SYRIA WITHOUT ASSAD: SUCCESSION POLITICS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00634A000400010052-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 21, 2006
• Sequence Number: 52
• Publication Date: November 7, 1978
• Content Type: IM

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
National Foreign Assessment Center
7 November 1978
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
00010052-5 S I P25X1
SYRIA WITHOUT ASSAD: SUCCESSION POLITICS
KEY JUDGMENTS
--The stability of post-Assad Syria will depend
primarily on the ability of Assad's Alawite inner-
circle to maintain its cohesion and pick a successor
skillful enough to hold the regime together.
--An Alawite successor must devise a means by which the
Sunni majority feels it shares power.
--President Assad's brother Rifaat is well placed to
acquire greater power in the event of Assad's removal
by assassination or illness. Rifaat would encounter
significant opposition if he tried to claim the
Presidency itself, however, and he may settle for a
behind-the-scenes role or temporary collegial rule.
--The prime candidates to serve as figurehead President
are Sunni Prime Minister Muhammad Halabi and Sunni
Defense Minister Talas.
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This memorandum was coordinated within the Central
Intelligence Agency. Comments and queries are welcome
and may be addressed to the author, Middle
East Division office of Regional and Politica Analysis.
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--We expect much continuity on key issues like Lebanon,
the Arab-Israeli dispute and inter-Arab relations if
Assad were replaced by his brother or one of Assad's
Alawite loyalists.
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President Hafiz al-Assad has ruled Syria longer than
anyone else since independence was achieved in 1946. He has
brought an unprecedented degree of stability to Syria since
he seized power in 1970, and he is the first Syrian leader
to participate in the Middle East peace process.
Syria traditionally has been a deeply divided and
unstable country. Like many Middle Eastern states, its
borders were drawn by Britain and France following the
collapse of the Ottoman Empire and have never been accepted
by Syrian and Arab nationalists. Internally Syria is divided
by a host of regional, sectarian, ideological and class
differences. Before Assad, according to one count, there
were 21 coups or attempted coups between 1946 and 1970.
Assad is the first Syrian leader to publicly commit
Syria to peace with Israel, albeit on hard and uncompro-
mising terms. Assad has accepted the deployment of a UN
peace-keeping force on the Golan Heights and despite his
rejection of the Camp David framework for peace, he has
committed Syria to a comprehensive settlement based on UN
resolution 242 and 338.
Causes for Concern
Assad's hold on power is firm but there are causes
for concern about the long term stability of the regime.
Syria's 30-month long intervention in Lebanon has never
been popular at home and many Syrians see it as an unending
drain on their country--a quagmire with no solution in sight.
A stream of casualties has added to the unease, as has the
danger of a direct clash with Israel. Reports of unhappiness
in the military with Assad's approach to the Lebanese
problem have surfaced; their discontent with Assad's
unwillingness to go all out against the Maronites or to
pull out does not appear to pose a threat to Assad.
Shortly before Assad's initial intervention in Lebanon
in June 1976 a series of assassinations began in Syria. The
targets have been members of Assad's minority Alawite sect
that dominates the regime--especially the military and
security services--and constitutes Assads power base (see
Annex--The Alawites). Over a dozen prominent Alawites have
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been killed--the latest was in August. The regime has been
unable to identify the assassins although suspicion centers
on extremist elements of the Sunni majority probably backed
by Iraq. There have also been periodic outbreaks of unrest
in the Sunni strongholds of Aleppo, Hamah, and Hims. The
sectarian murders have clearly alarmed the regime's security
services and they have taken
great pains to improve ssa s persona security.
Scenarios
There are two broad scenarios with which this paper
will deal in analyzing the succession problem in Syria. The
first, posits that Assad alone leaves office either through
assassination or illness but that the regime remains in
power. The alternative--which is far less likely at this
juncture--is a coup d'etat in which both Assad and his
government are overthrown.
