Attacking the Vietnamese Communist's Southern Organization

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T01719R000300040003-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 22, 1998
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: March 17, 1967
• Content Type: MEMO

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SUBJECT: Attacking the Vietnamese Communists'
Southern Organization
'1. The Communist insurgency in South Vietnam is
basically a triumph of organization. The Communists
do not now have any widespread or deep-rooted emo-
tions working for them as they did in Viet Minh days
when they were able to capitalize on a pervasive
surge of nationalist sentiment and opposition to con-
tinued French rule. Nor do the Communists now have
any mass base of genuine popular sympathy. (They
were able to develop the beginnings of such a base
in the earlier years--1954-1963--but in recent years
this base has been eroding rather than growing.) What
the Communists do have is an efficient, flexible,
tightly disciplined and usually locally-rooted or-
ganization, carefully built up over a long period
of time (in some areas, over more than two decades).
It is this organization which holds the insurgency
together and keeps it going. Even if all North Viet-
namese troops and North Vietnamese logistic support
were withdrawn from South Vietnam, the Communists'
southern organization (which started the insurgency
and through which the insurgency was exclusively
waged through 1964) would remain a potentially fatal
cancer within the Vietnamese body politic.
2. The Communists' southern organization is
knit together and controlled through an elaborate,
hierarchical committee structure which runs the
People's Revolutionary Party, the name used by the
Lao Dong (Vietnamese Communist) Party south of the
17th Parallel. At the apex of the southern pyramid
the Communists have an entity known as the Central
Office for South Vietnam (COSVN), which is actually
the Central Committee of the PRP. Below COSVN, the
Communists divide South Vietnam into six regions.
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Each region, in turn, is divided into Communist
provinces (whose boundaries are not always the same
as those of the GVN's provinces), each province into
districts and each district into villages. At every
command echelon the Communists direct all of their
activities--.political, military, subversive and
terrorist-.-through a PRP committee which is sub-
ordinate to the PRP committee controlling the eche-
lon above it and which, in turn, directs the PRP
committees controlling the various echelons below
it. These directing committees vary in size and
organizational complexity (depending in part on the
command responsibilities of the echelon in question
and in part on the degree of Communist control in
the area involved). Every committee has a chairman
and a panoply of subcommittees. The number and
designation,.of these subcommittees varies from
locale to locale, but at every echelon there are
always subcommittees for military affairs, Front
(i.e., NLF) affairs, and security.* In the upper
reaches of the Communist structure, these subcom-
init:tees themselves may be large and complex bodies;
in the lower reaches (or in areas where Communist
control is weak) they may consist of only one person
or a very small group.
3. The heart of the Communists' southern organ-
ization is their network of provincial and district
committees. It is these committees which hold the
organization together and maintain the insurgency's
essential base at hamlet and village level--the base
which exerts control over the rural population and
provides the local manpower and resources (e.g.,
food) without which the insurgency would collapse.
*The chairman of the Military Affairs Subcommittee
controls all Communist military activity within
his parent committee's area of geographic juris-
diction. (At the village and district level, the
Military Affairs Subcommittee chairman is usually
the commander of the village VC platoon or district
VC company.) Similarly, the chairman of the Front
Affairs Subcommittee at each echelon directs all
NLF activity within his parent committee's geo-
graphic jurisdiction. The Front has an organiza-
tional structure which parallels the PRP structure,
and is controlled by it at every echelon.
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The success and even the continuation of the Com-
munist insurgency depends directly on the perform-
ance, morale and effectiveness of these committee
cadre, particularly at district and provincial levels.
These committee cadre constitute the target group
addressed in this paper.
4. In terms, of numbers, the target we are talk-
ing about is relatively small. The activities of
all the Communists' regional, provincial and dis-
trict committees throughout South Vietnam are prob-
ably directed by something less than.10,000 people.
Virtually all of these are ethnic southerners,
though most of them were trained in North Vietnam
and infiltrated back into the south, usually to
their native areas. It is through these southern
Party members that the Lao Dong,and Hanoi control
the southern insurgency. It is these southerners
who would remain even if all North Vietnamese troops
should leave the country.
