ARGENTINA: THE NEXT NUCLEAR POWER PLANT EXPORTER?

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CIA-RDP80T00702A000400090008-0
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Approved For Release 2003/03/06 : CIA-RDP80T00702A000400090008-0 mot. Nut, t -I ff 10 Ut I" I, *DOE REVIEW COMPLETED* Approved For Release 2003103/06 CIA-RDP80T00702A000400090008-0 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/03/06 : CIA-RDP80T00702A000400090008-0 Approved For Release 2003/03/06 : CIA-RDP80T00702A000400090008-0 Approved For Release 2003/03/06 : CIA-RDP80T00702A000400090008-0 Argentina: The Next Nuclear Power Plant Exporter? Central Intelligence Agency National Foreign Assessment Center By the early 1990s, Argentina should be tech- nically capable of exporting a complete nuclear power plant of the CANDU heavy water, natu- ral-uranium type, including ancillary fuel-supply services. If it exercises this capability, it will join the small group of industrial states now supply- ing power reactors. Among LDCs, only India stands a chance of matching Argentina's progress. Argentina's nuclear effort began in 1950 as part of the Peron government's drive for primacy in Latin America and the Third World. All subsequent governments have supported the pro- gram, which fits the average Argentine's view of his country as the natural leader of Latin Amer- ica in science and technology. The cost of the program has never been seen as particularly onerous, largely because Argentina started early (from an already good scientific and industrial base) and stretched the work out over a long period of time. Much of Argentina's nuclear technology has been developed domestically, including produc- tion of research reactors, uranium exploitation, and fuel fabrication. Foreign support neverthe- less was-and is--needed for nuclear power proj- ects. Buenos Aires has been very successful in obtaining advanced technology from foreign con- tractors. We believe that its efforts will be equally successful in the future. ? Argentina supplied engineering, materials, hardware, and labor amounting to 40 per- cent by value of its first power plant, com- *DOE REVIEW COMPLETED* pleted in 1974 under contract with Siemens A.G. of West Germany. ? Buenos Aires is supplying inputs equal to M0- 60 percent by value of its second plant, now under construction under a contract with Atomic Energy of Canada, Limited, (with Impianti of Italy furnishing the conventional power sections). ? We expect Argentina to supply as much as 60 percent of the equipment and 90 percent of the engineering and installation work for a third power plant, for which it is negotiating with Canada and West Germany. As Argentine capabilities have grown, Buenos Aires has begun to export nuclear technology and equipment to other Latin American nations Argentina has contracted to furnish two research reactors to Peru and is providing a research reactor and a uranium ore treatment plant to Bolivia. While these exports are being under. taken primarily for reasons of prestige and re- gional leadership, they are also necessary to make full use of Argentine productive capacity and trained manpower. We expect this trend to accelerate. Argentina's growing reputation as a depend- able nuclear supplier in the Latin American region can assist it in establishing a more sub stantial role worldwide. This is especially true among Third World countries, where its status a, a developing nation enhances its acceptability as an alternative to established nuclear suppliers. whose policies may restrict dependable nuclear 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/03/06 : CIA-RDP80T00702A000400090008-0 Approved For Release 2003/03/06 : CIA-RDP80T00702A000400090008-0 I I supply. Moreover, supply contracts with its Latin American neighbors permit Buenos. Aires to in- fluence their nuclear programs heavily and give Argentina a measure of control over their uranium reserves. Although foreign support remains indispens- able for progress on Argentina's nuclear power program, the country is not dependent on such support for establishing a full nuclear fuel cycle. Facilities are in operation or under construction for all components of a complete fuel cycle free of foreign controls: uranium refining, production of zirconium-alloy cladding, fuel fabrication, and spent-fuel reprocessing. Buenos Aires also is currently attempting to obtain a foreign-supplied plant to produce the heavy water coolant/ moderator for power reactors but is encountering difficulties because of nonproliferation consider- ations. We believe that even without major for- eign help Argentina can complete its own heavy water plant by the late 1980s. By 1990 or soon thereafter, Argentina should be able to produce domestically a heavy water power reactor together with essential supporting services. If it can find a customer, we believe that Buenos Aires may opt to export the plant rather than add it to its own power system, since the country will still have ample hydroelectric poten- tial to exploit. Approved For Release 2003/03/06 : CIA-RDP80T00702A000400090008-0 Approved For Release 2003/03/06 : CIA-RDP80T00702A000400090008-0 Argentina: The Next Nuclear Power Plant Exporter? Introduction