SADAT'S LIBERALIZATION POLICY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00942A001100040002-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 3, 2003
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: June 1, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

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Assessment
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Sadat's
Liberalization Policy
A Research Paper
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PA 79-10145
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Assessment
Center
Sadat's
Liberalization Policy
A Research Paper
Information as of! June 1979 has been used
in preparing this report.
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Sadat's
Liberalization Policy
Introduction
Egypt is in the midst of an election campaign
precipitated by President Sadat to rid the People's
Assembly of the most vocal critics of the peace treaty
with Israel. The situation dramatizes Sadat's paradox-
ical approach to liberalizing politics in Egypt. On the
one hand, he has been responsible for unquestionable
progress in moving Egypt away from authoritarian
government and closer to Western-style democracy.
He has allowed the formation of competing political
parties for the first time since their abolition under
Nasir, and the present election is the second he has
sponsored since his liberalization program began. On
the other hand, the parties Sadat encourages?his own
and the official "opposition"?differ only slightly,
while those offering real alternatives are barely toler-
ated; the current election was called because Sadat
could be almost certain of the defeat of most Assembly
members actively opposing his policies; and the govern-
ment has moved in recent weeks to discourage opposi-
tion groups of both the left and the right.
Despite Sadat's on-again, off-again approach to politi-
cal liberalization, the overall impact of the program
has been to strengthen his popularity. Most Egyptians
appreciate the sharp contrast between Sadat's Egypt
and the oppressive atmosphere created by Nasir. Even
extremists of the left and right, who have on occasion
seen their members rounded up, their printing presses
raided, and their newspapers and magazines banned,
have benefited from concern for their civil liberties;
time and again, cases against extremists of both sides
have been thrown out of court for lack of evidence.
Critics of Sadat's policies chafe at his low threshold for
tolerating opposing views, but such critics represent a
distinct minority. Sadat does have most of the people
on his side?or he could hardly move against his
opponents by means of an election that will probably be
largely free of direct government interference.
tin life of the state for the benefit of his chi Idrei and,
where necessary, maintaining discipline. The u er
classes, who are better educated and might be ex )ected
to compose the bulk of those eager for a mot.; rr 'lure
democracy, have probably been disarmed to son e
extent by Sadat's economic liberalization, wniel was
in fact a return to a more conservative economic xilicy.
They have been the primary beneficiaries of the "open
door" policy? the restoration of a measure of pi vate
enterprise, despite the retention of many of tne
elements of the enlarged public sector created u ider
Nasir.
Egypt's economic "opening" has had mixed effe ts in
the political sphere. One has been a wideniue of the
gap between rich and poor. The revitalized calm pre-
neurial class has eclipsed those who used to be t
economic elite under Nasir?the military oft ice s and
upper echelon bureaucrats. The resentment of piblic
sector employees does not seem to have been t rat slated
into significant political opposition, but the dank er is
obvious. One factor mitigating the situation may be the
avenues of upward mobility accessible to most E 1.yp-
tians as a result of Sadat's combined politica an I
economic reforms: educational opportunities. an I the
availability of _jobs in other Arab countries, Ns hie 1 so
far have survived Egypt's quarrel with the other iskrab
states.
Egypt's economy constitutes Sadat's Achilles' h.( sd?
both because of the potentially disruptive effects
economic malaise could spread throughout all SO -ial
groups, and because the new economic currents 1 1
Egypt have hit the military particularly hard Sa lat's
regime is based, in the last analysis, on military
support?not on the approval of the peasants w h .
constitute the bulk of the population and look on -;adat
as one of their own!
the Army is primarily concerned about bread and
IIbutler issues and the future of the military, not
questions of state such as the treaty with lsraol ( vhich
it applauds) or the breach with other Arab states
(which may grow more important over time, but .o far
The bulk of the Egyptian people-I

!probably see Sadat as he
sees himself: as a father figure charged with ordering
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is dismissed with the feeling that Egypt has paid its
dues). Sadat's ability to maintain property in Egypt is
limited in the best of times. His recent foreign policies
have tied his hands still further, and he has com-
pounded the problem by aggravating his quarrel with
the other Arabs. As long as Egypt's economy is
precarious, Sadat's position cannot be said to be
25X1 immune to threats.
From the political point of view, however. Sadat has
managed to manipulate political opponents with con-
siderable skill. He has allowed both the left and the
right outlets for legal activity?outlets that may
prevent a buildup of underground activity. He has been
hardest on the left, which has relatively little following
in Egypt's traditional, deeply religious society. Yet
even the left has a legal party and seats in the
Assembly (possibly whittled down to one after the
coming election). With the extreme right Sadat has
been more careful. Until recently, the Muslim
Brotherhood?the most influential voice on the right?
was given considerable latitude; its monthly magazine
was allowed to publish despite consistent opposition to
government policies, and it was allowed to dominate
student activity on university campuses. In recent
weeks the regime has moved against the right on both
counts, though the approach has been restrained to
avoid provoking a showdown. Sadat has no wish to
confront the Brotherhood?with its tremendous influ-
ence?and equally little wish to allow an Iranian-style
revolution to coalesce. His strategy seems to be to
ensure the continued absence of an organized religious
movement or charismatic leadership that could focus
25X1 discontent against the regime.
Right wing dissidents?and leftists as well, though to a
lesser extent?draw much of their strength from their
appeal to Egyptian students, a group significantly
disenchanted by Sadat's leadership. They tend to look
at political activity with the naivete of youth and the
arrogance of budding intellectuals; they have no
patience with relative improvement, preferring to deal
in absolutes; they are too young to have vivid memories
of Nasir's regime, too sophisticated to be impressed by
Sadat's "father of his people" approach. As a group,
they represent a bulge in the population that is
particularly frustrated by narrow opportunities for
employment. Many take little comfort in new opportu-
nities brought by the "open door" because they are
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philosophically opposed to free enterprise. Sadat's
recent warnings that political activity will no longer be
tolerated on campus may have some effect in keeping
the lid on active student dissent, but will not eliminate
the problem.
Sadat has approached political liberalization with a
view to maximizing freedom of expression for his
supporters and minimizing it for his critics. He believes
that the majority of Egyptians support the moderate
positions he has taken in Egypt's domestic and foreign
policies. He therefore risks little by giving them
freedom to express their views in political parties and
elections to an Assembly that does not make policy but
does serve as an influential forum for opinion. Where
individuals and groups in Egypt go beyond "construc-
tive" criticism?and Sadat has revealed himself to be
thin-skinned in defining these limits?Sadat reins
them in.
The net effect of liberalization, in political terms, has
been an Egypt that allows an impressive degree of
political freedom when judged by the standards of
neighboring states, but where critics of the government
are kept on a tight leash?a situation Sadat has every
intention of maintaining. Sadat's approach to liberal-
ization has not been consistent from a philosphical
point of view. Pragmatically, however, Sadat has been
predictable in encouraging behavior that will solidify
his position and discouraging behavior that might
undercut it. So far his judgment has been correct, and
Egyptians have supported him for it.
The likelihood of a prolonged stalement in the negotia-
tions with Israel over the future status of the West
Bank will probably pose additional problems for Sadat
and his political liberalization program in the coming
year. Although the general public is likely to stand
behind Sadat almost reflexively, at least for a consider-
able period of time, the left and the right will be eager
to seize on the situation to exacerbate popular discon-
tent, augmenting their own following in the process.
Even a tame Assembly, the likely outcome of the June
1979 elections, may find the temptation to attack
Sadat's policies irresistible. Sadat is not likely to prove
tolerant of such activities; his previous responses to
criticism have given him a fund of precedents for
dealing with it?ranging from the arrest of leftists and
radical rightists to a referendum authorizing harsh
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emergency measures or a new election. Sadat will not
hestitate to do what he feels he must; he may even
exhibit greater sensitivity to criticism than before out
of frustration with the Israelis. Nevertheless, he will
probably keep the basic outlines of his liberalization
program intact?if only because it offers few barriers
to whatever measures he may contemplate. He knows
its existence will enhance his standing in the eyes of the
25X1- public.
Discussion
Egypt's Anwar Sadat is a duly elected President and
the country has an elected assembly, political parties,
and other democratic institutions. But the veneer of
democracy is thin. Sadat has inaugurated a "political
liberalization" program that has introduced only
carefully selected reforms. In Iran, such a process spun
out of control. The question naturally arises whether
Sadat has been more successful. Why did Sadat
embark on the reform program?is he genuinely
committed to democracy, or is it a cynical attempt to
embellish an autocratic regime with democratic
trappings? Have his reforms unleashed forces no
longer amenable to control, forces that could ulti-
mately topple Sadat? This paper will attempt to
25X1 answer these questions.