5. This target cadre group constitutes the Com-
munists' greatest source of strength, but also their
area of greatest vulnerability. Losses among this
cadre group--whether by death, capture or, particu-
larly, defection--constitute blows at the vitals of
the Communist movement. Thus efficient and effective
attacks on this target produce maximum results for
GVN and allied effort expended.
6. A successful attack on the Communists'
southern organization requires (a) precise target
intelligence and, (b) effective action based on that
intelligence. The intelligence required includes
the names and physical descriptions of the regional,
provincial and district PRP committee members, the
aliases or disguises they employ, where they live,
where they work, their movement patterns, their
backgrounds (e.g., schools, professions, interests,
associates, friends, etc.), the names, descriptions
and locations of their families and relatives, and
the channels of access through which these target
personalities can be reached. The object of all ac-
tion taken against such target personalities is to
detach them from the Viet Cong organization by
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inducing and accomplishing their vQluntary defection
(the optimum method), by capture or--if neither de-
fection nor capture is possible--by physical elimina-
tion.
7. During the past year, a variety of collec-
tion programs including Provincial Interrogation
Centers, GVN Police Special Branch activity, GVN
Central Intelligence Organization activity and,
particularly, Census Grievance programs operated in
conjunction with Revolutionary Development cadre ac-
tivity have made impressive progress in obtaining
intelligence on the individuals who comprise the Viet
Cong's district, provincial and regional leadership.
Progress in this field is not uniform throughout the
country; but in many local areas, notable achieve-
ments have been recorded in obtaining intelligence
on Viet Cong leaders operating in that area--i.e.,
the Viet Cong opposite numbers of GVN provincial and
district officials. The achievements are real,
though they are hard to quantify on a national scale
with any meaningful precision, partly because much
of the intelligence gleaned remains at province and
district levels (where, at least potentially, it
does the most good) and is not reported in detail
to Saigon, let alone Washington.
8. Both the Police Special Branch and, par-
ticularly, the Special Operations Corps of the Cen-
tral Intelligence Organization are endeavoring to
develop penetrations of the Viet Cong organization
at district, provincial and regional level, pene-
trations which will not only serve to provide new
intelligence and authenticate intelligence received
from other sources, but will also provide mechanisms
through which defection operations can be mounted.
A number of such penetration operations have already
been initiated. Efforts are constantly underway to
improve them by continued review and assessment of
each case and cross-checking of its production with
information or intelligence obtained from other
sources. On the books, there are 107 going cases
and approximately 250 developmental cases which are
currently being vetted. This figure is constantly
changing, but provides the base from which new pene-
trations develop.
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9. The GVN has made considerably more progress
in collecting intelligence on the Viet Cong pro-
vincial and district organizational structure than
in taking effective action against identified mem-
bers Of that structure. General pressure has been
exerted on that structure by improved police opera-
tions, by the US Marine Corps' "Couhty.Fairs" in
I Corps, and by integrated police-military-intelli-
gence operations such as Operation FAIRFAX in the
Saigon area. In terms of pinpoint operations,
against precise VC organizational targets, the
Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRUs) have proven
themselves an increasingly effective instrument.
These units, generally not more than eight to ten
men (all intensively trained) both can and do operate
in Viet Cong territory. Utilizing intelligence col-
lected by other sources such as the Census Grievance
Program and intelligence collected by their own ef-
forts, PRU teams are extensively used in operations
designed to capture or, when capture is impossible,
ambush Viet Cong cadre.
10. At the present time, there are three major
classes of obstacles which hamper our attack on the
Communists' southern organization. First, although
there has been a significant increase in relevant
intelligence information, much of this information
is imperfectly exploited, analyzed, and collated.
While American intelligence organizations are gen-
erally well-coordinated, considerable work remains
to be done in improving the cooperation among the
various Vietnamese military police and civilian;
entities with intelligence collection functions
and in making a total intelligence product avail-
able to Vietnamese action agencies. These prob-
lems are more serious in some areas than others and
are generally more pronounced at district rather
than province level, but they do significantly
hinder present action against the Viet Cong target.
