BRAZIL: AN EARLY LOOK AT THE FIGUEIREDO ADMINISTRATION (U)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00942A001100070001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 4, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 1, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

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Foreign o N-,voc cN~r :ACr
Assessment
Center
Brazil: An Early Look at the
Figueiredo Administration (u)
An Intelligence Assessment
Research for this report was completed
on 29 May 1979.
This report was prepared by the Latin America
Division of the Office of Political Analysis. It has been
coordinated with the Office of Economic Research,
the Directorate of Operations, and the National Intel-
ligence Officer for Latin America. Questiowis and
comments are welcome and should be addressed to
secret
PA 79-1 n151
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NOFORN-NOCUNIKACT
Brazil: An Early Look at the
Figueiredo Administration (u)
Key Judgments Early evidence indicates that the new Brazilian administration is ser-ous
about continuing the political openings begun by former President B~~nesto
Geisel.
The government has the means and the determination to control the race
and limits of the process, lee less
inclined than their predecessors to take up peel tical
causes. Moreover, the relative political opennc>s gives
tc,day's students less to aim at. (s)
Still, the students could be a problem if they s3:ould, at
same point, join with other groups---perhaps v ork-
ers-to protest economic conditions. For the s~. curity-
niinded government memories of past student .rctiv-
i .m, especially links to terrorists, remain vivid. and
there would be a strong temptation to deal harshly with
the youths if they should display any of the ol~
tendencies. (s)
T'he government is anxious for its program to fi~~d favor
with the Catholic Church, a frequent critic of he
regime and second only to the armed forcer: as an
institution with national influence. Figueiredo under-
scored the importance he ascribes to good relations
with the church when he became the first. chic`
executive to visit the headquarters of the Natir~~nal
t'ouncil of Bishops. Even before Figueiredo tor>k over,
sc,me top clerics acknowledged that there had ',een
substantial human rights and political progress in
Brazil; the new President appears committed t.,
gaining still greater acceptance by churchmen (s)
There is also a strong desire to shore up suppor from
the business and industrial community, once thy, major
civilian backer of the military government, but less
e?thusiastic since the so-called economic miraeie faded
some years ago. Businessmen undoubtedly wer.~ en-
couraged by the moves to open up economic
d~:cisionmaking and hope that the administration will
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yet make good on its promise to reduce the govern-
ment's role in the economy. In general businessmen
appear to think liberalization is beneficial to them, to
the extent that it lessens social tensions. (s)
Figueiredo also hopes that his program will blunt the
appeal of the far left. The Moscow-line Brazilian
Communist Party and a loose coalition known as the
Socialist Convergence have been trying to gain a
following by exploiting the grievances of striking
workers. These groups appear to have made no
noticeable inroads, but officials will remain vigilant for
any signs of resurgence. (s NF rrc)
Officials express concern that exiled politicians, most
notably former Labor Party leader Leonel Brizola,
could cause problems later in the year, when and if
they return to Brazil, under the amnesty provisions.
Brizola in particular represents the kind of demagogu-
ery the military sought, with considerable success, to
extirpate. There is still a worry that such figures could
rekindle populist ideas and create a movement
unacceptable to the armed forces. But the regime's
willingness to allow these men back appears to_ reflect a
belief by the top leadership either that it can hem them
in in ways that do not blatantly violate the liberaliza-
tion program, or, that time and changing circum-
stances have rendered them anachronistic. (s)
Congress and the Politicians
Thus far, the government appears to be having little
difficulty living with an invigorated Congress, increas-
ingly disposed to debate basic issues. In part, this
reflects the recent election of a number of legislators
highly critical of the regime's stress on economic
growth and its reliance on foreign capital, among other
policies. But the trend toward greater outspokenness
has been growing since Geisel took the first liberalizing
steps. The new Congress has already taken up such
proposals as legislating an end to the indirect election
of governors and mayors, and shortening the terms of
those federal senators who were appointed rather than
elected. The opposition also had pushed a measure that
would have given Congress, not the executive, the
power to grant amnesty. (s)
Since the government has a majority in Congress,
there is little prospect for the passage of any bill it
strongly opposes. Nevertheless, the precedent for a
more vigorous congressional debate of the issues has
been set, and the regime cannot simply ignore the
legislature. The government now relies on political
rather than arbitary means to deal with congressional
dissent. (s)
In some cases, the administration has preempted
congressional initiatives, as with the amnesty issue.
