, that the Communist parties themselves will take a stronger
initiative in the peace campaign, and rely less on the initiative of
the World Peace Council.
10. The meeting of representatives of sixty-five countries
also discussed the Declaration "decided upon by the represent-
atives of sister parties of the socialist countries." Again, there
are no indications that it was brought to a formal vote, and it may
be presumed that at least a majority of the Communist parties
of the Free World represented there accepted the Declaration.**
Some of the issues inherent in the Declaration (i.e. , the evalu-
ation of the war threat and the leading role of the Soviet Union)
may have aroused debate. Mao Tse-tung, Walter Ulbricht,
Duclos and the Czech leader Hendrych appear to have steered the
debate into desired channels.
The Suslov report must obviously also have been discussed.
Available references suggest that it dealt, among other topics,
with an assessment of the strength of the Communist Movement
in the Free World. The report appears to have contained some
The World Federation of Trade Unions, another international
Communist front organization, was also criticized. In this con-
text it is noted that the CPSU Central Committee Plenum decision
on trade unions (16-17 December) states that "it is the task of the
Soviet trade unions to work actively for the consolidation of
the World Federation of Trade Unions."
** There are no indications that the Yugoslav delegation defined
whatever objections it may have had at this meeting. A re-
liable source indicated that the Yugoslays merely stated that
they were not yet ready to sign the Declaration.
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frank admissions of damages sustained and existing weaknesses..
Although referring to the growth of International Communism
since the prewar period, the report pointed out that"at present
the existence of 34,of 62 Communist parties is strictly
Judging from Ebert's account, it also admitted "some damages
at individual points of the Communist movement" as a result of
the Korean War, the events in Egypt, and the Hungarian revolt.
This admission points to Europe, since the report stated that
"in Asia and Africa, however, and also in some Latin American
countries, some of the sister parties have considerably grown."*
11. The difficult situation of non-Bloc Communist parties,
which was referred to in the Suslov report, was apparently elabor-
ated upon in speeches made by representatives of those parties.
Ebert stated, "their reports on their parties' struggle show the,
full impact of the difficult stand they have /racing/ the imperialist
rulers." The result appears to have been an acknowledgement of
the.needs of the weak Communist parties of the Free World. Ebert
postulated: "It appears to be a matter of greatest urgency to devote
more attention to the sister parties which are working under such
difficult circumstances and above all,to grant them more moral
and political help within the framework of the cooperation of the
Communist and workers' parties of all the world," The imple-
mentation of this policy is bound to increase security problems
in many countries in the Free World where Communist parties
are outlawed or have lost ground..** Ebert referred to needy Com-
* Max Rebmann, the West German Communist leader, warned the
meeting of the unfavorable climate existing in_Western Germany
because of Adenauer's popularity.
** In certain states such as Syria, Iran, the Sudan, and Egypt,
it is also likely to involve serious political problems, be-
cause such action is difficult to reconcile with the Soviet claim
of ,non-interference in the internal affairs of these countries. In
order to conceal this conflict, the Soviets may channel assistance
through Bloc Communist 13arties. Important SED functionaries with
extensive conspiratorial background have already been spotted in
the area.
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munist parties in Latin America and the Near and Middle
East, and the small European Communist parties were also
considered by Moscow.
12. Organizational Integration of the International Communism
Movement. One of the most important items on the agenda, a:
subject extensively discussed, was the problem of the organi-
zational integration of the Communist Movement, under the leader-
ship of the Soviet Union and the Bloc. The concept had been pos-
tulated in the Declaration, which stated:
".At bedrock of the relations between the countries of
the world socialist system and all the Communist
and workers' parties lie the principles of Marxism-.
Leninism, the principles of proletarian inter-
nationalism which have been tested by life. Truly
the vital interests of the working people of all-
countries call for their support of the Soviet
Union and all the Socialist countries, who, pursuing
a policy of preserving peace throughout the world,
are the mainstay of peace and social progress. The
working class, the democratic forces, and the working
people everywhere are interested in tirelessly
strengthening fraternal contacts for the sake of the
common course, in safeguarding from every encroach-
ment the historic political and social gains effected
in the Soviet Union, the first and mieilies't socialist
power--in the Chinese People's Republic, and in all
the Socialist countries, in seeing these gains ex-
tended and consolidated. "* /Underlining supplied. /
* This formulation is a modernization of Article #14 of the Con-
ditions of Admission to the Comintern, which stated, "Eadh
Party desirous of affiliating with the Communist International
should be obliged to render every possible assistance to the
Soviet Republics, in their struggle against counter-revolu-
tionary forces."
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13. The dominant position assumed by the Bloc and the Soviet
Union was apparent in a statement in the Declaration revealing--
possibly inadvertently--the policy-making power of this group,
e.,i. "What is needed here is a united anti-imperialist and anti
feudal front. . ." /Underlining supplied,/
From Ebert's account it emerges that the subject caused
debate, The issue at stake apparently was that "closer co-
operation under the leadership of the Soviet Union would im-
pair national interests." Ebert stated "It was established
during the discussion that any concern in this respect was
completely unjustified," The issue, however, is a real one.