11. Secondly, Viet Cong security practices pre-
sent a formidable obstacle to our efforts to reach
key figures in the Viet Cong organization. The Com-
munists are past masters in the art of clandestine
operations, including the use of aliases, clandestine
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meetings, frequent movement, and the whole profes-
sional paraphernalia of covert activity. The Viet
Cong are well aware of the importance of their cadres
and the need to protect them against blandishments
as well as simple bodily harm. The Viet Cong tend
to coddle their important leaders in matters of
personal safety and the Communists' inverted pyra-
mid of bodyguards reaches impressive numbers when
a provincial or regional officer is being protected.
12. Thirdly, with the exception of some PRU teams,
GVN elements lack the ability to reach important mem-
bers of the Communist organization. The police, as
now constituted, are incapable of penetrating VC-
held areas. Nor, considering the slow growth of
Police Field Forces, is it likely they will have
such a capability on the national scale in the. near
future. Similarly, efforts to recast elements of
the Regional Forces and Popular Forces into a na-
tional constabulary are beset by a variety of obvious
difficulties. Military sweeps do provide a shield
for the National Police who, when armed with well-
drawn black lists provided by a variety of intelli-
gence sources, can screen the population in swept
areas and do some separating of the sheep from the
goats. The level of VC cadre apprehended in this
manner, however, is rarely much above that of ham-
let or village committee. Provincial and district
Communist leadership is generally far too well pro-
tected to be surprised by the ponderous movements
of a conventional military sweep.
13. Police action, expanded Chieu Hoi programs,
and even some military sweeps can make inroads into
the Viet Cong cadre structure at village level and
below at a pace which should accelerate as security
grows in the countryside. General government suc-
cess and military pressure will also contribute to
a weakening of Communist cadre morale at this level
and make such cadre ever more susceptible to GVN
blandishments. The district, provincial and re-
gional Communist leadership, however, will continue
to be another matter. These cadre have a higher po-
sition to protect and are more steeped in and subject
to Party discipline, which can be counted on to keep
the majority in place. Furthermore, the higher one
goes in the Communist hierarchy the greater will be
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the sense of outlawry, the greater the estrange-
ment from or hostility toward the GVN, and the
greater the relu ;:;ance to expect conciliatory treat-
ment from the GVN or its agents. In addition, even
when cadre at the district or provincial level are
disaffected with the Viet Cong movement, they may
not know how to disengage or turn themselves over to
the government.
14. A continuation of all the various forms of
pressure now being exerted on the Communists plus
continued GVN progress in the pacification/Revolu-
tionary Development field and in the creation of na-
tional political institutions should increasingly
hamper Communist effectiveness, lower Communist
morale and improve the general climate for work
against the Communists' southern organization at all
levels. A wide range of GVN rural actions already
in train, particularly if integrated with an ex-
panded Chieu Hoi program, will augment the drain on
the lower rungs of the Viet Cong hierarchy. Work
against the upper (i.e., COSVN) level hierarchy is
a difficult, highly specialized task requiring sep-
arate consideration. Our attack on the district,
provincial and regional levels of the Communist or-
ganization can be considerably enhanced by efficient
execution of the actions outlined below.
15. First, we must improve the collation, inte-
gration and exploitation of intelligence already in
hand or available through already existing collec-
tion channels, particularly at the district (sub-
sector) level. This is really a more immediately
urgent task than that of acquiring new collection
25X1X7
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16. This does not mean that we should try
mechanically to establish duplicate centers in every
district in South Vietnam. Instead, there should be
a province by province analysis of local coordina-
tion problems and the means best suited to solve them
in that province and its districts. Since the optimum
means in each area will be determined by the status
of -local programs in that area and the calibre of the
locally-assigned people operating them, what works
best in province X or district A will not necessarily
be the best solution for province Y or district B.
Nor should we devote the same degree of effort in
all provinces. Instead, we should concentrate ini-
tially in those areas where the operational climate
and assets available (including effective GVN offi-
cials) provide the best environment in which to work.
17. Secondly, in view of the need for an effective
instrument capable of attacking the Viet Cong organ-
ization on a province-by-province basis, it is essen-
tial that on urgent effort be made to develop an ef-
fective, well-trained constabulary force. This con-
stabulary would combine various elements such as
Regional Forces, Popular Forces, Police Field Forces,
and the PRUs into a body which could take effective
action on intelligence produced by the Police Special
Branch, CIO, Census Grievance program and all other
collection sources.
