COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF THE VIETNAM AND LAOS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T01719R000100170011-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 23, 2001
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: September 26, 1973
• Content Type: PERRPT

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No Foreign Dissem
NSA & DIA Declassification/Release Instructions on File
Q srerES or W S7A7E5 01
Thirty-First Report
COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF THE VIETNAM AND LAOS
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS
(This report covers the period from
19 September through 25 September 1973)
This memorandum has been prepared jointly by the
Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense.
Handle via Comint Channels
Secret
25
26 September 1973
SC No. 07807/73
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WARNING
This document contains classified information affecting the national security
of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, US Code
Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798.
THIS DOCUMENT MUST BE KEPT IN COMMUNICATIONS
INTELLIGENCE CHANNELS AT ALL TIMES
It is to be seen only by personnel especially indoctrinated and authorized
to receive COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE information within the
Government to which transmitted; its security must be maintained in ac-
cordance with COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE REGULATIONS.
No action is to be taken on any COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE
which may be contained herein, regardless of the advantages to be gained,
unless such action is first approved by the Director of Central Intelligence.
Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence
Sources and Methods Involved
a-Ifi,d by 014522
E.emof Irom declasdficadon
le f E. a p _:shed:
0. 11692, m, ?SB (1 Aomlma imllyl dedoseiliede ?r r 1
Dese Impossible to Dot,,,),.
Iunless mpossible, insert dnto or ovens)
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SECRET SPOKE
26 September 1973
Thirty-First Report
COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF THE VIETNAM AND LAOS
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS*
(This report covers the week from
19 September through 25 September 1973)
The Key Points
With the onset of the dry season, North Viet-
namese infiltration of combat troops to the
south has resumed on a substantial scale.
Information received during the week has led
to an increase in our estimate of total North
Vietnamese infiltration to the south since 27
January from 57,000 men to more than 63,000
men.
The North Vietnamese are continuing their pre-
parations to resume the large scale use of the
Ho Chi Minh trail in southern Laos during the
coming dry season.
Recent evidence indicates that the North Viet-
namese are planning to augment their logistic
capabilities in northern South Vietnam by ex-
panding their port facilities in the Dong Ha/
Cua Viet area of Quang Tri Province.
Although combat activity was generally low in
both South Vietnam and Laos, Communist forces
in a sizable offensive operation overran an
ARVN ranger camp west of Pleiku during the week.
* This report has been prepared jointly by the
Central Intelligence Agency and the Department
of Defense.
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The Details
NOTE: This is the thirty-first in a series of memo-
randa summarizing evidence received during the re-
porting period of (I) Communist efforts to infil-
trate new manpower and military materiel toward and
into South Vietnam, (II) Communist-initiated combat
activity in violation of the Vietnam and Laos settle-
ment agreements, and (III) other developments af-
fecting Communist military capabilities in Indochina.
As with previous issues, we have prepared sections
I and II of this memorandum in sterilized form in
order to minimize the risk of source exposure if
parts of the memorandum are used outside U.S. Gov-
ernment channels. For U.S. eyes only, we have ap-
pended a listing of specific sources to sections I
and II at ANNEX A. Section III of the report has
not been sterilized. Its contents should be held
within the U.S. Government, and within the proper
channels for material so classified.
I. Infiltration and Redeployments of North Viet-
namese Personnel and Military Supplies
A. Personnel Infiltration and Redeployments
1. North Vietnamese combat infiltration to
the southern war zones has resumed on a substantial
scale now that the dry season is about to begin
again in much of Indochina. During the past week,
four new regular combat groups were reported en-
tering the infiltration pipeline in North Vietnam,
substantiating earlier evidence that the southward
movement of troops was to start again. Two of these
groups are destined for the northern half of South
Vietnam while the other two are traveling to southern
Laos. The last regular combat group detected starting
its trip south left North Vietnam in mid-July. In
addition to these southward-moving groups, one regular
combat group was identified entering the pipeline in
North Vietnam apparently destined for northern Laos.
