CLASSIFICATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00704A000100040016-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 26, 1999
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: August 2, 1976
• Content Type: MF

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1~'IE?~iORA~DI.TlI~ FOR: Director of Centx?al lntel.ligence
1' R~l~~ : Edti~,~ard 1T~, I'roctar
SU13J1~~C,T : Classification
? I. .This mernorandtzm summarizes xny vieS~~s on the pr~oblems
of cl~~ssification and access to intelligence and discusses same
principl s and approaches 1~fh3ch I believe the Uirectar of Central
Intelligence and the Intelligence Community should pursue. It
describes sorrle of the mast important classification-problems x~nder
tti~To headings: ? ,
The gere:ral problems which apply to ali. kinds
Of classiied 1.T1fC~r'I7`]Fl"ClOx1, 1nC1L]d1I1g ltl%~ t1.7:geilcE'.
The specific problems ~~rhich apply to classified
intelligence, particularly intelligence sources
and :methods.
C eneral Froblexns
2. The fundamental document ti=rhich governs classification ~i~d.
declassification {E~ecuti~e order 11652) applies to the broad range of
official iz?~arrr.ation bearing on U. S. national defense a.nd foreign
relations. Intelligence infarxratiori, itself, is mzntioned only as
e~~axnples of classified information or as exceptions to specific
p:ro~~sit~ns. -Thus, changes that are necessary taratiana.lize the
cla.ssificatian of intelligence would also require similar changes in
the rules, practices, and attitudes with regard to the ~~hale body of
~1.33~~
;;rrn~~tir~n
in ender to carry out their respansibi.lities.
'E'hPse guidelines could be supplemented to fake care of the needs of the
Congress, the needs of E?A S. Government contractors, and tl-~e .sharing
_ of classified informatidn with certain foreign go~~ornmenLs and infer--
na.tional organizations.
5. A revie~.~v of the current situation leads me to conclude that
the accumulation of detailed regulations, instructions and, most
ixnpartantly, long-zstab7ished practices- tends to encourage urnecessa.ry
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classification a.nd overclassification. ?have neon numerous carrzi~~iaints
ai_~cnat presumable- Zilzdr:rclt ssified daci.iznents, but :~ h2ve not seen any.
acti:ans tai;en to in~plernetzt the part of the Ehectative Order which states
tl~za.t azzef lI. ~. Government en~ploe~ee ''who unz~ecessarily classifies or
over-classifies izLfarmatian... steal? be notified that. his actions are in
violation of ti~:;.s order..-.. P.epeatcd abuse of the r_7:assafication process
shall b~ grounds for an administrative reprimand.''
6. The present att-etudes tatitirard the classification and disclosure
of classified information have evolved aver the past t~vo or three
dec;zdes. ti'CTith fe4v exceptions, past changes in ~aecutice C~rdcrs,
directives and implementing regulations Have ha.r~ I.i~ Ie effect o.n:
Haw a~~d -why officials classify or disclose
inforrr~2.tiort,
~'he rake at which classifier) documents are
produced. . _
The real prot~:cEiozz afforded truly sonstivo
inform ati on.
7'3-Je :irE~quence- and .severity of breaches of
s ocurity.
"the availability of in.farmation tQ the public,
-the ~'ong.~ ess, and various elements of the
~;:~ecutive Branch. (The. principal ~rxceptii~n
to. this is the #'reedai.n of ln#'orxxzation Act. ~
A, 11 of i.',:zese are primarily affected by the attitudes of the people rho
cla ~,r,ifJ ~znd have access to classified information:
Attitudes .about i;he degree o#' protection any
l~inc3 of classification can be e~-pected to provide.
.Attitudes. about the'ia~vnership" of official
iri{'a~mati~in and the rights of access to that
zrifox rnati.on tivhich the public, the press, the
Cangress, and various elements of the 1/:~ecutive
F _~: anch have.
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.[~%titi?des about the real need to protect zx?ost
classified inforrn~!tion.
7. The effects of these attitudes are afte?~ reflected in
criticis,--?s of tl.~e classification s3?ste?zi bath from. within and frarn
outside the Executive Branch, such as:
.Coo n?uch official information. is being classified.
The declassification of mast classified daczimerts
would not really damage U.S. na.ti:onal defense
or foreign relations.. ?
In_rormation is aftEn classified or o~.~erclassified `
autornatioally lay officials ~~dtl?aut appropriate
consid era~tian of the applicable criteria;
'l'he classification system is .often used -kci
prevent the embarrassment of officials or
departx-raents rather than the national. security,
Clasti?ifi ed informati:on is often releaseel selectively
t.a the public by high-.level officials of the .E~aecutive
Fra.nch for political purposes and u%ith lii:tle regard
fo.~ the sensitivity of the information.
