WEEKLY VIETNAM INDICATORS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T01719R000100030006-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 16, 2001
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: May 9, 1970
• Content Type: PERRPT

? Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80T01719R000100030006-5
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WEEKLY VIETNAM INDICATORS
Week Ending 9 May 1970
NSA Declassification/Release Instructions on File.
For the President Only
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Tip SJ, ,
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SOUTH VIETNAM WEEKLY INDICATORS
1968-1970
Weekly average for each month
1968 1969 11970
500
400
300
200
100
500
400
300
200
100
6000
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
1000
800
600
400
200
0
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
60%
50
40
30
20
10
J FMAMJ JASOND
J F MAMJ J AS OND
J FMAMJ j ASOND
J FMAMJJ ASOND
JFMAMJJ ASOND
500
400
300
200
FEBRUARY? MAY 1970
Weekly data as reported
February March
US BATTLE DEATHS increased markediy to 160 from
May last week's 123.
100 -
0 1111111 II 111111 111111
7 14 21 28 7 14 21 28 4 11 18 25
500
400
300
200
SOUTH VIETNAMESE BATTLE DEATHS
6000
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
0
7 14 21 28 7 14 21 28 4 11 18 25 2
9
INFILTRATORS DETECTED IN PIPELINE
March ,April May
1000
800
600
400
200 -
7 14 21 28 7 14 21 28 4 11 18 25 2 9
bhio,
rose sharply to 481 contrasted
to last week's 300. The official
total will change as late reports
are received and will be lower
than figures released to the
press by the GVN.
remained at zero for the third
week. The total number of
infiltrators detected since
23 October 1969 stands at
some 59,000 to 60,500.
ENEMY-INITIATED INCIDENTS reflected the enemy's con-
April May tinuing, limited current
offensive as they increased
again to 987 from last
week's 918.
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
60%
50
40
30
20
10
I 14 21/
7 14 21 28
4 1
2 9
ENEMY KILLED IN ACTION
April May
SOUTH VIETNAMESE EFFECTIVENESS
Morcb MaY
7 14 21
4 21 28 4 11 18 25 2 9
Statistics for the latest week shown are preliminary
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
climbed to 5,898, significantly
higher than last week's 3,415.
as measured by the percentage
of enemy killed by RVN
forces rose again to 66%
over last week's 62%.
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Enemy Activity
This week, higher levels of enemy activity in the northern
provinces of South Vietnam highlighted the current phase of stepped-
up Communist activity. The enemy will probably attempt to continue
his offensive for at least another week or so by mounting attacks
in widely scattered areas, though the individual attacks themselves
will probably not be on a large scale. Harassment by fire, including
sporadic rocket attacks against major cities, will probably also con-
tinue.
In north Laos, the situation remains quiet with government
guerrillas encountering little resistance as they move out of their
enclaves. To the south, however, the Communists have continued at-
tacking government positions near the Bolovens Plateau. A Lao
government decision to evacuate non-combatants from Saravane probably
presages the loss of this province capital as further Communist at-
tacks in the area are anticipated.
Allied operations into Communist sanctuaries in Cambodia are
generally encountering only light resistance. In about one week,
these operations in Cambodia have resulted in the seizure of more
enemy supplies and materiel than has been captured in ,South Vietnam
during the entire past year. Deeper inside Cambodia, however, the
Communists have increased their harassment of government positions
and lines of communication across a wide front.
Enemy Infiltration
The apparent standdown of troop infiltration into South Vietnam
carried into its fifth week with only a few small "QL" groups, prob-
ably composed of specialists, detected since 8 April. The current
lack of detections suggests that the pattern of last year's rainy
season is being repeated. Less than 4,000 infiltrators were ob-
served entering the pipeline from May through September 1969.
South Vietnam Developments
The disturbances in Saigon have subsided temporarily following
the government's crackdown against the dissidents last week but the
basic causes of the malaise remain, and the situation is still poten-
tially inflammable. Our Station in Saigon summarizes the situation
in the following way: Opposition to the Thieu government has grown
over the last six months, spurred by an unfavorable economic situa-
tion and given added impetus by a long series of other troublesome
issues. Disturbances in Saigon during the last two weeks contributed
to an atmosphere of disquiet and raised apprehensions among Vietnamese
that a more serious disruption of public order may be in the offing.
Agitation has thus far been centered largely in Saigon, but should
it spread to other areas of the country, the equilibrium of Thieu's
administration could be threatened. The discontent has culminated
in the protest of the students, who, with the help of some outside
instigation, have persisted in their anti-government agitation
despite repeated government attempts to conciliate them. The recent
Buddhist confrontation between the rival An Quang and Quoc Tu factions
has added a further unstabilizing element and threatens to embroil
the government in a religious controversy not of its making. In
addition, the Supreme Court's three recent rulings against the govern-
ment have served to give further ammunition to the opposition and
damage the government's image. However, the opposition is still
fragmented and continued U.S. support should deter anyone of a mind
to move against the Thieu government. The more forceful action taken
recently against demonstrators may also act as a deterrent against
further disorders. In addition, government moves into Cambodia have
served to raise the morale of the military, which had been showing
increasing signs of discontent over economic difficulties. Recognizing
that the government's position is still not strong and that any further
disturbances or a worsening of the economic situation would have an
additional weakening effect, we still believe, on balance, that the
Thieu government will weather the current storm, but the prospects
for the long term are not so clear.
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Top Si;
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