SCENARIO ONE
Constitutional Procedures
The precedents for an orderly transfer of power in
Syria are few. The constitutional procedures for succession
are untested.
According to article 88 of the Syrian constitution,
the Vice President is the interim successor in the event the
President is incapacitated. Assad has never named a Vice
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President, however. Next in line, according to the constitution
is the Prime Minister--a post now filled by Muhammad Halabi.
Under Assad, Syrian Prime Ministers--including Halabi--have
been Sunni figureheads with little real power. Their task
is to execute what Assad decides. New elections are mandated
in the constitution to fill the Presidency within 90 days
after the office is vacated. The Peoples Council nominates
the candidate selected by the ruling Baath Party (Article
84). We suspect this procedure would be followed but several
key constituencies and power brokers would affect the smooth-
ness of its execution.
Key Constituencies
Clearly much would depend on the circumstances in which
Assad left office. If Assad is seriously ill he may make
succession arrangements in advance--perhaps by naming a
Vice President. Rumors that Assad is contemplating this
step are current in Damascus. Assad's sudden removal would
prevent a carefully planned transfer of power.
If Assad were removed from office by an assassin's
bullet or a sudden fatal illness, we believe the future
stability of a post-Assad Syria will depend primarily on
the ability of Assad's inner circle of Alawite supporters to
maintain cohesion and pick a successor skillful enough to
hold the regime together. A mayor struggle within this
clique--known as the Jamaa (company)--would undermine the
prospects for a stable transition. Assad's lieutenants
recognize this and will seek to minimize the danger. Nonetheless,
some jockeying for power is inevitable.
The Alawites dominate the Syrian military establishment
and thus have a major voice in the choice of a successor.
Political power in Syria since independence has consistently
depended on how many divisions one can command not on votes.
We know very little about division and brigade commanders in
the army or their preferences on succession. These men--
especially those who command armored units--are certain to
be involved in the transfer of power. Presumably the key
figures in Assad's inner circle have close ties to these
officers.
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The Baath Party would influence the choice of a successor
to Assad but it is dominated by Assad's Alawite lieutenants
and would probably do little more than rubber stamp their
decision. The Baath Party apparatus plays little role in
decisionmaking in Syria today. (see Annex-The Baath)
The Alawites are aware that Assad's removal could spark
a surge of Sunni animosity toward the Alawite minority. The
Alawite Jamaa must devise a means by which the Sunnis feel
they have a voice in the political process. Assad has been
reasonably successful at this. If his successors are not
similarly adroit, major sectarian violence is possible.
While the Alawites hold top military positions, the Sunnis
can mobilize the streets and mount large scale civil unrest.
In 1973, for example, the Sunnis rioted in Hims and Hamah
for several days to protest a draft constitution that failed
to specify that the President must be a Muslim. Assad
backed down and changed the text.
Contenders, Power Brokers and Figureheads
Most Syrians believe Assad's younger brother Rifaat
will succeed to power if Assad dies; there is considerable
opposition to his inheriting the Presidency, however. Rifaat
is a key adviser to the President and a major figure in
assuring the regime's survival. Rifaat commands the 20,000-
member Defense Companies, an Alawite-dominated elite force
based primarily in Damascus. Rifaat is thus well placed to
influence events in the capital when his brother is gone. He
also controls an extensive intelligence network that permeates
Syrian society to guard the Assad family's hold on power.
In the last year Rifaat has succeeded in improving his
power base in Syria. In March 1978 he helped engineer the
downfall of his longtime rival Air Force commander Naji
Jamil and replaced him with a Rifaat loyalist, Subhi Haddad.
Rifaat also helped place a friend, Muhammad Halabi, as
Prime Minister, removing General Abd al-Rahman Khulayfawi,
who had criticized Rifaat for corruption. In July Rifaat
benefited from a major shakeup in the army high command that
placed many of Rifaat's Alawite allies in key positions.
