THE CONSEQUENCES OF A HALT IN THE BOMBARDMENT OF NORTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T01629R000300080011-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 22, 2004
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: October 9, 1967
• Content Type: IM

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
The Consequences of a Halt in the Bombardment
of North Vietnam
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12
9 October 1967
No. 1391/67
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
GROUP I
EXCLUDED FROI.1 IOMATIC
Il~ DO- I AUINOUANU
UE LASSIFICATION
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
9 October 1967
The Consequences of a Halt in the
Bombardment of North Vietnam
Summary
If the United States were to halt the bombard-
ment of North Vietnam, and avoided saying that it
was setting a time limit on the halt, Hanoi would
probably be willing to enter direct talks. It
would almost certainly take a cessation of longer
than a month to elicit such a response,and none would
be forthcoming at all if a reciprocal gesture of
de-escalation were demanded.
Hanoi makes a distinction between talks, pri-
vate, tentative, and exploratory, and negotiations,
the formal settlement of outstanding issues. Thus
its initial response would be cautious, and would
be intended at the most to open the way to "talks."
The opening of "negotiations" would depend on
whether the US position, as revealed in these pri-
vate conversations, was sufficiently forthcoming
to give Hanoi hope of eventually achieving its
goals in South Vietnam.
The North Vietnamese would see a cessation of
bombardment without a reciprocal gesture on their
part as a sign the US will was weakening, and would
be greatly encouraged to believe that the course
they had been following was correct. On the other
hand, they would be highly suspicious of US intent,
particularly in the context of the election of 1968.
They would fear that the pattern of 1954 would be
repeated, that the great powers might somehow deprive
them of the fruits of victory. And they would expect
to feel intensified and conflicting pressures from
Moscow and Peking.
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? These factors would tend to strengthen Hanoi's
determination to press for significant concessions
from the US. Thus the outlook for the talks develop-
ing into more serious negotiations would be poor,
unless the US was willing to accept terms it has
hitherto ruled out. Nevertheless, the North Viet-
namese would seek to prolong the talks, because
they would probably believe the political pressures
for US concessions would be greater than the cor-
responding pressures on them. They would expect
that a continued erosion of the US negotiating
position, combined with continued military at-
trition in the South, would eventually bring the
US to accept a formula for settlement favorable
to Hanoi's basic aims.
To this end, Hanoi would take advantage of any
halt in bombardment to improve its military capa-
bilities. It would move to restore and harden its
transportation and industry in the North, and strengthen
and reorganize its logistic routes to the South. A
cessation of a week would enable the North Vietnam-
ese to mount a stockpiling effort on the scale of
their operations during the Tet pause of 1967; this
would only yield them a short-term tactical advan-
tage. For any longer period their gains would be
proportionally larger. By the end of a year they would
have been able to set their house thoroughly in order
and to make themselves much less vulnerable to any
future attacks. Although the bombing of the North
has not been the limiting factor on the scale of
their operations in the South, they could, if they
chose, provide substantial reinforcements for their
forces there with less risk and distuption?than
they now suffer.
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General Considerations
1. The leaders of North Vietnam now assume that
the war will end in a negotiation of some sort. They
know that they cannot win militarily, but they continue
to believe that the US cannot do so either. They do
not think that what they see as a military stalemate
requires negotiation of a "compromise." They think
that the real issue of the war--who holds power in
South Vietnam--cannot be compromised. They expect that
in the end the Americans will recognize that they can-
not bring about a political-military situation in the
South permitting them to impose their own terms, and
will therefore grow weary of their exertions. At
this point a negotiation would become possible. This
would be a negotiation whose outcome, Hanoi would ex-
pect, would permit it sooner or later to achieve its
objectives in the South. In short, Hanoi will not ne-
gotiate merely to restore peace, but only to advance
its political aims.
2. This set of mind would determine Hanoi's re-
sponse to a cessation of attacks on North Vietnam.
