NICARAGUA S SANDINISTA NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00942A001200040001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 27, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 1, 1979
• Content Type: PAPER

Nationa For Release 2003/06/13: CIA-RDP80T00942AO01
Assessment
C'nnfnr
Nicaragua's Sandinista
National Liberation Front
A Research Paper
Secret
PA 79-10271
June 1979
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oreign
Assessment
Center
Nicaragua's Sandinista
National Liberation Front
Information as of 14 June 1979 has been used
in preparing this report.
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Nicaragua's Sandinista
National Liberation Front
This memorandum provides basic information on the
Sandinista National Liberation Front-its organiza-
tion, leadership, factions, foreign support, manpower,
and policies.
In the early 1960s the remnants of several revolution-
ary organizations formed, with Cuban support, the
Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN). After
two small invasion attempts from Honduras, the group
settled into a pattern of predominantly rural operations
by scattered bands, with occasional urban actions.
Prior to the events of the past year, the FSLN'S most
spectacular success was the capture of a Government
Minister's house in December 1974. The guerrillas
exchanged high-ranking hostages for 14 fellow guerril-
las, a large ransom, and safe passage to Cuba. During
1975 and 1976 government counterinsurgency efforts
During this low point the guerrillas fell into factional
squabbles that have persisted to the present. Three
groups emerged in 1976. A temporary alliance was
achieved in October 1977, and the guerrillas staged a
series of impressive attacks. Although the loose alli-
ance fell apart shortly afterward, the guerrillas still
consider their strikes of October 1977-and not the
murder of opposition martyr Pedro Joaquin Chamorro
in January 1978-to be the beginning of the present
anti-Somoza struggle.
The three primary factions of the FSLN currently are:
FSLN, Terciario
Some Terciario leaders prefer to call their group
"Insurrectional." This faction is the least doctrinaire
and contains, especially among the rank and file, many
non-Marxists. Most of the high-ranking leade:?s have
had personal association with Marxist groups, but play
down their political views to attract a wider following.
The Terciarios' primary differences with other factions
are over military strategy. They seek to foment as soon
as possible a national popular insurrection to
overthrow President Somoza and his power stj ucture.
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F'.SLN, Popular Prolonged War (GPP)
This faction is more orthodox in its Marxism-4 aninism
and has close ties to Cuba. It favors a classic guerrilla
military campaign in the mountains to devclor a
revolutionary army. Although not opposed to i isurrec-
tion-GPP leaders felt morally obliged to join i he
offensive last September despite misgivings abut the
timing-this faction believes the struggle muse be a
lengthy war of attrition to undermine the Guar. d while
building the confidence of the populace. Many eaPP
leaders believe that Somoza's continuation in c ffice
assists them in galvanizing the masses.
F.SLN, Proletarian Tendency (TP)
The TP is the most doctrinaire Communist Fact ion and
emphasizes political organization and indocirinition in
the labor, student, urban poor, and campesino.ectors.
It favors radicalizing the populace in preparatii in for
an "armed insurrection of the masses." Although its
leaders speak in terms of mountain guerrilla w; rfare,
the faction seems most active on urban fronts. I ike the
GYP, the TP takes a longer view of the struggle and sees
advantage in Somoza's perpetuation in power.
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At the fighting level, differences over ideology and
strategy may not be as significant because much of the
rank and file is probably motivated chiefly by a desire
to oust President Somoza. Except for university
students, most youths who are enlisting in the guerrilla
cause these days may be unaware of the political or
strategic orientation of the group they join. As the
Front gains in experience, sophistication, and organi-
zation, however, the lines could become more sharply
drawn.
To date, there has been
little progress in extending unity below the national
leadership level. During periods of major fighting, such
as the current offensive, the factions tend to overlook
their differences and join in the campaign, although
military action by the various groups is not very well
coordinated. When an offensive or major joint opera-
tion fails and factions begin blaming each other,
divisiveness returns.
