INTERNATIONAL ISSUES REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00942A000500010011-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 50
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 22, 2004
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: October 31, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

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Assessment
Center
International
Issues Review
Secret
PA IIR 79-009
31 October 1979
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SECRET
INTERNATIONAL ISSUES REVIEW
31 October 1979
CONTENTS
NUCLEAR POLITICS
WESTERN EUROPE AND THE INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR SYSTEM
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
The West European nations are finding it increas-
ingly difficult to reconcile their longstanding
interest in the development and export of nuclear
technology with their participation in institu-
tions designed to tighten the rules governing in-
ternational nuclear commerce. This article eval-
uates their attitudes toward US initiatives to
strengthen the international regulatory system.
COOPERATION AMONG EMERGING NUCLEAR STATES
This paper describes the incentives and disincen-
tives for nuclear cooperation among nuclear con-
sumer states. It summarizes three case studies
and concludes that present trends work against
collaboration that could lead to a weapons capa-
bility.
NORTH-SOUTH ISSUES
DISCORD AMONG LDCS THREATENS GLOBAL NEGOTIATIONS
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Increased squabbling among developed countries--
largely reflecting the impact of higher oil
prices--will make it more difficult in the future
for LDCs to maintain a unified front at global
negotiations.
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The West European nations are finding it increas-
ingly difficult to reconcile their longstanding
interest in the development and export of nuclear
technology with their participation in institu-
tions designed to tighten the rules governing in-
ternational nuclear commerce. This article eval-
uates their attitudes toward US initiatives to
strengthen the international regulatory system.
NUCLEAR POLITICS
WESTERN EUROPE AND THE INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR SYSTEM
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COOPERATION AMONG EMERGING NUCLEAR STATES
This paper describes the incentives and disincen-
tives for nuclear cooperation among nuclear con-
sumer states. It summarizes three case studies
and concludes that present trends work against
collaboration that could lead to a weapons capa-
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bility.
INTERNATIONAL ISSUES REVIEW
31 October 1979
CONTENTS
NORTH-SOUTH ISSUES
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DISCORD AMONG LDCs THREATENS GLOBAL NEGOTIATIONS
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Increased squabbling among developed countries--
largely reflecting the impact of higher oil
prices--will make it more difficult in the future
for LDCs to maintain a unified front at global
negotiations.
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INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS
ILLICIT ECONOMIES: A FOUNDATION FOR UNDERSTANDING THE
INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC IN NARCOTICS 28
This article assesses the economic structure and
impact of the international narcotics traffic.
It places drug production and trafficking within
the framework of a larger illicit economy that
often develops from local black markets and con-
cludes that the large quantities of money these
illicit activities generate may harm a country's
social and economic development.
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IN 1979: A PRELIMINARY
ASSESSMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Although most established patterns of interna-
tional terrorist behavior continue, the overall
number of attacks has decreased, including those
against Americans. Nonetheless, several groups
stepped up the scale and lethality of their opera-
tions.
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of the world market for nuclear technology.
Western Europe and the International Nuclear System
The growing problem of nuclear proliferation and
the prospect of a severe energy crisis in the coming
decade underscores the importance of the attitudes of
advanced industrial nations toward the future use of
nuclear technology. During the past 20 years, a num-
ber of interrelated institutions and organizations
have emerged to govern and regulate international
nuclear commerce. The West Europeans play an impor-
tant role in these institutions and their role will
become increasingly significant as they expand their
capacity to supply each other and non-European coun-
tries with advanced nuclear technology and services.
This paper examines the attitudes of West European
countries toward the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) and the willingness of these countries
to give continued support to international regulation
Introduction
One of the most important factors bearing on West
European attitudes toward international regulation of
nuclear commerce is the fact that the current system is
largely US-inspired. The IAEA, for example, was ini-
tially established as a vehicle for implementing the
Eisenhower administration's Atoms for Peace Program.
The nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), too, was
largely a product of American diplomacy. During the
past decade, there have been additional US initiatives--
such as the London Suppliers Group and the current In-
ternational Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE)--that
have been intended in part to further tighten the rules
governing international nuclear commerce.
Most West Europeans never have questioned the need
for or the value of measures to prevent the prolifera-
tion of nuclear weapons. In fact, some West Europeans,
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such as the Swedes and the Dutch, are deeply concerned
about the proliferation threat and strongly endorse US
initiatives to tighten control over nuclear commerce.
Nevertheless, most West European governments long have
differed with the United States over the extent of con-
trol needed. As a group, they tend to feel that the
dissemination of knowledge concerning nuclear technology
has reached the point where additional rules and regula-
tions to govern nuclear commerce are likely to be inef-
fective, especially in the long run, and will only in-
crease the economic and political cost to those nations
still willing to abide by a rigorous international sys-
tem of nuclear safeguards. Moreover, most West Europeans
feel that one can maintain a legitimate distinction be-
tween civilian and military applications of nuclear tech-
nology and that the US emphasis on thtential misuse
of this technology is too alarmist. the o
This growing disagreement with the thrust of US
nonproliferation policy also reflects deeper doubts
about the central role that Washington will continue to
play as the principal architect of the international
nuclear system. Many West Europeans were shocked by
the Congressional passage of the Nuclear Non-Prolifera-
tion Act last year. From their standpoint, it was a
unilateral action to establish new controls on the
transfer of nuclear technology, in violation of an under-
standing that INFCE participants would refrain from such
controversial actions as long as basic issues still were
being debated in the evaluation. This legislation, par-
ticularly because of its requirement that the US Govern-
ment renegotiate bilateral nuclear agreements with other
countries to make them consistent with US laws, has had
a negative impact on West European perceptions of the
United States as a reliable supplier state. More funda-
mentally, the West Europeans anticipate further attempts
by Washington to utilize existing international institu-
tions to achieve the nonproliferation objectives of the
recent legislation.
An Era of Good Feelings
Current West European anxiety about the future of
international nuclear commerce contrasts markedly with
the opinion prevailing when the basic institutions, pri-
marily the IAEA, were established in the late 1950s. At
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that time, the United States was the principal world
supplier of nuclear fuel and technology. Other West
Europeans thus found themselves dependent on the United
States for their supplies of nuclear fuel and technology.
This dependence did not generate much friction at
first because Washington encouraged the development of
nuclear technology in other countries during the 1950s
and through most of the 1960s. Indeed, the IAEA in its
early years was in many respects a conduit for US tech-
nical assistance to nuclear research and power programs
both in nonindustrial and industrial nations. Under
these circumstances, the West Europeans--initially in
the process of economic recovery--had every reason to
welcome American generosity and institutions like the
IAEA. F_ -1
Even the controversial issue of international safe-
guards for nuclear facilities, a prime responsibility of
the IAEA, was not a serious bone of contention. The re-
laxed attitude on the part of the West Europeans was a
direct reaction to two US actions intentionally designed
to keep differences of opinion to a minimum within the
Western alliance. Despite its desire for a universal
nuclear safeguards system under IAEA auspices, Washing-
ton recognized the independent safeguards system devel-
oped by those West European nations participating in
EURATOM (European Atomic Energy Community). Second,
when the United States began to push for the development
of the IAEA safeguards system in the 1960s, Washington
used a case-by-case approach that allowed the implemen-
tation of safeguards only as new nuclear facilities
came into being.
The Watershed
The Non-Proliferation Treaty drafted in 1968 con-
stitutes an historical turning point because it inaugu-
rated a far more rigorous regulatory system than had
previously emerged under the IAEA. It has since been
one of the primary factors conditioning West European
attitudes toward the whole system of. international in-
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There are at least four distinct problems connected
with the NPT that have influenced Western Europe's nu-
clear energy programs and export policies. These issues,
taken as a whole, help explain why since the late 1960s
there have been some West European reservations about the
IAEA and about initiatives to intensify the system of
institutions responsible for regulating nuclear tech-
nology. These problems are:
-- The US demand in conjunction with the NPT that
EURATOM subordinate its own safeguards system
to the broader IAEA safeguards program.