Argentina, with a strong technical tradition (including several Nobel Prize winners in the sciences), has long considered itself the obvious leader of Latin America in scientific matters. Thus it was natural that it should enter the nuclear field at an early date. Although the initial decision to establish a nuclear program reflected the Peron government's drive for Third World leadership, the program has been strongly supported by later governments and by the aver- age Argentine citizen. Having achieved consider- able success in establishing a sophisticated do- mestic nuclear industry, Buenos Aires is now beginning to export technology and equipment to other Latin American nations. Argentina's Nuclear Background With nearly 30 years of experience in nuclear science and engineering, Argentina has devel- oped a sizable cadre of competent nuclear per- sonnel. Since the founding of the Argentine Nuclear Energy Commission (CNEA) in 1950, the country has established several nuclear re- search and training facilities and now has the only operating nuclear power plant in Latin America. Its first research reactor, designed and built entirely by Argentines, was completed in 1958. Construction of the first power reactor began in the mid-1960s, with completion in 1974. Argentina now is striving for full nuclear power self-sufficiency based on its large domestic uranium reserves. Its choice of natural-uranium power reactors permits it to exploit these reserves without dependence on foreign enrichment ? services. Argentina has done a large share of the work on its nuclear power plants. For the first plant- the German-built pressurized heavy water reac- tor at Atucha-domestic industry provided civil SECRET The 10,000-kW RA-3 research reactor, Ezeiza Atomic Center. Built entirely from Argentine resources, the reactor was completed in 1967. engineering, materials, electro-mechanical equipment, and labor amounting to about 40 percent of the plant's total value, and Argentine subcontractors directed about one-fourth of the engineering and installation work. The contract with Canada for a second plant, a CANDU-type reactor now under construction at Embalse in Cordoba Province, calls for a 50-percent domes- tic input; the share may well reach 60 percent. Buenos Aires intends to build a second reactor at Atucha, to be completed in the late 1980s. Admiral Castro Madero, head of CNEA, has stated that domestic content of this plant will amount to 60 percent, Argentina also is taking steps to become self- sufficient in heavy water and in the complete nuclear fuel cycle. Construction is about to begin on a pilot plant for heavy water-used as moder- ator/coolant in its reactors-and a full-scale facility is planned. A pilot-scale fuel-fabrication 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/03/06 : CIA-RDP80T00702A000400090008-0 Approved For Release 2003/03/06 : CIA-RDP80T00702A000400090008-0 plant was completed last year. A few power- reactor fuel elements have been produced, and technology for producing mixed oxide fuels is being developed. A full-scat.:: plant to produce about 270 metric tons per year of power-reactor fuel elements is being built and should be in production by 1980. Chemical reprocessing of spent fuel was conducted on a laboratory scale as early as 1969, and construction of a pilot plant to reprocess spent fuel element, from the Atucha plant is scheduled for completion by 1981 (see table 1). Technical Capabilities There are few gaps in Argentina's nuclear technology base. CNEA has gained practical experience by designing, engineering, construct- ing, and operating most components of a full nuclear program, from uranium exploration through research reactor development, fuel fabri- cation, and reprocessing. In moving into the nuclear power plant field, the Argentines are widening their nuclear construction and engi- neering skills and are providing a growing array of high-technology equipment and components. These capabilities are emerging rapidly from a modest beginning. During construction of the Atucha plant, for example, Argentina's contribu- tion was limited mainly to excavation and site preparation, installation of some of the concrete and nonnuclear-grade pipe work, and some elec- trical equipment. Practically all the power plant equipment-nuclear and nonnuclear-was im- ported and installed by the West German con- tractor, Siemens A.G. Based on the experience gained from Atucha, the Argentine contribution to the Rio Tercero plant now under construction at Embalse is much greater. In addition to providing most of the nonspecialized electrical installations in the plant and in the switchyard and substation, the Argentines are assembling (from domestic and imported components) and installing steam gen- erators, turbogenerators, and much of the nuclear- grade piping and valves. While the Canadian contractor is providing and installing the nuclear reactor and its critical linkages and controls, even these operations are being carried out with close Argentine support. Argentine Nuclear Production and Export: The Record and Prospects' Research reactors ................. _.. _........................ First 1958 First 1978 Fuel-fabrication services for research reactors ...................................... 1966 1979/80 Uranium prospecting, mining, and concentration services .................. late 1950s 1977 Assistance in setting up nuclear research centers ............... _................ NA 1977 Fuel-fabrication services for power reactors Pilot-scale ......_._..__ ................._......._.............................................._. 1977 NA Full-scale ......... _... .... ._._ ........ ................... .............. ....... ................... 1980 1990 Heavy water production Pilot-scale ........ . _ ................ ........... ......... ................ ....... ................... 1980 NA Full-scale. ...... _............. -....... ..._ ..................................................... 1984 1986 Full-scale' ...... .... _.... _ ..................... _.... ........... .. .......................... 1987/88 1990 Heavy water power reactor .._......... .... ........................................ 1990/92 1990/92 Reprocessing services Laboratory ...... .............. _........ _....................................... _................. 1969 NA Pilot-scale ........ .................. .......... _...... ............................. ................ 1981 NA Full-scale ........ ............... .......... _.................................................... 1988 1992 ' Future dates are C[A estimates. 2 With purchase of a foreign-built plant during 1978. s Using Argentina's own resources. ` 100-percent Argentine-contracted. Approved For Release 2003/03/06 : CIA-RDP80T00702A000400090008-0 Approved For Release 2003/03/06 : CIA-RDP80T00702A000400090008-0 For Atucha II, Argentina expects to assemble and install the bulk of the reactor under supervi- sion of the foreign contractor still to be selected. Negotiations are in progress with both Canada and West Germany. The Argentines plan to manufacture many components themselves and will also be responsible for installing much of the imported equipment, such as high-pressure valves, pressure tubes, and control-panel compo- nents. The main items that will still have to be provided and installed by the contractor will be pressurizers, custom automatic refueling equip- ment, and the large nuclear-scale turbines. Table 2 shows the key items Argentina can now pro- duce and those it should be able to manufacture by 1985. Argentina is accomplishing all this despite an industrial base that, while strong by Latin American standards, is quite narrow when com- pared with that of developed countries. Although the construction industry is well developed, pro- duction of sophisticated equipment is limited and remains heavily dependent on imported compo- nents and specialty steels. For example, Argenti- na still imports a sizable share of its electric power equipment needs. Argentina's nuclear ac- complishments reflect mainly the relatively nar- row focus of the effort and the country's basic strength in the sciences. Manpower Resources The critical element in Argentina's nuclear accomplishments has been the large cadre of trained nuclear personnel that the nation has been able to acquire. Since the nuclear program was launched in the early 1950s, the stock of Constituyentes Atomic Center near Buenos Aires, devoted to research and training. Approved For Release 2003/03/06 : CIA-RDP80T00702A000400090008-0 Approved For Release 2003/03/06 : CIA-RDP80T00702A000400090008-0 Argentina: Production Capabilities for Key Elements of Nuclear Power Stations Conventional construction and power system High-quality welding ................. ... _........ ....... ........................ ._........... Yes Yes High-stress concrete .... ............ _.............. ...... .............. _......... _.......... Yes Yes Electrical contractinc ............... _ ......__........... .............. ........ ._............ Yes Yes Major electrical Switchyard equipment ._..... ........ ....................................... ............. . Yes Yes Turbo-generators ......................... .............. .. _ ...................... ............. Yes Yes Nuclear-scale turbines (megawatt) ............ ...... ..................... ............. No No Nuclear steam-supply :system Conventional large-diameter steel piping ._.. _ ................. ........ ......... Yes Yes Valves and pumps, auxiliary _ .......................... _ ................. _......... Yes Yes Large pumps and valves for reactor coolant .. .......... No Yes Nuclear steam -generators .......................... ...... _ ..................... .......... No Yes Internal equipment Pressure tubing .. ........................................ ............ ...._,..__........... No No Control rods/drivfs ........... .......... .......................... ..... .......... .._........ . No Yes Pressurizers ......... .............. ..... ..................... ........... ........................ No No Support equipment Fuel-reload machinery ......... ........................ ...... ........ ...................... No No Fuel-storage racks _ ...................................... . .. No Yes Control panels ..... ...... ........... ...._................................. .._.................. No Partial Technical skills for reactors Operation .._ ......... ....... ............. _................................... _......