Presently the FSLN is probably more divided over
strategy and personal differences than ideology. Nica-
raguan Communists, whether guerrillas or political
leaders, are split over doctrine, and if the war against
Somoza is won, those differences can be expected to
intensify. Since the death of Carlos Fonseca Amador
in 1976, the FSLN guerrillas have not had a single
leader. Tomas Borge, national directorate member and
GPP leader, may have the stature to fill that void some
time in the future, but it presently appears unlikely.
Eden Pastora-the widely publicized "Commander
Zero" of the National Palace operation-does not have
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Despite differences over strategy, all FSLN factions
seem to agree on certain military tactics. By assassi-
nating Somoza supporters and informers and engaging
in other terrorist actions, the guerrillas hope to provoke
the Guard into greater repression, leading to increased
public antagonism toward Somoza and the Guard.
Last spring, following the cotton and coffee harvests,
some guerrillas-particularly those of the GPP-
attempted to attack a few processing plants and stocks
of crops to disrupt exports and deprive the government
of badly needed foreign exchange. Only harvested
crops were targeted, in order not to alienate the
campesinos who depend on wages earned during the
harvests. Last fall the FSLN boasted of its intention to
destroy the National Guard, but fearing that this
threat may steel the Guard's resolve, Sandinista
leaders have more recently sought to induce desertion
with promises of good treatment.
Because its ultimate military success may depend on
broad public support, the FSLN has good cause not to
highlight the extent to which its political philosophy is
influenced by Marxist ideology. Publicly, FSLN leaders
claim to have democratic objectives and assert that it is
not possible to establish "another Cuba" in Nicaragua.
Leaders from all three factions seem to believe that
even if Somoza were overthrown, the FSLN mi ht not
immediately place its leaders in power.
Consequently, last fall the FSLN factions publicly
supported the idea of a provisional government under
the Group of 12-influential Nicaraguan professional
and businessmen who have been closely associated
with the guerrillas. Later the Sandinistas approved a
provisional triumvirate: Sergio Ramirez of the Group
of 12, Rafael Cordova Rivas of the Broad Opposition
Front, and Alfonso Robelo of the private sector
Nicaraguan Democratic Movement.
While numerous opposition groups might be brought
into a provisional government, the FSLN probably
would consolidate political control through its front
group, the United People's Movement (MPu) and the
larger, more diverse National Patriotic Front (FPN).
The MPu is composed of extremist student groups,
small Communist political factions, and representa-
tives of the two orthodox Marxist FSLN factions, the
GPP and TP. The Teciarios are also loosely connected
through a youth group, but unlike the GPP and TP
factions, do not have a representative on the governing
body.
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The published program of the MPU is probably the most
coherent public expression of FSLN political policies. It
represents the public views of the GPP and TP factions,
and it is almost identical to a Terciario pamphlet issued
some time later. It calls for:
? Unity of all "progressive" anti-Somoza forces.
? Abolition of repressive laws and amnesty for all who
opposed the Somoza regime.
? Expropriation of Somoza family property; national-
ization of natural resources and related industries and
transportation; price controls; national economic plan
to coordinate private industry and the state economic
sector to achieve social progress; tax reform; state
control of banking; renegotiation of foreign debt;
direction of private business into sectors not conflicting
with national or collective interests; regulation of
foreign and domestic commerce to redistribute the
wealth in order to guarantee all Nicaraguans the basic
necessities.
? Agrarian reform; abolition of latifundia; conversion
of Somoza family property to cooperatives and state
enterprises; emphasis on production of basic foods;
loans and technical assistance to farmers.
? Labor reform and jobs for all; more schools and
teachers, and education for all; social medicine for all;
housing for all.
? Formation of a national army with participation by
those National Guardsmen who actively oppose the
Somoza government.
Some FSLN propaganda last fall indicated the Front
would annul all treaties approved during the Somoza
dynasty, but more recently Tomas Borge has asserted
publicly that the FSLN would respect Nicaragua's
international agreements. He said the FSLN would also
respect the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
obligations, but would renegotiate the foreign debt.
Radio Sandino has reported that the FSLN favors
Nicaraguan membership in the movement of
nonaligned nations.