Communist party leaders in the Free World (Togliatti, to
mention one) are fully aware of the fact that the open identi-
fication of the local Communist party with the interests of the
Soviet Union hampers their efforts. At the meeting, represent-
atives of CP Great Britain, CP India and some Latin American
parties apparently also had some reservations on this point.
However, the forces demanding full and open subordination
of the Communist Movement to the CPSU carried the Declar-
ation.* Ulbricht stated flatly, "National interests are not im-
paired by proletarian internationalism," referred to the war
threat to justify organizational unity, and pointed out that "so
far nobody has doubted or questioned the independence of the
Communist and workers' parties,"
The trend toward closer identification of the Communist
Movement with Soviet and Bloc interests was also apparent
in the Peace Manifesto accepted by the meeting, The Peace
Manifesto equates the peace movement with the International
Communist Movement. In the past, Communists were care-
ful to conceal their leading role in the peace movement
* A.mong them, as reliably reported, were the French, Dutch,
Czech, and Chinese delegations.
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behind the facade of the World Peace Council and its offshoots:
as one example, the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee. The CPSU
rationale for this insistence on the identification of the interests
of Free World Communism with the Bloc and its head, the Soviet
Union, cannot lie in-a real need for defense of the Bloc by Com-
munist parties abroad--a majority of which (thirty-four) are il-
legal and in need of assistance. Rather, it would seem, the CPSU
assumes that identification with the Soviet Union would enable
Communist parties in the Free World to cash in, in political
terms, on the recent scientific successes achieved in the USSR,
and to transform themselves into more effective instruments
for subversion abroad. Whether this assumption will prove
correct remains to be seen.
14. Organizational Principles and Procedures. As previously
noted, the November meetings represented only the first stage
in the organizational integration of the movement. The Declar-
ation stated tersely, "After exchanging views, the participants
in the meeting arrived at the conclusion that in present con-
dition.s At is expedient besides bilateral meetings of leading
personnel and exchange of information, to hold, as the need arises,
more representatives' conferences of Communist and workers'
parties to discuss current problems, share experience, study
each others' views and attitudes, and concert / e., coordinate/
action in the joint struggle for the common goals--peace, demo-
cracy and socialism." Gomulka, in his speech of 28 November
to the Warsaw Aktiv, added a few more points. Ebert's report
to the SED added others. At this time, therefore, only a few
tentative conclusions can be reached concerning organizational
principles and procedures.
a) Agreement in principle has been reached on the basis that the
CPSU, as head of the International Communist Movement, will give
due consideration to the views of Communist parties, es-
pecially of those in power. Both Mao and Gomulka expressed
their satisfaction that the CPSU leadership would behave properly.
At the meetings, it was reported, all foreign Party represen-
tatives were treated with the same consideration.
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b) For the time being, the CPSU is willing to be correct
in its dealings with foreign Communist parties and to
foster the impression that "collective leadership" pre-
vails in international affairs. Furtseva, in her report
to the Moscow Party Aktiv, emphasized that the docu-
ments issued by the meetings had been "collectively
worked out." In view of the open credit taken by Ul-
bricht, Gomulka and the Czech delegation for their
contributions to the documents, Furtseva probably
was right.
c) Instead of creating a "central management" (i.e.
another Comintern) for the International Communist
Movement, a coordination procedure was adopted.
The main vehicle for coordination will be "conferences
of a large number or even of all Communist and workers'
parties." (Gomulka referred to the meetings as "the
structure of mutual relations.") According to reliable
data these meetings will apparently be of two kinds:
International (or plenary) meetings of all (or a great
majority) of Communist parties, on the model of the
meeting of Communist party representatives from
sixty-five 'countries, which would be able to pass
decisions binding for all. Such meetings are scheduled
to be held at least once a year. The CPSU will con-
voke these meetings.
Regional meetings of Communist parties with common
problems. Such meetings would apparently not have
policy-making powers and would deal only with
"practical problems" on an informal, ad hoc basis,
Ulbricht, at the November meetings, emphasized the
need for regional consultation and coordination of the
anti-NATO campaign within the Bloc. Prior to the
November meetings indications pointed to increasing
regional consultations on the NATO problem between
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CP France and some European Communist parties.
Regional consultation meetings between Scandinavian
Communist parties were held twice in 1957. In the
future such regional meetings should increase on the
basis of need. The possibility of Yugoslav partici-
pation in such meetings cannot be ruled out. Par-
ticipation of the ostensibly non-Communist parties
and fronts from Bloc countries is certain.
d) This coordination procedure complements but does not
supersede bilateral relations and meetings. The CPSU,
therefore, can, as before, coordinate directly with those
Communist parties which are more subservient or de-
pendent than others.
e) Some constitutional and procedural terms apparently
agreed upon in connection with the international (plen-
ary) meetings, would be designed to provide guarantees
for protecting the authority of Communist parties. The
following points emerged from Gomulka's 28 November
address:
"As a rule such conferences must be partici-
. pated in by party leaders."