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Sadat's Motives
Sadat seems to have a genuine revulsion for the
excesses of Nasir's brand of authoritarianism, and has
gone a long way toward reversing them. If he has not
substituted Western-style democracy, he also has
justification for supposing that democracy will not
work in Egypt, with its high percentage of illiteracy, its
impoverished and uneducated peasantry, its reflexively
left-leaning intelligentsia, its vast and possibly
unbridgeable gap between haves and have-nots, and its
pharonic tradition.
Sadat wants to allow the people of Egypt freedom to
manage their own affairs within parameters that are
not defined, but which are set by Sadat. In essence, he
wants them to choose to do what he thinks is best for
them. This concept appears internally inconsistent, but
Sadat is operating within a centuries-old tradition of
paternalistic rulers, and he may be correct in assuming
that a father-leader is needed by the population.
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Certainly he has few doubts about his own time .s for
the job. Sadat identifies with the "real- people e f
Egypt, the peasants or fellaheen. In the first ser ,ence
of his autobiography, Sadat describes himself a: a
"peasant born and brought up on the banks oft
Nile," and he speaks with considerable emotion about
his village of Mit Abul-Kum. ("That was my id :al
society, where I recognized myself and my erttin:
homeland. For a very long period Egypt to me r leant
Mt Abul-Kum.") From Sadat's conviction that he has
unique access to the "soul" of Egypt follows his belief
that true democracy for Egyptians consists in to lowing
hi prescriptions.
Sadat has made real progress in dismantling so ne of
the worst excesses of Nasir's repressive, author tarian
regime. In addition, he has introduced reforms aat are
democratic by anybody's standard- reformsx1 police
practices, competing political parties, genuine ebate
in the country's National Assembly, a free-whtAing
press?all in conjunction with a reorientation c. the
centralized economy toward free enterprise
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Sadat's political liberalization sprang from a va iety of
motives, including what seems to have been a s ncere
abhorence of the system as it evolved under Na sir.
Sadat has commented on his reaction to Nasir's regime
at some length in his autobiography:
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The worst and ugliest feature of Nasir's legacy
was what I have called a "mountain of hiltrer ? -
the spirit of hate which was emanated in eve y
direction and at every level, to the smallest f _mily
unit. Instances were rife of men working for the
regime who spied on their own kin just like t
Fascist regimes... . Fear is, I believe, a mos
effective tool in destroying the soul of an inc.vid-
ual--and the soul of a people.
People thus turned into dummies. They beet me
puppets in the hands of rulers, who did what they
liked with them. Travel abroad was forbidde 1. No
one could say anything that appeared to eon ra-
diet the official line of thinking (the penalty oeing
arrest and loss of livelihood). People's paskil ity
increased daily until one day no man felt he .ould
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be secure unless he had completely kept to
himself, cut himself off entirely, both from public
events and from the very stream of life around
him.
It is this that makes me say that just as the July 23
Revolution was colossal in its achievements, so it
was equally colossal in its mistakes. In time,
however, the achievements fizzled out . .. The
revolution was reduced to a huge, dark, and
terrible pit, inspiring fear and hatred but allowing
no escape.
Sadat's sincerity is unmistakable. He has a commit-
ment to individual freedom and a system of law that is
not so much logical and philosophical as it is emotional.
Other motives for Sadat's political liberalization pro-
gram were more pragmatic. He realized that political
liberalism was a means of earning points in the West?
particularly the United States, whose support he
needed to curb ties with the Soviets and reach an
accommodation with Israel. He may also have recog-
nized that greater political freedom would improve the
climate for private investment, both domestic and
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foreign.
The Economic Opening
Sadat inherited a poor country that was economically
stagnant. In his autobiography he comments that "We
had, with crass stupidity, copied the Soviet pattern of
socialism, although we lacked the necessary resources,
technical capabilities, and capital." In his own mind,
the root of the problem was Marxism.
Any free enterprise system came to be regarded
as odious capitalism and the private sector as
synonymous with exploitation and robbery.. ..
The people expected the state to provide them
with food, work, housing, and education. ... The
state was expected to provide citizens with
everything they needed without their having to
make any positive effort at all. It was that
shrinking back from active individual enterprise
that marked the beginning of our abysmal eco-
nomic collapse.
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Sadat's "economic opening," proclaimed shortly be-
fore the 1973 war, was an attempt to encourage private
enterprise while curbing the power and size of the
public sector. In addition, efforts to improve public
sector efficiency were initiated. Capital from the oil-
producing states, and perhaps from the West, would be
wedded to Western technology. The result would be an
inflow of foreign investment capital, Egyptian access
to advanced technology, a role for indigenous capital in
an expanding private sector, and greatly improved
employment possibilities for Egyptian labor.
There were political dimensions to the plan as well.
They followed from Sadat's bitter disillusionment with
the Soviet Union as an ally and arms supplier (Soviet
military personnel were expelled from Egypt in 1972)
and his conviction that the United States, despite its
support of Israel, could prove more useful. If the
United States could, by exerting its leverage on Israel,
obtain for the Arabs a treaty more favorable than they
could hope to obtain by force of arms, a stable Middle
East would be a natural field for US investment. The
wealth of the Arab oil states might be harnessed to
Egypt's benefit if the conservative Saudis and Persian
Gulf states saw Egypt renounce its Soviet tie and
embrace a greater degree of economic freedoms. Thus
US efforts to hammer out an Arab-Israeli peace
settlement and Sadat's effort to revitalize the Egyptian
economy would work hand in glove to bring about a
stable, prosperous Egypt.
Sadat unquestionably overestimated the role that
Western private capital would play. Incentives and
guarantees were legislated, and Cairo did indeed see a
steady stream of Western company representatives
and Arab delegations. The resulting projects, however,
were few. Private Western interests were not eager to
invest their own capital in Egypt, preferring instead to
sell management expertise and equipment. Potential
investors feared regional instability; memories of the
nationalizations of the Nasir era were not easily
eradicated; and foreign investors were faced with an
overwhelming bureaucratic maze. The situation has
not been improved by a proliferation of middlemen
eager to expedite business operations?for a fee?or by
Egypt's overburdened communications and transpor-
tation system. Technically skilled workers have been
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lured to the oil-producing Arab countries by higher
wages, creating serious labor shortages in critical
areas?basic services, especially construction, water,
sewerage. The ballooning post-1973 inflation rate caps
the list of discouraging factors.
To a considerable extent, however, the private Egyp-
tian has assumed the entrepreneurial role originally
expected of foreign investors. Some of these Egyptian
entrepreneurs are prerevolutionary elite returning with
a small fraction of their massive assets to test the
economic waters in Sadat's Egypt. Public sector firms
are also taking advantage of liberalization to form joint
ventures with private interests?monied Egyptians,
other Arabs, or, in the case of Arab contractors, their
own workers. Perhaps the most prevalent source of
entrepreneurial talent, however, are nouveau riche
Egyptians back from the affluent oil kingdoms of the
Persian Gulf. The numerous investments now occur-
ring outside the public sector are typically initiated by
an Egyptian or Egyptians, possibly with an Arab
partner, and are concentrated in light manufacturing
industries heavily dependent on imported Western
technology.
The resurgence of the entrepreneurial class has created
greater disparities in income than existed in Nasir's
day. During the heyday of Arab socialism in Egypt the
economic elite were military officers and upper echelon
bureaucrats who earned the maximum salary of $450
monthly in Egypt or somewhat more in positions
arranged by the government abroad. Even though such
salaries have been increased substantially, they are
now a pittance compared to incomes that can be
obtained in other Arab countries or earned in unoffi-
cial economic activities at home. Many public sector
employees moonlight in the private sector or turn to
corruption to maintain even a semblance of their
former economic status. With little hope of expanding
their output and no opportunities for moonlighting at
hand, the rural peasantry has been left behind, existing
in a manner than even the urban unskilled would now
disdain.
On the other hand, liberalization and social reforms
have created an avenue of upward mobility potentially
accessible to almost everyone in Egypt. For two
decades free public education has been available even
in rural villages, increasing the literacy rate dr mati-
cally among the young of Egypt's preponderart- ly
youthful population. Moreover, all who qualify are
el Igiblc to attend a wide variety of technical iru titutes
and Egypt's highly respected colleges and uaivi rsities
at government expense. These educational opportuni-
ties and the lure of the booming informal econc my are
siphoning off much of the underemployed la boa from
the countryside. From Cairo and other Egyptia i cities
the route for the skilled worker leads to Saudi r.rabia
and other affluent Arab countries and thence ?
pc rhaps?to the ranks of Egypt's new elite.
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A principal danger now is that the pace of econ mic
activity will itself become destabilizing. Since 1)73
many of the economic institutions developed dui ing the
Nasir era have been altered or eclipsed by priva te or
quasi-private counterparts. There is, moreover, .:onsid-
erable evidence that the government is losing control,
in part because it tends to opt for laissez-faire
whenever assuming responsibility for reform appears
unpalatable. A case in point is the financial sect 3r.