Borge has said the FSLN favors maintaining relations
with all countries, including the United States The
Sandinistas, however, have consistently denou-iced the
United States as the clearest example of moncpolistic
capitalism. Guerrilla propaganda asserts that Somoza
i simply a servant of US imperialism; that the United
States created Somozism, trains Somoza's elite troops,
buttresses his regime, and directs his policies, dl to
farther US economic interests. All elements o the
FSLN publicly opposed the US-sponsored mediation
effort last fall, contending that they would fig it on
even if the United States replaced Somoza, bet ause the
US intent would simply be to protect its eeonemie
i r terests.
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I the FSLN had 3,000 to 4,000 combatants i r
Nicaragua, and others in Costa Rica and t-lorduras;
this figure is probably close to the mark. G uer rilla
losses during the current offensive have probably been
offset through more successful recruitmen~. A. time
passes and the Guard and government alienat more
`14icaraguans, the reserve of potential manrx"w or for
the FSLN can be expected to grow.
It is impossible to determine the extent of popidar 25X1
upport for the Sandinistas. The vast majorit} of the
population is probably sympathetic to the Front
because it is perceived to be the only group ac iive'iy
challenging the Somoza government. To date this
sympathy has not translated into significant active
support. Instead the majority of the population is
intimidated and not sufficiently convinced of he
FSLN's military capabilit or the Guard's i-nn-inent
defeat to take up arms.
.,oung men for suspected collaboration.
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lluring guerrilla occupation of towns and neitthbor-
hoods, many young men and women join the
;andinistas in the streets. Others may relucta ntly go
along when the guerrillas depart out of fear that when
he Guard reenters guerrilla-held areas, it will execute
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The four critical elements of the FSLN'S foreign support
are:
25X6 ? Sanctuaries, primarily in Costa Rica and secondar-
ily in Honduras. The Honduran Government periodi-
25X6 cally contests Sandinista use of its territory.
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? Arms, coming primarily from Cuba and perhaps the
international market, and secondarily from Panama.
We have no information on the total volume of
materiel the FSLN has acquired from Cuba and from
purchases
Last fall it appeared the Venezuelans were the FSLN's
chief foreign supplier, but now the Cubans seem to
have taken up the slack caused by the change of
government in Caracas. Former President Perez,
however, may still be assisting the guerrillas. The
Panamanian Government also has supplied arms-
some purchased in the United States-but probably
lacks the resources of Cuba or Venezuela.
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Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN)
FSLN/Terciario (sometimes `Insurrectional"
FSLN/Popular Prolonged War (GPP)
FSLN/Proletarian Tendency (TP)
when referring to groups inside Nicaragua)
Tomas Borge
Jaime Wheelock
Personalist Fringe Groups Claiming
Humberto Ortega
Henry Ruiz
Luis Carrion
Association with FSLN (approx. 02%)
Daniel Ortega
Bayardo Arce
Carlos Nunez
Victor Tirado
(approx. 35-40%)
(approx. 20%)
011th of November Movement (25-30 persons)
(approx. 40-45%)
-Fernando and Edmundo Chamorro
-Some connection with FSLN/T
ili
fi
Ed
P
m
tary
gure
en
astora
"Benjamin Zeledon"
Southern Front
-commanded by
Eden Pastora
Tactiral,Cembat Sou"H
'opular Sandinist Squad
-6 or more guerrillas with
Combat`extferi nce, no training
Popular Sandinist Militia
-10 or more recent recruits
-supervised by ETC or EPS
Peasant Militia
-in formative stages
1
National Directorate
(the 9 factional leaders)
"Carlos Fonseca Amador"
Northern Front
-commanded by
German Pomares
"Rigoberto Lopez"
Western Front
-commanded by
Herman Pulmanez
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International Training
Schools
International
Brigades
"Camilo Ortega"
Central Front
-commanded by
Joaquin Cuadra
OLeonel Cabezas (25 persons)
-has headed several small
transitory groups such as
FSLN/Democratic, FSLN/Authentic,
FSLN/Insurrectional
-disowned by main body of FSLN
OPlutarco Hernandez
-once headed an "Insurrectional"
faction
-occasionally associated with Cabezas
"Ulises Tapia"
Eastern Front
-commanded by
Henry Ruiz
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