THE GAZA STRIP: A PRIMER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00634A000400010044-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 21, 2006
• Sequence Number: 44
• Publication Date: October 27, 1978
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
National Foreign Assessment Center
27 October 1978
The Gaza Strip: A Primer
While the Camp David accords treat Gaza and the West
Bank together, the realities of the two areas are quite
different. For example, an estimated 80 percent of Gaza's
more than 400,000 residents are Palestinian refugees--or
their offspring. About 44 percent of the West Bank's
700,000 residents are refugees. Gaza is also a political
anomaly. Once a district of Palestine, the area has since
Z948 been a dubious spoil of war detached. from any Larger
entity. Today Israel administers Gaza, but it does not
regard it in the same emotional or historical Light as the
West Bank. Nevertheless, Israel, for security reasons,
believes it must retain a military presence in Gaza for the
indefinite future. Egypt advances no claim to sovereignty
over Gaza, yet it considers Gaza its responsibility because
of its former role as administrator of the territory.
President Sadat's search for creditable Palestinian
residents of the West Bank and Gaza to participate in
negotiations to establish a Local self-governing entity has
so far been unsuccessful. The traditional Gazan elite--led
by members of the Shawwa clan--is tempted by the offer of
autonomy, but it is shackled by refugee support for the
Palestine Liberation organization, which opposes the accords.
Political dynamics in Gaza are essentially a struggle between
these two groups. The PLO hardliners so far have the upper
hand'on the question of negotiations by reason of their
numbers and their ability to intimidate opponents.
This memoranaium was coordinated within the Central
InteZZigency Agency. The principal author is 25X1
Middle East Division, D ice of Regional and Political
Analysis. Comments and queries are
welcome.
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Under the terms of the framework agreement for a
Middle East peace reached at Camp David, the initial goal
for Gaza and the West Bank is autonomy. The. first step is
agreement on the means for establishing a self-governing
authority. Once that authority is established through
elections, the Israeli military government and its civilian
administration are. to be withdrawn. At that point negotia-
tions are to begin to determine the final status of Gaza and
the West Bank. That problem is to be resolved within five
years.
President Sadat talks of negotiating a comprehensive
settlement with Israel, even if King Husayn of Jordan "does
not accept his responsibility.," Sadat's meaning is vague,
but he presumably intends, at least, to see that a local
self-governing entity is established in Gaza, where he can
legitimately claim to play a role. Success will depend on
Sadat's finding local Arabs willing to participate in the
negotiations.
No individuals who have a credible political base in
Gaza have so far come forward. We believe, however, that
there are Gaza politicians who are tempted to do so. It is,
therefore, possible that Sadat will be able to proceed with
negotiations for the autonomy of Gaza, offering the results
as a model for what might be achieved on the West Bank.
This memorandum is intended to serve as a'primer on the Gaza
Strip in anticipation of negotiations to resolve its status.
History
Before 15 May 1948 the Gaza district of Palestine,
comprised the entire southern half of the country, and as
a part of Palestine was administered by the United Kingdom
under a mandate from the League of Nations, On 15 May
1948 the British mandate was terminated and the Arab-Israeli
war began. Egyptian forces entered Gaza city, which became
the headquarters of the Egyptian expeditionary force in
Palestine. The area of Egyptian control was reduced by
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the fighting to a narrow strip of coastal territory 25 miles
long that became known as the Gaza Strip. Its borders were
demarcated in. the Egyptian-Israeli armistice of 24 February
1950; its southwest limit was the'prewar boundary between
Egypt and Palestine.
During the 1948 fighting, the Strip became a haven for
Palestinian refugees. Egypt did not annex the territory
the armistice, but administered it through governors
Between 1949 and 1956 there was a gradual escalation of
violence between inhabitants of Gaza and the neighboring
Israelis. Israel temporarily occupied the area during
the 1956 war, but relinquished control to Egypt in March
1957 under US and UN pressure.
Anti-Israeli activity accelerated in the Strip in the
mid-1960s with the formation of the Palestine Liberation
Organization. The Palestine Liberation Army, Fatah, and the
forerunner of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Pales-
tine were all active in mobilizing the population against
Israel up to and during the 1967 war. After the Israelis
occupied the Strip in 19.67, these groups went underground
and used the refugee camps as bases for attacks on the
occupation forces. Israel crushed the guerrillas in 1971
and rooted out the PLO organization. Armed resistance has
since mostly ceased in the Gaza. Strip.
