IMAGERY ANALYSIS MONTHLY REVIEW SEPTEMBER 1979

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: NGA Records (Formerly NIMA)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00250A000100780001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 30, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 1, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

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National Top Secret
Foreign
Assessment
Imagery Analysis
Monthly Review
Top Secret
October 1979
copy l 0 6
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National
Foreign
Assessment
Center
Imagery Analysis
Monthly Review
The information and judgments presented in this publication were
derived principally from analysis of imagery. Although information
from other sources of intelligence may be included for background,
this publication does not reflect an all-source assessment and has
not been formally coordinated within CIA. (U)
Comments and queries on the contents of this publication are
welcomed. They should be directed to the analyst whose name
and green line extension appear after each article. (U)
Ic MR 7o.nn7I
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Top Secret
Satellite Communications The first satellite communications equipment to be
Equipment Identified at identified at an SS-20 missile base was observed
SS-20 Base (TSR) on recent imagery at Drovyanaya Mobile IRBM
Base to (TSR)
Problems in Transshipping The Soviets are encountering problems in handling
Grain Imports (I 1) the large amounts of grain they are importing this
year. (U)
China Forms New Infantry The Chinese have upgraded an internal defense
Division Near Lao Border (S) division located near the Lao border into a main
force infantry division, (S
Chinese May Be Testing
An ABM ('CSR)
The first missile seen at the 1)iamvei Missile 'l'est
Center could be China's first attempt to develop
an antiballistic missile, (TSR)
H Civil Defense Shelter A preliminary review of photography of 13 major
Program (II) urban areas in China confirms that the Chinese
have developed an extensive urban personnel
civil defense shelter program. (S)
10 Status of the Chinese An imagery- analysis study reveals China's aluminum
Aluminum Industry' (U) industry has grown at a slower rate in the past five
years than in the early 19-0s. (S
China's Iron and Steel An imagery analysis study of 39 of the largest
Industry (U) plants in China's iron and steel industry estimates
these plants have about three-fourths of the indus-
try's 42-million-metric-ton-per-year capacity.
(TSR)
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Satellite Communications Fquipment Identified at SS-20 Rase (TSR)
The first satellite communications equipment to he identified at an
SS 2O missile base was seen on October 1979 imagery at Provvanava Mobile
IRBM Base I . lthat appear to he two PARK PRIVF antennas in the deployed
mode were observed next to an II-hay garage in the vehicle support
area. PARK IlR1VPP antennas are normally deployed in hairs with three
support vehicles associated with each unit. I'owever, no support vehicles
were observed at Provyanaya. (TSR)
The PARK PRIVF system can he used to provide direct satellite
counnunications with Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) headquarters in Moscow
or with any other SRF command center equinped for satellite communications.
This added satellite communications capability fits the Soviet trend
toward redundant command and control communications. Additionally, the
use of the PARK C)RIVP system provides for mobility required to support
the SS-20 system, and complements the current Iandline, i!F, and 11111,
capab i 1 i t ies . ('1'SR)
PARK DRIVE Communications
Antenna Trailer. (S)
Top View
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Problems in Transshipping Grain imports (U)
Analysis of imagery of Soviet grain ports during the July-to-early-
September-1979 period indicates the Soviets are experiencing some
difficulty in transshipment of imported grain. This year, as in 1975,
the Soviets have been forced to more than double their usual grain
imports due to a poor harvest. Imagery of 17 of the 18 ports
traditionally involved in grain transfer shows shortages of available
grain--carrying railcars, large rnnnbers of ships waiting at anchor,
relatively long periods at quayside berths, the use of lightering, and
the widespread use of general cargo berths in addition to berths at
specialized grain handling facilities. The situation probably will
deteriorate further in coming months as the amount of grain arriving at
the ports increases and port operations slow due to cold weather and
iced harbors. (TSR)
The widespread use of general cargo berths for grain transfer,
rather than the specialized grain berths which have storage facilities,
has increased the need for railcars at the ports at a time when they
are also required in the harvest areas. However, an average of only
17 railcars per ship were observed at or near the quay when grain
ships were berthed. We would expect to see many more, if they were
available, as about 500 sixty-ton railcars are necessary to acconnnodate
an average shipment. The railcar shortage has contributed to the
extended period grain ships have been observed at quayside berths.
