TURKEY PROBLEMS FOR ECEVIT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00634A000500010039-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 28, 2005
• Sequence Number: 39
• Publication Date: December 22, 1978
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2006/03/17: CIA-RDP80T00634A0005000100
TURKEY: PROBLEMS FOR II.CEViT
The year-old Ecevit government is relatively cohesive by recent:
Turkish standards, and it has moved more vigorously than its predecessc;r
on many of the pro ler.rs, foreign and domestic, faciriq it. None of the
problems is close t resolution, however, and Ccevit, with only a razor
thin parliamentary majority, has little leeway for the pclit.i-ally ri,,ky
moves that almost certainly are necessary. His room for maneuver will h.:
further reduced by the factional discontent that has hequn to appear oral
his supporters. This discontent is not yet strong enough to unseat hi,
but he will have to devote more attention to it in the coming month_;.
Ecevit will try to temporize where he can. In narticularr, this means
that although he will be looking for substantial and concrete assisl'aric"
from the West to help him through his difficulties, he will be rrluc:tant
to give him domestic opponents any anniunition by showing too much flexihi_
on the disputes between Greece and Turkey. Temporizing is not an easy u;;tHHrr
for him on domestic issues such as political violence and Turkey's parlor.
economic situation, where inaction could carry as many as action.
Foreign Policv Challenges
The issues confronting Ecevi t in the foreign policy tie I i are fo+r rdr r -!;1 r
enough:
--The Cyprus problem, recently complicated (from the Turkish points
view) by the introduction of the US "non-paper";
--The Aegean dispute, centering on questions of sovereignty and
security which both Greece and Turkey cony-eider critical ly ir!?Mr. ~A0
--Greek reintegration in the military wing of NATO, an issue where t
Turks hold strong cards lout are inhibited by a reluctance to ali+i,t,,
their allies;
--Renegotiation of the base and defense cooperation agreements with
State Department review completed
Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80T00634A000500010039-9
 ApgRegiFhjec?q%/r1t~ 1-4(i5PEOoTt %6
c3~A00e501~c1 u9tpess krrvi t
(along with the leaders of the other countries involved, to be sure) spencl5
some of his domestic political capital . He will do this only grudgingly, gin: e
he almost certainly calculates that this capital should be saved for the
pressing domestic problems that have a more direct beearinq or, his own
position.
ECONOMIC TROUBLES
The Turkish economy, plagued with a chronic, shortage of foreign cxc ...- ,
is in bad shape. The cost of debt service totaled $500 - $600 million;n
1978, equal to more than 25 percent of Turkish exports of goods and s~rv c ;.
The shortage of foreign exchange has seriously affected imports of raw
materials and spare parts, causing cutbacks in industrial production- f?r
GNP showed little or no growth in 1978 . Unemployment is around 0 1-1c.,
and is worsening. Inflation is running at an annual rate of over 50 tpet. r.,i.
Turkish importers owe to foreign suppliers remains outstanding.
loan. However, some $1.5 - $2.0 billion in non-guaranteed debt which
and snows no sign of abating.
International banks have agreed to reschedule about 85 percent of cL
$2.5 billion owed by Turkey in convertible lira deposits an.1 bankers'
credits. Altogether, Ankara has managed to reschedule about 60 percen!
of its short-term debt, and a total of $360 - $370 million in new money
has been raised by foreign banks in an effort to put together a syndica'r_nI
The government has taken no significant measures to cope with t,hc'
economic crisis since its second tranche drawing from the Internatiorr,,l
Fund in September. The Fund is dissatisfied with Ankara's previously
enacted stabilization measures ana their impiementation. without further
measures--perhaps another devaluation, tighter credit controls and rear i
on wage increases--Turkey I s unlikely to qualify for the tt, i rcl franc h:,
drawing which was due in November. If the IMF continues to withhold t;Iri
tranche disbursement, foreign banks may well withhold the syndicated 1,);i;
problem .
The measures needed to yet Turkey's economy back on track: would
economic activity depressed through 1979. In the absence of such mensure..
however, another sizable current account deficit looms, and new fin7nc.ir
would be hard to obtain. in any case, inflation will remain a seriou'.