The leaders there would ask themselves whether this
development meant that the American attitude toward
a settlement was changing. If they were told, or
inferred from seemingly inspired press comment, that
the halt in attacks was for one week, or even one
month, they would conclude that the US was not ready
for "serious" negotiations. They would believe that
another such "pause" was an effort to pressure them
into a negotiation on unfavorable terms, or was the
prelude to a new escalation. In their minds, a pledge
by the US to halt the bombing "permanently" is sought
as an indication that the US is ready to entertain
terms for a settlement which would be at least a step
toward achievement of their war aims. They might view
a US commitment to suspend attacks for a year as some-
thing approaching a permanent halt, because they
would know that the US would find it extremely diffi-
cult for political reasons to resume.
3. The leaders in Hanoi are convinced that in
the end the United States, like France, will succumb
to a combination of political stonewalling and mili-
tary attrition. They are aware that large sections
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of international opinion and some elements of the
US domestic political spectrum believe that the US
is engaged in a war it cannot win. They are aware
of the intense pressures on the US, first, for a
cessation of bombing, second for a US recognition
of the National Liberation Front, and finally
for a US withdrawal from South Vietnam. Thus
Hanoi would see a US willingness to halt the bomb-
ing without a reciprocal gesture as a sign that the
US was beginning to yield and would be correspond-
ingly reinforced in its conviction that its course
had been correct.
4. At the same time they would view a US con-
cession with deep suspicion. As the election of 1968
approached, they would be increasingly tempted to see
any such move as a political trick designed to win
the election. If aerial reconnaissance on North
Vietnam is maintained, and if bombing in Laos con-
tinues, they might argue that the US had not "un-
conditionally" ceased its attacks. Above all, they
would be afraid that the history of 1954 would re-
peat itself. They would envisage themselves trapped
in talks from which world opinion would not let them
escape, and in which the great powers would deprive
them of the fruits of victory. They would also have
to assess the potential pressures from Moscow and Pe-
king for and against a settlement.
5. In the end, Hanoi would probably come to be-
lieve that entering exploratory talks with the US was
in its interest. In the subsequent paragraphs, this
paper examines probable North Vietnamese moves, first
in the political and then in the military and logistic
field, during the period in which bombardment was halted.
In so doing it assumes that the US, whatever diplomatic
initiatives it undertakes, would do nothing that con-
tradicted the impression that the halt was of indefinite
duration.
The Political Play
6. No positive response would be likely from
Hanoi after only one week. The North Vietnamese
would need more time both to assess US intentions
and to plan their own moves. Indeed, any positive
political reaction by Hanoi to a cessation of at-
tacks would be unlikely until at least a month has
passed. This response could hardly be more prompt
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unless the US also conveyed something promising
about the ultimate terms of negotiation. The North
Vietnamese might think that on grounds of face the
cessation had to continue longer than the earlier
pause of 37 days.
7. Hanoi would, by this time, have come under
considerable pressure, from free world and probably
Soviet bloc countries, to agree to talks. Hanoi's
public posture would be ambiguous at first, though
it would be probing actively through third parties
to get a fix on US intentions. When the North Viet-
namese finally agreed to direct talks, it would prob-
ably be on condition that these be shielded as much
as possible from publicity. They would fear that a
theatrical encounter would put them under interna-
tional pressure that would limit their maneuverability.
In short, they would want the first move to the table
to be for a private, exploratory phase.
8. Hanoi would probably be unwilling to scale
down hostilities-during this phase., and would almost
certainly be unwilling to halt them. It would, how-
ever, be looking over the American delegation's
shoulder at the political situation in the United
States. If the talks extended into the election
campaign of 1968 the North Vietnamese would make
tactical modifications of their position to exploit
whatever opportunities may be offered them in the
course of the campaign.
9. They would nevertheless not deviate from
their primary purpose, to establish whether the US
was prepared to move toward a political settlement
which would permit eventual achievement of Hanoi's
aims in the South. The heart of such a settlement
would be the role assigned to the National Liberation
Front. They would insist that, whatever the transi-
tional steps, the fix should be in, that is, that the
National Liberation Front would emerge as the dominant
political force in the South. A firm schedule for US
military withdrawal would probably be demanded as an
earnest of the US commitment to the essential political
bargain. They would not be willing to discuss cease-
fire arrangements seriously--or enter formal and pub-
lic negotiations--until this basic point was settled
to their satisfaction.
