SPANISH INTERNAL STABILITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00634A000400010005-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 20, 2006
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: August 31, 1978
• Content Type: MEMO

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31 August 1978
SUBJECT: Spanish Internal Stability
The transformation from Francoist authoritarianism to parliamentary
democracy in Spain is still on track, largely due to the moderation and
desire for consensus that has dominated relations among the major parties
for almost two years. The moderation of the major political actors is
partly a legacy of the Civil War, which serves as a constant reminder
of how quickly polarization can get out of hand. It has allowed Prime
Minister Suarez to pull off a delicate balancing act to overcome the
minority status of his government--he lacks ten seats in the lower
house--and chalk up an impressive list of achievements since the first
free parliamentary elections of June 1977:
--All seven parliamentary groups, including the Communists, accepted
a moderately austere economic program last fall and, by and large, have
adhered to it.
--All but the small rightist Popular Alliance have also signed a
similar pact aimed at controlling terrorist violence and keeping the
security forces under better government control.
--Regional unrest has been dampened (except in the volatile Basque
provinces) by rants of provisional autonomy and by promises of a more
formal devolution of powers under the new constitution.
--Labor unrest has been contained and the first free plant-level
elections in forty years were held this spring.
--The draft of a new constitution has just passed the lower house
of parliament and is now being considered by'the upper house; it will
probably be approved by popular referendum this fall.
Major obstacles to the peaceful consolidation of Spanish democracy
still lie ahead, however. The most immediate of these is the issue of
Basque demands for autonomy. The essentially moderate Basque Nationalist
Party,-?which represents the vast majority of the ethnically Basque popula-
tion of the region, is wavering in its support for the new constitution
RP M 78-10334
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because: it provides only limited autonomy for the Basques, Increasingly
worried that they will lose support to more radical Basque groups if they
do not make a show of standing firm against the Madrid government, the
Basque Nationalists absented themselves from the constitutional vote in
the lower house. There is still hope that face-saving adjustments can be
made to the draft during the debate in the upper house that would allow the
Basque Nationalists to accept the constitution; if they do not, it is
unlikely to achieve the desired consensus vote in the Basque region and
this would cast a cloud over future relations between those troubled
provinces and Madrid.
Basque terrorists (ETA), meanwhile, are making a last-ditch bid to
derail the Madrid government's program of limited autonomy and prevent
the ratification of the constitution. The ETA (see attachment for back-
ground) will settle for nothing less than a completely independent,
Marxist Basque nation. Though few in number, these terrorists are well-
organized and effective; since 1975 they have assassinated over 60 people--
mostly policemen, politicians, and "informers"--and caused a great deal
.of damage. Moreover, the ETA is aided and abetted by a larger group of
sumpathizers who can them
h
as
eroes of the former struggle against Franco
bolt of ti
ym c
d
problem is most acute in the Basque reg on, partly because of the efficiency
of the ETA and partly because of the Spanish military's extreme sensitivity
to Basque separatist aspirations. The military's visceral hostility toward
the Basques--who were among Franco's bitterest enemies--gives the government
very little maneuvering room in which to make concessions to the Basque
Nationalists. Perhaps sensing that this may be the weak link in the chain
of consensus that is holding Spain together, the ETA seems to have decided
to provoke the military.
--On 18 June an ETA commando group forced its way into the head-
quarters of the military governor of Guipuzcoa, possibly intending to
kidnap the governor. They were foiled when a rifle went off prematurely,
alerting the guard.
--On 21 July terrorists killed a general and his aide in Madrid--
the first purely military assassination in recent years.
--On 28 August terrorists killed four policemen in three different
regions of northern Spain, including two in the Basque area.
In both of the latter cases, there are indications that the ETA
cooperated with the other major Spanish terrorist organization, the
leftist Groups of Anti-Fascist Resistance--1st of October (GRAPO).
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resistance to control by Madrid.
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h
V e penis people. The
J ority of military leaders, however, are loyal to the King and to the
constitution and have no desire to intervene, They are not likely to do
so unless:
GRAPO has hitherto operated primarily in Madrid and Barcelona, while
the ETA activities are limited largely to the Basque region. If the two
have indeed joined forces to expand the terrorist battlefield, this will
be a cause of.major concern to the military, which can be expected to step
up pressure on the government to crack down on public order.
Both the ETA and GRAPO hope that a military takeover with Francoist-
yle repressions will lead to a mass uprisin of th S
--Public order breaks down to such an extent that the paramilitary
police forces--the Armed Police and the'Civil Guard--cannot contain it.
--A succession of top political and military leaders are killed or
kidnapped. (At a guess, this would probably have to include people like
the King and the Prime Minister.)
--The government shows signs of caving into Basque separatist demands.
We believe that both the government and the Basque Nationalists realize
how high the stakes are and that both are still willing to work for a solution.
Working out an acceptable compromise on Basque autonomy, however, will take
all of Suarez' negotiating skills and a high order of statesmanship from the
Basque Nationalists. `Given the alternatives, both sides are likely to give
as much as they can. In these negotiations, Suarez has the support of the
leftist opposition; that and the shared recognition by all parties that
Spanish democracy cannot be consolidated without a measure of stability in
the Basque country give grounds for hope. It is likely to be a close thing,
however.