This would prevent the CPSU from manipulating second-
ary leaders in order to put pressure on the top.
"The questions which will be discussed at the
conference must be known in advance to all
its participants."
Such procedure would ensure that national CP leaders
would-be able to anticipate and reply to criticism and
other pressure.
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"The problems existing in the internal
policy of each party, in accordance
with the principle that each party is
best able to determine the political
line for itself and for its country,
cannot be decided by interparty con-
ferences."
This statement, however, was immediately weakened
by the following point.
"This does not apply to the internal
problems common to all parties if
they have --or if they achieve at a
conference--the same views on these
problems."
These affirmations suggest that Communist parties will
accept plenary conference decisions as binding only with
their consent. The Declaration itself has already been
formally accepted by Central Committees and party
Aktivs in the Bloc.* Outside the Bloc the Declaration
has been accepted by CP France and CP Italy, The
CPUSA, however, was forced to postpone ratification
because of internal factional struggles. The significance
of these procedural safeguards remains to be tested by
practice. It is amusing to note that even the CPSU,
which drafted the Declaration, had it formally ratified
by its Central Committee.
* The Declaration characterizes "revisionism and dogmatism"
as "international phenomena," indicating a binding resolve
of and for the Movement.
48
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f) According to reliable information, the question was
raised at the meeting, as a procedural problem,
whether or not the international body would or should
have a right to subject member parties to criticism,
and whether or not such criticism should be made public.
Some delegates apparently maintained that timely criti-
cism of CP Hungary would have prevented the revolt
in 1956.
g)
No evidence is available to show that agreement
has been reached on the question. Some representatives
appear to have been reluctant to endorse the publication
of criticism because open criticism would immediately
expose the mechanics of Moscow's leadership.
According to some indications, the problem of speeding
up communications was also discussed. The problem
was expressed in terms of the need of non-Bloc Commu-
nist parties to stay ahead of the West in reporting about
the Socialist countries, and to impress the workers in
the Free World with the alleged high living standard in
the Bloc, One delegate--apparently seriously--proposed
that East Germany and Czechoslovakia should be made
into showplaces. Meetings between CP's in Western
Europe and the fraternal parties in East Germany,
Czechoslovakia and Poland would be arranged in order
to speed up the dissemination of favorable propaganda
about the Bloc to the West.
h) The language of Bloc propaganda to the West also came
in for some criticism. One unidentified Yugoslav dele-
gate apparently pointed out that in order to be more
effective the language of such propaganda should be made
more intelligible to U.S. and Western audiences, which
are different from East -Z,u.rnpeati one;- In drafting the
documents issued by the meetings, however, the "Social-
ist countries" did not take the Yugoslav point into consider-
ation.
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i) The principle of subordinating the interests of Commu-
nist parties in capitalist countries to the anti-colonial
struggle also was discussed. The French representa-
tive, Duclos, defended, with little success, the PCF
position that Algeria should remain with France. Ali
Jata, Secretary General of the Moroccan CP, speaking
in behalf of all Arab CPts, opposed the French stand.
A Syrian delegate and some European delegates also
opposed the French. The Syrian delegate appears to
have strongly recommended that the interests of the
Communist parties in imperialist home countries and
in France be strictly subordinated to the interests of
the struggle against colonialism. This position was
supported by the Dutch delegation.
15. Organizational procedures of Free World Communist
parties were discussed. Fragmentary information available in-
dicates that there were views in favor of a general reinstatement
of "illegal" or "parallel" apparats to prepare for the revolutionary
overthrow of a government. This is plausible in the light of the
Declaration which imphasizes the need for "non-peaceful" tran-
sition to Socialism in case of resistance to Communist parliament-
ary advances., The November meetings did not result in a firm
agreement or policy on this point. It is nevertheless probable that
this question will be pressed again by the CPSU in bilateral conver-
sations or at conferences. One significant Communist party in
South Asia reportedly objected to organizing an illegal apparat on
the grounds that the effort would pull away valuable functionaries
from important overt political work. This party, however,
promised to increase its penetration of the local armed forces.
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16. A Theoretical Journal and Future International and
Regional Centers. Thus far only the issuance of a "theoretical
journal" for the Communist and. Workers' parties has been
announced as agreed upon.* Contributions to the journal will be
submitted on a voluntary basis. As a preliminary step to issuing
the journal a press agency may be set up, probably in Prague.
An international conference of Institutes of Marxism-Leninism
and Party History, held in Prague from 19-23 November, may have
concerned itself with the question of issuing the journal. The
conference allegedly was organized by the Institute of History of
the Czech Communist Party, and attended by delegates from Albania,
Austria, Bulgaria, China, Czechoslovakia, East,Germany, France,
Hungary, Italy, Korea, Mongolia, Poland, Rumania, and the USSR.