Rifaat also seems to be improving his position in the Baath
Party and will probably strengthen his position in upcoming
elections.
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Despite this formidable power base, Rifaat will face
strong opposition if he tries to assume outright the Presi-
dency. To Syrian Sunnis he is the symbol of Alawite arrogance
and abuse of power.
It is possible, therefore, that Rifaat could be forced or
induced by the other power brokers in Damascus to accept the
role of behind-the-scenes strongman in post-Assad Syria. If
he tried to become President, a civil war could be ignited.
Another possibility is that Rifaat may participate in
a collegial ruling group made up of the members of the Jamaa.
Such a collegial approach to decisionmaking is likely in
the days immediately after Assad leaves the scene but it is
doubtful that such a system would last long. Rifaat or
another contender would probably emerge as the major power
broker.
Rifaat's power base is to a great extent a function of
the fact that his brother rules Syria. How much of his
power Rifaat could hold on to once Hafiz is gone from the
scene is unclear. Rifaat is well aware of this and is likely
to make his move early while his assets are still well placed
to give him control of the situation and before his enemies
can mobilize against him.
If Rifaat should falter, there are several key Alawite
military officers in President Assad's inner circle. A
major power broker is military intelligence chief Ali Duba.
Duba's intelligence apparatus--primarily Alawite and Baathi
in composition--maintains a close watch on any sign of
dissidence in the army. A grey eminence in the regim2,
Duba has adopted a low profile but is widely reputed to be a
cunning and ruthless man.
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Ali Duba reportedly has quarreled in the past with
other members of the Jamaa including Rifaat, Naji Jamil and
Air Force Intelligence Chief Muhammad Khuli but we know
little about the interplay between these figures.
Air Force Intelligence Chief Muhammad Khuli enjoys a
very close and trusted relationship with Assad--he is the
President's security adviser, has been an emissary in
Lebanon, is from the same village, and is an Alawite. He
often performs special projects for Assad and is said to be
efficent, hardworking, self assured and very ambitious. His
subordinates claim Khuli is the number two man in Syria.
Khuli has a strong power base in Air Force intelligence.
Moreover, he is reportedly related by marriage to Alawite
Air Force Chief of Staff Ibrahim Hasan--the man who runs the
Air Force on a day-to-day basis.
Special Forces commander Ali Haydar, another Alawite,
commands the elite paratrooper and commando units of the
Army. Many are currently in Lebanon, a factor that may have
reduced Haydar's influence in Damascus where they are usually
stationed as a counterweight to Rifaat's Defense Companies.
Haydar has long been a loyal Assad adviser and an ally of
the other power brokers in Assad's inner circle, although
he has quarreled with Rifaat.
Among the civilians who would figure in succession
politics several Baath Party officials are worth mentioning.
Alawite Baathi leader Muhammad Haydar has been a confidant
of Assad for years. He has played a major role in the Party
since the mid-1960s and has been a proponent of liberalizing
the economy.
Two Sunnis are major figures in the Baath Party appa-
ratus--Deputy Secretary Generals Abdallah Ahmar and Muhammad
Jabir Bajbuj. Neither has an effective political base,
however, capable of moving against the military. Like many
Sunni Baathis, Ahmar and Bajbuj favor closer relations with
Iraq and Moscow and they take a very hardline on Israel.
They are not likely to do more than rubber stamp any
succession procedure. Bajbuj has long been an enemy of
Rifaat.
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Several Sunnis are strong candidates to emerge as
figurehead President, however. Prime Minister Muhammad
Halabi would by law succeed temporarily to the Presidency
if Assad were incapacitated or died in office. Halabi is
reportedly a Rifaat loyalist and is probably a strong
contender for Rifaat's backing if Rifaat wants to rule
behind the scenes through a Sunni. Before becoming Prime
Minister last March, Halabi served as Speaker of the People's
Council (parliament) where he established a good reputation
as a deliberate and efficient administrator. In neither
position has Halabi
Defense Minister Mustapha Talas, another Sunni, has
been widely mentioned in Damascus as a potential successor
to Assad. Talas has been a major figure in government and
the Baath Party since the mid-1960s; he is a longtime ally
of Assad. The ambitious Talas is an eloquent and colorful
speechmaker who is much in the public eye. He plays a minor
role in day-to-day military affairs. Talas is popular in
the military and especially with the Sunnis.
