LEBANON: FIGHTING IN THE SOUTH DIMS TRUCE PROSPECTS IN BEIRUT (Sanitized)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00942A001100090001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 28, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 1, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

p~b0~ For Release 2002/01/03 :CIA-RDP80T00942A00110` ~~j~~~~NTR,ac~3
Foreign
ORCON
Assessment
Center
Lebanon:
Fighting in the South
Dims Truce Prospects
In Beirut (c)
An Intelligence Assessment
Research for this report was completed
on 4 June 1979.
The author of this paper is
Near East~South Asia Division, Office of Political
Analysis. Comments and ueries are welcome and
should be directed to U)
This paper has been coordinated with the National
Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South
Asia and with the Directorate of Operations. (~
Secret
PA 79-10254
Approved For Release 2002/01/03 :CIA-RDP80T00942A001100d~d~'~-3
 ~,civ~`~1`~'or Release 2002/01/03 :CIA-RDP80T00942A001100090001-3
~-P~r~~e~ Fo~R~lease 2g42/01Ht~ C1A-RDP80T009~42AOb1100,A90001-3
 Approved For Release 2002/01/03 :CIA-RDP80T00942A001100090001-3
National Security
Information
Dissemination Control
Abbreviations
Intelligence Sources
and Methods Involved
(WN INTEL)
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions
N_OFORN (NF) _
NOCONTRACT (NC)
PROPIN (PP) _ - -
N_FIBO_NLY (NO) _ _
ORCON (OC)
RE_L..._ _ _
FGI _
This publication is available
on microfiche.
To get a microfiche copy of this
publication call OCR/
DSB); for future Issuances in
addition to or in lieu of
hard copies, call _
(PPG/RDB).
All material on this page
is unclassified.
Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals _ _
Not Releasable to Contractors or Contractor/Consultants _
Caution- Proprietary Information Involved __ __
NFIB Departments Only_ ____ _ _ _ ___ _
Dissemination and Ext[action of Information
Controller! by Originator
This Information Has $een Authorized for Release to..-
ForeignGovernment Information
Derivativd- classification by 236427
Review 3t) yeah from date
Derived from multiple
Approved For Release 2002/01/03 :CIA-RDP80T00942A001100090001-3
 Secret Approved For Release 2002/01/03 :CIA-RDP80T00942A001100090001-3
NOFORN-N000NTRACT-
ORCON
fd~ri~r
~-..~
Godah
Syrian Pres~nce
SYi'1a
0 KILOMETERS 20
Secret ii
Approved For Release 2002/01/03 :CIA-RDP80T00942A001100090001-3
 Approved For Release 2002/01/03 :CIA-RDP80T00942A00110009(~,'~~,_,voca.ryr,~acT-
Lebanon:
Fighting in the South
Dims Truce Prospects
)fn Beirut (c)
Key Judgments Christian leaders in Beirut are showing an increased willingness t~~
cooperate with President Sarkis and the Syrians to ease tensions, in ar effort
to prevent another round of major fighting between Christian militia. and
Syrian forces. (s)
The increased aggressivene~~s of Christian militias in southern Leban:~n,
however, is likely to cause al l parties to the Lebanese conflict to ha~-de r their
positions if it continues unabated, thus jeopardizing the cautious moti es by
the Syrians and Christians to reach at least a limited accommodatior in
Beirut. (s)
Christian militants in Beirut for now are showing restraint, but they -till
prefer confrontation rather than accommodation with the Syyrians_ ar d they
might attempt to rekindle tensions by provoking the Syrian forces rnil tardy.
(s)
An agreement is likely to be reached within the next few weeks providing for
the Lebanese Army to assume a greater security role in Beirut, perm.tting
some Syrian units to be redeployed away from areas of confrontation with
the Christians. (s)
Efforts by Sarkis and the Syrians to bring about the formation of a Le Lanese
government of national unity are making slow progress because of th~
difficulty of getting Lebanon's rival factions to cooperate and the Christians'
reluctance to agree to Syrian demands that they sever ties with Israe~. (s)
Approved For Release 2002/01/03 :CIA-RDP80T00942A001100090001-3
 Approved For Release 2002/01/03 :CIA-RDP80T00942A001100090~'Te$
NOFORN-NOCON7 R.4CT-
ORCON
Lebanon:
Fighting in the South
Dims Truce Prospects
in Beirut (c)
Events in Lebanon's two main areas of conflict are
moving in opposite directions. In Beirut, Christian
militias, the Syrians, and the Lebanese Government
seem more inclined than at any time in more than a
year to cooperate in easing tensions and beginning the
process of national reconciliation. Both the Syrians and
the militias for now appear to want to avoid major
fighting. In southern Lebanon, however, fighting has
increased markedly in recent weeks between Christian
militias and their Israeli allies on the one hand, and on
the other, Palestinians and leftist Muslims. The
worsening situation in the south threatens to disrupt
the efforts to arrange aSyrian-Christian accommoda-
tion in Beirut. (s)
? Damascus wants to reduce the steady drain ~n its
forces in Lebanon from the daily skirmishes w th the
t hristian militiamen in Beirut and reduce the chances
of confrontations with Israel.