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Military and Logistic Factors
10. Regardless of its political response, Hanoi
would certainly use a bombing pause of any duration
to improve its military and economic posture. It
would seek to translate these improvements into in-
creased military capabilities in the South. Con-
cerned that the US would couple its diplomatic
initiative with an intensification of military pres-
sures in the South, it would seek to maintain at
least its present strength in the South relative to
that of the US. The North Vietnamese would want not
only to prevent a weakening of their negotiating hand,
but also to continue the erosion of American public
opinion by holding their own in a war of attrition.
11. Within a week after bombing stopped the North
Vietnamese could certainly duplicate the build-up of
stockpiles carried on during the 4-day Tet bombing
pause in February 1967, when an estimated 15,000-
20,000 tons of supplies were moved into the southern
part of North Vietnam. A considerable part of these
supplies could be moved into Laos. During one day of
Tet, for example, over 800 tons of supplies were trucked
through the Mu Gia Pass route alone. The movement of
15,000-20,000 tons of supplies would be more than
adequate to satisfy for 30 days the essential require-
ments for the civilian and military elements in the
southern half of North Vietnam as well as for the Com-
munist forces in Laos, the DMZ area, and South Vietnam.
12. During a brief bombing pause, North Viet-
namese would not attempt much in the way of permanent
repair to bomb-damaged facilities. They would, how-
ever, try to restore lines of communications closer to
normal capacities by completing temporary repairs to
road and rail beds and would make some progress in re-
pairing key transportation targets such as bridges.
13. With resupply efforts on the Tet scale the
North Vietnamese by the end of a month would have been
able to move and preposition a 3-4 months' stockpile
of essential military and economic goods. They would
also have made substantial progress in relieving other
bad situations, for example, the congestion and ac-
cumulation of stocks in the port of Haiphong. With
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these logistics measures achieved, the intensity of
resupply efforts would fall off. If the nature
of combat in the South were changing sharply, some re-
supply measures such as the movement of heavy weapons
and ammunition would continue. The supply requirement
in this case would be relatively small and easily ex-
ecuted once stockpiles of other supplies had been built
up.
14. Within a month the North Vietnamese would
have completed temporary repairs to any bridges
they chose on any lines of communication in the
country. Additional bypasses to bridges, roads, and
rail lines would also have been completed. The
North Vietnamese would, for example, be able to re-
store thoroughly rail service on the heavily inter-
dicted Hanoi-Vinh line.
15. Between six and twelve months after a bomb-
ing pause, the North Vietnamese would have installed
additional bypass railroad bridges over such key cross-
ings as the Red River at Hanoi and the Song Tram Boc
at Haiphong. Permanent repairs on key roads and rail
lines would have been completed and temporary alter-
nate bridges and bypasses would be kept serviceable
in case bombing resumed. If the pause were seen as
permanent, great progress would have been made in re-
storing major damaged industrial facilities to opera-
tion. Even if the pause were of uncertain duration
those industries most important to the war effort,
such as the Haiphong cement plant, could be restored
to operation within six months to one year.
16. Manpower pressures would be significantly
reduced. If the North Vietnamese thought the bomb-
ing pause was permanent, the 500,000-600,000 person-
nel now tied up in repair, dispersal, and civil de-
fense programs could return to their normal pursuits.
Even if they felt the bombings would resume, they
would at the end of a year be able to carry on any
remaining repair programs, take measures to im-
prove their security and reduce their vulnerability,
and release at least one third of the labor force
presently tied up by the bombings.
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17. Thus after a year North Vietnam's situa-
tion would be significantly improved. Because the
bombing does not presently limit the flow of men and
supplies to South Vietnam, its cessation will not
automatically bring an increase in this flow. With
the bombing interrupted, however, the infiltration
and supply would be orderly, more easily managed,
and less expensive to Hanoi--even if the ground war
escalated in the South.
18. In one case, moreover, a cessation would
have a direct and immediate effect on the military
situation in the South. This would be in the DMZ.
Without the ability to strike back at North Vietnamese
positions north of the DMZ, the US Marines might
quickly find such positions as Con Thien untenable.
The abandonment of these positions would also have
considerable impact on both sides at the negotiat-
ing table.
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