In sum, Talas is perfect for the role of a Sunni
figurehead President behind whom Rifaat or other Alawites
would ru Talas' relationship with Rifaat is uncertain,
however. the two men are
rivals and enemies. Some recent eviaence indicates that
this enmity may have abated. In general, whatever Talas
past difficulties with Rifaat, he could probably switch
patrons in the Assad family if Hafiz was gone. Moreover,
once installed'in the Presidency Talas may exercise more
power than he has in the past.
Army Chief of Staff Hikmat Shihabi may be an alternative
to Talas. Shihabi is an apparently honest and hardworking
technician who has played a key role in Lebanon. Although
influential with Assad, he has no independent power base.
Former Air Force commander Naji Jamil is another Sunni
contender although his removal from command last March makes
him a long shot. Like Talas, Jamil is popular with his
fellow Sunnis. He has played a relatively significant
decisionmaking role in the past. Jamil and Rifaat are
longtime enemies, however, and we doubt Rifaat would welcome
Jamil's return to a position of power.
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Foreign Minister Abd al-Halim Khaddam,Speaker of the
People's Council Mahmud Hadid, and former Prime Ministers
Abd al-Rahman al-Khulayfayi and Mahmud ibn Salih al-Ayyubi
are other possible Sunni contenders for a figurehead Presidency.
There are two Sunni figures who play an important role
in the security and intelligence field who would play a role
in succession politics.. Minister of the Interior Adnan
Dabbagh and his intelligence deputy All Madani seem
to be trusted advisers to the President and figures of some
influence. Madani and Rifaat are reportedly strong enemies--
Madani was close to Naji Jamil before Jamil's fall from
power.
Policy Implications
The most immediate impact of the removal of Hafiz Assad
from office and his replacement by any of the men discussed
above would result in a turning inward as the new leadership
sought to consolidate power. The new rulers in Damascus
would probably be unable to propose or respond effectively
to major overtures until they felt confident about their
hold on power. Once the new regime felt secure, we believe
it would probably make few if any major departures from
Assad's policies on these key issues:
(A, The Peace Process--Assad's Alawite lieutenants
have had a hand in formulating Syria's cautious
approach to Middle East negotiations. In general,
the officer corps takes a pragmatic approach
to the Arab-Israeli dispute and is inclined toward
coexistence with Israel--albeit on Syria's tough
terms.
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There are no indications of substantial differences
within the Jamaa toward Syria's opposition to the
Egyptian peace initiative and the Camp David
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accords. We doubt that Assad's successors would
alter that policy. There appears to be an almost
universal consensus in Syria against the agreements
because they do not mention the Golan Heights and
fail to address the political rights of pre-1967
Palestinian refugees.
(B) Lebanon--We believe that an Assad successor would
stay in Lebanon at least in the short run but
would find it difficult to sustain Assad's careful
and adroit policy. Rifaat, Khuli, Shihabi and
Khaddam have all been backers of Syria's two-year-
old intervention in Lebanon. Rifaat has generally
appeared to favor a tougher line toward the Maronite
militias than his brother but recent evidence indicates
that Rifaat is willing to support a political compromise,
involvement in Lebanon has never been popular at
home, hoever, and a successor regime would probably
try to find a way to reduce the Syrian presence.
(C) Inter-Arab relations--There is no evidence to
indicate that Assad's Alawite supporters favor any
major changes in Syria's relations with its Arab
neighbors. The Alawites are distrustful of Iraq,
but appear to favor a continuation of Syria's
relationship with the Saudis.