Israel regards the Gaza Strip as an anomaly, In its
view it has neither the I emotional and historical associa-
tions of the West Bank nor is it part of Egypt. But because
of its proximity to Israel's populous coastal plain, Israeli
leaders strongly believe they must retain some measure of
control over the area to prevent it from again becoming a
staging base for Palestinian terrorist attacks.
Egypt presently considers Gaza its responsibility until
Gaza achieves self-determination as part of an independent
Palestinian state or as a self-governing entity. Cairo does
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not include annexation of the Strip among the options avail-
able to Egypt, in part because-of the large refugee popula-
tion in Gaza.
Jordan, which took control of and ultimately annexed
the West Bank portion of Palestine after the 1948 war,
maintains economic links with Gaza, but advances no claims
of sovereignty.
Geography
The Gaza Strip is a narrow rectangle of land along the
Mediterranean Sea between the'Sinai Peninsula and the Israeli
border. Only about 25 miles long and four to eight miles
wide Gaza's 145 square mile area is slightly more than
twice the size of Washington, D.C. Gaza City is 40 miles by
road from Tel Aviv, 62 miles from Jerusalem, and about 240
miles from Cairo.
The topography is characterized by sand beaches along a
straight shoreline, sand dunes and sparse vegetation in the
west, and sandstone ridges in the east. Alluvial soil is
found inland which supports citrus plantations and field
crops; agriculture is the major economic activity. The
small areas of loess soil in the eastern part are the most
productive; the soil in the south tends to be saline and
more sandy. Coastal areas are covered with sand dunes,
though. there are some pockets of soil that retain moisture
and are cultivable. Water supply is precarious; it is
dependent on wells tapping underground aquifers fed by
rainfall seepage. Average annual rainfall is about 14
inches.
Gaza has no known commercially exploitable natural
resources and no natural harbor.
Human Resources
The Gaza Strip, with.about 2,QQQ persons per square
mile according to a 1967 census, is among the more densely
populated areas of the world. By comparison, the population
density of Bangladesh is about 1,400 persons per square mile.
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Gaza's population is estimated to be over 400.,0.0.0 and
growing at an estimated annual rate of 3 percent. The exact
growth rate is obscured. by the migration of Palestinians to
the West Bank and other Arab states.
it is a young population, nearly half under 15 years of
age. It contains more females than males, especially in the
20 to 30 age group. Gazan tgwns--Gaza city (1967 population
87,793), Khan Yunis (1967 population 29,5221, and Rafah
(1967 population 10,8121-'h.ave become artificial urban
centers in that they are dense. residential areas for native
and refugee populations who work elsewhere.
Principal population movements were the influx of
Palestinian refugees between 1948 and 19.49 and'a much smaller
exit of these refugees from Gaza since 1967. .Present outward
movements consist largely of workers commuting daily to jobs
in Israel and the West Bank and the temporary migration of
young males to study in Arab universities or take jobs in
other Arab countries, Over 9.5 percent of Gazans are Arab
and Muslim.
The influx of refugees raised the population from
72,000 in 1946 to 280,000 in 19.49; the natural increase of
the 1948 refugee population is largely responsible for the
area's current population of more than 400,000, of whom the
refugees comprise over 80 percent. About 60 percent of the
refugees continue to live in the eight-camps administered by
the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), The
camp refugees, especially, remain a distinct social and
political element that has not been absorbed into the sur-
rounding communities and continues to regard itself as
temporarily separated from its homeland.
Israeli Presence
There are between .50,Q and .60.0 Israelis in the. Gaza
Strip, They are associated with. the. milit.ary,government,
security, or the five Israeli settlements. A sixth settle-
ment is planned near Katif, but-it is not yet occupied.
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Israeli settlements are located near main traffic arteries
and interspersed at regular intervals between major towns.
Gaza has never been a priority settlement area for
Israel. The emphasis since the 19.67 war has been on the
Jordan Valley and Jerusalem. Settlement activity in the
Rafah approaches' along the northeastern Sinai coast and
in Gaza began about 1971, after armed resistance in the
Strip had been crushed.