__.......... Partial Yes Safety .................... .................. ..... .............. ........... ................_.......... Partial Yes Design and engineering .......... ................ .................... ........ ..... ........ Partial Yes Nuclear fuel cycle Fuel technology Mining .................................. _ ..... _ .. ................ _ ....................... Yes Yes Concentration ...... _................ _ ............._....................._.................... Yes Yes Chemical and machine processing for UO, _ .................................. Yes (pilot) Yes Zirconium cladding (extrusion) ..................._.................................... Yes (pilot) Yes Fuel assembly .... ........... ........... .................. ............................._........ Yes (pilot) Yes Heavy Water Distillate columns _ ...............__...................................................... No No Valves .................... ............... ............ ........... _..............._................. No No Design and engine. ring ....... .......... ................................................. Yes Yes Reprocessing Chemical process ......... ........ ..._............. ...................... ._......... Yes Yes Fuel-chopping machines ......... .__ ............. ............................ _......... No Yes domestic nuclear personnel has. been greatly aug- mented by sending large numbers of students to Western Europe and the United States for train- ing in nuclear science and engineering. Largely by this means, CNEA by 1974 had accumulated a body of some 600 nuclear scientists and 1,600 professional-level technicians. The number of nuclear personnel employed by CNEA has since declined substantially, reflect- ing both a dispersion to private industry and research and a "brain drain" of several hundred who went abroad to obtain higher pay or to escape political repression during the Peron ad- ministration and following the 1976 takeover by Approved For Release 2003/03/06 : CIA-RDP80T00702A000400090008-0 Approved For Release 2003/03/06 : CIA-RDP80T00702A000400090008-0 Pressure chamber for Atucha arriving from West Germany (1971). the military government. Current CNEA em- ployment of nuclear scientists and professional- level technicians is estimated at 1,200 persons. Close to another 1,500 professional-level person- nel are employed by private Argentine firms, mostly on government nuclear contracts. Many of the several hundred still working abroad may eventually be attracted back to Argentina as the a country's nuclear program gains international prestige. An estimated 250 Argentines are cur- rently working in Western Europe, Canada, and the United States. In addition, a sizable but unknown number are employed in Iran. Academic training and extensive research ex- perience are adding to both the stock and the capabilities of nuclear personnel. Some students still are being sent abroad for training in nuclear science and engineering. The most important domestic academic facility is the University of Cuyo, which conducts a joint educational pro- gram with the Balseiro Atomic Institute at Bari- loche. It is now graduating some 15 nuclear engineers yearly and awarding doctorates in nuclear science. Nuclear research centers at the Universities of Cordoba and Rosario, both of which have research reactors, also provide aca- demic training. Research experience for the bulk of CNEA personnel-as well as increasing ex- perience in practical applications-is obtained ai the three large government nuclear research facilities: Approved For Release 2003/03/06 : CIA-RDP80T00702A000400090008-0 Approved For Release 2003/03/06 : CIA-RDP80T00702A000400090008-0 ? Ezeiza Atomic Center, near Buenos Aires (at which fuel-fabrication and chemical re- processing facilities are now under construction). ? Constituyentes Atomic Center, in Buenos Aires (where a prototype plutonium fuel- fabrication line recently his been installed). ? The Bariloche Atomic Center (where the main production facility for zirconium sponge is being constructed). Capabilities of CNEA nuclear personnel are being further enhanced by a program under which some 150 Argentines have received practi- cal training on the CANDU reactor in Canada. Touching Base Abroad Although Argentina began supplying nuclear technology and equipment to other Latin Ameri- can countries as early as 1970, such contacts have mushroomed since the military government came to power in 1976. The main purpose of these contacts is not to increase foreign trade- though this aspect will become increasingly im- portant in the future-but rather to cement relationships with neighboring countries and in- crease Argentine prestige. Argentina's military government, realizing that the country has little hope of catching up with Brazil militarily or economically, hopes to maintain some degree of Latin American leadership through these contacts. The nuclear relationship is most. advanced with Peru. Under a March 1977 contract, Ar- gentina is providing a complete research center including a zero-power research reactor and a 10-megawatt (thermal) reactor for producing