Because the government long avoided an adcqu ite
devaluation, resisted administrative reforms aria shut
its eyes to a wide variety of private transgressice is, a
large share of financial transactions now takes lace
outside the purview of official banking institutions. As
a result the government is left with an inadequai e
arsenal of effective policy instruments to contra credit
expansion, interest rates, and the exchange rate
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Political Liberalization
Sadat's political liberalization program was ant .2r-
taken to remove remnants of the Nasirist reeim to
generate political support and increase his own popu-
larity; to complement the "open door" polic3i by
convincing private domestic and foreign investoi s of
his distance from Nasir and acceptance of A estc:rn
ide.ts; and, in its later phases, to offset the social
dislocation caused by new economic directions
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Sailat launched his liberalization program shorty
after the October 1973 war, at the same time hit, open
door policy got under way. Egyptians consideret that
war an unequivocal victory, since it had fulfilled Arab
oblectives behind its launching: it made Israel
interested in negotiating a settlement. Sadat's pr .stige,
both domestically and throughout the Arab ?aor-1.1, had
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never been higher. Fresh from his triumph as "hero of
the crossing," Sadat felt secure enough to set in motion
major changes. In February 1974 he lifted censorship
of the press and replaced Muhammad Hassanayn
Haykal?a widely influential pro-Nasirist?as editor
of Egypt's semiofficial newspaper, Al Ahram. His
replacement, who later moved over to Al Akhbar, was
Ali Amin, himself the victim of repression in the Nasir
years; his brother Mustafa, who became chief editorial
writer, had spent nine years in jail on charges of spying
for the CIA. One immediate result was a press
campaign highlighting Nasir's violations of human
25X1
rights.
Other measures added to the sense that the pace of
political relaxation was quickening. Large numbers of
political prisoners were released. Police blacklists were
reduced. Properties seized in the 1960s were returned.
Traditional systems of local administration were re-
stored in place of an Arab Socialist Union structure
25X1 that had grown both oppressive and corrupt.
A series of incidents in the spring of 1974, however,
prompted Sadat to slow down. Most of the agitation
took place on the right side of the political spectrum,
and presumably originated in discontent over modern
ization measures promoted by Sadat but not specifi-
cally linked to his political reforms. Students and
teachers from Al Ahzar University, the leading
Muslim seat of learning, demonstrated against the
liberalization of divorce laws giving greater rights to
women. An abortive attack on the Military Technical
Academy, though organized by a Palestinian allegedly
in Libyan pay, was carried out largely by conservative
young men influenced by the thinking of the Muslim
Brotherhood. A street demonstration on behalf of a
Brotherhood leader, mistakenly thought to be under
arrest in connection with the Academy incident, shook
the security authorities. The other side of the political
spectrum was heard from when about 80 Egyptians,
most of them young, were arrested for distributing
pamphlets attacking secularization, "de-Nasiriza-
tion," and Sadat. In reaction, Sadat began to empha-
size the continuity between Nasir's programs and his
own, speaking of "corrections" rather than basic
25X1 change. But he continued to press ahead.
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Sadat presented the philosophical underpinnings for
his liberalization program in his "October paper" (a
reference to the 1973 war; it was published on 18 April
1974). Sadat argued that the war had inaugurated a
new era in Arab self-respect, and that Egyptian
energies that had made the victory possible should now
be turned to Egypt's own problems. The Egyptian
revolution had achieved much, but it had lost sight of
the supremacy of law and had failed to achieve
political freedom; corrections were in order. Much of
the paper concentrated on Sadat's open door economic
policy and his ideas about developing the educational
system, improving the status of women, and construc-
tion and reconstruction. He described one of the 10
tasks of the "new stage" ahead as establishing "an
open society enjoying the winds of freedom," but,
characteristically, he said nothing concrete about how
this was supposed to be achieved.
Sadat began with the Arab Socialist Union, the
country's sole legal political organization. He was not
yet ready to allow multiple political parties because, in
his view, they would shatter domestic unity, but he did
reject "the idea of one party which imposes its tutelage
on the masses, abolishes freedom of opinion, and in
practice deprives the people from practicing their
political freedom." Sadat had in mind a compromise
between a one-party system and a multiparty system:
retention of the ASU, but provision for competing
points of view within it.
The Arab Socialist Union
Political parties were abolished in Egypt in 1953
because Nasir's official ideology equated multiple
parties with decadence and corruption. Even the word
"party" was avoided as potentially divisive. In their
place, Nasir established a number of political organi-
zations designed to drum up and channel support for
the regime. None of them was particularly successful:
the Liberation Rally in 1953; the National Union in
1956; and finally, after the collapse of the union with
Syria, the Arab Socialist Union in 1962. In each case
the organization was intended to maximize control, not
transmit popular views.
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The ASU was pyramidal in structure, with its base
composed of units in every village, city quarter,
factory, and institution in the country. In theory, each
level elected the one above until the process culminated
in the Higher Executive Committee with the president
himself as its chairman. In practice, of course, the
system worked by appointment from the top down, and
other controls were built in.
After an initial burst of organizational activity which
drew in perhaps 7 million members, the ASU became
mired in inertia. In October 1965, however, Nasir
appointed Ali Sabri, then prime minister, Secretary
General of the ASU. Ali Sabri began to push the ASU
to grasp ever greater powers. Membership became the
prerequisite for a successful career, and candidates for
posts of every sort were required to be ASU members.
Trade Union appointments and the membership of
workers' committees were subjected to the scrutiny of
the ASU.
Like party organizations in the Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe, the ASU ran parallel to and
interlocked with the state at all levels; it now began to
interfere with its direction. Toward the end of 1965,
ASU executive bureaus were set up in all provinces in
order to get rid of "deviationist, negative, and reaction-
ary elements" of the local administration. Simulta-
neously, Ali Sabri carried out an intensive purge of
ASU personnel throughout the country, getting rid of
about 3,000 insufficiently active members and consoli-
dating his personal control over the organization.
Ali Sabri's power, and the pre-eminence of the ASU,
survived Nasir's death in September 1970 and the
early months of Sadat's presidency. In May 1971,
however, Ali Sabri pushed Sadat too far in an attempt
to preserve his position from gradual erosion?or,
perhaps, gave Sadat an excuse he was already waiting
for to act against him. The issue involved Sadat's
agreement?without prior consultation with the
ASU?to a federation of Egypt, Syria, and Libya. Ali
Sabri questioned Sadat's authority to make such a
commitment and engineered what amounted to a vote
of censure against Sadat. Sadat, after vetting his plan
with the military, fired Ali Sabri (then a vice president,
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although still running the ASU) and dismissed half the
abinet and more than 300 officials from all I vels of
the government, the media, and the ASU. Sad at was
left in firm, and undisputed, control.
The ASU never regained the power it had aim ssed
before Ali Sabri's abrupt departure. It Higner F.xecu-
tive Committee was dismissed in the purge: Sit tat
n-ver named replacements. For a time, rela dons with
the Soviets, the 1973 war, and negotiations wil tithe
Israelis distracted Sadat from domestic changi that
differed too radically from Nasir's model: he nay also
have been wary of antagonizing the Nasirists v hile
critical changes were afoot in the field of foreit n
affairs.
In August 1974, when he began to turn his atteition to
setting his own imprint on Egypt's internal iife Sadat
issued a "white paper" proposing modest chain es in
the operation of the ASU. This step tapped a ch ep vein
oi popular resentment; it unleashed floodgates if
newspaper commentaries and debates on the ft ior of
the People's Assembly. Prominent Egyptians mithusi-
astically suggested constitutional reforms, including
the reinstitution of the party system, the total
dissociation of the president from the ASU, arm the
protection of journalists from ASU control. In
December, Sadat appointed a committee to si u ty how
to make the ASU "an effective framework tor:- he
working forces of the people." The study group
reported within a week that the time was not vt t ripe
for the establishment of political parties, alt hot, di it
nt on to recommend expanded rights for the ..1.SU?
the right to submit questions to government off cials
and the right to demand the resignation of the
government.
In May 1975, Sadat announced that the ASU 1 as to
be "rebuilt from the ground up." Elections wen to be
held for all of the organization's seats- -10 men,bers
from each basic unit, followed by elections at tie
township and governorate levels. ASU memner-hip
was no longer to be a prerequisite for a seat in tie
People's Assembly, or for membership in trade anions
or appointment to high office. A new definition sif the
groups represented in the ASU "alliance" specil ed the
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intelligentsia, the military, and "national capital-
ism"?consistent with Sadat's insistence that his open
door policy be made to work. Students were not
included, and elections Within the "basic units" of the
universities were deferred until the fall?indications
that Sadat's willingness to experiment with greater
political liberalism did not include an eagerness to
invite dissent. The regime was undertaking a system-
atic effort to reshape the ASU's image. Editorials in
the ASU's official newspaper admitted that in previous
years the organization had been "keen on representing
the state rather than the people"; the coming elections
were advertised as "neutral, genuine, and reflective of
the people's will."