2. Three other southward-moving combat groups
were also detected for the first time during the
week, but all of these were noted farther south in
SECRET SPOKE
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Communist and South Vietnamese Regular Combat Forces in South Vietnam
VC/NVAI
325th
324B
320B
304th
711th
2nd
VNMC
Airborne
1st
2nd
3rd
Regional
Forces
support, and air defense units and local force companies and VC/N VA R VNAF
platoons.
2. RVNAF Ground Order of Battle. Includes assigned
personnel in ARVN/VNMC ground combat and combat
and Regional Force battalions. Although
support units
,
present for duty strength is no longer available, it is estimated 320th 23rd
to be about 85% of assigned strength. 10th 22nd
3rd Regional
MR 4
VC/N VA R VNAF
26,000 88,000
429th Sapper 25th
Command 18th
9th 5th
7th Regional
5th Forces
Dao
Phu Quoc
1st 21st m%. (Kien Giang)
9th
7th
44th Special
Tactical Zone
Regional Forces
' nint V
Long:,
,ffinh
Duong
(Tarn a
Guang
Quarg
Military region boundary
Province boundary
ICCS region boundary
0 25 50 75 Miles
i l I 11 1
0 25 50 75 Kilometers
SECRET
' A ang
G,E ng tr ~'v' ~?, -irih
VII
Forces
Lnng Lath gong
Long
t Khanh
Gen
Hoa
IV
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SECRET SPOKE
the infiltration pipeline. Two of these groups are
moving toward the central coast of South Vietnam,
while the third is destined for southern Laos.
One special-purpose group--traveling to northern MR-i--
also was initially noted starting south from North
Vietnam during the past week.
3. As a result of the new information received
during the past week, we have increased our estimate
of total North Vietnamese infiltration to the south
by more than 6,000 men. We now estimate that over
13,000 North Vietnamese personnel have entered the
infiltration pipeline since the 15 June "second"
ceasefire. Nearly 12,000 of these have been combat
troops. Since the signing of the original ceasefire
agreement on 27 January, more than 63,000 North Viet-
namese combat troops and specialists have moved south
through the infiltration system. Of these, over 38,000
have started south since the ceasefire, while the re-
maining 25,000 were in the pipeline moving southward
as of that date. (ANNEX B, for U.S. eyes only, con-
tains a more detailed discussion of the information
pertaining to infiltration which was received during
the past week.)
4. In southern Laos, two new NVA regiments--
the 99th and 171st--have recently been identified
which probably are involved in the dry season pre-
parations currently underway there. Since it is not
clear whether these regiments are combat or administra-
tive services units, or whether they have recently
infiltrated or have been created from existing units
in the Laos Panhandle, we will await additional in-
formation before adding them to our order-of-battle
estimates. Evidence received during the week also
indicates that the NVA 49th Infantry Regiment has been
redesignated as a communications regiment. The con-
version of this combat regiment to an administrative
services regiment apparently occurred last June or
July, and the conversion probably reflects the Commu-
nists' desire to centralize and improve their com-
munications efforts in southern Laos for the 1973/74
dry season.
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B. Movement of Military Equipment and Supplies
North Vietnam
5. Wet weather again prevailed over much of
the North Vietnamese Panhandle during the reporting
period, but did not appear to disrupt the flow of
supplies seriously. Between 16 and 20 September at
least 125 NVA vehicles transported supplies to the
Vinh area from storage facilities in the Hanoi and
Thanh Hoa areas. Several days later on 22 September
a major logistics unit in the Thanh Hoa area report-
edly fulfilled its assigned transportation plan,
despite damage to some roads caused by the flooding
of the past month.
6. Further south in the area between Quang
Khe and the DMZ, very limited information indicated
that munitions and gasoline continued to move south-
ward through Quang Binh Province. On 17 September
a logistics unit near Quang Khe reportedly received
18 vehicles carrying ammunition from a unit near Vinh
and, on the following day,
_at least 525 tons of material remained in
storage in Quang Binh Province. On 18 September,
some 20 trucks were dispatched with gasoline from
Quang Binh Province to a storage area along the
western supply corridor in South Vietnam.