One ship was observed at a Batumi berth for at least 30 days in
August and September and another spent a minimum of 20 days at Odessa
in August. Much shorter periods would be expected for rapid transfer
of the grain. (TSR)
At the end of August there were 19 ships anchored at Vladivostok
and at least 22 ships at Nakhodka some of which were probably carrying
grain. Many of the other grain ports imaged also had ships at anchor
although fewer than were seen at Vladivostok and Pakhodka. Usually,
ships are at anchor when berths are not available, but general cargo
ships have been observed in the anchorage when there were open general
cargo berths. This could be another indicator of a shortage of railcars
to unload the ships. Lightering operations have been observed at eight
of the ports, both to speed the quayside transfer of grain and to move
the grain to smaller coastal and river ports. (TSR)
(TOP SECRET RUFF)
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Chin_r Forms New Infantry Division Near Lao Border (S)
The Chinese have formed a new main force infantry division near the
Lao border in southern Kunming (K'unming) Military Region. The division
was formed hr' upgrading an internal defense division that operated with
the 11th Arnv during China's incursion of Vietnam. The new division is
subordinate to the 11th Army and provides that army with its third
infantry division--the standard nrrniher in a Chinese army. The strengthen-
ing of the 11th Army in all likelihood was prompted by China's deteriorating
relationship with Laos and tensions with Vietnam. (S
According to NSA, conmunications intercepts of late Mar and early
June 1O;5 provided evidence that an internal defense division in southern
Ki nmirig 'lil itarv [legion was being upgraded to a main force infantry
division. The division was identified as the 33rd. l;xamination of
sateII to nhotogr,aphy since late May corroborates NSA's analysis. A
numl:~ r I ,: arrisons that formerly housed an internal defense division
have hear; e:goIpned with heavy weapons and equipment characteristic of a
main force inlantrv division. The divisional elements identified to
date include ,r division headquarters, three infantry regiments, an
art ill cry regiment, an ant inircraft artillery battalion, and a ponton
Location of 11th Army Units, Kunming Military Region. (S)
Hanoi 0
xxxx
LI Army Headquarters
xx
Infantry Division
Hong Kong
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China
Chinese May Be Testing An ARM (TSR)
':he first missile ever seen at the Dianwei (Tien-wei) Missile
'lest Center was observed on It could be China's
first attempt to develop an antiballistic missile (ARM). (TSR)
The Dianwei Missile Test Center is in Yunnan Province. It was
constructed in 1971 and consists of a launch site with a fixed-azimuth
zero-length launcher; four tracking facilities arranged in a fan pattern
extending out from the launch site; and several support facilities.
The missile seen at the test center on was conically shaped
for most of its length, was light-toned was a out 12 meters in overall
length, and had a maximum diameter of The conical shape
extends from the missile's tip to a point back, and the
rear is cylindrical. Enhanced imagery shows what may he
small fins on the forward portion of the missile. The rear portion
of the missile was obscured by the launcher and it could not be
determined if fins were present there. (TSP)
The combination of the design of the launcher and the pattern
formed by the tracking facilities is compatible with both ARM and
surface-to-air missile (SAM) testing facilities. The configuration of
the missile--which is similar to that of both the US Sprint high-
acceleration AIM and the Soviet SII-08 high-acceleration ARM--suggests
that the Chinese could be testing a developmental version of an ARM
rather than a SAM. (TSR)
Although constructed in 1971, the Dianwei Test Center was
inactive until April 1978 when a missile load simulator was seen
attached to the launcher. Activity associated with this simulator
was completed by when the simulator was returned to
the missile assembly and checkout facility near the launch site. On
the conical missile was first observed as it was being
attached to the launch rail. By , the missile had been
suspended from the launch rail and a larger number of vehicles and
personnel were present in the area. On the missile,
vehicles, and personnel were no longer visible, and the launch rail
was elevated to about 45 degrees.
(TOP SECRET RUTT
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Top Secret
Civil Defense Shelter Program; (U)
A preliminary review of 1970-79 photography of 13 major urban areas*
in northeast, north central, and east China confirms that the Chinese
have developed an extensive urban personnel shelter program. In addition
to the known urban tunnel networks which provide evacuation routes and
sheltering capability, the shelter program includes detached, semi-
detached, and basement shelters. Although preliminary findings indicate
that the highest rate of shelter construction occurred between 1975 and
1977, both shelter and tunnel construction were continuing in mid-1979.