25X1
From Platforms to Parties
In September 1975, Sadat issued a new statute
governing the ASU. Its preamble emphasized the
beginning of a new era and an "opening up" in Egypt
of thought, economy, and policy to promote develop-
ment, freedom, and socialism. Its most notable feature,
however, was permission to establish various
"minbars"*?platforms or forums?to enable mem-
bers of the ASU to express differences of opinion more
freely and systematically. The minbar idea was a way
of allowing a limited amount of party activity without
25X1 actually allowing parties.
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The idea was greeted with enthusiasm. Individual
members of the People's Assembly moved almost
immediately to announce their intention to form
minbars, and by the end of November the list exceeded
30, with about half actually established. Sadat?who
had been out of the country during the greatest surge
of minbar formation?predictably moved to slow the
process. The regime made it clear that the minbars
were not supposed to debate the formation of policy but
to discuss how best to carry out policies already
established.
* In a mosque, he minbar s a platform on which a reader sits to
chant the Koran, and from which pronouncements are made. The
metaphor, as used by Sadat, has some of the connotations of our
"political platform," but with religious overtones similar to our
"pulpit."
Secret
Sadat announced the upshot in March 1976. There
were to be three political "organizations" (tanzim, not
minbars) within the framework of the existing ASU:
one centrist, following the orthodox government line
and called the Arab Socialist Organization of Egypt;
one rightist, confusingly named the Socialist Liberal
Organization; and, to the left, the National Progressive
Unionist Grouping. A joint conference of the ASU and
the People's Assembly approved their establishment
and named their leaders: Prime Minister Salim for the
center; Mustafa Kamil Murad, a "free officer" and
veteran parliamentarian, for the right; and Khalid
Muhi al-Din, also a former "free officer" and the
country's most prominent Marxist, for the left. The
three groupings provided an outlet for expression to the
country's major political elements, but two were
specifically excluded?the rightwing religious conser-
vatives, particularly those attracted to the Muslim
Brotherhood and similar organizations, and the
Nasirists, who opposed such key elements of Sadat's
new policies as economic and social liberalism at home,
a deemphasis of Pan-Arabism, and repudiation of the
special relationship with the Soviet Union.
The prime minister, the entire Cabinet, and an
overwhelming majority of the assembly members
flocked to sign onto the centrist organization to be
close to the people dispensing patronage and other
favors. Some of Murad's supporters made no bones
about their fear that unless they joined with the
"official" organization their chances for reelection
would be sharply diminished. Eight of his initial 14
adherents in fact tried to withdraw from the rightist
group, and agreed to stay on only at the urging of the
speaker of the assembly. The leftists, meanwhile, were
having troubles of their own, with Muhi al-Din
fighting to prevent the takeover of his organization by
Nasirists denied a grouping of their own.
The three organizations prepared vigorously for the
People's Assembly elections, scheduled for October
1976?the first in which political groups were allowed
to participate since the abolition of political parties
after the revolution. Each of 175 constituencies was to
elect two members, one of which had to be a peasant or
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worker, with "worker" defined to include senior
administrators of companies and organizations. Over
1,600 candidates eventually came forward to contest
the 350 seats, with the center standing in virtually all
constituencies, the right fielding about 170 candidates,
and the left 65. The big surprise, however, was the
disproportionate number of independents?over 800-
including candidates of every political stripe. Most
Nasirists chose to run as independents, and so did some
Marxists/Communists, on the theory that their
chances would be better if they could avoid the
"atheistic" label being applied to the official leftist
group.
The leftist party, easily the best organized of the lot,
slanted its platform toward the laboring classes and
concentrated its activity in rural districts. The leftists
even attempted to woo the religious right by peppering
their published statements with liberal quotes from the
Koran and, on a less elevated plane, by bribing
religious groups.
The center party, in contrast, was undisciplined; in
many constituencies its candidates were running
against other center party candidates, a situation
Prime Minister Salim, as party leader, made no effort
to correct. Although center party candidates not
infrequently made use of government funds and
property, the regime maintained a "hands off" attitude
throughout?a stance undoubtedly made easier by
Sadat's conviction that the center party would win
handily in any case. The elections were not without
improprieties; votes were freely bought and sold (the
going rate was reported to be an Egyptian pound), but
such transgressions were conducted in a nondis-
criminatory fashion?for the benefit of wealthy and
influential individuals, not the regime. Candidates felt
free to levy specific allegations of wrong-doing against
incumbent Cabinet ministers; the regime intervened
only to put down occasional instances of violence.
The result was an overwhelming victory for the
government's center party---275 seats to 12 for the
right and only two for the left, with 48 seats going to
independents. Sadat was clearly gratified by the
results of his experiment with democracy, and decided
to carry it one step further; at the opening of the newly
elected assembly in November he proclaimed that the
9
political "organizations" had been elevated to he
status of political parties?although politician:- were
not required to belong to any of them Sadat Ii ted
institutional changes that would follow, particularly
changes needed to protect the parties from AS 3
domination. Parties were to enjoy "absolute freedom"to organize their activities within the limits of and
the constitution. Sadat nevertheless described - he
ASU's role as one of organizing the activities c the
parties and stipulating how their finances weed I be
controlled?obviously extensive fields of inflate ice.
The contradiction arose from Sadat's deterinin ition to
prevent the growth of a myriad of small parties each
pi imarily a vehicle for an ambitious politician- the
sort of outcome the minbar idea was evolving t,ward
before Sadat called a halt. Sadat is fond of -ec fling
the pre-1952 political chaos in Egypt as an exa nple to
bc avoided at all costs.
Sadat declared that the ASU would retain its s ibsid-
iary secretariats (youth and women's organizat ons),
as well as its partnership in newspapers?presu nably
to ward off individual ownership and ensure eq al
access to the media by all the parties. The ASI
Central Committee, renamed the National Corgress,
was to be expanded to include independents as well as
senior officials of trade unions, agricultural coo sera-
fives, chambers of commerce, and professional ,t-gani-
zations. The idea seems to have been to return lie
ASU to its initial conception as an "alliance ' o-
popular forces. Finally, Sadat made it clear ilia the
new parties were to abide by the three basic pri
that had (supposedly) governed the ASU: natio ial
unity (thus ruling out a party based on the Ishii tic or
any other religion), socialism (suitably interore- ed by
the regime), and social peace (to avoid class dis inc-
tions).
The People's Assembly responded to Sadat's ne
freedoms by engaging in policy debates to an ur prece-
dented degree, many of them involving the citns itu-
tional status of parties and democratic practices in
general. Initial activity centered on the large nu nber
of independents who represented widely diverge it
points of view but found common cause in claim ring
for certain reforms: the adoption of more del aoc -a tic
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rules of procedure within the assembly, such as
abolishing the rule that at least 50 members must
agree to any topic to be discussed from the floor; an
unrestricted number of political parties, each with the
right to issue its own newspaper; and greater freedom
of assembly. Independents resented the fact that the
rightist party was named the "official" opposition,
believing that the leader of the opposition should have
been elected at a meeting of all noncenter party
deputies. The result was the emergence of an unofficial
leader of the opposition, Hi1mi Murad, a democratic
socialist who resigned from the Cabinet in 1969 to
protest Nasir's emasculation of the judiciary, and who
subsequently left the country until 1976. Murad and
his followers were permitted to organize and publicize
their views, although the leader of the rightist part
25X1 continued to head the "official" opposition.
The official leader of the opposition, Mustafa Kamil
Murad (the similarity of names is unfortunate),
meanwhile made every effort to justify his title by
conducting freewheeling attacks on the policy state-
ments of the new government. Both Murads were more
concerned with establishing their right to be fully
informed and critical of any aspect of government
policy than with influencing specific current policies,
but they barred no holds in the debates. Prime
Minister Salim was accused of desiring to be a
dictator, usurping power, and running a slipshod
government. The Egyptian press welcomed the un-
precedented give-and-take as a sign of democratic
health; Sadat's political liberalization policy by late
25X1 1976 had received an enthusiastic launch.
After the 1977 Riots
In early 1977 Sadat and the political liberalization
program suffered a severe setback. Under pressure of
Egypt's need for a stand-by agreement with the
International Monetary Fund, the government an-
nounced on 17 January?making no effort to prepare
the ground in advance or cushion the blow?that
because of cuts in government subsidies the price of
such staples as bread, flour, tea, sugar, butane, and
gasoline would double. The result was a spontaneous
explosion of discontent on the part of the urban masses,
peaceful at first but augmented and channeled by
organized leftist elements, and directed against Sadat,
his wife, the prime minister, and the speaker of the
assembly. The rioting, the worst since the fall of the
Secret
monarchy, spread from Cairo and Alexandria to
numerous provincial towns, forcing Sadat to order the
Army into the streets and suspend the price increases;
at least 50 people were killed and more then 700
injured. The regime blamed Egyptian Communists,
and moved to crack down on leftists in general.
