THE POLITICS OF AYATOLLAH RUHOLLAH KHOMEINI

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00634A000500010002-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 1, 2004
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: November 20, 1978
• Content Type: IM

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SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
National Foreign Assessment Center
THE POLITICS OF AYATOLLAH RUHOLLAH KHOMEINI
KEY' POINTS
--Ayatollah Khomeini has long been the central figure
in the conservative Shia clerical opposition to the
Shah. His influence is now so strong. that neither
other clerics nor civilian opposition .leaders will
take actions he opposes.
--Khomeini is determined to overthrow the Shah -and is
unlikely to accept any compromise. He considers. the
Pahlavi regime to be corrupt, anti-Islamic and con-
trolled by the US.
--Khomeini's power base is composed of the Shia clergy,
bazaar merchants, the urban lower classes and students.
Senior military officers generally oppose and feel
threatened by Khomeini, but junior officers-and
enlisted men presumably are more responsive to his
Shia message.
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--Khomeini is anti-communist but his following may be
susceptible. to communist .and radical penetration. He
has cooperated in the past with an Islamic terrorist.
group in Iran.
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This memorandum was coordinated within the Central
Intelligence Agency. Comments and ueries are tueZeome and
may be addressed to the author, Iran AnaZytzeaZ
Center 0 flee of Reg2onaZ and Political Analysis; (Phone:
with support from the Office of Central Reference.
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- -An Iranian regime under Khomeini's influence would
be xenophobic and probably prone to instability. It
would probably not be aligned with either the US or
USSR.
--Dependent on oil sales for the preponderant share of
its revenues, a Khomeini-influenced regime would con-
tinue to sell oil t:o the US and its allies, perhaps
with the exception of Israel. It might find it ideolog-
ically attractive, however, to slow the rate of indus-
trialization and therefore institute more conservative
petroleum extraction practices.
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Ruhollah Khomeini has emerged this year as the leading
figure in the opposition to the Shah of Iran. Khomeini,
who holds the title of Ayatollah, meaning a prominent leader
of Iran's Shia Muslims, is determined to see the Shah and
the Pahlavi monarchy abolished even at the cast of throwing
Irian into chaos and anarchy. In place of the Shah, Khomeini
advocates the creation of a vaguely defined "Islamic Republic"
to be guided only by the principles of Shia Islam. This con-
cept is not Khomeini's alone; it is a doctrine firmly embedded
in Shiism.
The eloquent and charismatic Khomeini has amassed wide
support among Iran's 35 million people, and has so intimidated
the moderate opponents of the Shah that they have accepted his
veto over their activities. He does not control the opposition
to the Shah, however. Although he has become its foremost
spokesman and symbol, the opposition remains an amorphous and
disunited movement.
Khomeini seems supremely confident that he has unleashed
the forces that will destroy the Shah. He recently boasted
that the "latest riots herald the start of a gigantic explosion
which will have incalculable effects."
Shia Islam--Khomeini's Base
Shiites constitute about 70 million of Islam's 500 mil-
lion believers, and Iran is the center of Shia Islam, with
93 percent of its population belonging to the sect. Shiism
is a heterodox sect--the orthodox are the Sunnis--which split
from the rest of the community in a quarrel in the 7th century
over who should succeed Muhammad as leader of the Muslim
world. The Shia espoused the cause of Muhammad's son-in-law
Ali.
Tn part because of its minority status in the Muslim
world and in part because of its role as the "out" part in
Islamic history, Shiism has a tradition of support for revolu-
tionary dissidence against the established order. In Iran
the conservative Shia religious leadership has played a major
role in promoting dissent in all of the major historical
turning points during this century, including the 1906
revolution and the 1953 crisis.
Islam is general does not grant formal religious authority
to an institutionalized clergy. A clergy (known collectively
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as the ulema) exists, and 'the laity willingly grants them
considerable authority, but since theological doctrine denies
to any man religious preeminence over his brother, there is
virtually no hierarchical structure. The ulema does interpret
Islamic law, however, and the Shiite clergy in particular has
traditionally had great influence in day-to-day secular
matters.
What hierarchy does exist in the ulema is determined on
an ad hoc basis. When a clerical leader achieves a certain
status and eminence, based, on the writings, reputation, and
the quality of advice he gives, his followers may refer to
him as "ayatollah," and if enough of the respected theologicans
and the community accept the title, it sticks. Shia Islam's
foremost leader is called the "pishva-ye-moslemin" (leader of
the Muslims) and is chosen by a consensus of the Shia com-
munity as expressed through the ulema. Such a consensus is
hard to achieve. Since the death of the last pishva in 1971,
the post has been vacant. Khomeini is widely regarded as
the leading candidate, but: the Iranian Government has maneuvered
to block any attempt to give him the title. The "mojtahed"--
almost invariable an ayatollah as well, is the legal specialist
with the right of independent interpretation. At the other
end of the hierarchy are f~he "mullahs" or lesser clergy,
prayer leaders, and Koran chanters.
Several holy cities are of importance to the Shia. Qom,
Mashad, and Esfahan in Iran are centers of Shia learning.