All Israeli settlements in the occupied territories
are administered by the Israeli Defense Force under martial
law. Gaza settlements are of two types--the nahal -and the
moshav. Nahals are paramilitary settlements established by
the Nahal (Fighting Pioneer Youth Corpsl of the IDF. They
are normally converted to civilian status after a few years.
Two Gaza nahals, Netzarim and Morag, are exceptions to this
rule.
A moshav is a farming community in which each settler
has a separate. home. and works his own piece of land leased
from the state. Produce is marketed jointly. There are two
moshavs in the-Gaza Strip and another under construction,
all affiliated with the National Religious Party of Israel.
Social Factors and Welfare
Set against the refugee population is a traditional
Gaza social structure--politically conservative, landowning,
and with-economic links to Israel and Jordan. The Shawwa
clan stands above the others in economic and political
influence. Its wealth rests on ownership of large portions
of Gaza's arable land and control of the citrus export
business. The. Shawwa, clan numbers about 5,000.. Its titular
head and wealthiest member is 71-year-old Rashif Shawwa. As
mayor of Gaza City, he augments the clan's economic power
with control of political patronage,
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The religious makeup of the Gaza population is over-
whelmingly Muslim. The fewer than 4,00.0 Christians are
mostly Greek Orthodox. The Greek Orthodox community con-
sists largely of educated professionals; it is quite
prominent in the Gazan court system. A small Roman
Catholic community--25Q--consists. mostly of poor ref-
ugees from northern Palestine, The Baptists, supported
by foreign funds, manage a major hospital, although the
local Baptist community is small.
Medical care. and education are adequate and provided by
UNRWA to the refugees and by Israel and private charitable
groups to both refugees and native Gazans. Educational
levels are higher in Gaza than in the West Bank and slightly
higher among refugees in Gaza than nonrefugees. UNRWA
provides free education to male and female refugee children
through the ninth grade.. About 50 percent of all Gazans
have had five or more years of schooling; 17 percent have
11 or more years of schooling. Each year several hundred
students attend vocational schools operated by UNRWA or by
Israel. Of the 10,000 Palestinian students studying at
Egyptian universities in 1977, 9,000 were from Gaza. The
Egyptian curriculum is used in Gaza, and access to Egyptian
universities is an important factor in sustaining Egyptian
influence in Gaza.
Local health conditions are typical of those in a
developing society-,-high fertility, high mortality rates,
and poor sanitation. UNRWA and WHO maintain good health
conditions in the UNRWA refugee camps. Food appears to be
available in sufficient quantity and quality.
The Economic Setting
Gaza's economy has grown rapidly in the past decade.
Per capita annual income is estimated at $50.0 to $700..
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(_Jordan's is near $500 and Egypt's around $3Q0.) Growth of
real gross national product since 1968 has averaged an
impressive 14 percent annually.*
The rise. of the standard of living in Gaza is less a
product of economic development than a derivative of full
employment and, worker remittances from abroad. Full employ-
ment became possible after 1968 when Israel allowed Gaza's
surplus labor to work in Israel, mostly as unskilled day
laborers in the construction and agricultural sectors. An
estimated 25 to 30 percent of Gaza's gross national product
is attributable to remittances: from these workers.
Such unemployment as does exist in Gaza is centered,
ironically, among the better educated, because the demand in
Israel is for cheap unskilled labor.
Trade patterns--,During the 1948 war Gaza was cut off
from its natural hinterland, which became part of Israel.
Economic links were then forged with Egypt, which. at that
time. administered.the territory. After the. 1967 Israeli
occupation of Gaza economic ties again shifted. The old
links to Egypt were. reduced, and a gradual integration of
Gaza's economy with. that of Israel's began. Gaza became a
source of cheap labor and a protected market for Israeli
manufactured goods.
Israel has also become a market for Gazan agricultural
exports. Exports to Israel have jumped threefold since
1974. Gaza's communication, transport, and power systems
are now tied to the Israeli systems. Differences remain in
the areas of tax and finance.
*GNP measures total output of an economy, all goods produced
and all services rendered. GDP, by contrast, excludes income-
earned abroad by residents of a territory--a particularly
important factor in the case of the Gaza Strip--and overseas
investment income.