Sadat invoked his constitutional power to take' imme-
diate measures" to deal with a threat to national unity.
He put forward an 11-point emergency decree stipulat-
ing that imprisonment for life could be imposed for
committing or instigating a variety of acts, including
participation in a clandestine group or in a strike that
could jeopardize the country's economy. As required
by the constitution, a referendum on the emergency
measures was held a week later and was predictably
approved?by 99.42 percent of all votes cast. The
regime probably took whatever steps were necessary to
ensure the overwhelmingly positive vote, and may have
rigged the ballot boxes to indicate a heavy turnout. A
prominent rightist who had denounced Sadat's law-
and-order decree was expelled from his assembly seat,
and subsequent months saw successive waves of arrests
and trials of alleged Communists.
The riots and their aftermath blunted Sadat's move
toward liberalization, but they did not produce a return
to police state methods. The round-up of leftists ran
afoul of the new respect for civil liberties; security
services unfamiliar with the more stringent rules of
evidence found case after case dismissed. In the
summer of 1977, it was decided to dramatize the
regime's breach with the Nasir era by bringing to trial
in absentia the infamous Shams Badran, minister of
war in 1967, charged with torturing political detainees
of every stripe with such methods as flogging, rape, and
savaging by dogs. Badran was ultimately sentenced to
30 years hard labor, as was his colleague Safwat al-
Rubi.
Sadat took the occasion of a speech to the faculty of
Alexandria University in May 1977 to expound his
personal political philosophy, which he dubbed "demo-
cratic socialism." As Sadat put it, under Nasir's
system the call for dictatorship of the proletariat
masked a grab for dictatorship of the party leadership.
Under democratic socialism, the reins of rule were no
longer confined to one person or class; the rule of law
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was sovereign and had to be respected even by the
president, and the rights of the individual were sacred.
"The aim of the open door," Sadat declared grandly,
25X1 "is man."
In fact, the new law on parties debated in May and
passed in June 1977 was somewhat less liberal than
these sweeping pronouncements might have suggested.
It did allow any 20 current members of the People's
Assembly to form their own political party, a step that
seemed to promise freedom to organize parties offering
true alternatives to the government's program. But a
provision was retained that allowed the regime to
regulate which parties would be registered: the ASU
was to set up a credentials committee on which the
government's center party would hold a majority.
When the committee was actually appointed in Sep-
tember, it included the ministers of justice, interior,
and local government, and was headed by the Secre-
tary General of the ASU?a guarantee that the
committee would hew closely to the wishes of the
25X1 regime.
The credentials committee was not used to bar the
formation of a fourth legal political party, the new
Wafd Party, despite the fact that Sadat strongly
opposed its establishment. The Wafd had been the
majority party in Egypt for nearly three decades before
the revolution of 1952, and the successful revolution-
aries?including Sadat?felt that it had been thor-
oughly discredited. Among conservative segments of
the population?and they constitute a large body of
public opinion in Egypt?the Wafd nevertheless re-
tained considerable appeal, and its leaders announced
their intention to re-form as soon as the controls were
off new parties. The announcement was popular?an
indication that the government's official center party
had failed to strike a responsive chord in the country at
large. Many suspected that a legal Wafd Party could
rapidly grow into the majority party in Egypt, deposing
the center party?and threatening Sadat with a
25X1 specter of true political opposition.
Sadat was caught in a dilemma. He did not want to
appear to violate the constitutional and legal frame-
work he had just constructed with such fanfare. He
probably was taken by surprise at the degree of interest
sparked by the prospect of the Wafd's reemergence.
11
He first attacked the Wafd in various speeches,
describing the system that existed prior to 19f 2 a
"fake democracy" and denouncing the -voices ft im
the hateful past." Newspaper editorials elabot ate d
extensively on the theme?although a handfu ned
that refusal to allow the Wafd to re-form would I ode
ill for Sadat's trumpeted reestablishment of d.,;mi c-
racy. . Sadat's personal opposition undoubtedly cu
down the number of assembly members who wer
prepared to subscribe to the new party, but did n
whit tie the total to less than the magic number o 20:
22 members actually signed the application, and he
number eventually grew to 24. Sadat presurni.bi
decided that refusal to grant the Wafd's applicat on
would make a mockery of his own program, and hat
its legalization was a lesser evil than going back ?n his
Own announced principles. The Wafd was leg illy
reconstituted on 5 February 1978, and newspape
editorials pointed out?with justification?that I ritics
could no longer claim that democracy in Egypt vas
solely a matter of form without substance.
Resurgence of the Religious Right
In 1977 another, potentially more dangerous elia lenge
emerged: a renewal of activity on the part of isla.nic
fundamentalist organizations, and, in particular, a
willingness on the part of the radical fringe te resort to
violence. In July, the former minister of relig out
affairs was abducted from his home by members of an
Islamic group called al-Takfir wa-al-Hijra.1 he _T roup
announced that it had taken this action because )1 the
minister's attitude toward their movement, a ,,e-
manded a ransom of 200,000 Egyptian pounds a id the
release of 60 jailed members. The minister's ocv was
found three days later; he had been murdered wt,211 the
ult+ matum expired. The killers were ultimate 'y c iught,
bui the incident touched off a wave of bombings in
public places--a declaration of war, according t ) a
Takfir spokesman, against the Sadat regime Vv ien
the leader of a group was arrested, it was disi,x)v- red
that the minister was intended to be the firstiarg;:t of a
series of escalating urban terrorist actions.
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The Takfir society?which may have had links with
the considerably larger Muslim Brotherhood, which it
resembled ideologically?was a fundamentalist move-
ment rejecting Westernization and all modern innova-
tions, and demanding the "establishment" of institu-
tionalized Islam. The two central elements in its
doctrine were the denunciation of the existing social
and political order as an "infidel" system (takfir can
be roughly translated "infidelization") and the conse-
quent requirement that adherents disengage them-
selves from society (hijra is a "flight" or "emigration"
from evil). The organization provided military training
and maintained stockpiles of arms and ammunition;
members were obliged to sever all past ties and join a
sort of commune, where they were subject to absolute
obedience, and desertion was punished by death.
The regime moved quickly against the Takfir. After a
series of arrests and interrogations, 54 were brought
before a military court. Although the regime, operat-
ing in an atmosphere of public outrage against the
Takfir, must have been tempted to dispense summary
justice, the trial was conducted with fairness and
impartiality. A defense lawyer was appointed for each
of the accused; allegations of mistreatment of the
prisoners were investigated; and although the group
was taken before a military court, they were tried
under the civil code. Additional individuals, indicted
after the trial of the others had already begun, were
subsequently released; others were freed without being
charged because of lack of evidence. The scrupulous-
ness of the regime slowed down the time of the trial,
which took four months. Ultimately, five of the
defendents were convicted and executed in March
1978.
The crackdown on the Takfir uncovered at least two
other ultrarightist religious groups?the "Soldiers of
God" and the "Holy War Society"?and evidence
suggestive of links with the Muslim Brotherhood. The
affair brought to the fore the question of the regime's
relationship with the Brotherhood?something Sadat
found harder to deal with than the possible threat from
the left, primarily because religious fundamentalism
exerts a wider appeal in conservative Egypt than does
the atheism of the Communist ideology.
Secret
The Muslim Brotherhood was founded as a semi-
clandestine organization in 1928, and offered a politi-
cal framework enabling middle- and lower-class Egyp-
tians to express their anger at the pervasive Western
hold over Egypt in all spheres?economic, political,
and cultural. The Brotherhood developed effective
methods of recruitment and action that made it a
potential ally of the "Free Officers" who eventually
carried out the revolution against the monarchy, and
some of the officers?including Sadat?maintained
personal connections with the Brotherhood. After the
revolution, however, the Brotherhood was regarded as
a dangerous rival and ultimately outlawed. Subsequent
attempts by the Brotherhood to subvert the regime and
eliminate Nasir himself resulted in the arrest and
execution of many of its leaders and activists. In the
spirit of Sadat's political liberalization, however,
imprisoned members of the Brotherhood were released
and exiles were permitted to return. Some even found
posts in various governmental or religious bodies, such
as the ministry of waqfs (religious endowments), the
Council for Islamic Affairs, and Al-Azhar University.
The Brotherhood managed to put out a number of
regular publications, including the monthly al-Dawa,
and resumed political activity on university
campuses?where it pretty well controls student
Islamic societies?as well as in various professional
and labor circles.