-- The language in Article III of the NPT which,
paradoxically, is interpreted to accord sig-
natories freedom to require less stringent
safeguards when exporting to nonsignatories
than to other NPT parties.
-- The clear distinction in the treaty between
the status and obligations of nuclear weap-
ons states and those of nonnuclear weapons
states, which conflicts with the principle
of European unity.
-- The unwillingness of France and Spain to become
parties to the treaty, which further compli-
cates the effort to reach a European consensus
on the control of nuclear technology.
These issues have not been serious enough to weaken West
European support for the IAEA. Nor have they undermined
recognition in Western Europe of the need for and value
of safeguards. However, these issues do suggest some of
the reasons why West European governments retain doubts
about the effectiveness of international cooperation in
Vested Interests
The other major development along with the Non-
Proliferation Treaty that influences West European pol-
icy on nuclear technology regulation is the growing
economic and political stake some West European countries
have in nuclear technology. France and West Germany have
become major exporters. The Italians, Swiss, and Swedes
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are other important suppliers. Increasingly, these coun-
tries have found themselves in fierce competition with
each other and the United States as the international
market for nuclear reactors has contracted. Indeed, the
West German nuclear industry is in serious financial
trouble, which often makes it difficult for Bonn to
accept US policy on safeguards.
Furthermore, most West Europeans are convinced that
it is imperative for them to close the back end of the
nuclear fuel cycle by reprocessing spent fuel. Their
argument for this position is political and emotional
as well as economic. Most West European nuclear experts
concede the US point that the recycling of plutonium
in conventional thermal reactors does not yield major
economic benefits. However, they argue that reprocess-
ing will lessen their dependence on outside sources of
nuclear fuel.
privileged position and their dependence on it.
that the United States is attempting to prolong its
European dependence on the United States for fuel
and technology is now admittedly much less than it was
in the 1950s. The two uranium enrichment consortia,
URENCO and Eurodif, could supply Western Europe with
about 70 percent of its enrichment requirements between
now and 1985. These developments have significantly
eroded the kind of leverage the United States used in
the past to advance its policies in the nuclear field.
But the United States remains the single largest supplier
of nuclear technology. Along with Canada and Australia,
which also have stringent export controls, the United
States also exerts considerable influence over the world
uranium market. As a result, proposals to strengthen
the system of institutions governing nuclear commerce
tend to reinforce the suspicions of the West Europeans
The Current Scene
West European apprehensions are reflected in their
behavior or reaction to current developments that impinge
on the IAEA-NPT system as a whole. These developments
can be separated into four categories:
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IAEA politics, including the agency's nego-
tiations with EURATOM over safeguards.
-- The EURATOM-US discussions concerning the ulti-
mate disposition of US-supplied nuclear fuel
in Western Europe.
-- The concluding phase of the International Nu-
clear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE).
-- Relations among supplier states in organizations
established to coordinate nuclear export pol-
icies.
With respect to the International Atomic Energy
Agency, the West Europeans have concluded that this cen-
tral institution is here to stay, whatever reservations
they may have about US attempts to emphasize its police-
man's role. Where possible, these countries have tried
to balance US nonproliferation policy with strong su
port for the agency's technical assistance program.
This choice reflects their general preference that
the IAEA fulfill its second function as a promoter of
nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. However, none
of the West European members have given unqualified sup-
port to the attempt of some less developed members to
shift IAEA funds toward technical assistance programs.
On the contrary, the West Europeans have avoided actions
that would politicize the IAEA because they are disturbed
about what has happened in other UN-affiliated organiza-
tions. Their behavior on budgetary debates and on the
issue of the representation of less developed countries
(LDCs) on the IAEA Board of Governors indicates that the
West Europeans try to preserve their vital interests
without becoming caught in the middle of the dispute be-
tween the United States and the Third World over the
transfer of nuclear technology. The West Europeans have
cooperated with the US effort to get the IAEA to develop
a more effective safeguards system within what they re-
gard as realistic limits. At the same time they have
endorsed the LDC request for greater access to nuclear
technology because this corresponds with their own vested
interest in exporting such technology to the Third World.
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limit the scope of IAEA supervision as much as possible.
Despite this philosophy of accommodation, there is
one issue related to the IAEA on which members of the
European Community (EC) have long been adamant: their
need to protect the integrity of the EURATOM safeguards
system as an important instance of European integration.
Ever since the United States requested that this regional
safeguards system be more closely coordinated with the
one administered by the IAEA, the EURATOM members have
insisted on their right of self-inspection. This demand
has been controversial and has deeply disturbed the So-
viets, whose fears about nuclear weapons programs in
Western Europe have led them to become strong advocates
of the IAEA safeguards program.
It was not until 1977 that EURATOM and the IAEA
finally agreed on an inspection system that would pro-
tect the interests of each party. Negotiations on the
measures necessary to implement this system have been
under way for the past two years. They have been acrimo-
nious at times as several EURATOM members have tried to
Last March, the deadlock was partially broken.
EURATOM and IAEA officials developed formulas to govern
the presence and activities of agency inspectors at West
European nuclear facilities. These inspectors will not
be able to conduct independent verification in the full
sense of the word but they have been given greater rights
to observe and confirm the records of EURATOM inspectors.
The EC member states also were willing to commit them-
selves to comprehensive verification at fuel fabrication
plants--an issue im ortant to the United States and other
IAEA members.
This compromise does not resolve all the issues be-
teen EURATOM and the IAEA. Implementation of the IAEA
presence still has not been worked out for all of the
240 or so nuclear facilities inside the European Commu-
nity. For example, inspection procedures for uranium
enrichment plants like the one operated by URENCO in the
Netherlands have been a stumbling block. URENCO offi-
cials want to be sure that sensitive information concern-
ing their centrifuge technology does not fall into the
hands of their competitors as a result of IAEA inspec-
tions. Another issue that remains to be resolved is the
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need for a formula to allocate the additional financial
costs associated with the new EURATOM-IAEA relationship.
While it may take several months to iron out these
problems, an agreement will probably be concluded this
year or in 1980. This agreement, however, will be a
delicate arrangement representing less than a universal
safeguards system that treats all nations on an equal
basis. The political and economic stake the West Euro-
peans have in their own safeguards system is just too
strong to permit a transfer of more responsibility and
authority in this area to a central international in-
stitution.
The US Negotiations
Another problem area has been Washington's request
to renegotiate its accord with EURATOM that governs the
disposition of US-supplied nuclear fuel in Western Europe.
The Carter administration, in accord with the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, has pressed the countries
to begin discussions on this issue during the past year.
I I
Not surprisingly, the West Europeans were reluctant
to begin talks on new export controls. Some EC member
states, especially France, believe that the US attempt
to impose further restrictions on the reprocessing of
US fuel is designed to sabotage their plans to recycle
plutonium for use in fast breeder reactors. Furthermore,
Washington's demand for greater control over the retrans-
fer of US-supplied nuclear fuel strikes at the heart of
the principle of free trade within the European Community.
The discussions which began last November are still
at an early stage. EC representatives have given their 25X1
preliminary reaction to a US draft for a revised nuclear
cooperation agreement. They cannot negotiate seriously,
however, until the EC Commission has been granted a for-
mal negotiating mandate by the member states.