Whether there will be a permanent international headquarters
organization is not clearly discernible at this moment. A more
permanent organization is bound to emerge from the pattern of
plenary and regional meetings, if for no other reason than to conduct
business between sessions. The CC/CPSU has in its Foreign Section
and the latter's subsidiaries (CPSU fractions in the headquarters of
the international fronts) the nucleus of an international apparatus
through which it may be able to exert its leadership role more ef-
ficiently than at open meetings. Other Communist parties may, in
the future, renew a clamor for an international organization on the
Comintern model.
The emergence of future regional coordination centers can be
anticipated, although evidence is not yet firm. It stands to reason
that certain Communist parties will assume a more formal and domi-
nant position in regional affairs because of their strength and ex-
perience and, in certain areas, because of their legal status. (A
* One report claims that CP France was made responsible for
this publication. Another source claims that M. Suslov will
be responsible for the journal.
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legal CP could better control communications than could an
illegal CP).
In the Bloc, CP China, CP Czechoslovakia and the SED have
already emerged as playing an increasing role. CP China con-
sulted with leaders of CP Australia and possibly also CP New
Zealand in September; two leading functionaries of CP Japan
returned to their country from China in December 1956, after a
stay of five and three years respectively; and in November 1957,
a training school for foreign Communists was reported to have
been formed in Peking.
The SED met with representatives of the Algerian CP on 31
October 1957; representatives of the CP Denmark arrived in East
Berlin on 16 December 1957.
Outside the Bloc, CP France in 1957 made efforts to coordinate
anti-NATO propaganda with the CP's in Belgium, Luxemburg, and
the Netherlands. ?CP Finland reportedly attempted to assert a lead-
ing position among the Scandinavian Communist parties. In accord-
ance with previous practice, CP Mexico was used by the localSoviet
Embassy in 1957 as a communication channel to other Communist
parties in Central America. According to some reports, CP Indo-
nesia had been instructed by the CPSU to coordinate the work of
Communist parties in Southeast Asia.
The emergence of more formal regional centers should facilitate
indirect CPSU control of the Communist parties coordinated by these
centers. The most important trend, however, in the regional pattern
will be the further development of contacts between Communist parties
in "capitalist" and "colonial and semi-dependent" countries.
17. The data published in the Communist press on the organ-
izational aspects of the meetings make it obvious that the major
part of the proceedings is being concealed. None of the actual speeches
of the representatives have been published in full; the findings of the
Commissions created by the meetings have not been published; the
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Suslov report (allegedly several hundred pages long) has been
publicized only in a few excerpts. It is also not unlikely that specific
organizational proposals were made at the meetings which went
beyond the publicly-adopted positions on periodic conferences and
on the issuance of a theoretical journal. Some of the documents
issued at the meetings are reliably reported to be of such a sensi-
tive nature that they cannot be revealed fully even within a national
Communist party. After the conclusion of the meetings at least one
Communist party outside the Bloc is reliably reported to have re-
ceived a document through the local Soviet Embassy with the advice
to take action upon it.
While some of the secrecy can be attributed to a desire to conceal
the extent of disagreements and weaknesses--which are appaient even
in the published data--it would be safe to assume that specific oper-
ational reasons are also involved. The November meetings succeeded
in establishing a preliminary program and a procedure for the tactical
integration of the Communist Movement. It may be expec ted that
both will be refined and improved, upon the initiative of the CPSU.
The programmatic statement issued in the Declaration shows that
the CPSU considers that opportunities for increasingly aggressive
action have improved since last year, and that, given increased
discipline and unity, these opportunities can be exploited. In short,
the program aims at a restoration of the "revolutionary content"
and the "revolutionary spirit" of the Communist action plan. It is
perhaps for this reason that a Communist leader thought his party
would be outlawed if the full contents of the November meetings were
made public. They would be certain to reveal that International
Communism in concert with the Bloc has been called upon to mount
a political offensive.
18. The Tactical Program of the Declaration. In line with
previous estimates by the Soviets, opportunities exist particularly
in "colonial and dependent" (i.e.., underdeveloped) countries,
whereas "relatively good economic activity" in a "number of
capitalist countries" (i.e., industrialized areas) reduces the
effectiveness of Communist leverage there for the time being.
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In order to increase the opportunities the Declaration puts in the
center of Communist tactics the exploitation of a threat which, it
alleges, derives from "the presence of military danger created
by imperialism, and primarily by the imperialism of the United
States of America, which has now become the center of internation-
al reaction."* By fanning war hysteria and anti-Americanism
the Communist Movement will seek to mount increasing political
and other pressures on the local governments and political structures.