? Damascus would like to demonstrate that itf three-
ycar-old peacekeeping mission in Lebanon is s; arting
to show evidence of success, especially now thy, t al] of
the other Arab contingents in the Arab Deterrent
Force have withdrawn from Lebanon. (c)
Any Syrian withdrawal is likely to be limited i:s scope
and carefully timed. President Assad is well aw,~re that
a complete Syrian pullout would probably Ira to a
n=turn to civil war and threaten Syrian strateg c 25X1 C
interests in Lebanon. (c)
Beirut: Edging Toward a Truce
The recent cordial talks between Presidents Sarkis and
Assad in Damascus demonstrated that relations be-
tween the two have recovered from the low point they
reached earlier this year over Syrian dissatisfaction
with Sarkis's failure to act decisively to rein in the
Christian militias. Improved relations between the
Syrians and Sarkis, and between Sarkis and Christian
leaders, have increased the prospects-at least in the
near term-for avoiding another round of heavy
fighting between the Syrian and Christian forces. (s)
The Syrians probably have several motives for desiring
a pullback:
? Damascus wants to strengthen its forces on the
Golan, especially now that Egypt and Israel are at
peace.
Nevertheless, there is no reason to believe that lssad
has decided to give up his basic political objcc;t ve in
Lebanon of maintaining Syrian primacy in the .;oun-
try. Assad continues to believe that Lebanon is :,rucial
to Syrian security and that Damascus cannot a low
Israel to become the dominant power in the cou-~trv. In
eI sect the Syrians hope to reduce Israeli influer:ce in
Lebanon by political means, thus avoiding a mi'itary
confrontation with Israel, for which Damascus s 25X1 C
unprepared. (c)
Approved For Release 2002/01/03 :CIA-RDP80T00942A001100090001-3
 25X1 C
Approved For Release 2002/01/03 :CIA-RDP80T00942A001100090001-3
Sarkis and the Syrians. They might attempt to
undermine the fragile peace process by increasing
military provocations of the Syrian forces. (s)
Pierre Jumayyil and Camille Sharnun, the two princi-
pal Christian leaders, have contributed to improving
the political atmosphere by declaring their support for
Sarkis-in effect, a tacit acknowledgment also of their
willingness to cooperate with Syria. This is a signifi-
cant shift by Shamun, who until recently was implaca-
bly hostile toward Sarkis and the Syrians. Jumayyil
has always maintained cordial relations with the
Lebanese president. Jumayyil's recent statements
backing Sarkis have been more explicit-and probably
more sincere-than those by Sharnun. In May
Jumayyil also made a conciliatory statement about
Christian relations with the Syrians. (s)
Shamun and Jumayyil have-not explicitly endorsed the
concept of a national unity government, but Jumayyil
personally and representatives ofShamun have partici-
pated in the consultations Sarkis is holding with all
ns on the issue.
The Christians are still determined to get the Syrians
out of Lebanon, but for now they apparently want to
see if they can make progress toward that goal by
political rather than military means. Sharnun and
Jumayyil may have concluded that the Front has
gained nothing from its past policy of provoking the
Syrians into military retaliation against the Christian
sector of Beirut. They may also be concerned that the
Christian population is reluctant to support belligerent
Front policies that would lead eventually to a break-
down of the cease-fire and another round of Syrian
shelling. (s)
Christian militants so far have gone along with the
more moderate Christian policies, but they undoubt-
edly have serious reservations about negotiating with
Two particular political problems will have to be
overcome before the Syrians and the Christians can
reach an accommodation in Beirut. The first is the
issue of which individuals will be selected to represent
the major political groups in a new government. Each
group is opposed to having its rivals' extremists
included in the cabinet. The Syrians and the Christians
can probably reach an agreement on relatively moder-
ate Christian and pro-Syrian politicians in a new
government. The Christians, however, may demand
that the more radical parties in the National Move-
ment-the umbrella organization of leftist Muslims-
be excluded. They will be especially opposed to
Communist participation, but the Communists hold
leadership positions in the National Movement, and
their exclusion from a government would undermine
its claim to represent all major factions. Assad, for his
part, has demanded that Christian militant Bashir
Jumayyil be excluded from a new government. (s)
The other divisive issue is the link between the
Lebanese Front, the Israelis, and the Christian militias
in southern Lebanon, led by Major Haddad. The
Syrians have demanded, as a precondition to accepting
Front participation in a new cabinet, that the Front
sever ties with Israel and condemn Haddad's declara-
tion of "independence" for his southern enclaves.
