The Impact of Events Since 8 May 1972 on North Vietnamese Capabilities to Continue the War

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T01719R000300250002-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 15, 2000
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: July 3, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

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No Foreign Disrein
Sensitive
Intelligence Memorandum
The Impact of Events Since 8 May 1972 on
North Vietnamese Capabilities to Continue the War
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TCS No. 3895/72
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
3 July 1972
THE IMPACT OF EVENTS SINCE 8 MAY 1972 ON
NORTH VIETNAMESE CAPABILITIES TO CONTINUE THE WAR
1. Almost two months have passed since the U.S.
began its present campaign to interdict North Viet-
namese imports and to bomb those targets in North
Vietnam which contribute directly to Hanoi's war-
making potential. In the course of these two months,
the ground and air war has also continued in the
South. Both friendly and enemy forces in South
Vietnam have taken substantial losses, but the
losses of Communist forces have clearly been the
heavier. The following paragraphs discuss, in sum-
mary form, the effects which these developments are
likely to have on North Vietnam's ability and deter-
mination to carry on the war over the next several
months.*
2. As many as 40 percent of the enemy's infantry
regiments committed to the current campaign in South
Vietnam may at present be temporarily combat ineffec-
tive or at best marginally effective. North Vietnamese
armor and artillery forces have also suffered heavy
losses since 30 March, losses which in many cases are
not immediately replaceable.
'Foxy'-more deta Zed analyses and back-up data on many
of the key points covered in this summary memorandum,
see the earlier CIA memoranda of 8 June 1972 and 27
June 1972 (Ref, nos, TCS-2677/72 and TCS-2679/72)n
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3. High casualties among experienced officers,
NCO's and cadres have unquestionably weakened NVA
combat units. The Communists during the past dry
season infiltrated enough troops to bring their units
up to strength and expand their force structure, and
to replace--in terms of raw numbers--most of the
losses suffered to date by their units. Almost all
of the replacements are inexperienced, however, and
many are poorly trained and motivated.
4. Although Communist offensive capabilities
relative to the ARVN have been significantly weak-
ened, where enemy forces turn to a defensive role
and are well dug in, they may make it very difficult
for the South Vietnamese to regain areas which have
come under Communist control during the current of-
fensive.
5. Certain changes are likely to occur in the
pattern of enemy activity in coming weeks. In north-
ern MR 1, big-unit engagements will continue. Else-
where, the recent shift of enemy units from northwest
MR 3 to areas south and west of Saigon and the partial
redeployment of units away from Kontum in the high-
lands suggest that Hanoi may avoid big-unit engage-
ments and concentrate relatively more on attempting
to make inroads into populated rural areas during
the remainder of the campaign.
6. Such a change in emphasis would be consistent
with an expectation on Hanoi's part that some kind of
cease-fire may be negotiated in the next few months.
The enemy would wish to occupy as much territory as
possible--without necessarily attacking district or
provincial towns--before a cease-fire occurred.
II. Effects of the U .S. Interdiction and Bombing
. Programs
7. By the time the current interdiction program
against North Vietnam began on 8 May, the Communists
had already moved enough supplies through their lo-
gistic system to support periodic high levels of of-
fensive action in South Vietnam for several months--
and probably until the beginning of the next dry
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season (October. 1972). Except for certain important
items such as tanks and heavy artillery, the avail-
ability of supplies is not a key element in our. judg-
ment concerning the diminished capabilities of enemy
main force units in South Vietnam. The Communists'
personnel losses, the pounding they have taken on the
ground and from the air, and the consequent degradation
of morale in many units are all far more important
factors than supply stock levels.
8. The principal logistic constraints now facing
the enemy within South Vietnam derive from the weather
(except in northern MR 1) and the difficulty of moving
supplies into forward battle areas in the face of
Allied air and ground operations.
9. The mining of North Vietnamese harbors has
effectively cut off practically all of North Vietnam's
seaborne imports, and almost certainly will continue
to do so. Some supplies, primarily carried on East
European.. flag ships (but not those of the Soviet Union),
have been unloaded at the Chinese port of Huang Pu,
but once there they face the same difficulties in
getting to their destination in North Vietnam as do
all, overland imports. Other supplies have been off-
loaded onto lighters from a few Chinese freighters
off the North Vietnamese coast near Vinh, but the
amounts involved are small.
