SUGGESTED ADDITIONS TO DRAFT NSSM 94 PAPER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T01672R000200120011-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 22, 2004
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: June 2, 1970
• Content Type: MF

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.G. 20505
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable William H. Sullivan
Deputy Assistant Secretary for
East Asian and Pacific Affairs
SUBJECT : Suggested Additions to Draft NSSM 94 Paper
1. Appended for your consideration are my two proposed
inputs to the draft paper responding to NSSM 94. As indicated,
the first comes at the end of the present introduction; the second
after paragraph one of Section D. If my argument is bought, we
may have to do further surgery on the remainder of Section D,
but this is a matter we can discuss in more detail at our 3 June
meeting.
2. 1 am sending copies of this memorandum and its two
attachments to our colleagues enumerated below.
George A. Carver, Jr.
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs
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Copies
DCI/S AVA:GACarver:taw: 2June 1470
to: Distribution:
Orig. - Addressee w/attc & copies as stated
1 - VAS Chrono w/o atts
I +GAC Chxone w/o atti
Diplomatic Initiatives on Indochina watts
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acd_on to pad c 3 ;~_ .ro uc~ior_;
pursuit of the aims outlined above will not be easy, and
any - eal st c discussion of serious diplomatic initiatives develo wed
to ac ieve them must take cognizance of certain intractable givens
the problem. One of these givens, and perhaps the most
t ac able, is the fact that the Vietnamese Communists are not
interested in or willing to think about negotiations, cease-fires,
c.e-escalation of the fighting or even the withdrawal of U. S. troops
as ends in themselves. For four decades the Vietnamese Communist
.. arty:had the objective of acquiring political control over all of
Vietnam plus some form of party-oriented hegemony over Laos and
Cambodia. The Party's immediate objective is the acquisition of
political power in South Vietnam. In the present climate, the
Politburo leadership is not likely to negotiate seriously or respond
to diplomatic initiatives of any nature unless it believes that doing
so may help further the achievement of this basic objective. There-
fog:e the mechanics of possible J. S. initiatives or the channels used
to i n]p.,lement them, in Hanoi's eyes, will be far less important than
the substance of our political position taus conveyed.
if Hanoi estimates, on the basis of any such overtures, that
we may be ready to give the Commun-sts a solid share of political
ow in South Vietnam, .lon with fairly strong security guarantees
for their a.p~ a::atus and their followers, Hanoi may be responsive.
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c_^_G1 e sti:.-nate that we Wish oi-Jy to discuss substance thaz
:_anoi considers ;:anta-mount to surrender. -- e.
Vietrarniz .lion or the continued existence of the Saigon government. --
.~_c. not is not likely to be r%.ccDtive. Under these circumstances
Ianoi would almost certainly opt not to respond positively but,
-nstead, to continue the struggle by one means or another on the
assumo;:ion that Communist prospects for prevailing on the battlefield
will improve as the U. S. curtails its troop strength and level of
involvem en t.
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nor; her paragra~ : I in Sac;,--'o_ D:
2. When weighing the advantages, disadvantages and probably
outcome of various initiatives, however, the cautionary note sounded
in AN paper's introduction should not be forgotten. At the present
time and in the present climate the prospects for successful
international negotiations on Indochina are very dim, primarily
because of the gulf between the objectives of the two m. ajor protag"anists.
On the one hand, Hanoi seeks to bring down the present government
in Saigon, to install a successor regime more amenable to the
Con:, ;unists, and eventually to bring the entire country under
Communist control. Hanoi might be willing to accept some interim
political arrangements in South Vietnam which do not require the
prior overthrow and dismantlement of the present government, but
so far the Communists have refused to concede that the GVN even
has a role in a political settlement. In effect, Hanoi has insisted
that dismemberment of the GVN is a "non-negotiable" pre-condition.
to even serious talk of settlement.
3. On the other hand, the Communists see little inclination
on the U. S. /GVN side to negotiate about the political issues they
consider fundamental. So . ar as Hanoi is concerned, allied proposals
to date are all aimed at perpetuating a staunchly anti-Communist
red me in South Vietnam that as a free hand to continue killing
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c'~ fives cf the two sides, -ere is little hope that in_ternation a
c s, regardless of their format or the participants, w:-_
be successful in achieving a settlement of the war.
'-. There are also two time-linked considerations germane
to the subjects treated in this paper. First, Hanoi is almost certain
to be coldly unresponsive to any negotiation or conference overtures
floated in the immediate or near tarm future. in Hanoi's eyes, major
considerations of wce and image would inevitably be involved. Hanoi
would reckon (probably correctly) that any North Vietnamese
acceptance of a negotiation or conference overture -- however
abstractly tempting -- that was tendered soon after the withdrawal
of U. S. troops from Cambodia would be widely regarded in South
Vietnam, and the world at large, as an admission of Vietnamese
Co.: mun_ist weakness and a vindication of the thesis. that Hanoi was
vulnerable to military pressure.
Secondly, Hanoi's present hard nosed position on the
whole subject of negotiated settlement is rooted in the assumption
or calculation that, despite current adversity, Communist prospects
in South Vietnam are going to improve over time, particularly as the
U. S. curtails the size of its forces and extent of its direct involvement
___ t he struggle. Thus Hanoi is presently prepared to wait us out on
t e a tlefield (esti sating its staying power as greater than ours)
unless or until we glue clear signs of readiness to dive Hanoi the
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C C:: c io 1 is Of Course subject to modification, but the CO:?si:'e:= ..i:Ons
;ail. of dictating such modification will .'nave to 1_e in _anoi's own
reading of the course of events and the evidence derived there-from.
This calculation or assumption will alrnost certainly be reviewed -
;,rough not necessarily revised -- when Hanoi nets out the gains and
losses to its position and long term prospects in light of the U. S.
venture into the Cambodian sanctuaries. (Hanoi will frame such
an evaluation in light of its, not our, calculus, but it will unquestionably
considerations such as a major loss of essential stockpiles the
.oppositio
m__aus. column and ones such as the sharp rise in vocal
to the war the U. S. in the plus column.) Hanoi may well come
to t ha point where it considers the respite that could be affored by
a cease-fire or some less than optimam negotiated settlement would
outweigh- the theoretical long term advantages of continued struggle.
But Hanoi has not reached that -Point yet, nor does it appear likely
to do so in the reasonably near future.
.,"il y ':.hat an international
Thus, we must consider the n joss i'oi t,
conference simply cannot be arranged at the present ti -e. /Pick ap
tart from old paragraph 2, renumbering paragraphs that follow. /
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