POLITICAL VIOLENCE
Violent clashes in the cities between leftist and rightist extrem _.i ..
together with clashes among Kurdish factions and between Kurds and sr~cdr?i;.,
forces in eastern Turkey, were already something of a way of life before
Ecevit assumed the premiership last January. The increase in political
CONE I DENT JAL
Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80T00634A000500010039-9
 Approved For Release 2006/03/17: CIA-RDP80T00634A000500010039-9
violence since e come to power, however, is striking. it is occurio-
in the face of a fairly vigorous effort to bring it under control : II)
recently the government sharply increased the nu:'lbe r of genrlrarnper i e
patrolling the cities.
It is too early to tel I whether the efforts of the gerrdarmer i e w i
have an appreciable effect on the vendettas between left and right, an
chances that the government cna get to the root of the problem by r?arh
measures alone are not good. Ecevit is reluctant to taKe the far-react,-'
measures such as martial law that may be necessary, either thruuyh fE.
of compromising his democratic bona fides or through a reluctance to h
power with the military, or both.
Nor is there much chance that the violence in eastern Turkey can .
stopped. Unrest in the east is not the sort of problem that by iI.set{
would bring down a government in Ankara, but it is a constant distroUi., i
and a long-term drain on the government's resources.
POLITICAL FALLOUT
So far, neither the economic troubles nor the violence has had ~Ki,-
political effect that might be anticipated in Pont Western oountrie,.
The reasons are complex:
--The violence his by and large involved Only MCI St gntents of U
population, with one extremist group tartietirig anothpr. Th
government has not come under direct Wa'C. nor have therp brm
any manifestations of mass discontent.
--In a relatively undeveloped country like Turkey, econviic exr .
tations are low and there are ways of fukinq do.
--Ecevit has conveyed an impression that Ce is at least `.ryinq
deal with the situation; sentiment is fairly widespread that
likely successor would do no hotter and co ,rld well do worse.
---Ecevit's supporters, many of whom show a strong streak of fool iI
opportunism, believe that for the time beir~ at. least ':hey arnh.
off working with him than against him. 25X1
Ecevit's options are narrowing, however. According to US imbas~
reports, discontent with the government's perlbimance on either the r ,:rr t
or the internal security front (or both) is growing. Moreover, the :;;,r Y r;r r [.
will find it increasingly hard to fend off outside pressure for Former
austerity measures, which are. sure to he unpopular. At the same tim-,
grumbling within his own Republican Peoples Party (ItPP) is on the ri P,
This unhappiness has little ideological content; a t i s much wure the d i
pleasure of professional policians, many with independent political ,i _
over Ecevit's tendency to ignore them in favor of a coterie of advisnc, oh,
are dependent on him. I[ I
-3-
Approved For Release 2006/03/17: CIA-RDP80T00634A000500010039-9
CONkIDLNi IAL
 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80T00634A000500010039-9
The intraparty grumbling does not pose a n immediate threat to crvr i r
position. The malcontents are not united, the factions they control urcr
relatively small, and they can offer no credible alternative to Ecevit
either as prime minister or as party chief. Lcevit, an astute poliLic.,~l
manipulator, has already moved to mollify them by consulting more fregrent y
with them.
The discontent is not likely to go away, however. To some extent it
is simply the result of the wear and tear of holding office, and in this
respect it probably is inevitable particularly in a country with such a
strong tradition of political fractiousness. From now on Ecevit will have
to spend more time keeping his political fences mended, and he will want
to avoid giving potential opponents any issue they can use against him.
He doubtless realizes that givers his government's two-vote parliamentary
majority, a move against him could quickly assume bandwagon proportion,,
The political successes that would strengthen his position will be
hard to come by, and Lcevit may decide that his need for an event that
can be touted as a political triumph outweighs the advantages of tempccii
ing in the foreign policy field, especially if it can evoke badly needed
foreign economic assistance. In this case the issue on which Ecevit:
would be likeliest to show flexibility would be Cyprus. Many Turks
are weary of the Cyprus problem, and Ecevit is credited with reversinri
Turkish fortunes there by his decisive intervention in 1974. Even in
this case, however, the Turks would give ground grudgingly while con-
tinuing to make it clear that they expect extensive Western assistance,
particularly in the economic field.
Neither Western aid nor Ecevit's own efforts, however, are likely
to produce an early amelioration of Turkey's domestic probl cin