Some Sunni figures in Assad's regime favor changes
in Syria-Arab relations. Baathi leaders Ahmar and
Bajbuj reportedly want close relations with Iraq
while Naji Jamil would like to improve ties with
Saudi Arabia.
(D) Big powers--A new Syrian regime would probably
adhere to Assad's policy of keeping some balance
in Syria's relations with the superpowers. The
Syrians recognize the advantages of a relationship
with the US and many believe these ties have
restrained Israel in Lebanon.
Nevertheless, recent strains in US-Syrian bilateral
ties over Camp David, Lebanon and economic aid could
prompt a post-Assad leadership to underestimate the
US desire for strong bilateral ties. In that case
the Soviets are certain to improve their position in
Damascus relative to the US.
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The Soviets have been close to Rifaat over the
years and would probably welcome his succession to
power. Whether Rifaat would actually give them
more than his brother, however, seems doubtful.
(E) Domestic politics--Assad has made tentative moves
in the last few years to improve human rights
in Syria and liberalize the economy. Rifaat might
publicly adhere to his brother's position on human
rights but would probably be a much more brutal
ruler in practice. We doubt that any successor
to Assad would be able to alter substantially the
economic process in the short term given the
strong Baathist opposition to increasing the size
of the private sector.
SCENARIO TWO
A Coup D'Etat
A successful coup would be very hard to mount in Syria
at present. The overlapping intelligence apparatus and the
many praetorian guards surrounding Damascus make it unlikely
that Assad could be removed by force. The regime is--by
Syrian standards--popular. Assad is well thought of by the
population which appreciates the benefits stability has
brought.
There are several possible scenarios for a coup attempt
that is associated with the confusion surrounding the
transmission of power from Assad:
--some officers, perhaps lead by a member of the Jamaa,
might launch a coup if they'came to believe that
Assad was grooming a successor that was unacceptable
to the plotters;
--one of Assad's lieutenants might make a grab for
power in advance of Assad's demise if he concluded
that Assad was terminally ill;
--anti-Rifaat officers might try to move against him once
his brother died to forestall Rifaat's succession to
the Presidency.
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j?
We know very little about the attitudes of the major
figures in the military outside of the Jamaa. We believe
a successful coup in the near future is unlikely, barring
a major disaster in Assad's Lebanese adventure.
Nonetheless Assad has enemies, and they will probably
keep trying to remove him. They would probably try to
exploit the confusion surrounding Assad's death to mount a
challenge to his successors. There are two broad categories
of opponents of the Assad government that might mount a
coup--Alawites and Sunnis.
The Alawites
Assad's most dangerous opposition comes from within the
Alawite community. Since the Alawites form the backbone of
Assad's hold on power, a serious factional split within the
community could threaten him. We know of two groups of
Alawites who have been unhappy with Assad in the past and
might try to move against him in the opportune conditions.
Supporters of Assad's predecessor Salah Jadid--he is
now imprisoned in Damascus--have tried to restore Jadid to
power on at least two occasions since 1970--in November 1972
and December 1976. Assad has repeatedly purged the officer
corps of Jadidists but some secret sympathizers undoubtedly
remain. Jadid probably also has supporters within the Baath
particularly among the extreme left.
Jadid's-years in power--1966 to 1970--were marked by a
strong attachment to pan-Arabist and leftist ideology.
Syria was very close to the USSR and pursued a policy of
total rejection of any peace with Israel. If Jadid or his
supporters returned to power, we would expect a return to
these policies.
The second group of Alawites unhappy with Assad are
supporters of former Defense Minister Muhammad Umran--
one of Assad's rivals in the 1960s who while in exile in
Lebanon in 1972 was assassinated on Assad's orders.
We do not know of any attempts by Umranists to oust Assad,
in fact the Umran faction has participated as a junior
partner in ruling Syria since 1972.