Laos and Cambodia
7. Logistics activity in the Laotian Panhandle
was light this week, but we continued to receive
evidence of impending large-scale supply movements.
Recent analysis indicates that on 11 September at
least 1,100 tons of unidentified merchandise were in
storage in the vicinity of Route 99, one of the main
north/south roads throughthe Panhandle. Five days
later on 16 September, a logistics unit was planning
to ship some 220 tons of POL to a storage area
located near the Ban Karai Pass for future distribu-
tion. In other activity, logistics units continued
their road building efforts and some units were
noted transferring rice between storage areas. No
shipments of ordnance, however, were detected moving
in southern Laos this past week.
-4-
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 Mu Gia
Pass -
A
Phum Sdo
+Ach Romeas
Chmrrtap i / \~i
C hams 9fi
/ f3an Me 41 K6m po ny Thom Thum.
GAP
411111,
Classified by 015319
exempt from Boneral
declassification schedule of E.O. 11852
Exemption satagory 58111.121A3)
Oeclassifcetion dote impossible to determine
Names and boundary representation
are not necessarily authoritative
South Vietnam
and
North Vietnam Panhandle
Province boundary
Military region
International Commission
of Control and Supervision
region boundary
Road
Railroad
- POL pipeline
25 50 75 Mi les
0 25 50 0 75 Kilometers
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
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South Vietnam
8. NVA logistics units again shipped sizable
quantities of rice, fuel and construction material
through northern South Vietnam this past week, pre-
sumably for both civilian and military purposes.
The only information received during the reporting
period involving a sizable ammunition shipment came
from a 13 September report which indicated that about
105 tons of ammunition had been loaded on trucks in
northern Quang Tri Province during an unspecified
time period. Possibly related to this was the
sighting of 72 trucks along the northern portion of
the Communists' new western supply corridor, also on
13 September.
9. Activity since that date has followed the
normal recent pattern of trucks carrying either non-
combat material or unidentified cargo. On 14 Septem-
ber, 54 vehicles carrying unidentified cargo travelled
between storage areas along the western supply cor-
ridor. Four days later on 18 September, 26 vehicles
carrying rice to Communist forces were detected
moving along this corridor. On the same day, an NVA
logistics unit in northern Quang Tri reportedly re-
quested 25 vehicles to transport construction material,
needed for building a warehouse, reflecting the Com-
munists' continuing concern with maintaining and im-
proving their logistics network in this area as the
rainy season approaches.
Ii. Communist-Initiated Combat Activity in South
Vietnam an Laos
A. South Vietnam
10. In South Vietnam, the total number of
communist-initiated ceasefire violations reported
by the South Vietnamese Armed Forces since 27 Jan-
uary, 15 June, and for the last week (19-25 Sep) are
shown below:
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Military
Region
Total Since 27
January Ceasefire
Total Since 15
June Ceasefire
Last Week
(19-25 Sep)
Major
Minor
Major
Minor
Major
Minor
MR 1
1,280
4,502
255
1,143
20
94
MR 2
503
3,422
239
1,568
23
109
MR 3
538
3,842
136
1,266
2
59
MR 4
1,021
9,248
343
3,082
27
205
Totals
3,342
21,014
973
7,059
72(72)
467(440)1/
1/ Denotes totals of previous week.
11. Some of these violations may have been
initiated by GVN forces rather than communist forces,
and it is impossible in all cases to determine the
actual instigator. The table above and the charts
on the following pages, however, do show fairly ac-
curately the trend in the amount of combat that has
occurred in South Vietnam since the ceasefire. The
fact that a combat incident occurred at a particular
time and place is generally reported accurately by
the South Vietnamese, even though the question of
who started it may not always be treated in objec-
tive fashion.