We believe, however, that the Syrians may be more
flexible than they have so_ far indicated. (s tvF xc oc)
The Front leaders will not agree to the Syrian demand
as stated. They might, however, be willing to play
down their ties to Israel and Haddad. The Christians
are certain to bargain hard on this issue, and are likely
to compromise only if Syria makes some concessions on
its military presence in Lebanon and provides some
indication that it accepts limitations on its political
influence over the Lebanese Government. (s)
Approved For Release 2002/01/03 :CIA-RDP80T00942A001100090001-3
 Approved For Release 2002/01/03 :CIA-RDP80T00942A0011000~~b~-3
In southern Lebanon, Haddad has become more
aggressive toward both UN forces and the Palestinians
since he declared his independence from Beirut in
April. He has threatened to seize several villages
within the UN zone if their inhabitants refuse to join
his cause. His forces have intensively shelled Palestin-
ian positions and the UN zone, ostensibly because the
Palestinians had fired on Christian positions from
within the UN area. The Palestinians did, in fact,
initiate most of the firing that led to a heavy exchange
of artillery shelling during the last week in May, but
we have no evidence that their positions were located in
the UN zone. (s)
Israel's publicly declared intention to strike at the
Palestinians at will, apart from retaliation for specific
terrorist acts, has almost certainly encouraged
Haddad's belligerency. We have no hard evidence on
Haddad's intentions, but he is capable of attempting to
enlarge his area of control by military action, unless
the Israelis explicitly oppose such a move. (s)
Haddad and the Israelis, besides wanting to disrupt
Palestinian activities, may also be keeping the south in
turmoil as a warning to the Lebanese Government to
be careful about trying to assert its authority in the
area. They view the dispatch earlier this spring of
about 500 Lebanese troops to the south as the opening
move of aSyrian-supported effort to undermine and
eventually eliminate Haddad. The government is not
at this time preparing to send any more troops south,
preferring to consolidate the position of those already
there. (s)
The increased hostilities in the south have so far not
affected efforts to arrange aSyrian-Christian accom-
modation in Beirut. This state of affairs, however, is
not likely to continue for long. The fighting is almost
certain eventually to encourage all the parties to the
Lebanese imbroglio to become more intransige ~t. 7'he
S~-runs and the Lebanese Front may find it diftscult, if
nest impossible, to cooperate at a time when tht.r
respective allies--the Palestinians and Haddad"s
farces--are engaged in virtual open warfare. (~ -
25X1 C
Tile fighting in the south, in fact, threatens ro draw the
Front and Haddad closer together.
Tare conciliatory attitude of Pierre Jumayyil and
25X1 C
C:~mille Shamun is probably not so strong that ~t could
withstand a determined challenge by Bashir ar d other
Christian militants. Continued serious fighting in the
south could provide the militants with the lcvea age
they need to convince Front leaders that this is not the
tune to be talking about even a limited truce mirth the
Syrians. (s)
I:~en if an agreement is reached in Beirut proviiing for
a reduction of the Syrian presence and the four anon of
a government of national unity, it will at best E~nly
improve the immediate security situation. l.eb inon's
Christians and Muslims are still very bitterly civided,
and there has been no fundamental change in he
p~~licies of any of the groups. A more secure ce ae-fire,
h~~wever, is a necessary first step toward encouraging
the groups to begin thinking more seriously ab.>ut
resolving basic issues. (s)
Approved For Release 2002/01/03 :CIA-RDP80T00942A001100090001-3
 ~'eCretApproved For Release 2002/01/03 :CIA-RDP80T00942A001100090001-3
Secret
Approved For Release 2002/01/03 :CIA-RDP80T00942A001100090001-3