radioisotopes. Also included in the project will be equipment and training in radiation protection, uranium prospecting, ore treatment, and prep- aration of isotopes for industry and research. Buenos Aires won the contract in competition with France, Spain, and the United Kingdom. The value of the entire deal has been reported as just under $50 million. It is to be financed by a long-term Argentine loan. Argentina also recently signed nuclear assis- tance agreements with three other South Ameri- can countries-Uruguay (March 1977 and April 1978), Ecuador (April 1977 and April 1978), and Bolivia (April 1978). The agreements with Montevideo, whose research reactor-acquired from the United States-was recently activated by CNEA specialists, covers information and personnel exchange, cooperation in radioisotope production, and preparation of studies for a 1- megawatt (thermal) research reactor. The agree- ments with Ecuador focus on personnel training but also look to the possible installation of a research reactor. The agreement with Bolivia updates and expands a 1970 accord under which Argentina built a pilot concentrating plant at a Bolivian uranium mine. The new contract covers training of Bolivian technicians, planning and possible construction of a research reactor, devel- opment of uranium mines and ore-processing facilities, and planning for possible future nucle- ar power plants. Argentina also has nuclear exchange arrange- ments with several other Third World countries, some of which may eventually become customers for Argentine nuclear goods or services. In early 1977 Buenos Aires signed a generalized agree- ment with Chile providing for personnel ex- changes and technical assistance. Argentina also has nuclear cooperation agreements with Para- guay, Venezuela, and Mexico; at present these apparently cover only personnel exchanges but they are likely to be expanded in the future. No official nuclear cooperation exists with Brazil, but personal contact among experts is fairly extensive. Argentina also is discussing possible Approved For Release 2003/03/06 : CIA-RDP80T00702A000400090008-0 Approved For Release 2003/03/06 : CIA-RDP80T00702A000400090008-0 Atucha-first nuclear power plant in Latin America, completed in 1974. arrangements with several countries in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. The Continuing Foreign Role While developing its own capabilities, Argenti- na remains dependent on foreign support to master the technological skills needed to build its nuclear power plants. For example, although Argentine subcontractors on Atucha II are to assume responsibility for the design, procure- ment, and installation of much of the equipment, they will need close day-to-day guidance and supervision from the foreign contractor to dis- charge this responsibility effectively. Argentina is not dependent on foreign support for full-scale facilities for fuel fabrication or for chemical reprocessing of spent fuel, although it is getting some West German help for the former and is studying Indian and Italian technology for the latter. It also is not dependent on such support for its planned full-scale heavy water plant, but foreign help would substantially speed its completion. Buenos Aires is obtaining the necessary for- eign technology for its nuclear power plants primarily from Canada and West Germany. In current negotiations for the Atucha II contract, CNEA is insisting that the contractor provide whatever training and support is needed to assure that Argentina will be able to produce most of the components and assemble all but a few. For some sophisticated items, such as pressurizers and pressure tubing, CNEA plans eventually to acquire the needed skills through a combination of bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements with such countries as Spain, India, and Italy and the hiring of foreign specialists by Argentine subcon- tractors. At present Argentina has reciprocal nuclear cooperation agreements with at least a dozen countries. Argentina's footdragging in adopting interna. tional safeguards' has so far not hampered prog ress in its domestic nuclear program or its export contracts. Exported research reactors are sale- guarded because the enriched fuel they use must Argentina has not signed the Nuclear Proliferation Treats Although it has signed the Treaty of Tlatelolco, designed to keep Latin America free of nuclear weapons, this treaty is not yet binding on Argentina because, like Brazil, it has not yet waived thr provision that all Latin America countries must ratify the treat; before it becomes operative. Approved For Release 2003/03/06 : CIA-RDP80T00702A000400090008-0 Approved For Release 2003/03/06 : CIA-RDP80T00702A000400090008-0 come from a third country. The Argentine goal of nuclear self-sufficiency, however, is encoun- tering snags on the safeguards issue. The United States and Canada refuse to supply the full-scale heavy water plant that Buenos Aires wants until it adopts full-scope safeguards and, more impor- tant, renounces its plans for reprocessing. Al- though Buenos Aires is likely to give in on the safeguard issue, it almost certainly will not alter its reprocessing intentions. Other countries tech- nically