The Brotherhood was quick to denounce the Takfir
and the other terrorist groups. It was not prepared for
an open challenge to the government and clearly had
no wish to jeopardize its own semilegitimate status and
freedom of operation. At the same time, the Brother-
hood sympathized to some extent with the ideology of
the terrorists and may have provided support.
as seen somew at at a oss to igure out an e ective
way to deal with the religious right. There is consider-
able evidence that he increasingly regards the Brother-
hood as a danger, but until recently he has held back
from launching a campaign against it out of fear of
arousing a storm of protest from the conservative,
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deeply religious Egyptian masses? Sadat's own natu-
25X1 ral constituency.
In the spring of 1979, however?probably in an effort
to suppress domestic opposition to his treaty with
Israel?Sadat did take a number of measures designed
both to curb criticism and to serve notice on conserva-
tive groups that more extreme measures could be
forthcoming. His first target was the Islamic student
societies, which had provoked several incidents against
Egypt's Christian minority, and had distributed leaf-
lets opposing the peace treaty. In speeches to university
and government officials in mid-April, Sadat warned
that political activity would no longer be tolerated on
university campuses; students ignoring the ban would
be expelled. The student Islamic societies received
special censure. The warnings were followed by the
government's suspension of student union elections for
the year; technical grounds were cited, but the real
reason was probably to avoid increased gains by the
religious right. Finally, al-Dawa, hitherto free to
publish articles critical of the government, has
25X1 disappeared from the stands.
Sadat undoubtedly hopes that these relatively mild
measures will warn off the right from provoking an
outright confrontation that would be extremely
unpalatable for Sadat and work to the advantage of
Egypt's leftists. On the other hand, Sadat has a short
fuse?and no interest in seeing Egypt go the way of
Iran. He will do what he feels he has to do to keep the
25X1 right within bounds.
Retreat From Liberalization
In the early months of 1978, Sadat seemed to see
himself as besieged on all sides. The January 1977 riots
were still fresh in his mind; and although the security
forces may have exaggerated the degree of leftist
involvement?and Sadat may have believed the exag-
gerated version?the involvement was real. Now
rightist extremist groups were turning to violence. The
conservative Wafd Party, whose rebirth Sadat had
reluctantly permitted, had struck a responsive chord
throughout the country; its growing popularity could,
if unchecked, eventually threaten Sadat' s own center
party. The situation was exacerbated by the freewheel-
ing, critical debates in the National Assembly, particu-
larly the attack launched by Wafd delegates in April
alleging corrupt activity on the part of the center party.
13
(The executive branch was accused of making nt w,
subsidized apartments available to center party HE-
cials.) Newly established newspapers of the official
leftist and rightist parties (Al Ahali and Al Ahri r,
respectively) joined in the attacks on the regime Ind
met with a warm reception. Al Ahali was partici.larly
well received in intellectual circles, and its critic sm of
the government's domestic policies and of Sadat s
peace initiative was influential. The mounting ea ti-
cisin in turn provoked complaints from Sadat su 'port-
ers that he was losing touch and allowing the go' ern-
ment to drift under the inept leadership of Primt
Minister Salim.
Sadat might have been prepared to live with the
criticism had his dramatic overture to Israel- -h trip
to Jerusalem in November 1977?been successful. But
that trip, applauded in the West and bewailed thiough-
out the Arab world, failed to achieve the breakth rough
Sadat sought. Negotiations bogged down and th
specter of stagnation loomed, despite US attemt- is to
maintain the momentum. Sadat was vulnerable in this
issue. He could not give his critics a free hand tie
generate popular pressure against him, fest this r :strict
his freedom to negotiate.
25X1
25X1
Hi, counterattack began with the seizure on 12 kpril
of in issue of Al Ahali containing a hard-hit-int
aniiregime interview by Muhammed Hassanayi
Ha ykal?the prominent Nasirist and former ed: t_or of
Al Ahram. Sadat next used the occasion of his flay
Da y speech to serve notice on opposition groups
Referring to the Wafd, Sadat said that there we uld be
no return to the corrupt practices that existed before
19s2, when ".5 percent of the populace rulec Ei vpt."
He castigated the leftists, in turn, as "agents of
iscow seeking to reestablish centers of power' -
Sadat's code word for the group led by Ali Sabri which
he had disposed of in May 1971. He hit out agai 1st the
papers of the left and right, particularly Al Aho'i, for
attempting to "destroy the social peace." His sti ungest
criticism, however, was reserved for the "disrna level
of recent parliamentary debate. Although he ga )e lip-
service to parliamentary immunity, he called fo
reform of the Assembly statutes so that menibe s of
parliament would bear personal responsibility fr
accusations against individuals.
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In mid-May Sadat issued the text of a referendum that
the people would be asked to endorse on 22 May. It
banned from positions of influence anyone guilty of
"defaming religious law"?something particularly ap-
plicable to Communists. Anyone holding a Cabinet
position before the 1952 revolution or playing a leading
role in any prerevolutionary political party (with
carefully drawn exceptions designed to protect several
people close to Sadat), was forbidden to belong to a
political party?a measure directed against the three
key leaders of the Wafd. The most far-reaching
measure provided that anyone convicted of corrupting
political life or even "considered" to have broadcast
false reports would be banned from public life. (The
targets here were Egyptian journalists who published
critical comments in foreign media.) The referendum
would also create a "socialist public prosecutor" with
authority to investigate atheists, pre-1952 leaders, and
writers.
Passage of the referendum was never in doubt,
although the regime presumably inflated the figures;
the announced 98.29 percent in favor seemed unlikely
in the face of sparse voter turnout. A bill was promptly
drafted to carry out the provisions of the referendum
and just as promptly passed. A certain amount of due
process was retained. The socialist prosecutor was to
submit his cases to the appropriate authority?the
prime minister in the case of government officials, the
Higher Press Council for journalists, the trade unions
for labor officers, the ASU parties committee in the
case of political parties, and the Assembly in the case
of prerevolutionary politicians. Politicians had 10 days
to rebut the prosecutor's case; everyone else had the
right of appeal to an ad hoc judicial body. The
referendum and its implementing legislation served
notice on the Egyptian body politic that it was free to
operate only within narrow limits. Now that Sadat had
engineered the regime's right to rein in opponents,
however, he no longer perceived the need to exercise it.
The powers provided by the new legislation were, for
all practical purposes, never invoked?although of
course they remain on the books, probably sufficient
deterrent in itself.
The most significant effect of the antiliberal legislation
was the result of self-censorship: the new Wafd
Party?probably the most vital component of the
Egyptian political scene?dissolved itself, and the legal
Secret
leftist party "froze" its activities, although it remained
in being. The Wafd presumably chose not to operate if
it could not do so with its old leaders; in addition, it
probably hoped to dramatize Sadat's failure to adhere
to his own enunciated principles. Sadat, nevertheless,
was undoubtedly delighted to see the primary thorn in
his side vanish in such a cooperative manner, particu-
larly since in subsequent speeches he was able to stress
that his opponents had taken their own decisions to
dissolve or lie low; they had not been shut down by the
government.
The Aftermath: Striking a Balance
Sadat seems to have launched his liberalization process
in a genuine effort to bring a degree of democracy to
Egypt, but he clearly never intended to permit full
democracy in the Western sense of the word. Probably
he believed, naive as it sounds, that his popularity
would soar in the eyes of a grateful populace. He had
always seen himself as uniquely able to understand the
"soul" of the "true Egyptian"?by which he meant the
devoutly religious villager, not the intellectual who was
likely to be a leftist and a chronic complainer. He
therefore did not expect to have to contend with the
storm of criticism that mushroomed in Egypt's newly
liberal atmosphere. Just as he had accelerated the
liberalization process against the advice of his closest
advisers, even in the wake of the January 1977 riots, so
when he decided a correction was in order his actions
appeared unnecessarily abrupt and harsh. In his own
mind they did not constitute a withdrawal of democ-
racy since, in his view, the criticisms were not the acts
of a responsible opposition but incitement of the
masses to turn to violence. Even so, many of the gains
of the period of liberalization were left intact. What
died was the spirit of exuberance with which Egyptians
went about uncovering flaws in their own institutions;
Sadat was not prepared to countenance the rough-and-
tumble of democratic dissent. Perhaps he was correct
in gauging that he could not afford to do so.
The more repressive features of the crackdown were
ignored. A half-formed attempt to create a national
"code of ethics" that might have injected still more
restrictions into public life never got off the ground;
instead, in a speech in July 1979, Sadat called on each
party, union, syndicate, institute, and organization to
formulate its own code and apply it to its members.
