INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE SALT TALKS IN GENEVA, JULY 2, 1975

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00294A001200010018-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 5, 2003
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: July 18, 1975
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For~Release 2007/02/07 :CIA-RDP80T002~001200010018-2
NATIONAL SECURITY CQUNCIL
WASHIM1tC-+TOhl, D.C. 20506
NSC REVIEW
COMPLETED,
7/2/03.
r
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE -XGDS
July .18, 1975
National Security Decision Memorandum 301
TO; The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
The Chairman, 'U. S. SALT Delegation
SUBJECT: Instructions for the SALT Talks in Geneva, July 2, 1975
The President has approved the following instructions for the Strategic
Arms Limitation Talks beginning on July 2, 1975 in Geneva. These
instructions supplement those contained in NSDM 285..
1. At an appropriate time, and in a manner of its choosing, the
Delegation should il~dicate willingness to consider the Soviet proposal
to ban the developrr~ent, testing, and deployment of systems for placing
nuclear weapons or any other kind of weapons of mass destruction into
earth orbit if the provision is broadened to?include present and future
fractional orbit bombardment systems (FOBS). Prior to discussing
treaty language for dealing with this system, alternatives to the Soviet
language should be submitted to Washington for approval.
2. With respect to the effective date; of the 2,400 aggregate limitation,.
while it is the US view that both sides should be at this level by
October 3, 1977, the US is prepared to consider a reasonable proposal
(a few months) from the Soviet side as to what mutually agreed period
of time after that date might be required in order to attain that level.
The agreed period of time should reflect an expedited program of
dismantling and destruction of those strategic delivery vehicles in
excess of 2, 400. ?
3. In connection with discussion of the effective date of the 2,400
aggregate limitation, the Delegation should note that the US believes
the other obligations in the agreement, which are not inconsistent with
the Interim Agreement, should become effective upon entry into force
(i, e, , exchange of instruments of ratification) of the new agreement.
TOP SECRET/SE_NSITIVE -XGDS (3)
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4. On the question of impedin ;verification by national technical
means contained in Article XVII of the Joint Draft Text, paragraph 3
should be reworded as follows:
Each Party undertakes not to use any measure or
practice, including measures and practices associated
with testing and development, which deliberately impedes
verification by national technical means of compliance
with the provisions of this agreement, This obligation
shall not require changes in current construction, assembly,
conversion, or overhaul practices. The parties undertake
to avoid measures or practices which result in unintended
interference with national technical means of verification
of the other party..
5. The following language should be substituted for the current US
version of Article XVI of the Joint Draft Text:
"The Parties undertake to continue active negotiations
for limitations on strategic arms, beginning no Iater than
one year following entry into force of this agreement, with
the objective of. achieving further limitations and reduction
of strategic arms at the earliest possible date. The Parties
shall also have the objective of concluding negotiations , well
in advance of the expiration of this Agreement, on an agreement
limiting strategic offensive arms to become effective upon
such expiration. "
6. The Delegation should indicate to~ the Soviets that the unbracketed
portions of the JDT are acceptable to the US Government with the
exception of ArticlE: VII and paragraph 3 of Article XVII which should
be modified as described abave. Concerning some issues contained
within the bracketed portions of the JDT:
a. Preamble: Either bracketed formulation would be acceptable
and resolution of this issue is left to the Delegation.
b. Article II; The phrase "capable of ranges" should be substi-
tuted for "with a range" in the US definition of ICBMs, ASBMs, and
any subsequent definitions based on range.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE -XGDS
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3.
c. Article IV: -The term "depth" may be used in place of "length"
provided the negotiating record reflects the understanding of both
sides that "depth" is defined as the total internal distance from the
top to the bottom of an ICBM silo launcher. In connection with
discussion of this Article, if the Soviet side continues to reject the
US formula set forth in the JDT the Delegation should explore alterna-
tive formulae.
-He
my A. ~Cissinger
cc: The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
TOP SECRET/SENSIT'IVE - XGDS
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