IRAN: THE NATIONAL FRONT

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Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP80T00634A000500010017-3
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RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
11
Document Creation Date: 
December 16, 2016
Document Release Date: 
November 1, 2004
Sequence Number: 
17
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
November 30, 1978
Content Type: 
IM
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PDF icon CIA-RDP80T00634A000500010017-3.pdf402.52 KB
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Approved For Release 2004/12/02S~P80T00634A0005000100 25X1 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY NATIQNAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER Summary The organized political opposition to the Shah of Iran centers around the National Front--a coalition group estab- lished by former Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq in 1949 on a program of opposition to Britain's exploitation of Iran's oil. After the Shah removed Mossadeq from power in 1953 the Front went into a long dec:Line. It existed tenuously with parts of it splitting off only to rejoin later. The Front has reappeared in the last year as a loose association of intellectua:Ls and political activists.. It includes a wide range of parties from moderates to radical leftists, but not Communists. Ideological and personal feuds, some decades old, weaken its cohesion and have damaged its ability to negotiate during the current disorder. The National Front has not put forward a formal program other than calling for a return to the 1906 constitution. This memorandum was prepared by the Iran AnaZytieaZ Center of the Office of Red/ionaZ and PoZiticaZ Anal sis. Questions and comments may be addressed 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/12/02: CIA-RDP80T00634A000500010017-3 Approved For Release 2004/12/0~~,~~DP80T00634A000500010017-3 In general, most National Front leaders advocate a reduced role for the Shah, civil liberties, an end to corruption, some form of socialism, and a non-aligned or independent for- eign policy that would loosen ties with the US. The more specific demands of the various elements of the Front range from abolition of the monarchy to acceptance of a figurehead, but since early November most leaders in the FroYrt have moved closer to the hardline views of the exiled leader of Tran's Shia Muslim clergy, Ay~.tollah Khomeina:,..who insists on.~abolition. Although the Front doe:a have some popular support-- especially among intellectuals and the middle class--and has drawn large crowds to some of its rallies--it is Khomeini who has the largest backing among the demonstrators and rioters who have plunged Iran into ~~haos. The power of Khomeini has disturbed some of the Front's leaders who have tried to arrange an accommodation betrween the Shah and Khomeini with- Should the Front come to power, ideological and personal divisions would probably widen and prevent a realistic program or an effective administration. AFront-dominated government would be likely to drive hard bargains on oil issues, press for a non-aligned foreign policy, and turn away from the Shah's support for conservative regimes in the Persian Gulf area. Mossadeq--The "Golden Age" of the National Front Since the late 1940s the major organized political oppo- sition to the Shah has come from the National Front, a wide assortment of political activists who maintain that the last legal government in Iran was that of Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq, removed from .power by the Shah in 1953. The Front came into being in 1949 when Mossadeq, then a deputy in the Majlis (the lower house of parliament) joined 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/12/02: CIA-RDP80T00634A000500010017-3 Approved For Release 2004/12/02: CIA-RDP80T00634A000500010017-3 SECRET eight other deputies in promoting a vague but popular program calling for neutralism, independence from foreign domination, a fight against corruption, and a reduction in the powers of the Shah. Mossadeq's immediate goal was the elimination of British influence in Iran and the nationalization of the oil industry. The original nine parliamentary members were soon joined by other nationalist-minded groups and individuals, and the association became the strongest grass roots political organ- ization in Iran since the constitutional movement around the turn of the century. Mossadeq showed a keen awareness of the fears and prejudices of the Iranian people. The National Front did not create the program it advocated but gave voice and direction to feelings that were, and still are, widespread in Iranian society. Mossadeq was appointed Prime Minister in April 1951. A prolonged struggle for power ensued between