The l'entagan Papers affair, the ~"reedam of
Irz{'orrxi atian Act,. and. the .recent revelations about
intelligence activities published by the press and
varioas L or_gressional Cornm.ittees are proof of
the abuse of the classification. system.
Ber~ause the throe standard classifications do not
provide adequate protection against unauthoriLed
disclosure, the most effective ~vay to protect truly
sLSnsitive information is to use restrictive handling
markings, codewords, and bigot lists;
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I~~uch classified information is so restricted by
h~zz~dling znarkiz-:gs, code,,vords, and bigot lists
that n-zany officials are denied access to information
which is imi~ortant to their jobs.
The absence of effective legal penalties for the
revelation of most classified information under-
axxiz~es the effeGtivenc~ss of any Classification
system.
The automatic declassification of inforxnata:on
re:ciuired by directives is not being irr~plerr~ez-zted
as :>cheduled rtiainly because of the Iax~ge volurxze
of t,?assi.fied documents and the faiI.ure to pro~Tide
p~~rsorxnel to .review and declassify them.
~. Cr. iticisrrls of this sort are true to some extezxt. Y men i.f ~ . .
z-r~xze ~zi~=.re true, the fact that these vietivs are widely held sigz~i:i'ic~zntly
a fiects riotiv people classify infor. matiozx and how they protecEt it. V4'tzat
tr~esc~ criticisms reflect is an increasizig Lack of CoziiidenCe ix7. the
~:Iassxfi.Gation sM-st.exrl--on the one hand, a lack ~f Goz2~ridenCe that .
the system is able to prevent the unauthorized disclosure of classified .
in`or3n=tiorz; and on the other, a lace of confidence that cl~:~,v,?if~cati_ons
are z~iE~ing applied to official information whose unauthox-ized disclc>sur. o
wood ra:ally damage our national defense or ~:oreign relations. `These
t~ti-o vi.e~,~rs tend to feed on each other by encouzaging ovcrc'+assificatiorz
and. I:zy r:~ducizlg the inhibitions agai.rzst the unaut.norized disclosures.
lzi order to be effeC~ive changes irz the classi:fic~.tion px?acess z{-Quid
t.a ire to generate Confidexzce in the system and ~youldrequirz a tI~rJroz~gh
re-education of those who have the authority to classify in:~orxnatioz-a.
C.7nly zrozTi such a re-education program and evidence That rle~crr Y7raCtiCe.s
are T~c.i.n~; ir:stituted to z~zsizirnize the extent and degree. of classifi.ca~~ic~n
z~-i.Zl. there evolve an attitude of confidence that what is classified ~.Iesorves
protection against unauthorized disclosure. T1iis new confidence,. together
with a lavr providing penalties for the unauthorized disClostire rf classified
ir~i'ormation, should also produce zxzc,re secure handling of such irzforxraatan
by U. S. officials ~~vho have access to it.
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Tntelligez~ce 1'roblezns
9. Some progress 1:s }~ein~,f rz~~~de within. the liz~~;it~~d areas tii~~xcxn~
the ~irectar of Central Zniell.igence has uz~irue authority; z. e, ,, :in
matte-.rs dealing z~-it~h satel?ite recor~n2~issarxce. Papers are x;Qw befo~c
the i`r S~ recoznmenaing reducing t}ie classification. ar;d thereUy ixnj~raving
the access tc; iniar?~r;ation deri~-ed from and atEribute~d to this source. ~3ut,
n~~~ch more can be doze ~vit~un tl}e Intell..igence Conxzrfuz~i~y to simplify the
Txlilltip~i.city cif res~rictive handling controls (i:z7cluciiz~g special handlizzg
n~~trl~ings, cozr~pax~txn~nts, ~~;d bigot lists}. ~'he use Qf tihesc ~antrals
ha.s increased as a reaction to the recent rash of disclosures cif
i.n~.r~lligenc~: sources and xnet.hods and the L-elief that the three standard
cl:~.ssifications do r;ot? afford significant protection, against -unauthorized
ciisclasur~s.
