INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES TO THE ROLLING THUNDER PROGRAM (ALTERNATIVES 1 2 AND 3)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T01629R000300080004-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 16, 2008
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: June 1, 1968
• Content Type: IM

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i op Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES TO THE ROLLING THUNDER PROGRAM
(ALTERNATIVES 1, 2. AND 3)
JCS Review Completed
Top Secret 25X1
Copy No. ii
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POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES TO THE ROLLING THUNDER PROGRAM
(The case in which attm.ed tteconnaizzance attacfzz
atte pettmit-ted against ti..nez o~j communication and
aU 4ixed Langet6 in Noit-th Vietnam except those
tattg e t-s pttevious! y un authott Lz ed which ate within
3 and l . 5 naut,icat mi.2ez o4 the cente'to o6 Hanoi
and Haiphong, tc.espective.ey). (No. 1)
(The case in which existing Rotting Thundett gttound
nu.-ens ane modi6i.ed to penmi-t coa,5ta2 and rteconnais-
4sance attacks against posittive1y .ident Lied Note-h
Vi.etnameti e attack ctta~)t and Logiz ices etta~t out-
zide o. 3 nautical mLLe4 o4 the Boast ott coaztaL
L Lando o. North Vietnam). (No. 2)
(The ease in which the Rotting Thundett pttogttam of
Mcv ch 1968 do mod iced to #ncLude at taefz4 again 6t
mifLitany tattgets in populated attea6 with gtteate)t
LJfzef-ihood o4 hi.ghett c,c:vitian cazua2Uies. and
eollatenal damage). (No. 3)
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
June 1968
Possible Alternatives
to the Rolling Thunder Program
The cases where the Rolling Thunder Program
is reinstituted under March 1968 ground rules,
modified as follows:
Reduction of the restricted bombing
areas around Hanoi and Haiphong (No. 1)
Authorization of strikes against
North Vietnamese attack and logistics
craft outside the 3-mile limit (No. 2)
Authorization of strikes against
military targets in populated areas
(No. 3)
Summary
This memorandum examines the effects of a resump-
tion of the Rolling Thunder Program under March 1968
ground rules, modified to permit strikes against pre-
viously unauthorized targets:
(a) all fixed targets except those within
3 and 1.5 nautical miles of the centers of Hanoi
and Haiphong, respectively; or
(b) North Vietnamese attack and logistics
craft outside the 3-mile limit; or
(c) any military target regardless of its
location in populated areas.
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The effects of any of these alternative programs
would not differ markedly from those achieved by a
resumption of full-scale bombing under the March 1968
ground rules.* Although alternatives 1 and 3, particu-
larly, would add'to the cost of North Vietnam's con-
tinued support of the war, their effects would in all
likelihood not be sufficient to alter the course of
the war. Alternative 2 would present such few addi-
tional targets that it would have little, if any,
impact on the war.
Under alternative 1 only one of 26 previously
unstruck targets in the Haiphong area and 20 of 49 un-
struck targets in the Hanoi area would be open to
attack. Few of these are of prime importance to North
Vietnam's war sustaining capabilities. Alternative 3
would expose a large number of significant targets to
attack, including the port facilities at Haiphong and
other major transport and industrial targets. The key
military command facilities that could be attacked are
believed to be in hardened sites. Attacks against
barracks areas would have little disruptive effect,
because the dispersal of large elements of the popula-
tion means that adequate housing should be available.
The major effects of the loosening of the March
1968 restrictions on the bombing program would be as
follows:
1. The initial strikes against storage
areas in Hanoi and Haiphong might result in the
destruction of 90,000 tons of supplies, or as
much as 5 percent of one year's seaborne
imports at present levels. After these initial
strikes, however, these facilities would be
dispersed and later strikes would be much less
successful.
2. Transportation problems would be
increased. The flow of imports through Hai-
phong would become more costly and time con-
suming. The loss of important repair facili-
ties, particularly for railroad rolling stock,
would create localized transportation problems.
The heretofore largely undamaged machine
building industry that contributes to the
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maintenance of transport equipment could
be disrupted. The flow of men and
supplies to the south, however, would be
maintained. Supplies moving into South
Vietnam were only.a small fraction -- 2
percent -- of daily imports in 1967.
The burden of any shortfall in imports
would be carried by the civilian popula-
tion.
3. Attacks against previously un-
struck targets in urban areas would cause
heavy collateral damage to civilian
structures and inflict an estimated 1,000
to 3,000 civilian casualties.