It is not clear how flexible the members, especially
the French, are ultimately prepared to be. The fear that
the United States might eventually resort to selective
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awareness might encourage EURATOM to test the US admin-
istration's determination to impose its maximum demands.
or temporary embargoes on the shipment of nuclear fuel
as a pressure tactic may incline some of them toward
compromise. They are aware, however, that the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Act does not require the United States
to take any immediate measures because the issue does
not involve safeguards on nuclear facilities. This
Whatever the final outcome of the negotiations,
EURATOM already has won an important concession. There
will be no further discussions concerning its agreement
with the United States until INFCE concludes early next
year.
INFCE Developments
The US-sponsored conference to evaluate all phases
of the nuclear fuel cycle has been the principal battle-
ground where the West Europeans have defended their need
to close the back end of the fuel cycle. Nevertheless,
their desire for greater energy independence which rein-
forces this interest in reprocessing spent fuel has not
entirely precluded a cooperative attitude. On the con-
trary, their contribution to the Evaluation's eight work-
ing groups has been substantial and reflects a serious
commitment to the search for more roliferation-resistant
technologies.
Perhaps the most striking evidence in INFCE of West
European sincerity has been their support of the effort
to reduce the levels of highly enriched uranium used in
research reactors. Furthermore, the British and French
have accepted the US argument that the recycle of pluto-
nium in conventional thermal reactors has little to rec-
ommend it on economic grounds. These two nuclear weap-
ons states have indicated that they will forgo the re-
processing of spent fuel for such purposes--but not for
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These concessions to US nonproliferation policy,
nevertheless, appear meager compared to the fact that
the West Europeans, along with the Japanese, have largely
forced the United States to abandon hope that INFCE would
begin a new consensus on the international nuclear system.
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Even before the evaluation began in October 1977, the
West Europeans, led by the French, insisted that INFCE
remain purely a technical exercise that would not bind
the participants to policies which they did not approve.
Furthermore, the West Europeans have not been content
to view INFCE as a "damage limitation" exercise. In-
deed, they have been aggressive in advancing their po-
sition in the various working groups on the controver-
sial issues of uranium supply, reprocessing, and the
fast breeder reactor. Their argument is that the re-
cycle of spent fuel in fast breeder reactors is essen-
tial in the long run because it promises to reduce their
dependence on supplier states whose export policies have
made ready access to uranium less certain.
The effort to compile and summarize the results of
the evaluation's working groups is nearly complete and
most West European participants are now convinced that
they have succeeded in blunting the impact of US non-
proliferation policies on their domestic nuclear programs.
Washington, for example, has dropped its objections to
reprocessing if it is essential to existing research and
development programs for the fast breeder. Thus, most
West Europeans feel INFCE has been valuable because the
technical exercise has encouraged a more pragmatic Ameri-
can policy.
Despite this reaction, it is doubtful that the West
Europeans will support proposals to "institutionalize"
INFCE as a permanent organization. Most will prefer that
future work on proliferation be handled within the various
working groups supervised by the IAEA. More importantly,
Western Europe's significant exporters of nuclear tech-
nology believe that the special organizations designed to
coordinate export policies are more appropriate forums
for the proliferation problem.
Suppliers Organizations
The West Europeans play a major role in the two in-
stitutions created to coordinate the export policies of
supplier states, the London Suppliers Group and the NPT
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Exporters Committee or "Zangger Committee."* Participa-
tion in these organizations obligates suppliers to insist
on IAEA safeguards as a precondition for the transfer of
nuclear fuel and equipment. Yet this obligation repre-
sents only a minimum consensus. Some West European sup-
pliers will insist, as a matter of their own policy or
as a result of US pressure, that the recipient country
accept "full scope" safeguards applying to all its nu-
clear facilities, acquired or indigenous.** However,
"The Zangger Committee was established in 1970 to implement arti-
cle III of the NPT which obligates supplier states to adhere to
a common export policy. All the West European nations except
France and Spain--which have not signed the treaty--and Portugal
belong to the Committee. The London Suppliers Group lies outside
the NPT regime. It is a smaller consultative body formed under
US leadership in reaction to the Indian nuclear explosion in 1974.
The group's guidelines on export policy are not legally binding,
but the criteria and trigger list of sensitive nuclear material
and equipment are virtually identical to that employed by the
Zangger Committee. Seven of the group's 15 members are West
ditional concern with national sovereignty and independence.
European, including the French who feel that a "gentleman's
agreement" on nuclear export policy is compatible with their tra-
**The complex question of nuclear safeguards may be summarized
as follows: All states that have joined the IAEA must adhere to
an organization document (INFCIRC 66) which first specified the
agency's role in administering safeguards and conducting inspec-
tions of nuclear facilities. Those nations that have also signed
the NPT are committed to a more stringent safeguards system as
outlined in INFCIRC 153. This document goes substantially beyond
INFCIRC 66 because it provides for the use of containment/ sur-
veillance equipment and requires states to establish a State Sys-
tem of Accounting and Control (SSAC) for nuclear facilities.
This more rigorous system is sometimes referred to as "NPT safe-
guards" to distinguish it from the earlier system. As a matter
of practice, NPT safeguards are often equivalent to "full-scope
safeguards" because NPT signatories are required to accept safe-
guards on all nuclear facilities within their territory. However,
as suppliers NPT parties can export nuclear technology to non-NPT
countries under the less stringent guidelines outlined in
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efforts to bind the West Europeans legally to this strin-
gent safeguards policy have not had much success. Most
West European suppliers balk because it might cost them
the export contracts they need to keep nuclear in-
dustries in business.
Resistance to full scope safeguards is not the only
obstacle to the effort to create a broader consensus.
The London Suppliers Group is an ad hoc organization
which only obligates its members to consult and exercise
restraint. The Zangger Committee trigger list to control
the transfer of sensitive nuclear materials and equip-
ment has a legal foundation in Article III of the Non-
Proliferation Treaty. But France is not a signatory
and, therefore, not represented in the committee.
Furthermore, the Belgians, Italians, and Swiss have re-
fused to go along with the decision to harmonize the
trigger lists of the two suppliers organizations. These
nations took particular exception to Washington's posi-
tion that heavy water production technology should be on
the Zangger trigger list because they do not consider
this technology sensitive.
These factors suggest that the effort to coordinate
export policies may have gone about as far as possible.
The future of the London Suppliers Group in fact is un-
certain. Member states agreed not to hold meetings as
long as INFCE is in progress. There is a possibility
that the group may become dormant, though members would
probably still abide by its guidelines and trigger list.
The Zangger Committee meets once every six months to re-
view the activities of its members.
Recent developments suggest that active West Euro-
pean involvement in the movement to tighten export cri-
teria in the future will take place directly with the
United States on a case-by-case basis. This has been
true since developments in Pakistan's nuclear program
heightened awareness of the danger of proliferation.
Numerous informal consultations concerning this problem
have taken place between US and West European officials,
often on the fringe of INFCE.
Other such consultations, however, have only dem-
onstrated the degree to which commercial rivalry among
suppliers makes a consensus difficult to obtain. As if
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to highlight the difficulty caused by commercial rival-
ries, less stringent safeguards policies have apparently
enabled West Germany and Switzerland to make a major
technology sale to Argentina, at the expense of more
proliferation-conscious Canada.
Prospects
An attempt to summarize West European attitudes to-
ward the international nuclear system can be misleading
but it appears that these nations as a whole feel they
are in a limbo. On the one hand, they have for the large
part resisted intense US pressure to revise the rules of
the game to any substantial degree. In this sense, they
have won a breathing spell. Indeed, some West European
officials expect that US nonproliferation policy will be-
come even more flexible, or change direction, especially
if a new administration comes to power late next year.