(I'SR)
The majority of the nearly 100 detached, semidetached, and basement
shelters observed under construction during the 1970s appear to he
independent of any urban tunnel network. Although there is a high degree
of similarity in the construction techniques, there are notable differences
*1`hidanj iang (Mu-tan-chiang), Qigihar (Chi-chi-ha-erh), 11arbin (lJa erh pin) ,
Changchun (Chang-shun), Shenyang (Shen-yang), Lucia (I,ii-ta), Tianjin
('Tientsin), Shiiiazhuang (Shih-chin-chuang), Baotou (Pao-tou),
I lolihot (I lu-ho-hao-te) , Lanzhou (Lan-chow) , 1iangzhou (11ang-chou) , and
Shanghai (Shang-11"11).
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Top Secret
in the physical design and sizes of the shelters. Generally, the shelters
are constructed below ground level, are vented, and have associated
entrance/exit structures. Tn most shelters, prefabricated roof arches
span brick or concrete walls. Following completion of the shelter
and application of waterproof sealant, the shelter is earth covered
and the surface landscaped. A high percentage of the detached and
semidetached shelters observed are located at schools, parade fields
within !'!ilitarv installations, and institutional-type facilities. ('fSR)
The sizes of the detached, semidetached, and basement shelters
observed to date range from ?5 square meters to 2,200 square meters.
Applying the standards used for the Soviet civil defense program,
whore two-thirds of the shelter area is considered useable for people
and 0.5 square meter is allocated per person, the rapacity of these
individual shelters range from 100 to almost 3,000 people. (TSR)
Many military, government, and other institutional buildings and
facilities have direct access to the, tunnel network, the other important
aspect of the Chinese civil defense program. Portions of these under-
ground tunnel networks have been seen under construction in several
cities. However, the extent of the tunnel networks has not been
Clete III] ined. (S~
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Top Secret
Status of the Chinese Alunirnnn Industry (U)
I\ recent ly completed imagery analysis study reveals China's aluminun
industry has continued to grow over the past five years, although at a
much slower rate than in the early 1970s. No new aluninum-producing
plants have been built since 1973, and the growth that has occurred in
the industry is the result of plant expansion and improvements in operating
efficiency. There was considerable growth in China's production capacity
for alumina, the raw material for producing aluminum. Between 1975 and
1977' one new alumina-producing plant began operating, and in 1978,
alumna production facilities at three of the other four al mina-producing
plants were being expanded. (S
The Chinese aluminum industry consists of 40 plants. Nine of these
plants account for over half of the country's aluminum production capacity,
and in 1978 they accounted for an estimated 70 percent of actual production.
The remaining 31 aluminum-producing plants are small operations. Based
on the n mtber of potrooms seen operating in 1978 and early 1979, the
nine large plants were operating at full capacity and the 31 smaller
plants at about 60 percent of capacity. Assuming that these levels of
operation were maintained throughout the year, and using a methodology
which relates roof area of a potroom to production capacity, the total
aluminum industry production for 1978 would have been about 400,000 metric
tons production of aluminum, or about 83 percent of capacity. No method
for estimating altunina production from photography has been developed.
IPor additional details sec IS 9 101271;, I Aluminum
and Altmnina Production Facilities, China, September 1979 (Top Secret
('FO1' SI'CR1 d RI),F1 C )
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Chine's Iron and Steel Industry (U)
Top Secret
recently completed imagery analysis study provides infoi-ration on
9 of the largest plants in China's iron and steel industry. l:stinuates
of blast f>>rnace capacities derived from analysis of satellite photography
indicate that these plants have the capacity to produce about 30 million
metric tons of iron annually -- about three-fourths of the industry's
overa11 estimated annual capacity of almost 42 million metric tons. "]hc
Chinese reportedly expected to produce about 33 million metric tons of
iron and from 31.7 to 34.3 million metric tons of steel in 19711. (TSR)
Since 1974 construction of new production facilities and renovation
or expansion of existing production facilities has been observed at 33
of these 39 plants. The nature of the recent construction indicates
that the Chinese are attempting to increase productivity in their iron
and stee] industry by introducing modern technolopv such as hasic oxygen
furnaces and eliminating bottlenecks in raw materials processing and
finished stCC I production.
For additional details see IS 79-10149K, L_
]roll and Steel I'1_Ints, October 1979 ('Top Secret
(TOP SFCRFT RUFF
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New OIA Publications (U)
The lollowiup reports have been published by the Office of Imagery
;\rtalvsis since the last issue of the Imagery An_tlvsis Monthly Review.
Imagery Research Papers
Bavkal-Amur Mainline Railroad:
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Cons
truction Status (U)
, September 1979 (Top Secret MIT/
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IS 7
9-10145K,
, Bulgarian Petroleum Ref ining
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Indu
stry (U), October 1
979 (Top Secret
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3.