4. The morale of the North Vietnamese
people and leaders might deteriorate in
the long run. No accurate measure can be
made, however, of the amount of pressure
that the regime can withstand or the
price it is willing to pay before withdraw-
ing support of the war in the South.
5. The attacks would be carried out
at a high cost to US forces. Loss rates
for attacks in the Hanoi and Haiphong areas
during April 1967 through March 1968 were
almost seven times as high as for opera-
tions over all of North Vietnam. In addi-
tion, large numbers of US personnel being
held prisoner in compounds within urban
areas would also be endangered.
6. The attacks against Hanoi and
Haiphong would almost certainly cause the
North Vietnamese to break off the Paris
talks, unless the total war situation and
the status of negotiations led Hanoi to
believe that it was attaining success in
undermining the Saigon government. What-
ever the circumstances of the attacks,
Hanoi would mount a vigorous propaganda
campaign charging the United States with
terror attacks against defenseless civilians.
Despite what might be viewed as a justifi-
able action in the United States, a sub-
stantial segment of world opinion would
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probably echo these charges or, at a mini-
mum, be critical of the United States
for escalating the bombing even beyond the
original limits of the Rolling Thunder
Program.
7. Extension of the attacks to include
targets along the Chinese border would
increase the chance of violation of Chinese
air space and make US aircraft subject to
attack by Communist Chinese aircraft and
air defenses. The targets in the buffer
zone are almost exclusively transportation
targets. Their neutralization would be
short-lived and would have only a minor
impact on reducing the flow of imports.
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e in which armed reconnaissance attacks
cation and all
The case
permitted against Lines of communi
reviousZy unauthorized which are
fixed targets p o the centers of
5 nautical mites of (No. 1)
within 3 and 1? respectiveZy.
Hanoi and Haiphong,
the 31 March restrictions in the
1. Prior to the Rolling der Thun bombing d rules North Vietnam, 'Haiphong,
am had strict grounes controllin air
Program. miles of Hanoi and d im-
and 4 attacks within an10 d along the Chinese border30 miles
loosed ed lesser lesser controls over attacks within
Hanoi an d within 10 miles of the
of the n examines the
p center of ctio
center of Haoq?* _ This in the event full-scale
effects of modidifYfying-the Rolling Thunder Program
is resumed __ all
bombing attacks against
previously
to permit armed reconnaissance targets p
targets in North Vietnam exce3t and tar1.5 nautical 'thi unauthorized that aHaiphongn respectively.
miles of Hanoi and Zones
strikes in the Reduced Hanoi Prohibited
Air
If the prohibited zone around Hanoi s were
2. a 10- to a 3-nautical-mile radiu,
from targets on the CINCPAC Rolling Thunder
20 unstruck targ in the Hanoi area would be
(RTTL) attacks These 20
Target List Dien and
subject to stets includes then minor Van and supply
unstruck tarp three storage a
Phu Thi railroad siding5- five barracks,
six dispersed POL site transmitter and
depots, school, the Hanoi training lant
facilities of ii fertilizer pal radio
receiver
chemic struck static) , and the Hanoi 18 previously
s hi h-
In addition,
railroad/ g
the
des
ets in the RTTL, including des Rap
tarq and bypasses over the Canal ie between
e would leen
ited
bridge railroad y
d 3-mile proh
Vien
roppSe
d
and the Yen
the existing 10- and the p
brought under more timely an
cold be
u
k
frequent attac
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3. The effect of unrestricted airstrikes on
targets located between the 10- and 3-mile zones
around Hanoi would be only slightly greater than
that achieved during the 1967 bombing campaign.
Attacks on the two unstruck rail sidings would
have little significance. Sustained interdiction
of the Canal des Rapides bridge and bypasses and
of the untargeted rail bypasses to the Doumer Bridge
would increase the need for the North Vietnamese to
use time-consuming and more costly alternate
routes and modes of transport. There are enough
bypasses and alternatives, however, for goods to
continue to move through the Hanoi area. Attacks
on military barracks and training facilities
could be disruptive, but most of the functions of
these installations could be easily relocated. The
neutralization of the international radio facilities
would have no significant effect on war-related
communications and could quickly be offset. The
Hanoi chemical fertilizer plant produces nearly
10 percent of the country's phosphate fertilizer,
but the loss of the plant's output could easily
be made up by increased imports. Initial strikes
in the area between the 10- and 3-mile zones
would probably result in heavy destruction of
the transport equipment, military goods, and
economic supplies now using the area as a sanctu-
ary. After the initial attacks, however, supplies
and equipment would be quickly dispersed or moved
into the reduced 3-mile sanctuary area with little
loss of supply capabilities.