This expectation, though possibly misguided, may encour-
age the EURATOM countries to drag out negotiations with
the United States over export controls as long as pos-
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Developments unrelated to US policies, on the other
hand, will almost certainly force the West Europeans to
acknowledge the need to reassess the rules governing nu-
clear commerce. Evidence that Pakistan is developing a
nuclear weapons option underscores the dangers in the
unrestricted spread of advanced nuclear technology. Few 225X1
West Europeans, including the French, are willing to
deny their responsibilities in this area.
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Even if there are no nuclear explosions or accidents
in the coming year, the West Europeans will find it dif-
ficult to strike a balance between nonproliferation ob-
jectives and their desire to accommodate the demand in
the Third World for nuclear technology. The second NPT
Review Conference will commence next summer. -At that
time, the less developed countries will bring great
pressure on the West Europeans to live up to Article IV
in the treaty which obligates supplier states to share
nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. West Euro-
peans are acutely sensitive to accusations from Third
World nations that industrial nations are participating
in a nuclear cartel designed to deny the less developed
countries the fruits of Western technology.
Perhaps the most decisive factor in the long run
for the West Europeans will not be their support for nu-
clear programs in the Third World, but their attitude
toward technological progress in the nuclear field
within their own region. At the present time, nuclear
energy programs in several West European countries are
in serious trouble. A combination of circumstances re-
lating to the antinuclear movement and the political
problem of storing spent fuel has forced a number of
governments to postpone reactor construction as in West
Germany and Sweden or cancel plans altogether as in
Austria. The Three Mile Island nuclear accident has
strengthened the public appeal of critics of nuclear
power in several other West European countries.
In contrast, the French and British Governments
have strongly renewed their commitment to nuclear power
in response to the long-term economic and political im-
plications of a tight petroleum market. The French,
within the next five years, will outstrip the West Ger-
mans in nuclear technology as numerous reactors come on
line and as the first commercial-scale fast breeder re-
actor becomes operational.
If it widens, this disparity between those countries
in Western Europe that succeed in reducing their dependence
on fossil fuels via nuclear power and those nations that
do not could further complicate their ability to reach
a consensus on European and extra-European issues. The
French and British, for example, will probably find
themselves much less vulnerable than other EC countries
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to outside pressure whether from OPEC or the United
States. Whatever impact the nuclear energy issue has
on the ability of the West Europeans to reach common
policy positions, those countries whose nuclear programs
are now stalled face serious consequences if they fall
behind in the search for energy security. In the long
term, this problem rather than the proliferation issue
or US policies may become the key factor in shaping West
European views on the value of and need for institutions
to regulate the growth of nuclear power.
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Cooperation Among Emerging Nuclear States*
There is growing concern among the nuclear supplier
states that countries outside their ranks could effec-
tively combine to frustrate their efforts to prevent the
spread of nuclear weapons. This apprehension is based
on recognition that the consumer states are increasingly
sensitive to--and may attempt to resist--what they per-
ceive as a discriminatory, unnecessarily rigorous non-
proliferation regime.
Their resentment has been expressed at such inter-
national forums as the United Nations Special Session
on Disarmament of 1978 and the ongoing International
Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE), and it will prob-
ably play a major role in determining the atmosphere at
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Con-
ference of June 1980. The growing availability of the
resources--skills, technology, money--required to sup-
port a modest nuclear program contributes to the pos-
sibility that the nuclear consumers may circumvent sup-
plier-imposed controls, either individually or in colla-
boration.
Additional factors that may encourage collaboration
among nuclear consumers include:
-- Common perspectives, problems, or enemies in the
international arena.
Common ideology, religion, or ethnic identity.
-- Complementarities in resources, technology,
or other fields.
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-- Desire to exploit the commercial potential
of nuclear exports.
-- Desire to build new regional bonds or acquire
prestige through sharing advanced technolo-
gies.
-- Desire to cement a relationship in order to
assure access to scarce resources such as
oil.
Against these considerations, a number of factors
can operate to inhibit collaboration in the nuclear
field. First, governments normally attempt to preserve
existing or prospective national advantages, including
"nuclear secrets"---unique technologies and the so-called
sensitive technologies--that are closely linked with
nuclear weapons development. They might do so in order
to maintain:
-- Potential military advantages and reduce the
chances for acquisition of nuclear weapons
by other, particularly hostile, nations.
-- Perceived political advantages, both domestic
and foreign, of possessing an elite tech-
nology.
-- Potential commercial advantages from unique
national nuclear technologies.
A second deterrent to nuclear cooperation, espec-
ially with another threshold state, is the possible
damage to a country's relations with those major nuclear
suppliers that are strongly opposed to the spread of
sensitive technology. Countries contemplating nuclear
transfers outside the international safeguards system
must consider the impact this would have on their secu-
rity and economic ties with these suppliers, including
probable termination of nuclear aid.
Finally, a potential nuclear sharer might avoid
collaboration because it requires all of its nuclear
materials, technology, and skilled personnel for its
domestic nuclear programs. F -1
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One example of actual nuclear sharing is provided by
Peru's acquisition from Argentina of nuclear technology
for peaceful uses. Buenos Aires favors such assistance
because it constitutes formal recognition of Argentina's
leading role in Latin America in the field of nuclear
energy. Both nations also see peaceful nuclear coopera-
tion as a means of strengthening bilateral relations
generally, a goal that has become increasingly important
because of common border tensions with Chile. The like-
lihood of substantially increased cooperation in the
future, however, is limited both by Peru's serious
financial problems and by its lack of trained personnel
and of guaranteed access to necessary nuclear material.
international environment could affect this equation in
At present, the factors working against nuclear
cooperation that might lead to a weapons capability ap-
pear to outweigh those that would encourage such a de-
velopment. Nevertheless, a variety of changes in the
31 October 1979
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North-South Dialogue: Discord Among LDCs Threatens
Global Negotiations F- I
The less developed countries (LDCs) are demand-
ing a new round of negotiations on global economic
and development issues. Nonetheless, the LDC posi-
tion on the agenda and structure of such talks is un-
certain, largely because influential factions among
them hold widely varying views on the priority of
issues to be discussed and the goals of the nego-
- While these types of disagreements are not new,
increasing internal squabbling will make it even
harder than in the past for the LDCs to develop com-
promise positions. Within the past year:
-- Higher energy prices have exacerbated ten-
sions among oil importers and exporters.
-- No strong LDC leaders have emerged, making
it more difficult to develop strategies and
tactics.
-- Institutional problems--mainly infighting
between G-77s (Group of 77) New York- and
Geneva-based delegates--have increased and
diverted attention from negotiations.
As a result, before the LDCs' UN caucus--the
Group of 77--can focus on another round of North-
South discussions, it will have to establish a uni-
fied LDC position, paying particular attention to
tensions between oil-importing and oil-exporting
LDCs. These problems undoubtedly will surface at the
round of South-South talks scheduled for New York in
January 1980.
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How the G-77 works out its internal problems
will help determine the ability of the developed
countries to cope with global negotiations. If the
G-77 papers over internal disputes on energy, for
example, the LDCs' final position would probably be
too general to elicit a specific response from the
developed countries. On the other hand, continued
discord within the G-77 could present the industrial-
ized countries with several pro Is on one issue,
also making a reply difficult.
The Setting
In general, the less developed countries believe that
their economic position has deteriorated, that industrial-
South dialogue has lost considerable momentum.
ized nations have become less responsive to LDC demands--
in part because of energy and economic concerns within
the developed countries--and that the concept of a North-
To regain the momentum, the G-77 has proposed that
the UN launch a new round of global negotiations at the
1980 Special Session on Development.* The G-77 has not
specified an agenda and structure. Instead, the resolu-
tion restricts itself to a general outline which calls
for:
-- A broad-ranging discussion on energy,
raw materials, trade, development,
and money and finance.
-- Participation by all countries within
the UN framework.