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Jordan is economically important to Gaza because it is
the funnel through which Gaza markets its citrus crop in the
Arab world,
Gaza's inflation rate--25 to 30. percent annually--
is somewhat lower than that experienced by Israel. Most
of the inflation is attributable to the economic links that
have evolved with Israel. Most goods and services are
purchased from Israel, and higher wage rates in Israel have
forced up wages in Gaza.
Agriculture is Gaza's most important economic sector,
accounting for 26 percent of employment, 28 percent of the
gross domestic product, and about 9.0 percent of all export
earnings. Industry is mostly restricted to traditional
crafts, small workshops, and assembly operations for Israeli
manufacturers.
ko1itical Dynamics
Gaza is administered by an Israeli military governor
assisted by 130 civilian technical personnel and 150 Israeli
Defense. Force personnel who supervise a local police force
of several hundred.
Gaza has no elected officials--the last election was in
1964--and organized political activity is banned. Local
government is provided by Arab mayors in four municipalities
and seven villages, each. assisted by.a council, Mayors and
councilmen are appointed by the Israeli governor,
The governor meets regularly with about 30 Gazan
notables, the mayors, and the heads of the city councils.
Israel allows Gazan officials some leeway in local matters
and patronage power in return for a degree of cooperation.
The officials are wary of appearing openly to be. doing
Israel's bidding because Gazans tolerate but do not accept
Israeli rule.
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Because political organizations are banned, most
political activity takes place. in ostensibly nonpolitical
societies. The Benevolent Society for the Welfare of Gaza
Strip Inhabitants is probably the most important of these
because it is run by the Shawwa family and represents the
interests of the conservative traditional elite.
Rashid Shawwa, Mayor of Gaza City, is the most prominent
member of the Shawwa clan, though. younger members are taking
an increasingly important decisionmaking role. He acts as
Jordan's unofficial representative in Gaza. He derives con-
siderable political leverage from his control of permits for
shipping goods to Jordan and of the Jordanian passports and
identity papers that are necessary to travel from Israel or
the occupied territories. Shawwa was first appointed
mayor by Israel in 1971, but was dismissed in 19.72. He was
reappointed in 1975.
The mayor is a pragmatist who clearly recognizes that
he is a bit player in a high stakes game in the. Middle East.
He has so far managed to walk a narrow line between the
conflicting demands of th.e Israeli occupation and his con-
stituents, mostly by cultivating an improved image with the
PLO.
The mayor's economic interests--and those of his clan
and other traditionalist backers--are built on the export
of citrus products, mostly to Jordan, with lesser exports to
Israel and Europe. Shawwa favors a federation of Gaza and
the West Bank with Jordan. He has said that a resolution
of the Palestinian question must include an internationally
guaranteed corridor between Gaza and the West Bank. He
looks to Egypt only for trade and education and not for
political links, Shawwa has indicated he would accept, as
an interim step, Palestinian self-rule under the. supervision
of the UN or the US for a period of four to five. years to
prove that a small Palestinian state represents no threat to
Israel.
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Shawwa and hi.s supporters must be very tempted by the
offer contained in the Camp David accords to join Egypt and
Israel in negotiating autonomy for Gaza. Participation
would entail great personal and political risk if the PLO
opposed, but it would also offer Shawwa the prpspect of
preserving his clan's power at the expense of younger,
more radical political rivals whose base is in the refugee
community.. The Mayor's final position is likely to be
determined by his reading of the attitude of King Husayn,
the PLO leadership, and the Saudis. The pro-PLO and anti-
Camp David accord forces in Gaza are the dominant voice at
present, in part because of their tactics of intimidation.
Shawwa, typically, has managed to keep a foot in both camps,
but it seems doubtful that he would be willing to stand
alone with Sadat and against both the PLO and Jordan on so
explosive an issue as negotiations with Israel.
Pro-PLO Sentiment
A major consideration for Rashid Shawwa must be the
attitude of the over 300,000. Palestinian refugees in Gaza.
Most are pro-PLO, and it is doubtful that an effective
governing body could be formed without their cooperation.