Attacks in the Haiphong Reduced Zone
4. The reduction of the prohibited zone around
Haiphong from 4 to 1.5 nautical miles would have
little or no impact on North Vietnam's support of
the war. Only one unstruck target on the RTTL --
a transformer station -- would be subject to un-
limited attack The transformer 25X1
station connects-lie city of Haiphong into the
main power network, but, if destroyed or damaged,
it could be bypassed, and the city could function
on local power from diesel-generating stations.
Nine targets located between the existing 4-mile
and the proposed 1.5-mile zones have already
been struck, including the Haiphong Cat Bi Air-
field, the Haiphong Highway Bridge SSE on Route 5,
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and some barracks and storage areas. Only two of
these struck targets -- Cat Bi Airfield and the
Haiphong Petroleum Products Storage Area -- re-
main as active targets on the RTTL. Unlimited
attacks against these targets would have little
impact beyond that achieved by previously authorized
strikes
Attacks in the Buffer Zone
5. A large number of unstruck transportation
targets are in the buffer zone along the Chinese
border, including the important Dong Dang railroad
yard, 10 other rail targets along the Hanoi-Dong Dang
line, 16 rail bridges along the Hanoi-Lao Cai line,
and about 300 highway bridges throughout the zone.
Attacks against these targets, however, would hinder
but not seriously impair transport operations. The
most serious effect would result from attacks
against the Dong Dang rail bridge and the rail yard
that contains some railroad car repair facilities.
Although the bridge and rail yard are the most
important in the China border area, they can be
effectively bypassed. The unstruck bridges on the
Lao Cai line are small and can be quickly repaired
or bypassed. Attacks against the many highway
bridges in the buffer zone would hamper transport,
particularly on Routes lA, 1B, 3, and 4, but by-
passes are sufficient to assure the continuation
of traffic. Initial airstrikes in the existing
sanctuary area along the Chinese border would
result in a substantial destruction of supplies
and transport equipment, but these items would
probably soon be relocated across the Chinese border
and supply movements would continue unabated.
Civilian Casualties
6. Air attacks against targets close to densely
populated areas would probably result in a high
number of North Vietnamese civilian casualties,
although effective civil defense measures and an
adequate warning system would tend to minimize
casualties after the first few attacks. As many
as 1,000 casualties might be inflicted in attacks
against previously unstruck targets, based on the
estimated 2,000 civilian casualties that resulted
from strikes against a larger number of similar
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targets in 1967. These casualties would probably
serve only to enhance the effectiveness of North
Vietnamese propaganda, rather than to weaken the
morale of the populace.
US Air Losses
7. An increase in air attacks against targets
within 10 and 4 miles of Hanoi and Haiphong,
respectively, would most likely result in a
substantial increase in US aircraft losses. Forty-
two US attack aircraft were lost in combat over
Hanoi and Haiphong during April 1967 through March
1968, a loss rate of 16.6 per 1,000 attack sorties,
compared with an overall loss rate of only 2.4 per
1,000 attack sorties. Moreover, increases in the
number of attack sorties against targets in Hanoi
and Haiphong have resulted in a greater than pro-
portionate increase in the number of combat losses.
8. Aircraft hitting targets in the Chinese
buffer zone might be subject to attack by Communist
Chinese aircraft or AAA if th
border.
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The case in which existing RoZZing
Thunder ground rules are modified
to permit coastal and reconnaissance
attacks against positively identified
North Vietnamese attack craft and
Logistics craft outside of 3 nauti-
cal miles of the coast or coastal
islands of North Vietnam. (No. 2)
9. A modification of the Rolling Thunder Program
as it existed in March 1968 to permit- air attacks
against North Vietnamese naval and logistics craft
outside of 3 nautical miles of the North Vietnamese
coast would have little impact on the' war. Such
attacks have been previously authorized throughout
most of the Tonkin Gulf -- below 20? 42'N latitude --
but few lucrative targets have been available, and
opening the upper reaches of the Gulf to air attack
would make few new targets available.
Past Air Operations
10. The Rolling Thunder Program of March 1968
permitted armed reconnaissance air attacks against
identified North Vietnamese naval and logistics craft
in almost all areas of the Tonkin Gulf (see Figure 3).