Mossadeq and the Shah--ending in Mossadeq's ouster in August 1953. In early August Mossadeq demanded control over the military. The Shah fled k~riefly to Rome but was reinstated by the army, led by General Zahedi. By the time of Mossacleq's downfall in 1953, his popu- larity had begun to ebb. Many nationalists had come to realize that Mossadeq was incapable of producing the reforms the country needed, and some were frightened by what was per- ceived as a growing threat: from the Communist Tudeh Party. The Shah cracked down on the Front after 19.53. The Front was declared illega:L, Mossadeq was kept under house arrest in internal exile, and many other members of the organization were imprisoned. Mossadeq's Foreign Minister, Hossein Fatemi, was executed. 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/12/02: CIA-RDP80T00634A000500010017-3 Approved For Release 2004/12/02: CIA-RDP80T00634A000500010017-3 SECRET Realignments and Quarrels The post-Mossadeq years have been chaotic far the National Front. The Front initially dedicated all its efforts to restoring Mossadeq to power. It split several ways, between professional white collar workers on one side and religious and bazaar elements on the other, .and between ' radical activists and moderates. The Shah's announcement in 1960 that elections would be held encouraged a revival of the National Front. Anew Front was organized on 27 4ruly 1960 under the leadership of Allahyar Saleh, an old-line supporter of Mossadeq. During the elections the Front ap~~eared weak, disunited, and even apathetic, but the organization gained strength because of the gublic reaction to the government's rigging of the elec- tions. It gained more ground in January 1961 when Saleh was elected to the Majlis in a second round of elections. Divisions continued to plague the Front as the various wings of the organization quarreled. In May 1961 the cleavage deepened as a significant wing of the coalition split off to form the Freedom Movement of Iran led by Mehdi Bazargan. Bazargan gained the support of Mossadeq but re- joined the Front in a loosc~ alliance in September 1961. The Shah cracked down on the National Front again in 1963 after the Front rebuf:Eed his offer to participate in a coalition government. The Front had demanded that the Shah return to constitutional rule and give up many of his powers. Saleh and Bazargan were imprisoned. Throughout the later :1964s and early 1970s the National Front--like most opposition groups in Iran--was largely dormant. Mossadeq died on 5 March 1967. An external Front organization appeared during the 1960s with branches in the United States and Western Europe. A key figure in the external Front is Ali Shaygan. In general terms the external organization has been more radical than the domestic group and has been more closely tied to leftist and Approved For Release 2004/12/02: CIA-RDP80T00634A000500010017-3 Approved For Release 2004/12/02: CIA-RDP80T00634A000500010017-3 SECRET student groups. There is little evidence available on the strength of the expatriate organization in the Front or in Iran. Appeal and Constituency The National Front since its inception has always been vague in its political me~~sage--a reflection of the disparate elements in the coalition. The Front has, however, tradi- tionally espoused constitutionalism as its main theme-- harkening back to the constitutional movement of the early 20th century in Iran that produced the 1906 revolution. By espousing a return to the 1905 constitution, the National Front has consistently found a receptive audience in Iran. A return to the :1906 constitution would mean a significant reduction in the Shah's powers. The constitu- tion stipulates that the 511ah act as a constitutional monarch, subject to the control of i:he majlis and the religious lead- ership, and gives the latter the power to review all legis- lation to ensure compatibility with Islamic law. In recent years the Front's spokesmen have also been actively involved in promoting the human rights cause in Iran. Such groups as the Committee for the Defense of Human Rights and Freedom are closely affiliated with the Front. Front spokesmen repeatedly have blasted the Shah for his "dictatorial, absolutist regime" that has imposed a "reign of terror." The excesses of SAVAK, the Shah's security and intelligence force, have been widely publicized by the Front. The Front has also lone advocated a change iri Iran's close relationship with the West. Mossadeq made an end to Britain's influence over Iran's oil wealth the centerpiece of his platform. In a public statement on 24 August 1978 National Front spokesman Karim Sanjalrsi outlined three principles: --the protection of human rights and the restoration of constitutional rule; Approved For Release 2004/12/02: CIA-RDP80T00634A000500010017-3 Approved For Release 2004/12/02$&I