Sadat nevertheless clearly decided that something had
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to be done to deal with the criticisms that had surfaced
earlier in the year, particularly of his government's
economic policy and the allegations of corruption. His
plan was threefold: a new cabinet would be formed, in
order to bring a new look into the handling of economic
policy; many of his former close associates would be
summarily dismissed, bringing new faces to the fore?
either to do a better job than the old crew or to deflect
criticism from Sadat himself; and a brand new official
party, complete with a brand new opposition, would be
launched?yet another attempt to inject some vitality
into Egypt' political life, while confining that activity
within strictly controlled channels. The unprecedented
aspect of the plan was Sadat's decision to place himself
at the head of the new party.'
ihe Assembly Sayid Mari, for years one 01 Sa lat's
most trusted advisers on domestic affairs, wat dis-
missed. The change of faces at the top was ac -ompa-
nied by the replacement of virtually the entire military
command?probably an attempt by Sadat to orestall
potential disaffection from that quarter mile: than a
move against known dissidents. The result wa the
creation of a new team?one that could presice over a
new era in the country's affairs, if the project .1 treaty
with Israel were completed smoothly. At the vi ry least,
the changes would give the public the illusion if
motion, the feeling that some of their earlier a iticisms
had been taken seriously. Perhaps the key adv ntage,
in Sadat's eyes, was the likelihood that his reit aining
Iadvisers would think twice before disagreeibg dth any
w his proposed courses of action. I
The new Cabinet was announced on 5 October shortly
alter the selection of Mustafa Khalil as Prime Minis-
ter. The change was heralded as bringing to t h fore a
"new generation" of politicians, although the r :w
faces-21 out of 31 Cabinet members?did no differ
greatly from their predecessors. In an effort to ive the
impression that the regime was moving prompt y to
deal with economic grievances, Sadat ordered K halil to
assign top priority to food production, improve( public
services, and reorganization of the bureaucracy ?a
charge similar to that given the preceding Ca bi let.
Some of the changes made were largely cosmet c but
did represent an effort by Sadat to ease populat fears
that his liberalization policy was to be reversed
altogether. For example, the Ministry of Inforit ation
and Culture?which had been providing officia, guid-
ance to all media and to cultural organizations- was
abolished. Statements by Sadat and the new pi, ne
minister stressed the government's desire to strelgthen
freedom of the press by putting radio, TV, and
newspapers under newly created "autonomous" igen-
cieis. It was announced at the same time that the press
was to be supervised by a Higher Press Council- -a
body already existing but with little real power.
Sadat announced his intention to form the party, with
himself at the head, in July 1978, but nothing was done
to organize it for some months?possibly a result of
Sadat's preoccupation with his languishing peace
initiative and, in September, the distraction of Camp
David. An overwhelming majority of the Assembly
members-238 out of 360?signed the new party's
application for legal status, submitted in late Septem-
ber. In a speech in October, however, Sadat promised
that the massive majority of the new party?now
baptized the National Democratic Party?would not
be used to stifle the opposition; he did not intend a
return to one-party rule.
The firings of several of Sadat's closest advisers and
other key aides began almost immediately after
Sadat's return from Camp David. Minister of War
Jamasi, considered to be unswervingly loyal to Sadat,
was dumped early in October; his replacement, former
intelligence chief Kamal Hassan Ali, took Jamasi's
seat at the peace negotiations with the Israelis in
Washington. Prime Minister Salim, who had been the
target of much of the freewheeling criticism earlier
that spring?possibly as a surrogate for Sadat?was
replaced by Mustafa Khalil, an economist untainted
by the charges of corruption and inefficiency that
brought down Salim. Sadat' close confidant, Ashraf
Marwan,1 lwas removed as
head of the Arab Organization for Industrialization,
possibly as a symbol that the regime's crackdown on
corruption was serious. A few days later, Speaker of
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Sadat's new party attracted so much support am mg
members of the Assembly that it appeared for a ime
that no opposition party could be successfully foi med.
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There was talks of lowering the legal requirement for
forming a party from 20 sponsoring members to 10?a
move the regime resisted, since it could have opened
the door to the formation of "undesirable" parties.
Instead, Sadat intervened personally to encourage his
own political supporters to join the ranks of the
budding Socialist Labor Party, no doubt assuring them
that they would not be left devoid of patronage to
dispense. Sadat may have made clear his determina-
tion to establish a "loyal opposition" on the Western
model, but as its formation from the ranks of his own
supporters suggests, the differences between the two
parties are imperceptible; the Socialist Labor Party is
perhaps slightly to the right of Sadat's NDP. Indeed,
the maneuver creating the new opposition was presum-
ably greeted with considerable cynicism by the politi-
cally aware?damaging Sadat's credibility as a leader.
Only two members remain of the old legal leftist party,
the Progressive Unionist Grouping. There are perhaps
40 or so Independents?the real political opposition in
Egypt?a figure that includes about 27 former center
party members. T11e old center party has been assimi-
lated by the NDP.
In an address to the People's Assembly in November,
Sadat stressed his determination to implement "full
democracy" in Egypt. Describing himself as the
"father of the Egyptian family"?a description that
capsulizes Sadat's basically patriarchal approach to
governing, an approach not strictly compatible with
democracy in the Western sense?Sadat avowed his
intention to treat his own party and the opposition
equally. In order to establish "full democracy," Sadat
called for the early passage of constitutional amend-
ments to reflect the abolition of the ASU (Sadat had
not waited for the amendments to effect the change),
facilitate the establishment of a multiparty system,
25X1 and redefine the role of the press]
As 1979 dawned, Sadat began to strike a new theme in
his speeches?his intention to inaugurate "government
decentralization," which he hailed as ushering in a new
era of democracy. The new policy, as Sadat described
it, is supposed to mean a transfer of authority to each
and every citizen?marking a turning point in Egyp-
tian history, which has seen more than 4,000 years of
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So far, however, governors are still appointed by Sadat
(most recently last November), although a special
point is supposed to be made of selecting men who are
native to their areas, and the local assembly delegates
are consulted to "guarantee" the governors' accept-
ability to the populace. The primary effect of the
decentralization program will apparently be financial,
not political. The governors and local councils are to be
given the right to decide on the use of funds provided
them for development projects?under guidelines es-
tablished by the central government. The result will
hardly be a step forward in the development of grass-
roots democracy, although the program may give the
people a sense of being in somewhat greater control of
their own destinies. The government apparently hopes
to institute direct election of provincial governors at
some point?but there is no sign that the step will be
soon in coming.
The Latest Moves
The signing of the peace treaty with Israel in March
1979 thrust Egyptian foreign policy into totally new
channels. Atlhough the treaty was greeted with
widespread enthusiasm in Egypt, there were dissident
voices?including some within the Assembly itself.
Several of the most respected independents were
particularly outspoken in their criticism, both within
the Assembly and in press conferences. Although the
Assembly ratified the treaty by a massive majority
early in April, Sadat was apparently infuriated by the
15 negative votes and 25 abstentions?out of a total of
360. As usual, sure that he knew what was best for the
country and unwilling to tolerate the "carping" of
intellectuals divorced from the mainstream of the
people, Sadat decided that his critics had to go. He
obviously figured that he could capitalize on the
overwhelming support for the treaty throughout the
country to ensure their removal in a way that would
appear democratic.
The day after the Assembly vote, Sadat announced a
referendum at which the public would not only approve
the treaty but also endorse the dissolution of the
People's Assembly and call for a new election. The
sweetner, enabling him to portray the exercise as a step
toward greater democracy rather than the reverse, was
his announcement that the requirement that there be
20 Assembly members among the founders of any new
party would be dropped?though the concession was
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hedged with other restrictions that guaranteed ulti-
mate government control. The founders of any new
party still had to number at least 50, half of them
workers and peasants; its program had to be submitted
to a seven-member "parties committee"?the obvious
point of government interference, enabling it to be sure
it could tolerate any parties formed; the party program
had to be different from those of existing parties, thus
ensuring against a proliferation of small and virtually
indistinguishable parties; and the "basic principles of
the state"?social justice, national unity, and the
absence of religious, racial, and other discrimination?
had to be followed. The government was thus able to
continue existing bans against rightwing Muslim
parties (which could be considered religiously dis-
criminatory) and Communist parties (considered to
advocate a totalitarian system).
Sadat's decision to dissolve the Assembly was, needless
to say, unpopular among Assembly members, who
would have to pay for a new campaign and face the
possibility of losing their seats. It also aroused concern
on the part of some middle-class Egyptians, basically
convinced of Sadat's commitment to political liberal-
ization but nervous about the future of their newly
gained freedoms. Some regarded the maneuver as
capricious; after all, the Assembly had just over-
whelmingly ratified the treaty with Israel. Others, with
little sympathy for Sadat's left- and right-wing critics,
merely considered the step unwise, believing that the
Assembly needs a true opposition to act as a brake on
the government and that Sadat's scheme, while consti-
tutional, established a dangerous precedent a successor
could use to reverse Sadat's liberalizing changes.
The referendum, held on 20 April 1979, resulted in
near-unanimous support for the peace treaty and
Sadat's planned reorganization of the government. The
stage was therefore set for new elections, scheduled to
take place on 7 June. One prospective party promptly
applied for legal status: the National Front, basically
the informal coalition of leftists, rightists, and
independents existing in the previous parliament and
led by an outspoken independent. The National Front's
application has obviously irritated Sadat, and a week
before the election the regime still had not approved
the application.