South of 20? 42'N latitude -- about 9 nautical miles
south of the center of Haiphong -- all such craft
could be attacked without limitation. North of this
latitude to the buffer zone (25 nautical miles south
of the Chinese border), armed reconnaissance was
authorized against positively identified North Viet-
namese craft sighted within 3 nautical miles of the
coast and offshore islands of North Vietnam. North
Vietnamese naval and logistics craft were free from
attack only when they were outside of the 3-nautical-
mile limit north of 20? 42'N (the upper reaches of
the Tonkin Gulf) and then only if they did not fire
on US aircraft.
11. Despite the sweeping authorization for attack,
only a negligible share of the Rolling Thunder Program
has been directed against watercraft in the Tonkin
Gulf. Only 105 attack sorties were directed at off-
shore vessels in 1967, and most of these attacks were
within 3 miles of the coast. These sorties delivered
about 120 tons of ordnance -- 0.1 percent of the total
delivered against all transportation targets in North
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Vietnam. Two PT-boats were sunk off Thanh Hoa in
July 1967, and various watercraft were reported
destroyed or damaged.
Potential Targets
12. Coastal junks and barges regularly move from
the coal ports of Hon Gai and Cam Pha to Haiphong and
further inland via coastal waterways. Coal is the
principal commodity moved, but other economic goods
are probably moved to the coal ports. These craft
normally use the coastline for shelter and it is un-
likely that they move outside of 3 nautical miles of
the coast.
13. The small North Vietnamese Navy, which con-
sists of about 40 Soviet and Chinese-built patrol
boats, gunboats, torpedo boats, and subchasers, is
often in the Haiphong and Hanoi areas to supplement
the air defenses of the two cities. These craft
seldom venture beyond Haiphong-or the coastal islands
east of Haiphong, however, and are rarely seen on the
open seas in the areas now proposed for air attack.
15. A few high-speed infiltration trawlers are
suspected of transiting the upper Gulf en route to
South Vietnam. These vessels presumably avoid running
the length of the heavily patrolled North and South
Vietnamese coasts by sailing through. the Hainan Straits
and down the eastern side of Hainan Island. Such
voyages are probably infrequent; only one known attempt
has been made to date in 1968 to approach the South
Vietnamese coast from the direction of Hainan Island,
and three of the four trawlers involved in the attempt
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were sunk. Further, the run in the Tonkin Gulf could
be made almost entirely within Chinese territorial
waters if necessary.
16. Major fishing centers are located at Mon Cay
near the Chinese border, at Haiphong, at Do Son, and
off the island of Cac Ba. Fishing boats from these
centers would probably be harassed by pilots searching
for naval and logistics craft in the upper Gulf.
Deep-sea fishing, however, is as yet relatively un-
developed in North Vietnam. The total annual fish
catch before the bombing was only about 200 , 000 tons,
of which about 110,000 tons were salt water fish and
the remainder fresh water fish raised in the many
ponds and irrigated fields in North Vietnam. Seventy
percent of the salt water fish catch was obtained by
fishing close to shore and only 30 percent was the
result of deep-sea fishing. Deep-sea fishing in the
area north of 20? 42'N latitude has already been
adversely affected by the Rolling Thunder Program
since most fishermen have had to pass through the
3-mile unrestricted zone.
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The case in which the Rolling Prcogram of March 1968 is modifiedntor
inlude attacks against military targets
Zn Populated areas with greater ZikeZi-
hood of higher civilian casualties and
collateral damage. (No. 3)
17? A renewed bombin
military tares uomr g program that brought all
lation attack without regard to pou-
concentrations would add to the cost of North
Vietnam's continued su
attacks would not in themselvestalterrtheb u
e
the war.^ This
l
a
course
ternative would open to attack 29
targets in Hanoi and 25 targets of
18, In Hanoi attacks a
in pop s
ulated areas , that have against
not beennsubjected targets
airstrikes -- including
and classification g theHanoi railroad station
and F of the Hanoi yaxd, Gia Lam Airfield, Areas B
vehicle repair a small boatyard, and six
vu icle pair shops -- would not be excessively s-
PVe- The Hanoi railroad station and classification
yard contains the country's largest locomotive
rai l car repair facilities and y
,
could hinder rolling Damage to this
could h heugh ing istock repairs and disruptrrail
traffic Bypasses, however, probably
provide for the continued movement of
The nearest alternative for rebuilding locomotives
would be in communist China, goods.
would be available but other facilities
Areas b and F of Hanoi servicing and for light re
B Port ing methods and are relativel y immune mploy primitive offluaars .
tide, Gia Lam Airfield is Nor to'neutraliza-
airfield for international th Vietnam s
attacks against passenger service, acdpal
the airfield would likel and
international Political repercussions , y have adverse
19 , In Haiphong
targets , air attacks against unstruck
and a cab-- the le dock area, five shipyards pt
ment of bridge -- could seriously a rail yard,
rd
move-
the large volume of imports hatnare vital to hir the the economy and to the maintenan,~o ..r , .