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'Dates for the Special Session will be decided by the General As-
sembly. Most observers believe the meeting will not take place
before September 1980.
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-- Use of the Committee of the Whole (a
committee established by the United
Nations to monitor progress in the
North-South dialogue) to work out the
agenda and procedures.
While there is a consensus among LDCs that global
negotiations are one way to move the North-South dialogue
in a more action-oriented, constructive direction, and
that energy issues should be addressed, there is still
no unified G-77 position on the priority of various is-
sues. These issues include:
-- The extent to which energy will be dis-
cussed, particularly the importance of
Mexican President Lopez Portillo's re-
cent energy proposals.
-- How new global negotiations will mesh with
talks already under way in other forums,
particularly the UN Conference on Trade
and Development.
-- The role and importance of the UN's Inter-
national Development Strategy, designed
to promote economic cooperation and de-
velopment in the 1980s.
Such differences among LDCs continue to reflect individ-
ual national political interests, disparities in levels
of economic development, and splits among regional
groupings.
While the hallmark of the G-77 in the past has been
its ability to close ranks when facing the industrialized
countries in negotiations, events over the past few months
suggest that this solidarity will be much harder to come
by in the future. Higher oil prices and the global eco-
nomic slowdown have exacerbated factional disagreements.
At the same time, in part because no generally acceptable
leadership cadre has emerged, institutional and regional
jealousies have intensified.
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The Energy Issue
Higher oil prices have strained LDC solidarity be-
cause oil-importing LDCs have put increasing pressure on
oil-exporting LDCs for relief and assistance. These ten-
sions surfaced publicly at the Fifth Session of the UN
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD V) in May
1979 when a group of oil-importing LDCs demanded that
energy be included on the conference agenda, breaking a
longstanding unwritten agreement against discussing
energy in multilateral forums. oil exporters were able
to avert these demands by promising to take part in
intra-LDC energy talks in the future--a promise the LDCs
pursued durin the summer, mainly in nonaligned forums.
Immediately following UNCTAD V, the LDCs engaged in
heated debates over OPEC pricing policies at the June
1979 meeting in Colombo of the nonaligned movement's
Coordinating Bureau. The OPEC members that attended--
Algeria and Iraq--became increasingly uneasy with the
issue. In part to counter LDC criticism directed at
itself, Algeria offered a proposal for global negotia-
tions. Although the plan did not respond directly to
LDC demands, it had some appeal. Without completely
forgetting their energy concerns, most LDCs viewed global
discussions as a vehicle to spur the North-South dialogue
at a time when it was losing momentum after UNCTAD V.
The members of the Coordinating Bureau recommended that
the nonaligned summit in Havana make a final decision
on Algeria's plan.
Further discussions were held among nonaligned mem-
bers at a presummit meeting in Georgetown, Guyana, in late
August.* Although the ostensible purpose of the meeting
was to develop proposals for increasing mutual assistance
and solidarity within the nonaligned movement, ener
issues dominated the discussions.
*Nonaligned members attending the Guyana meeting were Algeria, Cuba,
Guyana, India, Jamaica, Iraq, Nigeria, Sri Lanka, and Yugoslavia.
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Guyana had prepared and circulated a hard-hitting
paper that analyzed the adverse impact of OPEC price in-
creases on oil-importing LDCs. The paper proposed sev-
eral potential schemes of direct assistance to non-OPEC
LDCs including:
-- A complicated scheme in which OPEC would
levy a surcharge on crude exports and
rebate the money to oil-importing LDCs.
-- A discount on oil purchases for domestic
use by oil-importing LDCs.
-- The establishment of special funds to
finance economic cooperation programs
and development of energy resources in
LDCs.
After several days of heated discussion--during
which Iraq threatened to walk out--OPEC members managed
to have only a severely watered-down version of the orig-
inal draft released. Nonetheless, the meeting did high-
light the concern of oil-importing LDCs over the supply
and price of "raw materials" (a euphemism for oil) and
did emphasize the "overriding importance of the economic
dimension" of mutual assistance among LDCs (a muted
call for more OPEC aid). Probably most important, how-
ever, the Guyana meeting ensured that the energy prob-
lem would be introduced at the Havana nonaligned summit.
Energy proved to be a divisive issue in economic
discussions in Havana. Although the language in the
economic portion of the final nonaligned declaration
does not criticize OPEC, in order to pass the Algerian
resolution oil exporters had to commit themselves to
another resolution on collective self-reliance, which
keeps the door open for more OPEC aid and assistance to
other nonaligned countries. Most LDCs view the two
resolutions as one package even though the OPEC commit-
ments are more implicit than explicit.
India, Jamaica, and Yugoslavia were reportedly in-
strumental in keeping the focus on energy issues. Even
so, some member countries have argued that non-OPEC LDCs
31 October 1979
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yielded to OPEC pressure in the last hours of the con-
ference. Moreover, rumors persist that OPEC members worked
to soften sentiment against the oil producers by making a
number of special bilateral deals. FP_ I 25X1
The collective self-reliance resolution does not con-
tain specific promises of preferential pricing and rebate
schemes sought by many oil-importing countries. Nonethe-
less, nonaligned members agreed:
-- To grant priority of supply to each other for
"primary products and commodities."
To increase financial assistance to one another.
To channel more investment funds into other non-
aligned countries.
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To participate in joint energy projects, includ-
ing research and development into new energy
sources.
Venezuela reportedly played an active role in persuadin
other OPEC members to agree to these guidelines.*
The Leadership Problem
As the pressures within the LDC camp have increased,
it has become more difficult for any individual, country,
or region to take a leadership role. At the UNCTAD V
meeting in May, for example, the African, Asian, and
Latin American groups each chose a regional spokesman
to negotiate on individual agenda items, instead of one
G-77 spokesman. In fact, numerous LDC representatives
have admitted that the meager results of UNCTAD V re-
flect, in part the lack of leadership within the Group
of 77.
Moreover, it has become almost impossible for a
spokesman for one faction or region to table a proposal
*Saudi Arabia, although a nonaligned member, did not attend the
summit. OPEC members have implied that their commitments as a
group are not firm until all members are in agreement.
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without running counter to the interests of another
faction or region. For example, Mexican President Lopez
Portillo's speech at the United Nations in September, in
which he called for global negotiations on energy and
other related issues, was criticized by several OPEC
members for focusing too much on oil without the neces-
sary links to development issues.
In another example, the G-77, after months of dis-
cussions, is still trying to hammer out a position on the
UN's International Development Strategy (IDS). Some LDCs--
led by India--believe that the IDS should be instrumental
in establishing common LDC goals over the next decade.
A few others argue that IDS has been a failure in the
1970s--largely because developed countries have not lived
up to their commitments--and generally view the G-77
proposal for global negotiations as an alternative. Most,
however, are searching for some compromise solution in
which global negotiations would not overshadow or abandon
IDS.
Institutional Disagreements
Further complicating G-77 efforts is a growing ten-
sion between its New York- and Geneva-based delegates--a
somewhat lesser known, but not less serious problem. Each
group desires to take the lead in North-South negotiations
and in internal G-77 decisionmaking.
G-77 representatives in Geneva tend to be more con-
cerned with progress in individual negotiations, are some-
what more pragmatic, and are less inclined than their New
York counterparts to think about the North-South dialogue
as a whole. Many Geneva delegates--as well as the UNCTAD
Secretariat--oppose any activity in New York that they
feel distracts from UNCTAD negotiations. In particular,
they are suspicious of the Committee of the Whole and are
generally opposed to Algeria's global negotiations pro-
posal.
New York representatives, on the other hand, view
UNCTAD with some disdain and view the UNCTAD delegates
as merely technicians. To enhance their role as the
Group of 77 policymakers, most New York representatives
tend to favor new global negotiations centered in New York.