12. The most significant combat incident of
the week occurred on 22 and 23 September, when North
Vietnamese troops overran an ARVN battalion defending
the border ranger camp at Plei Djereng. (Plei Djereng
is located to the west of Pleiku town, about two-
thirds of the way from Pleiku to the Cambodian bor-
der.) South Vietnamese Air Force pilots on reconnais-
sance missions after the battle reported that they
saw eight NVA tanks on the airfield of the abandoned
camp, and survivors have stated that tanks were used
in the attack. This is the first time since the settle-
ment agreement was signed last January that the Commu-
nists have employed armor in an offensive operation.
The attack may have been in retaliation for recent ARVN
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(See Reverse Side of Page)
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 yed For Releeekf1f is jI10j*+"' rlWO&OU 1011-4
VIETNAM AS REPORTED BY RVNAF
(28 JANUARY THROUGH 31 JULY 1913)
THAL II TI N
JAN-FIB 200
0
200
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
0
XIY71 11 7
7 J 0 I S
IF&
IF, kmdo
100 0" sh. -.A III
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1:i 14 1* It il LO IV 4~ - 44 - - zu IQ 11 11 11
1:lLi u j I
200 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
100
; w " V 011 WA %I mom% 00 kawomm
0
"NEW"
CEASE-FIRE
JUL
0
200
6.000 00
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
CONFIDENTIAL
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VIETNAM AS REPORTED BY RVNAF
(1 AUGUST 1913 TO THE PRESENT)
AUG 100
SEP 100
OCT 100
2
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
I ill I
NOV 100
200 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
DEC 100
200 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
JAN 100
CONFIDENTIAL
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successes in the Trung Nghia area west of Kontum.
The elimination of Plei Djereng as a GVN strong-
point makes it easier for the North Vietnamese to
protect their logistic corridor near the Cambodian
border, and it would also strengthen Communist claims
to territorial control in this area.
13. Military activity in Laos remained at a
very low level during the past week. A small ground
action did occur during the week in Military Region
II of Laos which provoked retailiatory action by the
Royal Lao Air Force. On 24 September, a 30 man Royal
Lao Army unit about 10 miles east of Long Tieng was
hit with 13 rounds of NVA 60 mm mortar fire. The
attack caused no casualties, but in a fairly major
act of retaliation government forces directed four
T-28 air strikes against the North Vietnamese posi-
tion.
ITT. Other Developments Affecting Communist Mili-
tary Capabilities in Indochina
A. Large Stockpiles of Munitions in South-
ern North Vietnam
14. Hanoi is well along in its preparations
for moving materiel southward during the 1973-74
dry season, which normally begins in October. In-
tercepted communications received during the past
few months indicate that some 6,800 tons of munitions
have been moved into storage areas north of the
Demilitarized Zone since early July; another 1,300
tons of ordnance have been stockpiled near the Ban
Karai Pass--a major entry way into southern Laos.
The war materiel includes ammunition for almost
every weapon in the Vietnamese Communists' arsenal.
Taken together with the Communists' extensive road
construction program this summer and the deployment
of the NVA 32nd and 33rd Transportation Regiments
from South Vietnam back into southern Laos, these
stockpiles strongly suggest that the Communists will
ship large quantities of supplies through the Laos
SECRET SPOKE
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Panhandle early this dry season. Although the NVA/VC
already have large stocks of weapons and munitions on
hand in the South, the munitions reflected in the
recent messages by themselves would give the Commu-
nists a capability to sustain combat at levels as high
as have ever occurred in South Vietnam for at least
six months.
B. North Vietnamese to Expand Coastal Shipping
in Quang Tr Province
15. Communist communications of 18 September
indicate that North Vietnam intends to expand the cargo
handling capacity of coastal shipping facilities in
northern Quang Tri Province to handle a considerably
higher level of shipping from the north. The inter-
cepts record a North Vietnamese official's request
for sufficient manpower and dock equipment to in-
crease the cargo handling capacity in the Dong Ha/
Cua Viet area up to "1,000 tons per day." We estimate
that the present dock facilities in this area can
handle an estimated 700 tons of cargo per day if used
to capacity, although no more than one third of this
capacity has been used by the Communists in any recent
month.