17
There is little doubt that Sadat's NDP will win b g in
the coming elections. The government will take etre to
put up strong candidates to run against the often t ling
leftists and independents and will make it cles.r that a
vote for the NDP is a vote for peace, patriotism, nd
Sadat. As of late May, back-room deals had tire idy
been struck with a view to ensuring that the r:su ts of
the election are acceptable to the power brokers. file
leaders of the Socialist Liberal Party- --the ta ne
opposition created by Sadat to avoid the appeara ice of
a single-party state?claims to have reached .igr, .e-
merit with the NDP to "reserve" as many as 40 sats
for his party in the coming Assembly; the N i
supposed to accomplish this by fielding extreme! ,
weak candidates in certain districts. This estimat may
be optimistic, but the government will presume b v do
its hest to preserve a credible (and tractable) "os posi-
flow"
No other party is likely to make much of a sho ng
against the NDP. The leader of the tiny righi-wi ng
Socialist Liberal Party (the remnant of the oid r ghtist
minbar, which became a party in 1976 but held ,nly
two seats in the last Assembly) also claims to !inv.! been
allocated 25 to 30 seats by the NDP, but his esti' late is
probably unrealistic. The leftist National Progressive
Unionist Grouping will field several candidai es, but
the government will probably go all-out against - hem,
possibly leaving Khalid Muhi al-Din as the cniy
successful candidate. Assuming that the Nat ion
Front is allowed to form, its candidates --which will
probably include representatives of the Ward ar d the
Muslim Brotherhood?will undoubtedly run int )
strong opposition from the NDP. Perhaps three ir four
wii I prove successful, leaving Sadat with someth mg
like four critics out of a total of 392.
Conclusions
Sadat has inaugurated impressive changes i=i E
political life since he assumed power in Septein )er
1970. He has virtually eliminated the oppressiv?!
atmosphere that predominated under Nasir Hi per-
formance indicates that it is not in his nature to olidify
his position by resorting to widespread imprisot ment,
torture, or intimidation. Even potentially dangt rous
opponents, like the Muslim Brotherhood, have ieen
given a surprising degree of latitude to organizi and
criticize the government.
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Egyptians enjoy a degree of freedom not found in
neighboring Arab states, but Sadat is no democrat in
the Western sense of the term. He sees himself as the
father of his people, responsible, like a father, for
maintaining discipline and inculcating mature, correct
behavior. His "children" overstepped their bounds
early in 1978, abusing the freedoms he had granted;
very well, they had to be corrected. Sadat equates
"democracy" with the freedom to pursue responsible
policies, and sees no contradiction in the fact that he
alone is given the right to define which policies are
responsible.
Given this approach, a freewheeling, no-holds-barred
democracy is not likely in an Egypt ruled by Sadat.
The only questions are where Sadat chooses to draw
the lines?which opposition groups will be given a
limited amount of free activity and which will be
forced underground; whether the amount of freedom
allowed will be enough to release popular pressures,
give politically sophisticated Egyptians a feeling that
they have some control over their political destiny, and
avoid the kind of volcanic eruption that overtook Iran;
or whether, conversely, the controls will prove so slack
that Sadat will ultimately go down before a well-
organized, broad-based opposition. Sadat is trying to
give Egyptians a sense of possessing a political stake in
the continuation of the existing regime- but without
himself surrendering any meaningful power. The effort
may prove impossible.
So far, Sadat has walked the tightrope successfully. By
retaining a legal leftist party he has given the left an
outlet of sorts, but he is currently preventing publica-
tion of the leftist newspaper?which proved danger-
ously popular?and his crackdown in 1977 seems to
have thoroughly disrupted the activities of the Egyp-
tian Communist parties. His officially sanctioned
opposition party is conservative?to the extent, admit-
tedly marginal, that its policies differ from Sadat's
own party?but he foreclosed a resurgence of the
Wafd Party that might, in time, have grown large
enough to threaten the Sadat regime.
Sadat's decision to allow the Muslim Brotherhood a
significant degree of freedom to operate may contain
the seeds of future trouble. There are obvious parallels
between the devout Muslim fundamentalism exhibited
Secret
by the Brotherhood in Egypt and the emotional
following commanded by the Ayatollah Khomeini in
Iran. There is, however, one difference that may prove
critical?the Muslims in Egypt so far lack a single
leader capable of focusing their energies toward
political ends. Sadat, who is a deeply religious man
himself, has a certain sympathy for the Brotherhood's
point of view. Indications are that the Brotherhood
does not reciprocate, regarding Sadat as a hypocrite
who has in the past shown his willingness to trample on
their convictions, but they at least seem to see Sadat as
the best they are likely to get as things stand. Their
repression under Nasir is still fresh in their minds, and
they have shown no inclination, so far, to challenge the
regime in ways that might threaten their current
privileges. Should they do so, the likelihood is that
Sadat would take strong action against them; he has
already taken some preliminary measures intended to
serve as a warning. Meanwhile, Sadat has evidently
judged that a degree of legal activity is preferable to
forcing the Brotherhood underground and perhaps
encouraging its radicalization, along the lines of
splinter groups like the Takfir.
As always, Sadat's Achilles' heel is likely to be the
economy?not the degree of political expression he
allows. His vulnerability in this area is a fact of life and
will probably prove irreversible in Sadat's lifetime.
Egypt's economy is affected by factors only marginally
within the control of the government?relations with
Israel, relations with Saudi Arabia and other rich
Arabs, relations with the United States. As Sadat's
signing of the treaty with Israel?despite the breach
with his Arab patrons?has demonstrated, Sadat is
perfectly capable of ignoring Egypt's economic self-
interest in pursuit of what he sees as more important
goals.
It has so far been a truism to say that Sadat's regime is
stable as long as he has the Army solidly behind him.
Unfortunately, we have little information concerning
currents of opinion within the Army and the strength
of possible opposition to Sadat's policies. Our belief is
that the Army probably mirrors the attitudes and
criticisms existing in society at large?that the degree
of support for the Muslim Brotherhood is fairly strong;
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that any disaffection reaches its greatest pitch over
economic issues; that the appeal of Marxist and
Communist thinking is probably not widespread,
particularly as compared with its appeal in student and
intellectual circles. It would seem to follow, then?
although the conclusion has to be tentative?that as
long as Sadat keeps the economy from wreaking undue
hardship on large groups and manages to restrain the
more radical activity of the Muslim Brotherhood, his
regime will be reasonably safe. One ominous develop-
ment would be an alliance between the Muslim
Brotherhood and Egypt's leftists; there are some
indications that the left appreciates the enormous
advantage such a linkage would give them, but the
Brotherhood has so far refused to go along.
Negotiations with Israel over the West Bank and
Palestinian autonomy that failed to move Israel toward
a solution acceptable to the Egyptians?a likely
scenario over the coming year?could erode Egyptian
support for the treaty with Israel and pose a new
challenge to Sadat's liberalization program. A negoti-
ating impasse would spark new activity on the part of
both leftist and rightist groups, which would hope to
capitalize on popular disaffection with Sadat's policies.
Even the docile Assembly he will end up with after the
June 1979 elections might be moved to protest. The
regime's previous record suggests that such activity
would be met with stern counteraction. Sadat would
presumably use the familiar rationalization that his
critics do not constitute a "responsible" opposition and
thus forfeit their right to a democratic platform.
There is little doubt that large numbers of Egyptians
would welcome a greater degree of political democracy
than they now possess, or than Sadat is likely to a tow.
Their enthusiastic response to the early stages of
Sadat's political liberalization made this clear- the
dozens of minbars that were originally proposed,rne
vitality of the leftist and rightist newspapers, the Lard-
hitting debates in the Assembly. All of these channels
of expression are currently closed, and although n e
have little evidence of it, it is reasonable to suppose that
sonic resentment exists?perhaps more than if thr
wraps had never been lifted in the first place. Thee is
no evidence, however, that resentment has reache a
pitch that might threaten Sadat, or that revolution is
likely to be launched with democracy as its goal
Indi,:ations so far are that in the political realm, ai
least, Egyptians compare their lot with that existi ig
under Nasir and count themselves well ahead. Th:ir
economic well-being is another matter. Here the r eace
treaty with Israel has brought to the fore longstanding
expectations. If they are dashed, leftist elements--
otherwise less appealing in the Egyptian milieu - Juld
strike a dangerous response.
The average Egyptian tends to give virtually automatic
support to whoever is in power?a legacy of centuries
of Pharonic rule. The bulk of the public will probably
back Sadat in whatever he chooses to do, and as long as
this remains true, Sadat can afford to retain a political
system that allows a certain freedom of action and
includes some democratic guarantees. The very fact
that he pursues this course should enhance his popular-
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