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To deal with the problem, the Group of 77 established
a committee of 21 representatives in Geneva in early 1979
to study the possibility of creating some mechanism to
coordinate and carry through their policies. The strongly
differing factions within the Group of 77 prevented the
committee from reaching a consensus. Instead, the committee
sent a report to the full Group of 77 that presented the
differing points of view. Moreover, the G-77 foreign
ministers at a recent meeting in New York also could not
agree either to form the support group or to abandon the
idea; instead, they instructed a committee in New York
to continue studying the merits of the proposal.
Outlook
How the Group of 77 manages its internal problems
will largely dictate its position at new global negotia-
tions. While it is too early to predict that the LDCs
will be unable to reach a unified position, the coordina-
tion process will be more difficult this time around. The
Group of 77 might work out some positions general enough
to be acceptable to a large majority--that is, falling
back to the lowest common denominator approach they have
used in the past to work out contentious issues. None-
theless, a growing number of countries would probably
be dissatisfied. Under the rubric of collective self-
reliance, these countries are looking for specific commit-
ments--particularly from OPEC--on energy, aid, and develop-
ment to help with immediate concerns of higher oil prices
and slower growth.
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Many LDCs will be looking for these responses at a
promised round of South-South talks scheduled for January
in New York. Moreover, the meeting could become very
heated if it is preceded by an OPEC decision in December
to raise oil prices again without a specific plan to aid
oil-importing Group of 77 members. This would sharply re- 25X1
duce the Group of 77's ability to maintain a unified front
against the industrialized countries and to negotiate on
specific issues at global consultations.
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Illicit Economies: A Foundation for Understanding the
International Traffic in Narcotics* I-- I
The following article focuses largely on the role
played by narcotics in the flourishing illicit econo-
mies of many developing nations, but it also will be
of interest to analysts looking into the institutional
problems that generally inhibit development. The
paper outlines the conditions necessary for the devel-
opment of a sizable illicit economy, discusses the
role played by government policy, and surveys the im-
pact of illicit activities on domestic social and po-
litical institutions.
The international traffic in narcotics can have a
sizable economic impact on drug-producing as well as
drug-consuming countries. The scope of this impact is
difficult to measure because drug transactions, along
with other contraband smuggling, occur within an illicit
transnational market system. In most countries the net-
work that criminal elements use to exchange illegal
goods and services provides a foundation for a more
widespread illicit economy. By steadily infusing large
quantities of financial resources, the international
narcotics traffic contributes significantly to the growth
of an illicit economy. These infusions of money can
place severe pressure on existing social structures by
shifting traditional political and economic power bases,
often as a result of bribery and corruption.
Illicit economies result from a complex interaction
between political and economic processes and frequently
reflect a society's pattern of socioeconomic develop-
ment. Illicit economies are most frequently unintended
consequences of government attempts to regulate be-
havior through law and policy. There are many types of
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illicit economic activity. For example, the unrecorded
exchange of legitimate goods and services for cash in
order to avoid taxes is common in most developed coun-
tries. on the other hand, international narcotics traf-
ficking is a more organized criminal enterprise that
uses a broad range of illicit services.
The Origins and Development of Illicit Economies
The foundations of illicit economic development
most often grow from a local black market in the host
country. The distribution mechanism to supply the black-
market system is smuggling. By providing channels for
distribution of illicit goods and services, existing
black markets and smuggling enterprises contribute to
the organization of an illicit economy. Smuggling also
links black markets in different societies. The trade
and finance activities associated with this transnational
network of illicit activity parallels the international
economic system.
Black markets result from government regulation of
the market. Through regulation of choice in the market-
place, governments attempt to reallocate resources in
ways consistent with the purposes of national develop-
ment. To the degree that the demands of the population
differ from government objectives, the foundation for a
black market emerges.
The purpose of government trade controls is to in-
crease acquisition costs to the point where contraband
that does enter has a negligible impact on the economy
and society. While government policy may restrict sup-
ply, demand persists. The resulting scarcity of goods
brings black markets into being to supply demand at
artificially high prices. When no domestic source of
supply is available, entrepreneurs smuggle commodities
in from abroad.
How Black Markets Operate
Black-market activity most frequently occurs under
conditions of social disorganization or when there is a
lack of consensus on the value of social and economic
controls. In addition, the less developed countries
(LDCs) frequently do not have the ability to govern.
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They also often lack the basic infrastructures, such as
communication and transportation networks, necessary for
a modern economy and society to function. The laws and
regulations that have evolved to govern modern market
societies often are absent or fail to govern behavior
effectively in countries where national integration is
minimal and where traditional cultural and social values
and norms still predominate. Under such conditions,
farmers and merchants often have great difficulty in
perceiving their traditional pursuits as "illegal"
activities, particularly if a government remote and
alien to their daily existence makes the declaration.
Smuggling occurs to some extent in nearly every
nation and can take several forms. Manufactured goods--
such as appliances, automobiles, electronic devices, and
firearms--can flow from industrialized countries, fre-
quently through intermediary nations, to the LDCs. Con-
traband, particularly raw materials--like gemstones,
precious metals, animal products, and some agricultural
commodities--flow from the LDCs to the industrialized
nations. These smuggling patterns parallel the regional
division of labor and flows of trade and commerce that
characterize the transnational economy. Also smuggling
occurs locally between neighboring states; this pattern
is particularly prevalent in those areas where a national
boundary cuts across tribal and cultural groupings.
There are a number of places around the world--
Lebanon, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Paraguay--that are
long-established intermediate markets for smuggling
activity between the source of supply and the point of
final consumption. They exist for reasons of culture,
geography, history, and law. Often, they are entrepots
for a particular region, have a cosmopolitan atmosphere
tolerant of diverse lifestyles, and are trade and com-
merce centers with good communications and banking fa-
cilities. A legal environment conducive to interna-
tional trade and finance--that is, one with few govern-
ment constraints--is common. In such centers smugglers
can acquire contraband legally, since contraband becomes
illegal only at the points of origin and of final desti-
nation. Such an arrangement allows the smuggler to
evade reexport controls, maintain warehouses, minimize
taxation on the visible portions of his operations, and
coordinate exchange activity.
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Within the LDCs an urban-rural dimension is funda-
mental to black-market and smuggling activities. In
the rural areas of many LDCs there is only a barter and
subsistence economy. In these areas black-market crops
and commodities are often necessary adjuncts to subsist-
ence farming. The farmer can barter to sell illicit
goods in order to raise money for food, medicine, and
weapons in local village marketplaces. Black-market
agricultural commodities include not only opium gum,
coca leaves, and marijuana, but also timber, coffee
beans, and cocoa.
The more urban areas pose a different set of prob-
lems. In many cases the middlemen in black-market and
smuggling activities, including drug trafficking, are
members of minority groups whose opportunities for
making a living are often limited to such areas as trade
and commerce in which the dominant social groups have no
interest. Like many rural groups, the minorities are not
yet integrated into the dominant society and political
system. Simple societies in similar situations have
survived through mercantile activities, acquiring goods
here and exchanging them there.
Traders and merchants are important links in the
distribution channel, for they provide an exchange
partner for someone in need of a product. In this sense,
the trader is the point at which two societies, perhaps
with considerably diverse forms of social organization
and exchange activity, often interact. Contacts between
rural and urban societies and between similarly situated
minority communities overseas may facilitate the develop-
ment of a trading network, using trade and communication
routes that have persisted for centuries, for all types
of goods. Extended entrepreneurial families commonly
perform this middleman role. The overseas Chinese of
Southeast Asia are an excellent example.*
Black markets and smuggling possess a degree of
coordination and organization that is uncommon in crimi-
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nal activity. Because distribution channels used for
smuggling can cross great distances and several legal
jurisdictions, they are often quite complex. Two fac-
tors contribute to this complexity: the number of dif-
ferent functions the division of labor within the
distribution channel encompasses, and the degree of
organization necessary to perform each of these functions.