Pro-PLO Gazans tend to repeat publicly the hardline PLO
position opposing Camp David, but we suspect some are con-
cerned about being left behind by the peace process. A
small Gazan delegation in early October pressed PLO leader
Arafat to allow them to participate in peace talks. They
argued that the process is likely to move forward, and it
was better that they speak for Gazans than someone chosen by
Israel or Egypt. The delegation presented the same arguments
to King Husayn. Both Husayn and Arafat appear to have given
ambiguous answers rather than the approval the delegation
hoped for.
The exact strength of pro-PLO sentiment in Gaza is
difficult to measure. Israel destroyed the formal PLO organ-
ization in the camps during its crackdown in 14_71, and it
is not likely to allow a reestablishment as long as Israel
has a political role in the territory. Some covert organiza-
tion may still be present.
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The PLO viewpoint today is often expressed through the
Red Crescent Society, the Muslim counterpart of the Red
Cross. The society is led by two native Gazans who were
former members of the PLO Supreme Council of Gaza, Dr.
Haydar Abd al-Shafi and Ibrahim Abu Sitah.
Abd al-Shafi is president of the Red Crescent and on
the board of trustees for Bir Zeit University, the only
four-year university on the West Bank and a center of PLO
support. Abd al-Shafi is a longtime political rival of
Rashid Shawwa. He severed his official connection with the
PLO in the early 1970s in order to avoid being deported from
Gaza by the Israelis.
Abu Sitah is another longtime PLO official and a former
member of the Executive Committee of the. Palestine National
Congress. Israel linked him to bombings in 196.9 and deported
him from Gaza. He remains active in Gazan affairs and is
believed to have been allowed to return to Gaza.
Other sources of pro-PLO sentiment in Gaza are Zuh.air
el-Rayyes, a lawyer and editor of the pro-PLO Jerusalem daily,
al-Faj, and Fayyez abu Rahme, head of the Gazan bar associa-
tion. El Rayyes is a friend of Rahme
and a close collaborator of a -
Shafi. El Rayyes' family reportedly controlled Gazan politics
during the Egyptian occupation when many of the Shawwa
family were imprisoned.
Pro-Egyptian Sentiment
Pro-Egyptian opinion in Gaza is much less strong than
pro-PLO opinion. It is fostered by Gazan access to Egyptian
universities and by an overriding desire to end the Israeli
occupation, which. translates, into support for Sadat's peace
policies. Shawwa clan leaders and some mayors support
Sadat's peace initiative, though. political realities pre-
clude their publicly taking that position. Sheik Hashim al-
Khazeidar, the Imam of Gaza, is Sadat's most outspoken
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supporter, and he led a delegation to Cairo following Sadat's
trip to Jerusalem. Rashid Shawwa refused to participate
unless the PLO approved. They did not and instead accused
Khazeidar of being an "Israeli stooge." Israel has indeed
boosted Khazeidar--they appointed him imam--and he has
little standing in Gazan politics.
UNRWA
The local Arab administrators of the. UNRWA program, who
are relatively free of both Israeli influence and that of
the traditional, power structure, constitute another political
force in Gaza. The UNRWA group's importance would probably
increase if Gaza were faced with the practical problems of
self-government because UNRWA has the experience and machinery
to administer the. area.
Local UNRWA officials are drawn almost exclusively from
among the refugees. They preside over a multimillion dollar
operation that is in constant touch with the population
through the administration of schools and hospitals; control
of housing, food, and vocational training; and the dispensa-
tion of considerable patronage. It is the most thoroughly
organized, largest, and best funded administrative structure
in the Strip.
UNRWA was established in December 1949 by the United
Nations General Assembly to assist persons in the Gaza area,
West Bank, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria who were displaced by
the Arab-Israeli conflict. Field work began in May 1950.
The agency serves all eligible refugees whether or not they
live in the camps. UNRWA services are supplied directly to
individuals, not through the governing authority.
US Presence
The US has no official presence in Gaza, but it is
active in providing aid through the UN and various private
relief agencies. US assistance for the West Bank and Gaza
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began in fiscal year 1975 under the Middle East Special
Requirements Fund, established after the 1973 war. Funding
for West Bank and Gaza development projects has in recent
years been set at $3 million.
The aid program is a bilateral US-Arab effort, and
assistance is channeled through US voluntary agencies, not
the Israeli Government. The principal agencies involved
are the Catholic Relief Services and the American Near East
Refugee Aid.
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25X1
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