18. Basically, operations aimed at individual VC
leaders are appropriately the responsibility of the
police, or of a provincial constabulary structure
such as that sketched above. The PRUs have, in ef-
fect, filled a void created by the weakness of the
GVN's present provincial police structure. The
PRUs can continue to function effectively as a
specialized arm of a provincial constabularly but
they can never become a satisfactory substitute for
it.
19. The primary objective of PRU teams is the
capture of selected, identified Communist cadre.
Heavy emphasis is placed in PRU training on kidnap
techniques and methods of escorting prisoners through
hostile territory. This training has produced an
expertise which permits PRUs to operate in Viet Cong
areas, to ambush when capture is impossible and in
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the process to collect intelligence. This training,
however, has produced another critically important
capability, namely the ability to provide a means
through which a disaffected Viet Cong can be.phys-
ically contacted and escorted to safety, a means
through which he can defect.
20. Defection, not capture, of VC leaders should
really be our prime objective. The killing or the
arrest of a Communist official can have the effect
of a closing of ranks for his comrades; but should
he defect he leaves behind ripples of doubt and sus-
picion among his superiors, his peers and his sub-
ordinates.
21. Defection operations at province and dis-
trict level require the closest kind of supervision,
coordination and expert local direction. From the
wealth of intelligence data that we have, primarily
that from Census Grievance sources, we can discover
the location of the wife, mother or father of a VC
leader on whom conventional psychological warfare
approaches and showers of Chieu Hoi leaflets might
be wasted. We know, or can learn, a great deal
about him and his background from his neighbors or
boyhood friends. At this point we-come to grips
with the peculiarities of the Vietnamese psyche.
The divisiveness, suspicions, and jealousies that
complicate our dealings with our Saigon allies,
fortunately, are personality characterisics of the
enemy as well. The policy of downgrading provin-
cial cadres to district and district level officials
to village level cannot help but ruffle feathers
among some of those shifted and offers a fulcrum
for exploitation. Penetration reporting regularly
reveals internal jealousies, antipathies and gen-
eral backbiting among the Party officials, on per-
sonal rather than ideological grounds. Similarly,
the intense sense of family identity is a stout
bridge to use to dissuade the VC relative to return--
particularly when the fight is so evidently not going
well. Clergy. or friends can be used as go-betweens
to either the family or the target himself. In
other instances, police. or constabulary, teams (in-
cluding PRUs) could handle the communications into
safe haven and stand willing to see the defector
safely into GVN hands. Protection from VC reprisals
on the way out has been a major concern in almost
every defection engineered in this fashion.
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22. Within each province, all sources of intel-
ligence should be continually screened and collated
to sort out the personality targets of sufficient
status and interest to warrant individual attention.
Stature alone should not be the sole criterion, some
reasonable prospect of access or issue for exploita-
tion must exist: family relationships., hard data on
fixed location or on regular routes of movement,
intimations of disaffection, internal Party troubles,
etc.
23. Once the screening process has identified a
valid target, however, the decision must then be-,
made on the optimum.. instrument : for reaching that
target and detaching him from the Communist organiza-
tion. Then, when the decision is made, it must be
translated into action. All of this requires the
kind of coordinating staff now seldom found at dis-
trict level, a..staff: which can be created within
the framework of a constabulary structure,-designed
for effective provincial operations with U.S. advice
and support.
24. For security's; sake, but also to enhance the
chances for success, the staff should be kept small,
informal and directly responsible to the province
chief. Its nature and composition should be tailored
to each province',s individual needs and assets.
Should such staffs be created by a Saigon-imposed
national directive, their establishment might well
result in a pro forma bureaucratic exercise. They
should be created on a province-by-province basis
without initial reference to a national program.
As the executive agent for civil and military matters
for his province, the province chief's total support
is mandatory; if it is not forthcoming, the staff
will not function. We are certain that General
Thang, the Minister of Revolutionary Development,
would give his blessing and support to such activity,
however, knowing it to be generated province by
province in much the same way that the Census
Grievance program was built.
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