Impact
The institutionalization of an illicit economy
within a nation can present serious political, economic,
and social costs to a government. Production, processing,
and distribution of narcotics are especially noteworthy
as criminal enterprises within an illicit economy because
they introduce relatively large amounts of money into
local economies. In LDCs, for example, the immediate
costs are inflation and the outflow of much needed for-
eign exchange to pay for consumer goods manufactured
in industrialized countries. These costs detract from
a government's ability to pursue more productive goals
and, to this extent, detract from a country's potential
for development.
Given the regional division of labor associated
with the international narcotics traffic, the net flow
of foreign exchange earnings from the international nar-
cotics traffic probably favors the industrialized coun-
tries, which benefit from bank deposits and consumer
purchases. To the extent that drug-related funds are
used to purchase contraband items in the illicit economy,
the legitimate economy suffers further. Such participa-
tion also weakens government authority because illicit
economies almost always allocate goods and services in a
manner inconsistent with government intentions and needs.
The Role of Narcotics
In the LDCs, narcotics-yielding plants have increas-
ing importance as agricultural commodities because of
their unusually high value in the black markets of local
economies. Narcotics require only simple processing be-
fore consumption, unlike many other raw materials. Ex-
cept, perhaps, for bulk shipments of marijuana, illicit
drugs are also compact and relatively easy to transport.
Often, traffickers or their middlemen will transport the
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crop to market for the farmer, thereby lessening a po-
tentially serious marketing problem and increasing the
farmer's profit. Though initially the farmer partici-
pates in barter and subsistence economies, the returns
from drug production may promote the development of a
local cash economy. The profit margins become so high
that crop patterns gradually shift.
The returns from drug production and trafficking
within the LDCs impose additional costs on the govern-
ment. First, these returns undermine traditional social
elites by shifting political and economic power bases,
a change effected in large measure through bribery and
corruption. Second, the resources that a government
must devote to controlling drug production, trafficking,
and related activities in the illicit economy put an
additional strain on public expenditures.
The large profits from narcotics trafficking and
the organized structures required to process and distrib-
ute narcotics also encourage criminal enterprises to
develop and persist. Often, existing criminal enter-
prises engaged in other types of black-marketeering and
smuggling activities have already created conditions
conducive to organized drug trafficking. These enter-
prises can bring financial and other resources to bear
to ensure their continued functioning, principally by
immobilizing the authorities with bribery and corruption.
To the extent that monopolies can develop and persist,
a significant sector of the illicit economy in a coun-
try becomes institutionalized, creating an environment
favorable to an expansion of organized criminal activity
in non-narcotics-related areas.
In extreme cases, a pattern of corruption--sometimes
with roots in narcotics trafficking--can become so wide-
spread as to undermine the political structure of the
local government- In politically fragile situations,
public knowledge of high-level corruption that greatly
exceeds normal standards can lead to social and politi-
cal upheaval.
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Casualties Due to International
Terrorist Attacks
January Predicted
September 1979 1979 Total
1978
Total
Total incidents
192
256
353
Incidents in-
volving deaths
45
60
62
Incidents in-
volving injuries
47
63
57
Total deaths
166
221.
450
Total injuries
359
479
430
Geographic Distribution of International
Terrorist Incidents
January- Predicted
September 1979 1979 Total
1978
Total
North America
12
16
19
Latin America
28
37
61
Western Europe
105
140
166
USSR - Eastern
Europe
3
4
3
Sub-Saharan Africa
8
11
24
Middle East -
North Africa
30
40
61
Asia
9
12
16
Oceania
1
1
3
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International Terrorism in 1979: A Preliminary
Assessment* F__ I
Most established patterns of international ter-
rorist behavior recorded in 1978 have continued into
this year, including attacks on Western diplomatic and
business facilities, an emphasis on simple types of
operations, and a preference for striking targets in
industrialized democracies. Significant changes have
included a major decrease in the number of attacks
worldwide, as well as in the number and proportion of
attacks against Americans. However, several terrorist
groups stepped up the scale and lethality of their
operations in order to publicize their respective
"causes." Intergovernmental cooperation in combating
terrorism was spearheaded by a West European agreement
on extradition and prosecution and by the drafting of
a UN convention on the taking of hostages.
Trends
For the year as a whole, there was a decrease in
the number of international incidents (table 1). If
trends continue, 1979 will, in terms of the number of
attacks, be the second least active year of the decade.
There has been an even more marked decrease in the num-
ber of deaths from terrorist attacks, although one or
*Data presented in the tables that accompany this study are based
upon the same types of unclassified sources that have formed the
basis for our previous annual surveys of international terrorism.
Estimates for the final figures for 1979 were made by assuming
that terrorism will follow exactly the same trends in the last
quarter of 1979 as those experienced through September. While
this assumption undoubtedly will result in some inaccuracies in
our predictions, we have no theoretical or empirical basis for
believing that there will be an overall increase or decrease in
terrorism worldwide during the last quarter.
31 October 1979
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Geographic Distribution of
International Terrorist Attacks
Against US Citizens or Property
January- Predicted
September 1979 1979 Total
1978
Total
Middle East-
North Africa
10 13
40
Asia
3 4
9
Total
42 56
123
Nationality of Victims of
International Terrorist Attacks
January- Predicted
September 1979 1979 Total
1978
Total
North America
45
60
127
Western Europe
105
140
113
Middle East -
North Africa
34
45
70
Latin America
19
25
46
USSR -
Eastern Europe
12
16
17
Asia
2
3
13
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two incidents involving multiple casualties in the last
quarter of 1979 could well skew these figures. There
has not been a concomitant decrease in injuries from
international terrorist attacks. However, as has been 25X1
noted in our previous surveys, most terrorist incidents
are not aimed at causing casualties, and onl one-
fourth of all attacks resulted in injuries.
Terrorists continue to prefer operations in the
industrialized democracies of western Europe and North
America (table 2). More than half of all incidents
were recorded in Western Europe alone, both by indig-
enous organizations and by groups that have chosen to
export their grievances abroad. Perhaps due in part to
increased governmental countermeasures, terrorism in
Latin America and the Middle East has lagged far below
the levels recorded last year. F_ I 25X1
There have been fewer attacks than the previous
year, both in relative and absolute terms, on US citi-
zens and property, but Americans this year were the
victims of many more lethal incidents than before
(table 3). At least six Americans (Ambassador Dubs in
Afghanistan; Lewy in Rhodesia; Berkowitz in Iran; and
Goodman, Mosley, and Claypool in Turkey) representing
diplomatic, military, business, and private interests,
were assassinated. Infrequent though deadly operations
appear to have replaced the formerly preferred fire-
bombings of American vehicles. 25X1
Officials and businessmen--especially individuals
who are symbols of Western power and wealth--are still
the primary targets (table 4). Tourists and other pri-
vate citizens are victimized only incidentally (for
example, as passengers on a hijacked airliner). West
European nationals were victimized in over half of all
reported incidents; North Americans are the second most
frequent targets. Among US victims, businessmen con-
tinued to be the most numerous, although the absolute
number of attacks against corporations has dramatically
decreased (table 5).
