STATUS REPORT ON THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00634A000400010068-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 21, 2006
• Sequence Number: 68
• Publication Date: November 16, 1978
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2006/05/25 : CIA-RDP80T00634A000400010068-
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER
16 November 1978
MEMORANDUM
Status Report on the Soviet Leadership
We are now in the closing years of the Brezhnev era--
a possibly long drawn-out period marked by uncertainties
and generally sterile leadership. Although Brezhnev's
declining vigor increasingly prompts questions about how
long he can continue in office, there is no indication
that he plans to step down or.that..agreement has been
reached on who would succeed him except on an interim
basis.
Brezhnev, who will be 72 next month, is clearly not-the
man he was a few years ago. His health is failing. He is
subject to increasingly lengthy periods of illness, tires
easily, and is not always on top of the subject at hand. In
a sense he is being propped up. His press pictures are
touched up, his schedule is carefully controlled, and his
aides are increasingly in evidence to lend him support.
He is, however, being propped up by aides of his own
choosing and with the acquiescence of his Politburo colleagues.
And on matters of vital interest to Brezhnev--such as US-
Soviet relations, in which he has invested considerable polit-
ical capital--he is still capable of performing adequately
and defending his policies.
In some ways Brezhnev's position has never been stronger.
What he has lost in vigor has been offset by added prestige.
He gained the post of USSR president in 1977, presided over
the adoption of a new constitution later that year, and hopes
to crown his achievements with a summit meeting and a SALT II
agreement. And all the while a Brezhnev personality cult has
ballooned.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2006/05/25 : CIA-RDP80T0063RA000400010068-8
 Approved For Release 2006/05/25 : CIA-RDP80T00634A000400010068-8
Another facet of Brezhnev's power is his authority;
none of his colleagues is inclined to challenge him. In
part this is because no viable long-term successor has yet
emerged from the next "take-over" generation of leaders.
The situation within the leadership in this regard is at. a
stalemate.
The senior members of the leadership are all in their
70s and two of the most influential, Premier Kosygin and
party theoretician Suslov, are several years older than
Brezhnev. The seniors have tended to hang in together,
seeing their own interests best served by denying ambitious
members of the younger generation access to the levers of
power.
Andrey Kirilenko, Brezhnev's close associate and long-
time deputy in the party Secretariat, is the odds-on favorite
to inherit the "Brezhnev machine" if his boss is suddenly.
incapacitated in the near future. While he has a strong
.political base and is seemingly in robust health, he is
Brezhnev's age and can not, hope to serve as more than a
transitional leader.
None of the potential contenders for the succession
among the younger members of the leadership is sufficiently
well positioned to be considered a 'strong candidate. As
one seasoned observer put it, those who have the necessary
broad national experience are too old, while the most prom-
ising among the younger leaders do not have the requisite
experience. Politburo members Shcherbitskiy and Romanov
continue to hold posts in the provinces far from the center
in Moscow. Party secretary Kulakov, who until his death in
July was the most advantageously positioned of all the younger
potential successors, was hampered by his lack of experience
beyond the narrow field of agriculture--a limitation Brezhnev
apparently fostered.
Thus Brezhnev evidently has been successful in neutral-
izing all potential challenges, but it is clear from the
signs of political maneuvering this year that he himself
can not--anymore than he ever could--completely control
the succession process and push forward his own candidate
over the.objections of his Politburo colleagues.
It may be that Brezhnev is not eager to designate an
heir apparent, even if he could, for fear that to do so
could hasten his own political demise. He might want to
- 2 ,
Approved For Release 2006/05/25 : CIA-RDP80T00634A000400010068-8
 CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2006/05/25 : CIA-RDP80T00634A000400010068-8
improve the position of a favorite like his protege
Shcherbitskiy, whose transfer to a post in Moscow would
give him more national exposure. It is likely, however,
that Suslov, Kosygin, and other members of the Politburo,
including potential contenders in Brezhnev's own camp, would
oppose such a move because it could threaten their political
lives.
It may take the death of one or more of the top
leaders to break this seeming impasse. The order of their
going will be all-important to the shape of the future
leadership. If Brezhnev dies in office or becomes incapaci-
tated before many months have passed, Kirilenko is likely to
be named to succeed him to serve a relatively short term,
one characterized by jockeying among the remaining senior
Politburo members for influence over the direction of policy
and the outcome of the next succession. How this is handled
could determine whether the transfer of power to the next
generation of leaders is marked by a bitter, protracted strug-
gle or is relatively smooth. (There is an outside chance,
for example, that Brezhnev could outlast other seniors--
the highly influential Suslov, in particular--and in such
circumstances his opportunities to order the succession would
be greatly improved.)
The impact of a possible succession crisis on Soviet-US
relations is, of course, difficult to predict. Soviet history
suggests that transition periods can be times of foreign
policy flexibility and fluidity, but, as we have already
implied, Brezhnev's immediate succession could be marked by
a considerable degree of continuity.
The current stage of SALT, the major element in Soviet-
US relations, is not likely to be significantly affected by
a change at the top in Moscow. Recent meetings between Sec-
retary Vance and Foreign Minister Gromyko have narrowed some-
what the areas of disagreement on this issue, and Soviet of-
ficials have been voicing cautious optimism over the prospects
for a successful conclusion of SALT II and for initiation of
the next phase of negotiations.
At the same time, the Kremlin remains sharply opposed
to US mediation efforts in the Middle East and continues to
pursue its. political goals in Africa in conflict with US
policy objectives there, insisting at the same time that
there should be no political linkage between competition in
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2006/05/25 : CIA-RDP80T00634A000400010068-8
 Approved For Release 2006/05/25 : CIA-RDP80T00634A000400010068-8
Africa and major issues in Soviet-US relations such as
SALT. In addition, propaganda hostile to the United States
continues at a high level, particularly on issues such as
the neutron weapon. Under the best of circumstances, there-
fore, Soviet foreign policy during a succession transition
.period probably will display a similar mix of cooperation
and hostility. Even a divided group of leaders, fighting
among themselves, will no doubt find common cause in con-
tinuing to challenge the West in.selected strategic areas.
Approved For Release 2006/055P5 FCl l F bt00634A000400010068-8
 25X1 Approved For Release 2006/05/25 : CIA-RDP80T00634A000400010068-8
Approved For Release 2006/05/25 : CIA-RDP80T00634A000400010068-8