MEMO TO DDI FROM LEW LAPHAM

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP80T01002A000200020032-8
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
3
Document Creation Date: 
December 12, 2016
Document Release Date: 
November 5, 2001
Sequence Number: 
32
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
February 7, 1975
Content Type: 
MF
File: 
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PDF icon CIA-RDP80T01002A000200020032-8.pdf102.33 KB
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Do\ Approved For lease 2001/11/23 : CIA-RDP80TO100 fl00200020032-8 7 February 1975 INFORMAL MEMO FOR DDI I confess that I had not seen the C:CA paper on the meaning of the defense burden, but has read it and makes the following comments in response ur query: "The points made in the DIA critique regarding the political dimension of the question of defense burden are, I believe, largely right. No doubt political considerations heavily influence, and even dominate, economic decisions, and defense has always had, and continues to have, a very high priority, if not quite an overriding a one as the memo suggests. What is said in para 4.i. about how economic problems relate to detente is also essentially correct. If the CIA Memo implies that we think the Soviets have gone, or are about to go, soft on defense, then it leaves a wrong impression--one which was certainly not intended. But it would not be too difficult to deal with this objection by adding some language in the Key Judgments and in the text. "This would not be likely, however, to give DIA satisfaction, since it is also objecting to the whole methodological approach. Whether this objection is well taken or not is for others to judge. But because of this objection, it seems to me that any effort to achieve a meeting of the minds on the issue as a whole--'to broaden the analysis,' as DIA puts it--is likely to fail. To invite DIA to participate in such an exercise will, at any rate, invite such an outcome, which I suspect is what DIA would prefer. "I think the aim of your initial response should be to try to get DIA to give some indication of whether this is so. There- fore, I recommend that you ask Graham to express himself further as to feasibility of arriving at a 'paper intended to publicize our Government's views on Soviet military spending. . .' (his para 6) and on the question of a suitable methodology. 25X1A 25X1A Approved For Release 2001/11/23 : CIA-RDP80TO1002A000200020032-8 Approved ForiWease 2001/11/23: CIA-RDP80TO1002000200020032-8 The points made in the DIA critique regarding the political dimension of the question of defense burden are, I believe, largely right. No doubt political considerations heavily influence, and even dominate, economic decisions, and defense has always had, and continues to have a very high priority, if not quite an overriding a one as the memo suggests. What is said in para 4j about how economic problems relate to detente is also essentially correct. If the CIA Memo implies that we think the Soviets have gone, or are about to go, soft on defense, then it leaves a wrong impression--one which was certainly not intended. But it would not be too difficult to deal with this fJ objection by adding some language 15n the Key Judgments This would not be likely, however, to give DIA satisfaction, since it is also objecting to the whole methodological approach. Whether this objection is well taken or not is for others to judge. But because of this objection, it seems to me that any effort to Approved For Release 2001/11/23 : CIA-RDP80TO1002A000200020032-8 Approved For IW#Vease 2001/11/23 : CIA-RDP80T010024&00200020032-8 achieve a meeting of the minds on the issue as a whole --"to broaden the analysis," as DIA puts it--is likely to fail. To invite DIA to participate in such an exercise will, at any rate, invite such an outcome, which I suspect is what DIA would prefer. I think the aim of your initial response should be to try to get DIA to give some indication of whether this is so. Therefore, I recommend that you ask Graham to express himself further as to feasibility of arriving at a "paper intended to publicize our Government's views on Soviet military spending..." (his para 6) and on the question of a suitable methodology. 25X1A Approved For Release 2001/11/23 : CIA-RDP80TO1002A000200020032-8