MEMO TO DDI FROM LEW LAPHAM
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP80T01002A000200020032-8
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
K
Document Page Count:
3
Document Creation Date:
December 12, 2016
Document Release Date:
November 5, 2001
Sequence Number:
32
Case Number:
Publication Date:
February 7, 1975
Content Type:
MF
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
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Body:
Do\
Approved For lease 2001/11/23 : CIA-RDP80TO100 fl00200020032-8
7 February 1975
INFORMAL MEMO FOR DDI
I confess that I had not seen the C:CA paper on the meaning
of the defense burden, but has read it and makes
the following comments in response ur query:
"The points made in the DIA critique regarding the
political dimension of the question of defense burden are, I
believe, largely right. No doubt political considerations
heavily influence, and even dominate, economic decisions, and
defense has always had, and continues to have, a very high
priority, if not quite an overriding a one as the memo suggests.
What is said in para 4.i. about how economic problems relate
to detente is also essentially correct. If the CIA Memo implies
that we think the Soviets have gone, or are about to go, soft
on defense, then it leaves a wrong impression--one which was
certainly not intended. But it would not be too difficult to
deal with this objection by adding some language in the Key
Judgments and in the text.
"This would not be likely, however, to give DIA satisfaction,
since it is also objecting to the whole methodological approach.
Whether this objection is well taken or not is for others to
judge. But because of this objection, it seems to me that any
effort to achieve a meeting of the minds on the issue as a
whole--'to broaden the analysis,' as DIA puts it--is likely to
fail. To invite DIA to participate in such an exercise will,
at any rate, invite such an outcome, which I suspect is what
DIA would prefer.
"I think the aim of your initial response should be to try
to get DIA to give some indication of whether this is so. There-
fore, I recommend that you ask Graham to express himself further
as to feasibility of arriving at a 'paper intended to publicize
our Government's views on Soviet military spending. . .' (his
para 6) and on the question of a suitable methodology.
25X1A
25X1A
Approved For Release 2001/11/23 : CIA-RDP80TO1002A000200020032-8
Approved ForiWease 2001/11/23: CIA-RDP80TO1002000200020032-8
The points made in the DIA critique regarding the
political dimension of the question of defense burden are,
I believe, largely right. No doubt political considerations
heavily influence, and even dominate, economic decisions,
and defense has always had, and continues to have a very
high priority, if not quite an overriding a one as the
memo suggests. What is said in para 4j about how
economic problems relate to detente is also essentially correct.
If the CIA Memo implies that we think the Soviets have
gone, or are about to go, soft on defense, then it leaves
a wrong impression--one which was certainly not intended.
But it would not be too difficult to deal with this
fJ
objection by adding some language 15n the Key Judgments
This would not be likely, however, to give DIA
satisfaction, since it is also objecting to the whole
methodological approach. Whether this objection is
well taken or not is for others to judge. But because
of this objection, it seems to me that any effort to
Approved For Release 2001/11/23 : CIA-RDP80TO1002A000200020032-8
Approved For IW#Vease 2001/11/23 : CIA-RDP80T010024&00200020032-8
achieve a meeting of the minds on the issue as a whole
--"to broaden the analysis," as DIA puts it--is likely to
fail. To invite DIA to participate in such an exercise
will, at any rate, invite such an outcome, which
I suspect is what DIA would prefer.
I think the aim of your initial response should be to
try to get DIA to give some indication of whether this is
so. Therefore, I recommend that you ask Graham to
express himself further as to feasibility of arriving at
a "paper intended to publicize our Government's views on
Soviet military spending..." (his para 6) and on the
question of a suitable methodology.
25X1A
Approved For Release 2001/11/23 : CIA-RDP80TO1002A000200020032-8