IS 7
9-10149K,
Major Chinese Iron and Steel
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Plan
ts (U), Octoher 197
9 (Top Secret
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1.
IS 7
9-10127K, I
~ Aluminum and Alumina Production
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Iaci
lities, China (U),
September 11)79 ('l'op Secret
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5.
1S 7
9-10110K,
Chang-Chun Motor Vehicle Pliant,
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Chin
a (U), September 19
79 ('hop Secret
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0.
IS 7
9-101-15K,
Sain_hi Motor Vehicle Assembly
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Plan
t, North Korea (C),
September 1979 (Top Secret
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IS 7
9- 10117JX,
Possible loser test ttange,
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Che
rnomorskoye, USSR (T
SR), S e c r e t
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8.
IS
79- 101.38K,
Trends in the Development of
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Sov
iet Patrol Combatant
s and Fast Patrol Craft (S), September
197
9 ('hop Secret
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9.
IS
79-10124J,
Photographic Indicators of Missile
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lau
nchers, Shuangchengz
I Missile Test Center, China (hSR),
Aug
ust 1979 (Top Secret
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10.
IS
79-10119K,
Chinese Ilan-Class Submarine: An
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Ima
gery Analysis (S), A
ugust 1979 ('l'op Secret
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11.
IS
79-10092K,
Albania's Petroleum Refining Industry
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(U) , August 1979 (Top Secret
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12. IS 79-10097K, , urea Production Facilities in China
(U), ,July 1979 (Top Secret
1magerv An:u1vsis Memorandums
1. IS 79-10101K, Modernization of Cascade Building
at the 'Tomsk Uranium Isotope Separation Plant, USSR (Top Secret
I~IIIT)
2. IS 79-10153K, Transportation Systems and Communications
Facilities in the Vicinity of the Ros Koh Tunneling Activity,
Pakistan (hop Secret RUFF)
3. IS 79-10120K, Search for Military Presence at the
Pclindaha National Nuclear Research Center, South Africa (Top
Secret RUFF)
1. IS 79-10130K, N-Class SSN in Reserve Status at
Severodvinsk Naval Base, West (Top Secret RUFF)
5. IS 79-10136K, Typhoon SSBN Will Have Larger Pressure
lull Diameter 'than Delta-Series SSBNs (Top Secret RUFF)
0. IS 79-10110K, Recent Changes at Tunneling Site
Western Pakistan (Top Secret RUFF)
?. 1S 79-10122K, , Coal Mining Activity in the Kuznetsk,
hasin, USSR (Top Secret RUFF
0. IS 79-10142K, China: Analysis of Civilian industrial
Plants for Evidence of Missile Transporter Production Top Secret
2111 )
IS 79-10148, Status of Selected Industrial Facilities in Albania
(Secret
10. IS 79-10131J, L_
(Top Secret RUFF
11. IS 79-10153K,
Africa ('l'op Secret
RUFF)
Isfahan ["on and Steel Plant, Iran
POI, Storage Facilities in South
12. IS 79 10125K, Shock Isolation Component for the
'I'yIpe IIIF (SS_10) Missile Silo ('hop Secret RUFF)
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13. IS 79-10134K, -1 Construction Schedule for Completing
SS 18 ICBM Silo Croups (Top Secret
14. IS-79-10132K,I Analysis of Chinese CSS-1 MRBM From
Ground Photographs (Top Secret RUFF)
15. IS 79-10139K, Photographic Analysis of Cosmos
1100/1101 Dual-Payload (Top Secret Ruff)
16. IS 79-10163J, Unidentified Ponton Bridge Regiment
(Independent), Kunming Military Region, China (Top Secret RUFF
17. IS 79-10162J,I 14th Artillery Division (Independent'
Kunming Military Region, China (Top Secret RUFF
18. IS 79-1.0164J,~ 65th Antiaircraft Artillery Division
Inde endent) in Kunming Military Region, China (Top Secret RUFF
19. IS 79-10159, Analysis of Soviet Ground Force Combat Units in
Cuba 1962-1967 (Secret)
20. IS 79-10156K, Soviet Probable Airborne Unit in
Afghanistan (Top Secret RUFF
21. IS 79-10151K, Algerian Military Installations
and Order of Battle (Top Secret RUFF)
Brigade Size Unit in Cuba (Top Secret RUFF
Top Secret 14
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