Najaf and Karbala in Iraq, scenes of the deaths of early
martyrs in the Shia tradition, are important pilgrimage sites.
Shia Islam has sever been able to rally wide support for
their position in Iran. A traditional bedrock of this support
has been the small shopkeepers and merchants of the bazaars
in the cities. They provide much of the "khums"--a religious
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tithe the pious give to tPie ulema. This close alliance between
the bazaars and the clergy continues today, and much of the
recent unrest in the major- cities has originated in the bazaars.
Khomeini also can count on the support of many of his
fellow clergymen. The mullahs support his appeals to Islamic
law and tradition, and most seem to back him for the post of
pishva. There are moderate religious leaders in Iran who have 25X1
disagreed with Khomeini iri the past, but increasingly they
have lost the will and the ability to stand up to him.
The ulema is not a monolithic bloc in Iran. There are
rivalries, and differences. But these seem to work against
the Shah, as each faction tries to outdo the other in appeal-
ing to the mobs.
Khomeini draws his greatest popular support from the
lower classes in the urban centers. In the last several years,
and especially since the oil boom began in 1973, Tehran and
other Iranian cities have grown enormously.* In this milieu
of rapid change and social upheaval, many illiterate and often
unemployed workers have turned to the traditional values of
their religion. A miserable existence, with difficulty in
securing justice from the state, has festered in this group.
In Khomeini they see the symbol of Shia purity and orthodoxy.
* The population of Tehran has risen from 200,000 in 1900,
to 540,000 in 1945, to 2,720,000 in 1966, and to 4,400,000
in 1976.
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Khomeini also seems i:.o be developing more and more sup-
port among the university students. Traditionally a source
of dissidence against the Shah, the student population is
divided between leftists and su orters of the reli iaus
ri ht. 25X1
Khomeini appears to :have little support among senior
officers of the Iranian military. Most of the leading com-
manders of the military regard Khomeini as a threat to their
privileged status in the country and are worried that if
Khomeini should establish his Islamic republic in Iran they
would lose power. 25X1
Khomeini may have more ~>nnnrt among -junior officers and
rank and file soldiers.\
has publicly called upon "the soldiers and younger officers"
to "join the people's sts~uggle."
Attitude Toward Communism
Publicly Khomeini i:~ opposed to any collaboration with
Iran's communists, the Tudeh Party. Last October he explic-
itly critized the Tudeh for anti-Islamic beliefs and material-
istic tendencies. Khomeini also blasted the Soviet Union for
meddling in Iran's internal affairs in the past. In May he
told Le Monde that "we wall not collaborate with the Marxists
even to overthrow the Shah."
There is little reason to doubt that Khomeini is philos-
ophically opposed to communism as an atheistic force. Although
the Tudeh has endorsed Khomeini's opposition to the Shah, there
is little clear evidence to indicate the scope of the role the
Tudeh Party has played in the disturbances that have beset
Iran this year.
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Khomeini in Power--Implications
Khomeini claims to have no interest in holding power
himself. Nonetheless, a new regime in Tehran led by the
civilian opposition would obviously be greatly influenced by
his beliefs.* Any regime that replaces the Shah will have
to deal with Khomeini and will come under great pressure to
allow him to return to Iran and have a voice in policymaking.
If Khomeini is successful in unseating the Shah and
comes to play an important. role in a future regime in Iran
there would be serious policy implications for the United
States. We would expect a regime under his influence to be
.xenophobic. Khomeini migY~t:
--Move Iran away frost its alignment with the US. While
it is unlikely that: Khomeini would put Iran in the
Soviet orbit, he probably would like to see the country
adopt a non-aligned posture.
--Cut off Iran's ~~ ael. Iran sells Israel
f its oil
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--Curtail Iran's support for pro-Western regimes in the
Persian Gulf like CJman. A radical Shia state might
in time even try to support dissidence in the conserva-
tive Sunni dominated states like Saudi Arabia and
Qatar which have Shia minorities.
--Renege on business deals with the US. Khomeini has
stated that all of Iran's agreements with foreign
states--including arms purchases from the U5--will
have to be renegotiated in Iran's favor if the Shah
is removed. Khomeini might not feel restrained by
Iran's dependence on foreign technology in the pursuit
of a xenophobic foreign policy.
--Dependent on oil sales for the preponderant share of
its revenues, a Khomeini-influenced regime would con-
tinue to sell oil to the US and its allies, perhaps
with the exception of Israel. It might find it
ideologically attractive, however, to slow the rate of
industrialization and therefore institute mare conserva-
tive petroleum extration practices.
A devout Shiite is expected to choose a living Mojtahed to
whom he will turn and whose advice he will follow in all
matters. If strictly followed, this would place a clergy-
man at the elbow of every government official.
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The most significant implication -for the US of a regime
under the influence of Khomeini, however, is likely to be
instability in Iran itself. In fact he is unlikely to be
able to contain the revolutionary impetus he has helped to
spark and might be preempted by a leftist regime or a mili-
tary dictatorship.
Khomeini as an influential decisionmaker would probably
find it difficult to reconcile his Shiite principles with
the needs of a modern state--there is no precedent in Iran's
modern history for what Khomeini proposes.
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