Transport Tar ets
in Haiphong
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communication.U The Haiphong dock area receives most 25X1
of North Vietnam's seaborne imports. The destruction
of the dock area would make it necessary to increase
the use of lighters for offloading in the port area
or to offload at Chinese ports and move the goods in-
to.North Vietnam by coastal craft, rail, and truck.
Although less efficient, substantial amounts of sea-
borne imports could be unloaded by using lighters,
and transport routes from China have considerable
unused capacity.
20. Five unstruck shipyards in Haiphong-, together
with the accidentally damaged Shipyard No. 4 and a
naval base, provide an important part of the country's
capacity for ship repairs. Watercraft could be
serviced and repaired at dispersed-locations, but
major repairs to seagoing ships would be disrupted by
strikes against Shipyard No. 4 and the naval base.
21. Haiphong's rail yard is one of the country's
primary rail facilities, containing a car repair shop,
engine house, and general repair facilities. Exten-
sive damage to the rail yards would hinder rail
clearance from the port, congest port operations, and
reduce rolling stock repair capabilities. However,
the impact on transport capacity would be far from
decisive. Port operations and clearances of cargoes
were maintained in 1967 although through rail traffic
to the port areas was cut for an extended period by
the interdiction of the Haiphong railroad/highway
bridge.
Storage Facilities
22. The denial of sanctuary for storage of goods
in urban populated areas would hinder present logis-
tical procedures and would require the initiation of
alternate methods for storage and distribution.
Five unstruck storage and supply depots are in the
Hanoi area; in Haiphong, there are six major unstruck
storage facilities including warehouses and open
storage in the port. Initial attacks on storage areas
could render heavy damage to accumulated imported
goods. An estimated 30 , 000 to 40 , 000 tons of goods
could be stored in the Hanoi port area, and the
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Haiphong port at any one time might contain as
much-as 50',0'0'0 tons of miscellaneous cargo includ-
ing motor vehicle tires, barge sections, trucks,
jeeps, construction materials, and POL drums.
Military Targets
23. Attacks" against barracks areas and headquarters
compounds would have little disruptive effect. Key
command facilities are believed to be in hardened
sites. The elimination of barracks would place an
added burden on available civilian housing, but with
the evacuation of large numbers of young and old from
Hanoi and Haiphong, housing should be more than
adequate for those air defense and military units re-
maining in the cities.
Targets in Industry
24. The most important uns.truck industrial instal-
lations in populated. areas are the machine building
plants. The Hanoi machine tool engineering equipment
plant, the Hanoi engineering plant, and the Hanoi
machinery plant are. the largest and most productive
of North Vietnam's small machine"building industry.
Their output probably contributes significantly to
the maintenance of transport equipment. Successful
strikes against these plants would eliminate a large
share of the country's output of diesel motors, small
electric motors, generators, water pumps, and machin-
ery spare parts, adding significantly to import
requirements. Attacks against these facilities might
lead to further dispersal of an already decentralized
industry with the consequent inefficiencies.
25. Other unstruck industrial facilities in popu-
lated areas contribute products that support the home
front or are not essential to the war effort. In
Hanoi, a rubber products plant produces consumer goods
and a concrete products plant produces civil defense
shelters, among other products. In Haiphong, a con-
crete products plant, three POL tank fabrication shops,
and four diesel powerplants are relatively unimportant
targets.
Casualties and Collateral Damage
26. Air attacks against previously unstruck targets
in densely populated areas would result in a higher
number of North Vietnamese civilian casualties, although
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effective civil defense measures-and an adequate warn-
ing system would tend to minimize casualties after the
first few attacks. The number of civilian casualties
inflicted on these strikes might be as high as 3,0
based on the estimated 2,000 casualties inflicted by
less intensive strikes against targets-in populated
areas in 1967. This level of casualties might
increase the effectiveness of North Vietnamese propa-
ganda.
27. In addition to. civilian casualties, collateral
damage to civilian structures would-.be increased.
Damage to residential housing and public buildings
in Hanoi and Haiphong has been light thus far,
although in Nam Dinh, the third largest city in North
Vietnam, collateral damage has been particularly
heavy. Although casualties have been played down,
collateral damage has figured prominently in Hanoi's
propaganda.
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