Spanish security forces are probably strong enough to handle anything
short of a general uprising. The paramilitary Armed Police (who are
responsible for public order In the cities) and the Civil Guard (who
patrol rural areas and towns) are tough and efficient. In 1975 they
penetrated both ETA and another terrorist organization called FRAP and
crippled them with sweeping arrests.. Little has been heard of FRAP since
then. Early last year Spanish police succeeded in freeing a general and
a prominent official who had been kidnapped by GRAPO. Recently. however.
there have been disouietina signs of morale and discipline problems--especially
among Armed Police units stationed in the Basque country. Long used to
Francoist methods of repression, many policemen are doubtless frustrated
by the constraints imposed on their behavior under the new democracy. They
grumble that the government is not giving them the support they need to
crack down on terrorists and other extremists, and they feel vulnerable,
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` especially in the Basque region where they are the primary target for
tTA bullets. The Madrid government is clearly concerned by this develop-
ment and is undertaking various reforms to remedy the situation.
The ETA condemns nuclear projects in the Basque region as an attempt
to create a "nuclear reserve for the oligarchic interests," and it was
responsible for the attack last March on the IBERDUERO plant under con-
ruction at Lemoniz, when two Basque workers were killed and an estimated
47-3 million worth of damage was caused. Nuclear facilities, however, are
only one of several types of target for ETA, whose motivations remain
primarily political. Security measures reportedly have been stepped'up
at Lemoniz, and it seems Unlikely that ETA will risk another strike there
-in-'-the near future. This is particularly true because there are many
other tempting targets where an attack would involve less risk and provide
equal,or greater political impact.
Tna;.,symogllze the establishment. It has not yet attempted an attack on
a%nuclear`'fabi.lity., but it has never hidden its admiration for the ETA.
If-the two.organizetions are indeed collaborating now, GRAPO may try to
emulate the'ETA rr1d on Lemoniz elsewhere in Spain--although, just as
-with the ETA it would weigh the risks against the benefits and would
.:probably choose another target if security at the nuclear facility
appeared strong.
The new constitution is likely to be ratified this fall, but the
shape' of political events thereafter remains shadowy. Legislative
.elections are not due until 1981, but the opposition alleges that once
the constitution has been ratified the government will have fulfilled
its mandate. Suarez is concerned that the two parties of the left, the
Socialists and the Communists, will benefit from their stronger grass
roots organization and outpoll the governing party in the long overdue
municipal elections (as yet unscheduled, but likely to be held early
next year). The Prime Minister may therefore opt to call for early
legislative elections--perhaps as early as late 1978--in hopes that his
party will have a better chance at this level, particularly if the
ratification of the constitution produces a groundswell of popular
approval for.the government. In any case, no decision is likely until
after the constitution has been ratified.
The approval of the new constitution may usher in a new phase of
more confrontational politics as! parties jockey for position in
preparation. for local or legislative elections. This phase will put
to a new and*more severe test the moderation of Spain's political
leaders and their willingness to place the good of the country ahead
of their personal ambitions. Meanwhile labor, largely quiescent for the
past year, may lose patience with the austerity program as unemployment
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already over eight percent) continues to rise
Lab
.
or pressure will make
the next agreement among the parties on the austerity program which expires
at the end of this year, more difficult to achieve.
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The Basque Teririst Organization E~!
ETA (Euzkadi Ta Azkatasuna--Fatherland and liberty) appeared around 1960--
the outgrowth of dissatisfaction within the Basque Nationalist
Party's youth group over the party's rejection of an nll-out
struggle for Basque independence.
ETA has split repeatedly over tactics and ideology. The relationship
between Basque nationalism and marxism has been a particularly
contentious issue (as far as we know, all ETA adherents are
leftists of one sort or another). The "military front" faction
is currently the strongest and has been responsible for most of
the ETA terrorism over the past few years. It Is clearly Marxist.
error s s can count on passive p r
rom a muc w er circle of Basques, particularly when tension
between Madrid and the Basque country is at a high point.
ETA's basic aim over the years has been to maintain a cycle of terrorist
violence and police overreaction, with the goal of keeping Basque
antipathy toward Madrid at a high level and persuading the central
government that there is no way out short of Basque independence.
Most of its actions have taken place in the Basque country; favorite
ETA targets are police and government officials and Basque "colla-
borationists." ETA was also responsible for the assassination of
Prime Minister Carrero Blanco in Madrid in 1973. Along with
several non-Basque groups it claimed responsibility for the murder
of a Spanish general and his aide in Madrid last month.
Beginning in 1967 ETA terrorism led the government to declare five state,
of exception in the Basque country, and in 1975 the government
proclaimed a two-year antiterrorist decree that amounted to a
national state of exception. With the advent of the Suarez govern-
ment, however, Madrid adopted a less draconian approach to the
Basque question and gradually made it clear that Basque autonomy
was a genuine possibility. Several amnesty decrees have freed all
suspected Basque terrorists,. and ETA's political arm was legalized
last January. Popular support for the terrorists has declined,
but the events in July, combined with the ETA military wing's
record of over 25 assassinations since the beginning of 1978, makes
it clear that the organization still has considerable trouble-making
potential.
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