able to supply heavy water technology will probably also refuse aid. Although Argenti- na has reportedly been negotiating with a West German firm, in the end it will probably be forced to build the heavy water plant itself, relying on such technical assistance as it can acquire by hiring technicians from countries such as West Germany and Italy. Looking Ahead CANDU Capabilities About 1990, Argentina plazas to start building a fourth heavy water power plant, presumably of the CANDU type, that is to be entirely Argen- tine contracted and about 90 percent produced from the country's own resources. Assuming continuation of foreign support, we see no reason why Argentina should not be able to carry out these plans. Technology and components for CANDU-type reactors are less complex than those for light water plants. The engineering of pressurizers and refueling equipment should not prove a major obstacle within this time frame, although the country probably will still have to buy nuclear-scale turbines abroad. Producing Heavy Water We believe Argentina can complete by the late 1980s a plant to produce the heavy water re- quired to operate its power plants even if Canada and the United States refuse to supply it. Al- though Argentina lacks the technology needed to produce the high-pressure valves and distillation columns required for a full-scale plant (250 to 300 tons per year), it should be able to acquire it abroad-possibly from Italy or India. A plant of this size would be able to provide the initial The State National Shipyards (AFNE) in Rio Santiago. In addition to building ships of up to 60,000 dwt, the plant is supplying equipment for the Rio Tercero nuclear power plant at Embalse. Approved For Release 2003/03/06 : CIA-RDP80T00702A000400090008-0 Approved For Release 2003/03/06 : CIA-RDP80T00702A000400090008-0 charge for a new 600-MW power reactor every one to two years as well as to replace the normal losses of about 2 percent annually. Fabricating and Reprocessing Fuel Argentina will greatly expand its capabilities for fabricating natural-uranium power-reactor fuel and for reprocessing spent fuel. CNEA already has produced prototype fuel elements for Atucha and expects to complete facilities to produce zirconium-alloy cladding material this year. By 1979 it expects to be able to use the cladding material in a plant that will be able to produce 40,000 meters per year of tubing for fuel elements, using West German technology. Ar- gentina also is expanding its reprocessing capac- ity to develop a capability that would permit eventual production of plutonium and mixed- oxide fuels for breeder reactors. Despite the sophistication of some reprocessing equipment, such as spent-fuel chopping machines, the coun- try should have little difficulty achieving full- scale operations by the late 1980s. Selling Nuclear Equipment Over the next decade, the Argentine export effort will concentrate on research reactors and assistance to other LDCs in setting up nuclear research centers. Argentina also will likely step up assistance in uranium exploration, mining, and ore processing and concentrating. This will be done primarily for reasons of prestige and to gain further experience in nuclear technology. To support research reactor sales, Buenos Aires is in the process of developing its capacity for fabricating the fuels required to operate such reactors. At present, these fuels must be fabricat ed from highly enriched uranium, which has high nuclear proliferation potential and is, therefore, difficult to obtain from the London Supplier~4 Group. To facilitate fuel acquisition and thus to increase the attractiveness of Argentine reactor to potential customers, Argentina is now consid- ering shifting to production of research reactors designed to use low-enriched uranium (LE U) fuels. It is currently exploring possibilities for cooperating with Spain or the United States in developing LEU fuel elements. Looking farther down the road, Argentina should by the early 1990s have achieved suffi- cient experience in nuclear construction and en- gineering and in producing high-technology equipment to consider exporting a complete nu- clear power plant. It also might consider partici- pating with an established nuclear supplier in selling a nuclear plant to a third country. Wheth- er or not it will do so will depend heavily on how Buenos Aires evaluates the prestige to be gained from an export sale, which probably would resuit in a delay of several years in construction of its fourth domestic nuclear power plant. If a market can be found, export would be a practical option, since the country has ample unexploited hydro- electric potential that could be harnessed. Alter- natively, a fourth plant could be installed domes- tically and exporting delayed, perhaps until the mid- to late-1990s. 25X1 are welcome and should be directed to This publication is the joint product of the Office of Economic Research and the Office of Scientific Intelligence. Comments and queries 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/03/06 : CIA-RDP80T00702A000400090008-0 Secret Approved For Release 2003/03/06 : CIA-RDP80T00702A000400090008-0 Approved For Release 2003/03/06 : CIA-RDP80T00702A000400090008-0