SALT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00294A000300090004-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 26, 2002
• Sequence Number: 4
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2007/02/24: CIA-RDP80T00294AO00300090004-8
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NdW SECRET/EXDIS
SALT TWO
SESSION
A- 122
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
U.S. SALT DELEGATION
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND
[DATE: December 19, 1972
TIME: 7:00 - 7:15 p.m.
PLACE: Pare des Eaux-Vives
Geneva
Dr. Lawrence D. Weiler Mr. 0. A. Grinevsky
General
During the Swiss reception Grinevsky commented that it was unfortunate
that SALT TW01I was not going to last a few days longer since it might be
possible for both sides to get a better understanding of each other's views
in the next few days now that both sides had formally set forth their
positions. When I asked whether he thought the recent discussions between
Ambassador Smith and Minister Semenov had been useful, he said it was hard to
tell at this point.
Grinevsky said he found the life of a SALT delegate personally trying.
He said he could not bring his wife with him because of his sixteen year old
son who he felt should have a home at his age rather than be sent to boarding
school. The result of this decision, was, he said, that he spent much of
his life alone in a hotel room, adding that now it was a hotel room surrounded
by the polluted air of rue de Lausanne. When I noted that Geneva hotels
would probably be even more crowded for SALT TWO/TI, Grinevsky agreed, saying
that with the CCD delegations, the SALT delegations, and probably mutual
force reduction delegations. all here at the same time we would be lucky to
get any hotel rooms.
SECRET/EXDIS
State Department review
Approved For Release 2007/02/24: CIA-RDP80T00294AO00300090004-8
 Approved For Release 2007/02/24: CIA-RDP80T00294A000300090004-8
SECRET/EXDIS
Non-Use of Force and Nuclear Weapons
I noted that the General Assembly was winding up its work and asked
Grinevsky how he would evalute the results of this session. His reply
was 'only so-so." He said he was disappointed with the U.S. response to
the Soviet proposal on non-use of force and nuclear weapons, saying it had
been put forward as a way of meeting past Western objections to earlier
Soviet proposals. I said that aside from the various unfortunate UN
constitutional problems raised by the Soviet proposal, the proposal did
appear to be quite a change from past Soviet proposals on non-use and
asked if this represented a change in Soviet policy. Grinevsky replied
that it did not. He said despite all their best efforts the Soviets had
failed in their "past attempts to get the West to agree to more far-reaching
limitations on use of nuclear weapons and that they had hoped that by
their new proposal there could be agreement to have at least some
inhibition on use of nuclear weapons. He said that in the long run
Soviet policy remained that of a "real ban" on using nuclear weapons.
I commented that in view of past Soviet proposals on non-use, I was
surprised that the Soviets had not responded to the Chinese proposal.
Grinevsky said there was no point in agreeing to accept the Chinese
proposal on no-first-use because if the Soviet were to do so the Chinese
would tie such an undertaking to other questions, commenting that
this was the tactic the Chinese always follow. I did not carry the
matter further.
LDWeiler:bls OP4
December 20, 1972
SECRET/EXDIS
Approved For Release 2007/02/24: CIA-RDP80T00294AO00300090004-8