It has also hinted strongly that it will restore
direct elections of governors when the terms of the
incumbents expire in 1982. The administration, how-
ever, apparently has plans to blunt the effectiveness of
the opposition~r at least to keep it guessing and thus
less powerful than it might be. (s)
There is considerable speculation-much of it seems
officially inspired-that the government will shortly
ease the requirements for establishing new political
parties. Presumably, a centrist party and a mildly
leftist one could emerge. While the lineup of parties
might then prove more representative of a wide
spectrum of political opinion, it would also serve to
disperse and isolate the opposition. If there are to be
more parties, progress is apt to be gradual and
prospective founders will have to operate within closely
controlled guidelines. (s)
Outlook
The regime-and whatever party system emerges-
may not face a nationwide electoral test of any kind
before 1982, when the next congressional elections are
scheduled. Although municipal elections are slated for
next year, the government has strong incentives to
postpone them until 1982. Setbacks in previous local
elections throughout Brazil could influence the regime
to postpone the balloting rather than face the possibil-
ity of another poor showing, relatively early in
Figueiredo's term. Moreover, the government might
not wish to risk a nationwide campaign that could,
especially in difficult economic times, give rise to
agitation or unrest. Moreover, many local politicians
would probably prefer to wait until 1982, when they
would benefit from the increased campaign funds and
exposure attending the congressional elections. (s)
Under such a scenario, the Figueiredo government
would have nearly four years to consolidate its position
and put off-if necessary-further basic decisions.
Until early 1983, when all the officials chosen in 1982
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would take office, the regime would thus be guaran-
teed acongressional majority in both houses, majority-
party governors in all but one state, and an array of
local officials owing their extended mandates to
Figueiredo. (s)
In the meantime, the government would continue to
enjoy considerable room for maneuver, adjusting the
pace of liberalization and other policies to its evalua-
tion of the mood of influential civilian interest groups.
Postponing the elections almost certainly would not
mean canceling them indefinitely; the regime has
raised civilian expectations too far to risk the wide-
spread, bitter reaction that might result. But the
President would gain additional time and freedom to
ponder further reforms: changes in the authoritarian
Constitution; possible revision of the national security
concept that still guides so much of the government's
thinking even in the political realm; and, ultimately, a
decision to implement the election of a civilian
president to succeed Figueiredo, whose term expires in
1985. (s)
As recent political activism demonstrates, the civilian
sector is by no means unequipped or inexperienced in
grappling with national problems. Throughout the
regime's history, with a few brief exceptions, there has
been a functioning Congress, albeit at times sharply
circumscribed. Even at its most repressive, the military
government has consistently relied on the expertise and
management skills of highly trained civilians to run the
economy and implement foreign policy. There are,
moreover, credible civilian figures-such as Vice
President Aureliano Chaves and Bahia Governor
Antonio Carlos Magalhaes, who have both the trust of
the regime and their own political credentials-to
whom the regime is likely to delegate increasing
amounts of political prestige and authority. (s)
Clearly, the administration fully appreciates the deli-
cacy of the circumstances. Brazil is, after all, a large,
complex country trying to accomplish significant
political change. Although some feared that the rough-
hewn Figueiredo would not be equal to the task, his
government's measured approach to its problems thus
far indicates an ability to consider the risks before
plunging ahead. (s)
The coming months and years will call on all tht
ingenuity and diplomacy the government can sw~mon.
The process the new President and the nation ar~~
embarked on-paving the way for restoration o}
civilian-based rule after a lengthy military inter~en-
tion--is acomplicated one with ample room for
problems, misunderstandings, and some setback... Yet,
on balance, the prospects for continued libervliz:o-tion
seem favorable. The armed forces back Figueiredo and
in the main appear to have accepted the idea of
eventually handing over power. Civilian leaders :arob-
ably realize that their best hope for an end to military
rule lies in cooperating with Figueiredo. Thus, uattile
civilians will probe the limits of the regime's toles-ance,
most will probably prefer to stop short of outriglk t
antagonism. Finally, deeply engrained Brazilian traits
that. stress compromise and conciliation, though ~v no
me~~ns guaranteeing the future of Brazil's new a~,en-
ness, will facilitate the attainment of solutions as.
problems and disputes arise. (s)
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