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The Umran faction has maneuvered cautiously in the
past to disassociate itself from unpopular policies without
actually breaking with Assad. They have consistently
refused to cooperate with the Jadidists--a division that
obviously benefits Assad.
The Sunnis
We are not aware of any significant anti-Assad Sunni
cabals in the officer corps although some kind of Sunni-
organized opposition cannot be ruled out. The Sunnis-are
probably deeply divided over what kind of regime they would
like to see if Assad could be ousted.
A significant Sunni opposition in Syria looks to
extremist rightwing groups like the Muslim Brotherhood for
leadership. These Sunnis are probably responsible for at
least some of the assassinations of Alawites in the last two
years. They do not appear capable of mounting a serious
threat against the regime.
It is difficult to judge the impact of a Sunni led coup
that removed Assad given our lack of reporting on Sunni
dissident views. A Sunni regime might be more strongly
attached to fellow Sunnis in the PLO, Lebanon and Iraq.
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ANNEX A--The Alawites
The Alawites have played a preeminent role in Syrian
politics since the mid-1960s despite comprising only 13
percent of the country's population. Traditionally, the
Alawites have been one of Syria's poorest communities,
despised by the orthodox majority Sunnis. Many Sunnis do
not regard Alawites as true Muslims.
The Alawite heartland is in the northwestern part of
the country in the Nusayri Mountains along the Mediterranean
Sea. These mountains have provided the Alawites with
safehaven for centuries. They are named after the ninth
century founder of the Alawite sect, the Islamic mystic Ibn
Nusayr. The Assad family home is in the Nusayri Mountains
at Qardaha, although Assad spends much of his time in the
port city of Latakia. Alawites are also found in Turkey
around the city of Iskenderun and in northern Lebanon.
During the French mandate the Alawite region had a
great deal of autonmy; after independence the Alawite political
identity declined. During the early 1960s a number of
Alawites who had come up through the only channel of upward
mobility available--the army and air force--emerged as key
figures in the military wing of the Baath Party. Three
figures were particularly prominent--Salah Jadid, Hafiz
Assad, and Muhammad.Umran.
These Alawite officers have emphasized rural develop-
ment and social change since taking power--a reflection of
their social background and Baathist ideology. Widespread
land reforms have broken the hold of the traditional. Sunni
landlord and merchant class that dominated Syria before the
1960s.
Today the key units of the military--Rifaat Assad's
Defense Companies, Ali Haydar's Special Forces, the armored
units and the Air Force fighting units--are primarily Alawite-
controlled and the Alawites are heavily overrepresented in
their composition. The Defense Companies in fact may be as
high as 90 percent Alawite. Other minorities such as the
Christians and Druze are also heavily overrepresented in the
military.
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The Alawite community contains several tribal confed-
erations. The two largest are the Haddadin and the Khayyatin.
Jadid comes from the Haddadin and Umran from the Khayyatin.
Assad is a member of the smaller Kalbiyah tribe.. We suspect
these tribal ties play a part in Alawite politics. Kinship
and family ties are also influential.
Little is known of the internal workings of the Alawite
community. Religious values and practices are hidden from
outsiders--a common practice in heterodox Islamic sects who
adopted this tactic to protect themselves from the Sunnis.
The structure and influence of the sect's religious leader-
ship is a well guarded secret and a mystery both to the
outside world and most Syrians.
Syria's other sects include the majority Sunnis who are
predominant in the urban areas especially Hims, Harrah, Aleppo
and Damascus; as well as in most of the 13 provinces. Several
Christian groups including Greek Orthodox, Armenians, and
Maronites make up about 10 percent of the population. Other
heterodox Islamic groups include about 150,000 Druze, located
primarily in the As Suwayda region in the south and a few
Shia. Ethnically Syria is 90 percent Arab. There is a
Kurdish minority in the Al Hasakah province in the northeast.