The exploitation of this issue could, in the Communist estimate,
effect a change in the balance of power in the country in which the
party is operating, and therefore, internationally.** The oper-
ational method seleeted for this purpose is the promotion of the
United Front on the broadest possible basis. "The Peace Manifesto
clearly defines the position of Communist and workers' parties,
which consists of offering support to every step taken by a state,
a party, an organization, a movement, or an individual for the
preservation of peace and against war, for peaceful coexistence,
for the establishment of collective security in Europe. and Asia,
for reduction of armaments, and for banning the use of atomic
weapons and the carrying out of atomic .tests."*** (Underlining
* Quoted from Suslov's account of the Moscow meetings to the
Rostov Oblast party organization, 2 December.
** In this regard it is interesting to note recent reporting concern-
ing Syria, which indicates that the Communist Party has been
consciously exploiting the artificially sustained threat of external
aggression to persuade its opponents both in and outside the Party
to forego disputes, electoral contests, and other actions which
threaten to weaken the Party's position in relation to the national
front government. - -
*** From a Tbilisi (Tiflis) 1 December broadcast report on a
Georgian party organization Aktiv meeting.
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supplied.) This position permits and demands manipulation not
only of "left" political groups but also, and in some areas pre-
ponderantly, of "right" and nationalist forces.
19, This tactic of building up pressure in the Free World is,
of course, not a new one. In the postwar period such attempts were
intensified, particularly in periods when the Soviet expansion drive
was frustrated. The Cominform-endorsed tactic of direct assault
was adopted following the loss of goodwill which the Soviet Union
and Communist parties had accumulated during World War II in
many countries. When the aggression in Korea was halted, the
Cominform tactic of direct assault was transformed into the ,
tactic of the United National Front which closely corresponded to
the current line, inasmuch as it was also based on marshalling
all anti-American forces on a minimum platform. The current
action line stems mainly from the frustrations suffered by the Bloc
as a result of internal pressures developing after the 20th Congress
and in the wake of the Hungarian revolt.
The fact that this action line is being re-emphasized indicates
that internal pressures are still operating in the Bloc.. In this
context it is not coincidental that Walter Ulbricht, as reported by
Ebert, "emphasized the statement included in the draft declaration
that by the reestablishment of German militarism a focus ,of serious
danger of war has been established in Europe." Ulbricht was
seconded by "the representatives of the Czechoslovak and French
sister parties," and by Mao Tse-tung.* Ulbricht also stressed
The question of "German militarism today" had been previously
discussed at a joint conference of the editorial boards of the
Soviet publication International Affairs and parallel publications
of Poland, East Germany and Czechoslovakia (Prague, 17-18
July 1957. )
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that there was not the "slightest difference" between SED, CPSU
and CP China in the appraisal of the international situation. In
sum, the "threat of war" issue corresponds most to the interests
of the Bloc as an excuse for halting revisionism and evolution.
It can make a significant contribution to the fortunes of parties
in critical underdeveloped areas, such as the Middle and Near
East, but in Western countries it makes demands upon rather
than contributes to the forces of the International Communist
Movement. It is an artifice and therefore is in need of artificial
stimulation. It is probable that the Communist leaders assembled
for the November meetings were cleverly propagandized in this
respect. A clue is contained in a Rostov broadcast report 01 .3.
December on Suslovcs account of the November meetings which,
presumably, followed the pattern of his report at the Moscow
meetings. According to the Rostov broadcast
"a considerable place in the (Suslov's) report was
devoted to showing how imperialist reaction is
striving to undermine the position of the countries
of socialism and to restore in them the dominance
of the capitalists and landowners, The ruling
circles of the imperialist powers are using any
means of political, ?economic and ideological
advance from outside the socialist countries
with the simultaneous activation of internal
counter-revolution in these countries."
Ulbricht, at the meetings in Moscow, referred to "NATO documents
which show that in the future methods of violence are to play a great-
er role in organizing counter-revolutionary putsches in Europe, in
order to pave the way for military interventions," thus adding to
the abundance of "plots" and "documents" used by Khrushchev and
Communist media throughout the world to keep the issue of the war
threat alive..*
* During the Stalinist precedent of the current tactic, the trials of
Bloc leaders were used to dramatize the external threat.
rf,,,n-ibo'IF :then.
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Although the artifice of the "war threat" is a paradox in a
period when the "world system of socialism" proclaims superior-
ity, it is advantageous to the Soviet Union not only for internal
reasons. It also permits the Bloc to provoke the U.S. and its
allies into positions which can then be "exposed" as proof of the
thesis, It permits the Bloc to blame the West for failure to negoti-
ate on Soviet terms, and to maintain a climate of political pressure
on Free World nations, especially underdeveloped countries, to
alienate them further from the West. It permits even the use of
the paradox itself by alternately emphasizing the war threat and
the peaceful posture of the Soviet Union and the Bloc.