10. Therefore, for practical purposes almost
all of Hanoi's imports will have to come across China
by rail to the North Vietnamese border. The Chinese
rail system and inventory of rolling stock is adequate
to handle the added burden. (The Soviet Union could
conceivably initiate a large scale air-lift to trans-
port a significant portion of Hanoi's required imports,
but it.is unlikely to do so. China does not have the
capability to sustain a large scale air-lift.)
11. We estimate that North Vietnam's minimum
import requirements--both to meet its basic economic,
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needs for the next six months and to continue the
war in the South at near present levels until the
next dry season--are about 2,700 tons per day.*
12. Of this minimum daily requirement, 500 tons
would be motor gasoline. The new oil pipeline being
built from the Chinese border southward will, when
completed, probably be used exclusively for motor
gasoline, and it will have an uninterdicted capacity
to handle twice this amount. This type of Soviet-
designed military field pipeline is exceedingly dif-
ficult to interdict, because breaks in it can be re-
paired in a few hours and the necessary pumps, which
are portable, can also be quickly replaced. A suc-
cessful interdiction operation would have to break
the line on a daily basis and in many locations si-
multaneously,
13. The other 2,200 tons of Hanoi's minimum
daily import requirements for the most part must be
moved from the Chinese border by truck, since through
movement on the heavily interdicted North Vietnamese
rail system is impossible. North Vietnam has enough
trucks for this task--the estimated 2,840 trucks which
would be needed represent only 10 to 15 percent of
Hanoi's total truck inventory.
14. Whether Hanoi can in fact move the required
supplies from the Chinese border to the Hanoi area
and to destinations farther south cannot be deter-
mined from data now available. On the basis of past
experience, however, there is a strong presumption
that by mobilizing manpower (possibly including Chi-
nese), and by transporting supplies at night and using
by-pass roads or fords where bridges have been de-
stroyed, the Communists would be able to move the
minimum tonnages required.
'North Vietnam's "normal" volume of imports (i.e., the
1971 Zev9eZ) is about 6,800 tons per day, We are pre-
paring another memorandum which will spell out in de-
tail the impact on the North Vietnamese economy if im-
ports are in fact reduced to 2,700 tons per day.
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III. Impact of the Bombin
15. Aside from the widespread disruption to
transportation, the destruction of North Vietnam's
electric power and petroleum storage facilities has
been the most serious economic effect of the bomb-
ing. As of 3 July, over 75 percent of the nation's
electric generating capacity had been put out of
service. As of 30 June, we estimate that North Viet-
nam had petroleum stocks sufficient for 40 to 60
days. Fewer attacks have been made against manu-
facturing installations, but those which have been
struck rank among the most important in the modern
sector of industry, North Vietnam's only iron and
steel combine has been hit, as have the country's
largest textile and chemical plants, the only cement
plant, and one of the two largest coal-grading plants.
No attempt to repair any of these facilities has yet
been observed.
16. The damage which these facilities have suf-
fered is part of the heavy price being paid by North
Vietnam for continuing the war. This damage to North
Vietnam's economy probably will not directly affect
the capabilities of Communist forces in South Viet-
nam, since the North Vietnamese economy makes little
direct contribution to Hanoi's war-making capabilities.
The loss of economic facilities, however, and the re-
sulting dislocations--workers who must move to new
jobs, urban areas with little or no electricity--
may have a strong psychological impact on a war-
weary populace and some elements of the governmental
apparatus. This impact should be reinforced as the
reduction of imports forces the still undamaged re-
mainder of the economy down to even more basic levels
than at present, and as the North Vietnamese people
become more aware of the NVA's heavy casualties and
failure to achieve its objectives in the South.
17. Hanoi has given no clear indication that
the sum of its current vicissitudes has produced any
basic shifts in policy. If adequate supplies are
provided by the USSR and-China, the North Vietnam-
ese leadership may attempt to continue the struggle,
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although at a level below that of the past several
months. There are, of course, the suggestions from
Communist sources in South Vietnam that a cease-fire
is expected in the near future. This could mean that.
the Communists may now be willing to make significant
concessions at the negotiating table. Similar stories
were current in the spring of 1969, however, and the
Communists may only be engaged in a probing operation,
designed to test the degree of U.S. and South Viet-
namese flexibility over the next several months.
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