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The Syrian Baath Party plays little role today in
decisionmaking--that has become the exclusive province of
President Assad and his clique of Alawite advisors. The
Baath remains an important part of Syrian society, however,
and Assad uses it to organize civilian support for his
regime and provide a measure of legitimacy for his rule.
The pan-Arab ideology of the Baath provides a rallying point
for Syrians and tends to diminish Sunni discontent with Assad's
Alawite power base.
The Baath officially shares power in Syria with several
other parties through the National Progressive Front. The
Baath dominates the Front; it provides the chairman of the
Front (Assad) and controls eight of the sixteen seats on its
governing board. Four other parties share the remaining
seats--the Communist Party, two Nasirite parties (the Arab
Socialist Union and the Socialist Unionists) and the Arab
Socialists (followers of Akram Hawrani, a powerful politician
of'the 1950s). Only the Baath is allowed to conduct political
activity in the military, there is an extensive Party apparatus
in the military.
The Baath or Resurrection Party was founded in Syria in
the 1940s. Its primary ideological commitment is to Arab
unity but it also espouses the socialization of the economy.
and secularization of politics. The Baath has from its
start had a multiconfessional character. Its founders
included an Alawite, Zaki Arsuzi; a Greek Orthodox Christian,
Michel Aflaq; and a Sunni, Salah Bitar.
The Baath Party became the political instrument of the
Syrian military in the 1960s. Originally dominated in Syria
by civilians, a group of officers--including Assad-- clan-
destinely founded a Baath military organization separate
from the main Party apparatus during the period when Syria
was united with Nasir's Egypt (1958-1961). This small group
of officers masterminded a coup on 8 March 1963. These
officers took over the Party and ousted its founders, includ-
ing Aflaq and Bitar in February 1966. Assad ousted Jadid
from power in November 1970.
The officers who came to dominate the army in the 1960s
represented a sharp break with Syria's traditional political
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leadership. The latter had come from the landlord-merchant
class centered in the big cities and were primarily Sunni.
The officer corps, in contrast, contained members from
minority groups and often stressed agricultural-rural reform.
The minorities were over-represented because they found the
military to be the only path for social and economic advance-
ment during the Sunni domination of political life.
Accurate figures on the size of the Baath party are a
well-guarded secret. Most sources estimate about 100,000
active members and 200,000 supporters. The basic party unit
is the cell, a collection of cells forms a company, two or
more companies form a division, and several divisions form a
branch. Each of the 13 provinces has a branch, so do the
cities of Damascus and Aleppo. There is a. separate structure
of branches in the military.
The Party leadership is divided into two commands; a
Regional Command responsible for the Syrian"region" of the
Arab "nation" and a National Command which supervises the
Baath Party organization throughout the Arab world. Until
1966 there was one Baath National Command, since then there
have been competing commands and indeed competing parties
centered in Syria and Iraq. President Assad is Secretary
General of both the Regional and National Commands.
The Syrian Baath Party claims to have an organization
in every Arab country and even in several non-Arab states
with significant Arab populations. The Syrian Baath actually
has very little external appeal or organization. Only in
Lebanon does the Party have a significant following led by
Assam Qansu. Even there, the Syrian Baath plays little role
in Lebanese politics. Qansu is widely and. accurately
regarded as a Syrian puppet.
Inside Syria the Baath is extensively organized at the
local level to generate popular support for the Assad regime.
Syrian youths for example are inducted into the Baath Van-
guards. This organization was created in 1974 and official
statistics released in 1976 claim it has over 300,000 members.
It has cells throughout the country and is supposed to
infuse Syrian youth with the Baathi ideology.
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SECRET
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The ii j,' Institute for Political Science, located
n,s,ar i?am .sous, is assigned the task of training party cadres
fox pcsi i ns of responsibility in Syria and the external
bxa4ncl es. A,ssad, has devoted considerable attention to in