The threat of war is also an essential element of the Soviet
appeal to Yugoslavia. A.12 December Moscow broadcast in Serbo-
Croatian stated, "The great historic mission of the Socialist
countries, of all Communist parties and of peace-loving forces is
to prevent imperialism" from plunging "mankind into the flames
of nuclear war." The broadcast added that "not only one state
but thirteen Socialist states...are now fighting to prevent a third
world war. They will prevent it if they act monolithically in
defense of the cause of peace," The figure thirteen obviously
includes Yugoslavia,*
20. As an operative directive, the war threat as the central
issue for the United Front tactic is a signal for intensified dis-
ruptive action in the Free World. This signal appeared previously
in the August 1957 (#12) issue of Kommunist in an article by Ponomarev,
The cited broadcast is noteworthy because it omits one of the
nine laws which were codified by the Declaration as the most
important tenets of Marxism-Leninism to be applicable to all
Communist-led countries. The law omitted reaffirmed Commu-
nist orthodoxy,
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and was apparent in the "Theses" issued in September by the
Central Committee of the CPSU on'the 40th Anniversary of the
October Revolution. The resolutions passed by the 4th World
Trade Union (WFTU) Congress', 8 October 1957, did not use
precisely the same terminology as these documents, in view
of the mixed attendance, but some delegates, i.e. , Pena from
Cuba, and Chu Hsu-fan of the All-.Chinese Federation of Trade
Unions, pointed to the need to establish an anti-imperialist
(national) front.
For "colonial and dependent" countries the Declaration pre-
scribes a united anti-imperialist and anti-feudal front exploit-
ing peasant unrest and the grievances of the middle class, as
well as aspirations of "patriotic democratic forces." That the
Declaration calls for increasing pressure emerges from its
position on neutralist governments of underdeveloped countries---
the "zone of peace." This accent on. pressure becomes recogniz-
,
able in comparing Khrushchev's statement at the 20th CPSU
Congiess with the Declaration. In February 1956 Khrushchev
defined the "vast peace zone" (of neutralist governments) as a
"group of peace-loving European and Asian states which have
proclaimed non-participation in blocs a principle of their foreign
policy." This "peace zone" was presented as augmenting "the
/Communisa forces of peace." The Declaration, on the other hand,
defined as 'T.-the peace-loving countries of Asia and Africa" those
"taking an anti-imperialist stand and forming together with the
SoCialist countries, a broad peace-zone." In this definition there is
no longer any reference to "peace-loving European states." More
important, the "anti-imperialist stand" is emphasized as the
chief criterion. "Non-participation in blocs" is no longer mentioned
as a chief characteristic of a neutralist country. This language
suggests that the Soviet Union now requires a closer alignment on
the part of neutralist governments prior to considering them as
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useful adjuncts to its foreign policy aims.* Local Communist
parties may therefore exert greater pressure on their govern-
ments to force their alignment, or to bring them down.
21. Pressure on capitalist countries can also be expected to
mount. This is indicated in the Declaration by the call for attacks
on the "big monopoly" groups --the traditional signal for intensi-
fication of infiltration and unrest in labor and other fields.
For those capitalist countries which are closely allied with
the U.S., the Declaration also prescribes the foundation of a
broad united front, based on unity of the working class (i.e. ,
united action with Socialists) in order eventually to "overthrow
the rule of the monopolies who betray national interests." The
Democratic Socialists remain a key target for the united front
attack. Ponomarev, in the August issue of Kommunist, indicated
* A Soviet Foreign Office official recently urged in conversation
with Egyptian officials that Egypt abandon its "positive neutrality"
formula.
One source has also reported that pressiire had been applied by
a key figure within the Syrian government to make the national front
"truly representative" by reshuffling the cabinet and including
Khalid Bakdash, Secretary General of the CommunistParty,in it.
D. N. Aidit, Secretary General of the Indonesian Communist Party,
in a key speech delivered in Djokjakarta on 20 October 1957,
addressed both Communists and nationalists on this point in the
following terms: "The question of cooperation between the Commu-
nists and nationalists is not a question of wanting to or not, but
a question of historical necessity."
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clearly that some of the Asian Socialists were closer to the Commu-
nist position than the European Socialists, The 40th A.nniversary
Theses flatly declared that without a Communist-Socialist united
front "the working class cannot win power." The Declaration is
not so strongly worded and emphasizes the incompatibility of (Demo-
cratic) Socialist and Communist doctrine, It is entirely possible
that Khrushche'v and the CPSU considered that opportunities exist
for a "united front from above," i, e. , agreement with Socialist
leadership,* whereas leaders of Communist parties abroad,
especially those from Europe, pointed to the practical difficulties
involved. The Declaration suggests that the tactic of the "united
front from below" (i.e. , infiltration and splitting of the rank and
file from the Socialist leaders) has been agreed upon as the most
practical one, especially in Western Europe,
Accordingly, the 5 December resolution of the Central Committee
of CP France speaks of efforts necessary "to win Socialist workers
(not leaders) to the united front," Leadership agreements, will
probably be sought by the CPSU and the Soviet government with
Democratic Socialist parties in power,
22, The Declaration also makes perfectly clear---clearer,
perhaps, than the 20th CPSU Congress ---that the purpose of the
united front tactic is the gaining of state power, Reviving Dimitrov's
formulae of the 7th (Comintern) World Congress, it permits a
variety of "transitional forms" to this end, i, e, a "popular front"
based on "a united working class" (unity with the Socialists), or
"other workable forms of agreement and political cooperation
between the different parties and public organizations." The
latter formula obviously pertains to situations such as in Egypt,
* Khrushchev's October letter to European Socialist parties appears
to have been based on this assumption, At the 20th CPSU Congress,
Khrushchev also appeared to have in mind a united front from above.