~.0. `T'he situation has z cached a paint -whero the nuzxrUer ref these
res~irictive haradling controls has becox~e so ,great that rncis; ~cansuzza-rs
of ini:ell:ir efface a;.~d ;naz~zy i~:.telli.gezice cfiiciais do nat. recogn_~ze~ the trz.~e
xzze:~ning of these indi.catars. Thus, con'crary t:ci the purpose, of ti;ese
ha~radling controls, their overuse tends to dilute the degree of protection
aaford~.d szzch inta7:ligence. ~'urtherznare, tl~s overuse izil-!ihi.ts Lhe full.
une ~of tl;e inrorn~atian -czsl;a7ly by tl7e creation of bureaucratic }7lzrdlcs
fia access. tJffi.cials i.z-~ LhaSe Or~4n~L.a.tSazas ~~hiGh corzfarm strie:tly to
the rules gaverrizig these restrictive ha?zdling conirals are zz7ost adt-`rscly
affected by their averzase> Users of inielligence, especially the Y7'zilita ry
i.r~ the field, complain That the excessive use of thesE cantral.s z~educes
the effectiveness of their apprations b~~ denyiz~_g or dEla~~i~~zg access to
irr;portant .ntellig~~nce. .
X1. Ti;is is hat to say that al.l restricti~rE hazzdli.rag von~trols arc
unrrecessar~r. Clearly, they have an i.rnpartarit tale- in proteci:in,~ Truly
s~~x??sitive aspects of same intelligence sources a.nd xneti~ads> ~ bigczt
list does make sense when it is used to restrict knoti.?ledge of the
sez7sitive details about a particular human sGUrce axxd ti~rhen only a dozexz.
ar so officials have access to these details However, one must eiuestioza
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the true e~ffectiz-encss of codcz~ox?d systerz]s z,-nen tl]ey are ~.zsed to
"co~]trol" virtually all speets of a particular technical source. ax]d
its products and ti,~hen literally tho~asazids of people are authorized
access to the inforn-.aion. 1~'l]at is needed is much xnoro restraint
in creati~xg near restri c+~ ve h~~T]d7.ing controls end usir]g tl]em~ Z"lxe
rolauilding of co~xfidcnce in the ability of the thz~ee -basic classific.atians
to protect intelligence from unauf.ho:cized disclosure ~~~ould assist i.x].
reduc:ii]g the use of these restricti~?e handling coTxtrols~
1.~. It is the practice i.ri the Intelligence Coi:lma_nity whin
producing all-source intelligence to classify the fireshed product
a+~ the l-iighest level of classification {including all the restrictive
l]andLn.g controls) 1M1r7]icl] may appear or.. the various docunxents used.
This practice, sometimes referred to as "inherited classification",
tez~.,ds to produce docuznen~cs tiVlxich are overclassified and. have excessive
x~estrietive ha_~-~dlizxg controls. IlZuch more attention should he paid to
c1as~,ifyi~xg a~xd controlliz]g all-source intelligence on the l]asis of the
cc~xfcnts of tn.e :~i.iu.shed document itse7_f .rather t17an simply follotvi.ng .
tl]~ practice of inherited classification
1 ~~ In addition to increasixxg the lxsefulness of intelligence b~%
a.ri'icials u~ho n~~ecl it, a. decrease in the use of restrictive haaxdli.ng
C:c"~Iitl'()1S, tl]e level of ClaS5iflCatlOrl aI]d thE-~ ~in]oU2xt of t:ls'sSilE''d
:ixaforinati~-~n could have the fo7luvr~in.g benefits:
Security: It should be apparent that the smaller
the amount of higl]l5T classified incox~mGtion and
the sxna.l7.er volun_xe nxarked Z-vith r?cstrictive
har7clling controls, the more effective can 'ae
the actual s~:curity that i s prouid ed tr ul~y .
sensitive intelligencew
Declassification: Even though the E_secutive Ordex
requires the automatic revie~~v and c3eclassificatiazz
os documents after specified periods of time,
murnl~ers of the Intelligence ~'arzlmunity rarely
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take t}ie initiative to declassify thern. One
raasorz for this is the lack of resoY~rces na~edc~cl
to rr-.~~ie~sr t}~e east ~._nount of cla:ssificd dacu.,7a7~#.5
ti~Thich hhs accurnul.ated. 13ut, to a large e_~t.e?~t,
un?iecessary classifica~ian is the fundan3cntal
cause oi' this accumulation.
L;nclassified Pu"blica.tions: Pax t of the basis
for the ~~ieti~~ that i:neinbcrs of are Intelligence
~ozr~n~unity unnecessaz ily classify their
inforrnatian is that alley seldom 1orod"uc:~
documents which are not classified. A
program t.o issue unclassif?ed intelTigel-ice
publications would ga a long ivay tolrard
COl1ntE'.ring this vieur.
gbjLctives
14., `l'he follati~i.ng objectives should be establi-shed far im.provzri~;
t;ha effectiveness of the classification of i~itelligence: .
Restore confidence in the c,Iassification process.
P ractbr
f U F.. ti. y ~.3 ~ ~l~ r E P A F V 1 t! 11 5 ~_'
5-J3 i FD9:1iiHS
---.- a .~,u~,..~~ A~
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