16. Dong Ha, currently the only transshipment
facility in South Vietnam used regularly for Commu-
nist seaborne supply deliveries, has handled a large
part of the food and other supplies sent into north-
eastern Quang Tri Province since last March. Al-
though the Communists apparently intend to resume
large-scale resupply operations through Laos where
the dry season is imminent, approaching rains in
the coastal area of South Vietnam's MR-1 and the
North Vietnamese Panhandle probably make seaborne
supply delivery a more attractive means of resup-
plying this area. The rains also will raise water
levels in coastal areas, enabling larger deep-water
craft to use port facilities in the Cua Viet area.
C. Communists Move
Shortages
Vain Southern South iethm
17. An increasing volume of evidence suggests
that Communist forces in southern South Vietnam may
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face widespread rice shortages unless they are able
to obtain large quantities of rice from the fall
harvest in contested areas.
COSVN is anticipating a struggle wit the
Sou Vietnamese over several key rice-growing areas--
particularly those contested in the delta. To pro-
vide security for rice gatherers, COSVN has ordered
the deployment of combat units along the perimeter
of these areas, instructing them to "fight with the
enemy over each grain of rice."
18. More recent evidence indicates that rice
is already becoming scarce in some areas held by
the Communists. COSVN officials have complained
that since June the Khmer Communists--who are also
suffering shortages--have reduced the flow to South
Vietnam of Cambodian-grown rice. Moreover, crops
grown on newly cultivated land under Communist con-
trol in southern South Vietnam apparently have not
met expectations. Although the Communists are still
able to purchase large quantities of food from local
markets in South Vietnam, efforts by the South Viet-
namese government to prevent such activity report-
edly are beginning to have some effect.
19. The most pressing problem for the NVA/VC
is in northern MR-3, where the Communists must feed
three infantry divisions. To meet shortages in this
area, the Communists have begun to transport rice
northward from MR-4. COSVN is also urging increased
agricultural production in Communist-controlled
areas to prevent the rice shortage from growing more
serious. Underscoring the emphasis on increasing
local production, COSVN has ordered more units to
become self-sufficient and has instructed rear serv-
ices personnel to enlarge their rice stockpiles.
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Paragraphs 10 through 13: These paragraphs, which
list reports of Communist-initiated fighting
inside South Vietnam and Laos in violation of
case of South Vietnam, they
are exclusively derived from reporting
of the South Vietnamese armed forces and may
be subject to the biases inherent in RVNAF re-
porting at the present time. In the case of
Laos,. most of the reporting on combat viola-
tions comes from Laos Government commanders
who pass the information to American officials
at the Military Region Headquarters level. In
any case, there is no particular security
problem associated with'using the information
in these paragraphs in discussions with the
North Vietnamese.
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W
Post-Ceasefire Infiltration of North Vietnamese
Personnel to the South
1. During the past week, the first indications
were received that Hanoi was planning to resume
significant infiltration of combat troops to the
south. on 18 September, Binh Tram (BT) 8*--which
operates in the Vinh area of North Vietnam--in-
structed its commo-liaison stations to be ready to
receive one infiltration group per night, beginning
on 19 September. Although this message did not
specify the time frame during which the groups were
to move, forecasts of impending infiltration through
a particular binh tram in the past usually have
covered a period of one or two weeks. The last re-
gular combat group to be detected entering the pipe-
line in North Vietnam left Vinh'in mid-July.
2. The first conclusive evidence that the
North Vietnamese had actually begun to move new com-
bat troops southward was received on 22 September,
with the initial detection of Group 1069 at BT 8.