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Syria, Indonesia or any other country where political fermentation
is spearheaded by nationalist (anti-imperialist) forces.
The Declaration restricts the "parliamentary road to Socialism"
to "a number of capitalist countries," and postulates that a Commu-
nist majority in a parliament must be employed so as to "smash the
resistance of the reactionary forces and create the necessary con-
ditions for peaceful realization of the Socialist revolution." In case
of resistance to this scheme, the Declaration warns, "the possi-
bility of non-peaceful transition to Socialism should be borne in
mind." The intensification of the united front pressures in the
Free World will, of course, vary from country to country.
The recent (5 December) Central Committee resolution of CP
France illustrates how the line set forth by the Declaration is
being implemented in one country. The resolution emphasized the
exploitation of the recent strike waves in protest against the high
cost of living; development of the opposition to the war in Algeria,
particularly as a means of achieving agreement with the Left;
development of increased violent opposition to the U.S. and NATO
policies through protest campaigns and the peace movement, coupled
with a dramatization of the war threat. This tactic is clearly de-
signed to increase direct pressure on the local political structure
and government.
CP Brazil furnishes another example. In August 1957, Party
leader Luis Carlos Prestes in issue #11 of Kommunist published an
article which was consistent with the fundamental position of the
1954 Program of CP Brazil, calling for the union of all anti-feudal
and anti-imperialist forces: the proletariat, peasants, petit and
national bourgeoisie, all under the guidance of the working class
and its Communist party. In the article, Prestes still called for
the overthrow of the Kubitschek regime and stated also that "we
must concentrate all our fire on the North American imperialists
and their agents in Brazil" in order to mobilize the widest possible
forces and to exploit all possible divisions among the bourgeoisie.
In October CP Brazil started its drive for "legalization"; it surfaced
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some of its leaders and took steps to bring about the change of
laws governing its status. A Soviet Bloc drive for increased trade
and cultural relations started about that time also. Prestes ad-
justed the tactics of the CP Brazil on 9 November in an article in
which he stated that the party had been in error in advocating the
immediate overthrow of the Brazilian government, and that CP
Brazil would fight henceforth with constitutional means for a "nation-
al democratic coalition government" which would, in time, lead to
"Socialism." The apparent "softening" of the line vis-a-vis the
Brazilian government--motivated by a variety of practical con-
siderations--still permits CP Brazil to intensify its united front
tactic by an increased exploitation of the anti-imperialist issue,
e,,i. anti-Americanism.
. In Japan, HAKA.MA.DA. Satomi, JCP Central Committee member,
who returned to Tokyo in the summer of 1957 after five years in
Moscow, immediately began a denunciation of the inflexibility of
the incumbent Party leadership. He utilized as a factional nucleus
elements of local Party organizations which had independently
initiated a criticism of the Party leadership on the same grounds.
An early convert to HA.KA.MADA.'s opinions (which have been
assumed throughout the Party to represent those of the CPSU) was
Communist Diet member SHIGA. Yoshio who later was appointed
chief of the three-man JCP delegation attending the 40th Anniver-
sary Celebrations and subsequent conferences.
23. Given an intensified united front tactic with all its varieties
as the international tactic of the World Communist Movement, the
Declaration was forced to place not only "revisionism" but also
"dogmatism" out of bounds. Although the document states that
"revisionism is the main danger," it raises the fight against dog-
matism to a higher priority. "Dogmatism" means tactical in-
flexibility and the inability to make and manipulate concessions to
the non-Communist partners of the united front or United action.
In conformity with this precept, Thorez and the CP France de-
voted more attention to the dangers of dogmatism in their 5 December
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Central Committee meeting than previously. Thorez reportedly
declared that "dogmatism (and sectarianism) impedes the applic-
ation of Marxist-Leninist theory in concrete and changing con-
ditions. It prevents seeing modifications which are operating.
It ties those who are its victims to outmoded formulae and hinders
them in accomplishment of necessary efforts to win Socialist
workers to the united front." (Underlining supplied).
Thus, it would seem, the line against "revisionism" has been
blurred somewhat, at least outside the Bloc,* by the need to per-
mit the International Communist Movement the necessary tactical
flexibility in its united front maneuvers. In any case the position
should facilitate purges of deviators and anti-party groups of any
persuasion. Such a purge was carried out, apparently with success,
by CP Syria as early as October of this year.