Despite the publicity given to occasional sophis-
ticated operations, most terrorist attacks continue to
be simple in conception and operation (table 6). Bomb-
ings remained by far the preferred type of attacks,
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International Terrorist Attacks on US Citizens
or Property by Category of Target
January- Predicted
September 1979 1979 Total
1978
Total
Diplomatic
9
12
22
Military
6
8
30
Other US Government
4
5
2
Business
13
17
47
Private citizens
11
15
21
Total
43
57
122
Types of
International Terrorist Attacks
January- Predicted
September 1979 1979 Total
1978
Total
Kidnaping
18
24
27
Barricade-
hostage
6
8
11
Letter bombing
11
15
5
Incendiary
bombing
6
8
69
Explosive
bombing
89
119
133
Armed attack
21
28
36
Hijacking
5
7
2
Assassination
23
31
29
Theft/break-in
2
2
12
Sniping
3
4
9
Other actions
9
12
20
Nonterrorist
hijackings
22
29
23
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accounting for nearly half of all terrorist operations.
Unaccountably, incendiary bombings have plummeted from
second to seventh place in frequency among terrorist
attacks. Despite preboarding security precautions that
make the smuggling of weapons on board airliners highly
improbable, aerial hijackers have discovered that
pilots generally assume that their claims of being
armed are true, and have thus acquiesced to their de-
mands. Hence, although few hijackers have been armed,
hijackings--by terrorists and nonterrorists--have in-
creased somewhat over 1978 totals.
Fortunes of Major Groups*
The Irish Republican Army, as well as the Irish
National Liberation Army, succeeded in generating
substantial international publicity with several major
operations during the year, particularly those aimed at
symbols of the British Government and the Crown. They
assassinated Airey Neave, would-be Conservative Secre-
tary for Northern Ireland; Sir Richard Sykes, Ambas-
sador to the Netherlands; and Lord Mountbatten, a
member of the British royal family. The IRA also
continued to inflict mass casualties, injuring 18
persons in a bombing in Brussels and killing at least
18 soldiers and wounding another eight in an ambush
near the Irish border at Warrenpoint. According to a
recent British military assessment of the IRA, the
group has adopted a more clandestine structure, making
it much more difficult to combat. While this reorgani-
zation has increased the clandestine security of IRA
units and thus permitted successful major operations
without leaks to the authorities, compartmentation may
lead to operational errors. Many observers believed
the IRA's successful assassination of a Belgian banker
and the near-successful assassination attempt on SHAPE
Commander Alexander Haig were both cases of mistaken
identity. Despite popular outcry in the wake of these
attacks, and a papal plea for a cease-fire, IRA opera-
tions are expected to continue to be successful in the
near term.
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well as international terrorism involving these groups.
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On the European continent, the ETA, a Basque na-
tionalist organization in Spain, met with successes
similar to those of its Irish colleagues. The group
assassinated several important military officials,
leading to increased pressures on the government to
adopt repressive measures that the ETA believes would
ultimately redound to its benefit. Hoping to combat
French-Spanish cooperation against Basque terrorists
who slip across the border, the ETA declared war on
French business and tourist interests in Spain, con-
ducting a vigorous bombing campaign which in one week-
end claimed 118 casualties at three airport and rail
stations. Spanish rightists, despairing of a firm
governmental response to this wave of terrorism, con-
ducted a series of vigilante raids against Basque
leaders in France. Despite the positive outcome of the
25 October referendum on Basque autonomy, some members
of the ETA are expected to continue to use terrorism to
press for complete independence.
Italian terrorist attacks continue at their
pace-setting rate, although there have been some
noteworthy police successes against the major groups.
Individuals believed responsible for the kidnaping and
eventual murder in 1978 of Aldo Moro, one of Italy's
leading political figures, were arrested in Italy and
France. Other individuals responsible for major right-
wing terrorist attacks were detained in Latin America
during the year. Fissures within the Red Brigades,
Italy's well-known leftist terrorist group, appeared to
be growing, with an ideological battle between its
factions appearing in the country's newspapers.
International terrorism by Fatah was held in abey-
ance pending the outcome of Yasir Arafat's diplomatic
offensive to obtain Western recognition of the Pales-
tine Liberation Organization (PLO). Moreover, Fatah's
capability to conduct international terrorist exploits
was restricted by the assassination in Beirut in Jan-
uary of Ali Hassan Salameh, reputed planner of Black
September's attack on the 1972 Munich Olympics.
Saiqa, a Syrian-sponsored Palestinian group that
had not conducted any international terrorist attacks
since 1973, made headlines through a series of attacks
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under the name of the Eagles of the Palestinian Revolu-
tion, a fictitious name used to mask Saiga's attacks
against Egyptian interests in Europe and the Middle
East. Its most spectacular operation was the takeover
of the Egyptian Embassy in Ankara, Turkey. After the
takeover ended, Turkish authorities granted permission
for the opening of a PLO office in Ankara, reputedly in
return for PLO mediation with the terrorists. Saiga's
terrorist activities were halted, if only temporarily,
with the assassination in France of its leader, Zuhar
Muhsin.
Other Palestinian groups met with similar mixed
success. The Black March Organization, believed by
some observers to be either the Black September Or-
ganization or a cover name for the Popular Front for
the Liberation of Palestine, underscored its opposition
to the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty with a bloody attack
on Brussels Airport. West German authorities thwarted
possible similar operations by arresting several
would-be Palestinian terrorists entering the FRG in
late April.
El Salvadoran leftists were responsible for the
most noteworthy international terrorist operations in
Latin America, seizing several foreign embassies and
private installations, assassinating diplomatic and
business officials, and kidnaping still others, in-
cluding Americans. These organizations hope to be as
successful as the Sandinistas in Nicaragua.
Antiterrorist Cooperation
Regional cooperation was especially evident among
European countries faced by terrorism. Members of the
European Community in October scheduled to open for
signature a convention designed to resolve some tech-
nical legal difficulties experienced by its members in
implementing the Council of Europe's Convention on the
Suppression of Terrorism. The convention calls for
extradition or prosecution of individuals suspected of
certain offenses, whatever their motivation. In May,
police chiefs of 17 major West European cities met to
discuss means for combating terrorism and other forms
of violent crime.
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The most notable attempt to combat terrorism on a
global scale was the drafting by a United Nations ad
hoc committee of an international convention on the
taking of hostages. The draft convention calls for the
same judicial measures to be applied against the takers
of hostages as have been previously advocated in three
international conventions dealing with crimes on board
aircraft. Despite some differences regarding the con-
vention's scope, the draft is expected to be opened for
signature b the end of this session of the UN General
Assembly.
Several nations joined the three international
conventions on crimes against aviation, as well as the
UN convention on internationally protected persons.
The new round of demarches by the supporters of these
agreements is likely to add further to the list of
adherents.
Several steps were taken by major Communist nations
toward cooperating with the West in combating terrorism.
China has expressed support for the draft UN hostages
convention and has requested information from the United
States on international terrorism,
Cuba renewed its an ijac ing agreements with Canada
and Venezuela for another five years. The Soviets,
concerned about dissidents using political violence to
obtain publicity during the 1980 summer Olympics in
Moscow, have requested counterterrorist aid from West
Finally, a major nongovernmental actor joined the
fight against terrorism in September, when Amnesty In-
ternational (AI) announced that it would pay serious
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attention to human rights violations by "liberation"
movements and terrorist groups. Its willingness to
look at abuses by both established governments and
their politically violent opponents will enhance its
international reputation for evenhandedness. I
Outlook
While the statistical decreases in terrorist activ-
ity that we have noted are at first impression encour-
aging, the decline in incidents may be only a temporary
phenomenon. Terrorist incidents have shown a two-year
cyclic pattern during the 1970s, with 1979 having been
predicted to be a valley. Several terrorist groups may
have been improving operational security and sophisti-
cation, recruiting and training new members, and merely
waiting out government dragnets. This would allow them
to adapt further to governmental countermeasures, thus
increasing the likelihood of more frequent--and oc-
casionally more sophisticated--attacks. I
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