This group, which has a strength nearly 550 troops,
is traveling to the central coast of South Vietnam
(Viet Cong MR-5). Because most Communist combat
units in this area still are believed to be below
full strength, a flow of combat infiltration to VC
MR-5 would signify that Hanoi intends to bring its
present units there up to strength. During the
past week, references from the Laotian Panhandle to
Groups 1066 and 1067 also appeared in intercepted
messages; these groups probably started south from
North Vietnam within the past few weeks. As a re-
sult of these detections, we also believe that Group
1068, which we have not yet observed in communications
intelligence, probably departed North Vietnam for
VC MR-5 undetected during September.
* Until recently, Binh Tram 8 was designated Binh
Tram 18.
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SECRET SPOKE
3. On 23 September, Group 4020--destined for
Communist MR Tri-Thien-Hue in northern MR-1--was
detected moving through BT 8. This group, which
communications intelligence indicates has a strength
of 660 troops, may have been sent south to provide
replacements for the NVA 325th Division, which re-
portedly has suffered casualties in recent actions
against South Vietnamese forces. The designation of
Group 4020 suggests that three other 4xxx series
groups (4017, 4018 and 4019) have recently infil-
trated into this area undetected. Because of the
lack of data on their specific date of departure and
the current upsurge in infiltration starts, these
groups have been assigned a starting date of early
September. (The last detected group in this series--
Group 4016--was observed in the Vinh area in late
May.)
4. The third and fourth regular combat groups
initially observed in North Vietnam during the past
week were Groups 5075 and 5076, which moved through
BT 8 on 24 and 25 September. Both groups had strengths
of over 585 troops and are destined for southern Laos/
MR-559. Another new 5xxx series group--5064--was re-
ported farther south in the system on 21 September in a
message to BT 52, which operates along Route 19 in
eastern Ratanakiri Province, Cambodia, into Pleiku
Province, South Vietnam. Although the geographic
destination of this group--which probably has about
500 men--is unclear, it appears destined for either
northeastern Cambodia or South Vietnam. Because of
the unusually large number of undetected "gap" groups
between Groups 5064 and 5075, however, they will not
be added to our estimate of starts pending final
verification of 5075 and 5076. (Since the last
previously identified group number detected in the
5xxx series, however, was 5062, we have gap-filled
Group 5063--with an estimated strength of 500 men--
and included it in our estimates.)
5. In addition to these southward-moving
groups, regular Group 9037--apparently destined
for northern Laos--was detected in the BT 8 area on
19 September. The group reportedly has a strength
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SET
of 531 combat personnel. One small group (Y460)
comprised of seven specialists also was detected
at BT 8 on 23 September. This group is traveling
to MR Tri-Thien-Hue. Table 1 below summarizes in-
filtration starts of North Vietnamese personnel,
including specialists, since 1 January 1973, while
Table 2 compares infiltration starts of combat troops
to the various southern war zones since 1 September
1973 with those between 1 and 25 September 1972.
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 Approved For Release 200SI,RA-P,;WFMKE719R000100170011-4
Number of Personnel Entering the Pi eline,
Destined for South V16 nam, Southern
Laos, and Cambodia -Since-'-l January 1973
January
February
March
April
Total
20,000
10,200
3,250
1,925
May 7,175
June 2,200
July 3,650
August 2,200
September 1-25 6,050
SECRET SPOKE
Special-Purpose
1,600
2,100
2,250
1,200
Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80T01719R000100170011-4
 Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80T01719R000100170011-4
SECRET SPOKE
Comparative Infiltration Starts of Combat
Troops from North Vietnam, By Destination
1-25 September*
1972
1973
Total
4,000
6,000
MR Tri-Thien-Hue
2,500
2,000
MR-5
1,500
2,000
B-3 Front
0
0
COSVN
0
0
Southern Laos/MR 559
0
2,000
* This table covers the infiltration of North
Vietnamese troops to South Vietnam, Cambodia,
and southern Laos. Infiltrators moving to
northern Laos are not included.
SECRET SPOKE
Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80TO1719R000100170011-4
 Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80T01719R000100170011-4
Secret
Secret
Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80TO1719R000100170011-4