24. Outlook, The November meetings of Communist leaders in
Moscow perpetuated and generalized the hardened and bolder line
of the CPSU and Soviet foreign policy which has been characteristic
of the period following Khrushchev's victory in the June CC Plenum.
They resulted in a first step toward increased organizational unity
within the International Communist Movement, The Economic
Conference of the Eastern European satellites, convened as of
December 1957, is an indication of the determination with which
the CPSU pursues its objective of increasing cohesion in the Bloc.
* Within the Bloc, the line retains its potency. Suslov stated,
"In the countries of socialism, revisionism today is taking the
form of ignoring the teaching of the unavoidability of a serious
class struggle during the period of transition." While this
formula is not as forceful as Stalin's on the sharpening of class
struggle in the period of transition, it would seem to recognize
China's problem in particular.
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25. Whether the current tactical line of the World Communist
Movement will be maintained depends, of course, on its success,
particularly on the ability of the Soviet Party/government to play
with fire. For the moment the official Soviet prognosis is extreme-
ly optimistic. The Soviet writer and Khrushchev protege, Kornerchuk,
stated at the plenary session of the Central Committee of the Ukrain-
ian Communist Party on 2 December:
"Having frequently had the chance to travel
abroad, I have seen what prestige is en-
joyed by our great fatherland, the mighty
Soviet Union, which leads the struggle
for peace in the whole world. That prestige
has greatly increased since our country
launched the artificial earth satellites, which
are the glory and pride of our creativeness,
our science, and our whole socialist system.
Next year, the World Congress of Peace Parti-
sans will be held. Many will be invited who have
not yet joined that movement. The Congress will
be devoted to the problem of disarmament. We
are happy that the main theses of the Declaration
and the Peace Manifesto will help us to organize
new hundreds of millions of people around the
invincible banner of peace."*
* A new peace campaign has already begun in the Bloc and outside.
In 'Rumania, "spontaneous" mass meetings in factories, institutes,
clubs, etc. were organized to attack the U.S. for a refusal to ban
tests. Noteworthy was the attendance of the Catholic clergy. CP
Italy issued a statement following a joint session of its CC and
Control Commission on 11 December, which said that the Peace
Manifesto will constitute the beginning of wide agitation and polit-
ical action by the central Party. The concrete forms are to be
determined shortly by the PCI directorate.
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While this extravagant claim does not specify whether these "hundreds
of millions" will be organized within or outside the Bloc, it clearly
indicates an expectation that the Communist Movement can ride
on the coat-tails of increasing Soviet prestige. Khrushchev, in
confidential discussions with foreign CP leaders in Moscow, also
appears to have imbued them with a fighting optimism.
26. Mao's long speech at the plenary session followed the same
line. He must have deeply impressed the delegates, because some
had great praise for Mao's statesmanship and his modesty in re-
nouncing a role of world leadership in favor of the Soviet 'Union.
The war threat and the superiority Of the Bloc formed an integral
part of his speech.
Mao stated that the imperialist powers were moving toward
atomic war. At the time of the Suez crisis, the Politburo of CP
China estimated that, in case of general atomic war, 600 million
people would be killed and 300 million would be totally disabled.
In view of this high cost, Mao stated that "we do not desire to
start a war."*. He reportedly stated, however, that if there were
no other alternatives "we will do it" and in that case, another
and an accelerated victory for socialism would ensue.
Mao stressed that vigilance was necessary lest "we be drawn
into such an impasse." He reportedly also warned that certain
"elements among the imperialists" will take risks and will try to
"draw us out of our tents." Apparently in order to dramatize the
strength of the Bloc and the weakness of the imperialist "paper
tigers," Mao cited a series of instances where the imperialists
had suffered defeat, e.g. , in Korea, Vietnam, Suez. He bragged
In his use of the word "we," it is not known whether Mao was
speaking for the entire Communist side.
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that the Soviet Union solved the Suez crisis by sending a telegraphic
warning to England and that in the Syrian crisis "not even the cost
of a telegram was required." Khrushchev merely published an
article in his own newspaper.
The sputnik, according to Mao, signified the turning point. From
now on the imperialists would get blow upon blow although they still
could launch small offensives which could cause great harm to the
Communists. Mao called the Communist delegates to do their
utmost to deny the enemy even this capability.
Whether or not Khrushchev and Mao divulged their true estimates
of the strength of the Bloc to the international Communist leader-
ship cannot be ascertained. In any case their talks were clearly
meant to strengthen Communist morale and to inspire action de-
signed to create serious trouble in the Free World.
27. It may be assumed that the 1958 World Congress of Peace
Partisans (mid-1958?) will provide the CPSU with an opportunity
for a review of its tactics. The next international meeting of
Communist leaders may well coincide, or be held in conjunction
with, the next World Peace Congress, and thus facilitate a general
review.
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