FACTORS INFLUENCING THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS IN HANOI

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T01719R000400060006-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 7, 2000
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: August 3, 1972
• Content Type: IM

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DI u2 A- F=
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SENSITIVE
3 August 1972
I N T E L L I G E N C E M E M O R A N D U M
FACTORS INFLUENCING THE DECISION--MAKING PROCESS
9"iY
SENSITIVE
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MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: FACTORS INFLUENCING THE DECISION-MAKING
PROCESS IN HANOI
Table of Contents
Paragraphs
I. PSYCHOLOGY AND BASIC ATTITUDES OF THE
NORTH VIETNAMESE LEADERSHIP . . . . . . . . 1 - l7.
II. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE BASE . . . . . . . . . 12 - 24
-Party Discipline in the North
-Popular Morale
-Manpower
-The U.S. Interdiction Campaign
III. THE SITUATION IN THE SOUTH . . . . . . 25 - 35
-The Saigon Government
-The Communist Apparatus in the SoutiL
-Developments in the Military Struggle
IV. EXTERNAL FACTORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 - 47
-Sino-Soviet Support
-The International Environment
-The U.S. Electoral Situation
-The U.S. Negotiating Position
STRIKING THE BALANCE . . . . . . . . . . . 48 -- 53
VI. THE HUMAN DIMENSION . . . . . . . . . . 54 - 64
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3 August 1972
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: FACTORS INFLUENCING THE DECISION-MAKING
PROCESS IN HANOI
I. PSYCHOLOGY AND BASIC ATTITUDES OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE
LEADERSHIP
1. Central to any analysis of the factors influencing the decision-
making process in Hanoi is an appreciation of the fact that all major
decisions -- on peace, war, basic strategy or national policy -- are
ultimately made by no more than a dozen men: the nine (possibly ten)
surviviY.- full members of the Lao Dong Party's Politburo, in whose
decision-making deliberations the Politburo's two alternate members
probably also participate. _.= This is not to contend, of course, that debate
*In order of approximate rank, the nine known full members of the Politburo
are Le Duan (the Party's First Secretary and, until Ho Chi Minh's position
is formally filled, the Party's de facto chairman), Truong Chinh, Pham Van
Dona, Pham Dung, Vo Nguyen Giap, Le Duc Tho, Nguyen DIuy Trinh, Le
Thanh Nghi, and Hoang Van Doan. The two alternate members are Tran
Quoc I-ioan (Minister of Public Security) and Van Tien Dung (Chief of Staff
of the North Vietnamese Armed Forces). Pham Hung is field director of
all Party activities in the COSVN area of South Vietnam (roughly, GVN
Military Regions 3 and 4), where he runs COSVN, the PRG/NLF and all
other political or military activity conducted by the Party in his area of
jurisdiction. Since he physically resides in South Vietnam and/or Cambodia
(moving about frequently), he would not normally be present at actual Politburo
meetings in Hanoi, though he almost certainly has a secure privacy channel
with which he can communicate with his Politburo colleagues, and vice versa.
Also, there is strong but not conclusive evidence that in addition to the nine
known or overt Politburo members, there is at least one "secret" member:
Nguyen Van Linh (who has a string of Party aliases, including Nguyen Van
Muoi, Muoi Cuc, etc. ). He has been deputy director [Continued on next page]
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on matters of broad policy or basic strategy is confined to the Politburo.
The record of the activity preceding major policy decisions in the past
strongly suggests that the issue involved was extensively discussed, and
perhaps: actively debated, at least in the Central Committee, before a
final decision was taken. But the record also makes it abundantly clear
that the discussions which count are those conducted within the Party
(not the overt governmental) structure and that the final decisions are
made in and by the Politburo. Thus when we talk about "North Vietnam' s"
will, attitudes, determination and policies we are actually talking about
the collective views and decisions of less than a dozen individuals.
2. The official line, or myth, is that Politburo decisions are
unanimous. This is almost certainly not true, though there probably is
give and take around the table until an agreed concensus is reached or
until one view (even without a formal vote) clearly has majority support.
In any event, the rule of "democratic centralism" is strongly applied.
Once decisions are reached, everyone falls into line and further debate
ceases, particularly outside the Politburo meeting room. Also, no policy
is ever avowedly scrubbed or reversed. Each new strategic tack is
described and defended as the logical, inevitable ("correct') outgrowth
of its predecessor, based on an "objective analysis of the revolutionary
situation. "
(and, occasionally, acting director) of COSVN and/or the Nambo (Southern
Region) Committee in its various bureaucratic incarnations since the early
1950s and was allegedly made a full (though covert) member of the Lao Dong
Politburo in 1967. He too, however, would normally be physically present
in South Vietnam and/or Cambodia -- not Hanoi. Brief sketches of these
twelve individuals' backgrounds and Party functions are given in this
memorandum' s annex.
*For example, the discussions in early 1959 leading to the escalation
of the fairly low level of "armed, struggle" initiated (or resun-led) in 1957
into a full-scale "war of national liberation," the December 1963 discussions
leading to the introduction of line NVA units into the South, the discussions
in the summer of 1967 leading to the big-unit attacks and initiation of
negotiations in 1968, and the discussions in the summer and autumn of
1971 leading to the Laos offensive in December 1971 and the South Vietnam
offensive launched on 30 March 1972.
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3. The nine (or ten) full members of the Politburo and the two
alternate members are not automata. Each is an individual with his
own background (unique in at least some respects), temperament, private
ambitions and personal opinions (including opinions of the other top Party
leaders). The dozen-odd men here involved all have known each other,
and worked together in a common cause, for a very long time. They do
not necessarily like each other, however. Some (e. g. , Le Duan and Le
Duc Tho, Truong Chinh and Giap) are known to have been more or less
bitter rivals in the past, and in the Politburo members' respective private
opinions and ambitions (as discussed below) there may lie at least the
dormant seeds of future discord.. But these dozen top leaders -- who
collectively constitute "North Vietnam" so far as final decisions are con-
cerned -- have much in common, particularly with respect to general
background and overall outlook.
4. One important element they all have in common is age. The
oldest full member of the Politburo (Hoang Van Hoan) is 67; the youngest
(Pham I-lung and Giap), 60. Their average age is 63, and the spread
between their ages is only seven years. In short, they are all very much
of the same generation: revolutionary students in the 1920s and full- time
Party careerists since the early 1930s. They also share the characteristic
of longevity in the Party's top echelons. Le Duan has.been a PolitL,iro
member for thirty-four years (since 1938), Truong Chinh for thirty-three
years (since 1939), i. e. , both have been on the Politburo since Franklin
Roosevelt's second term. Pham Van Dong, Giap and Le Duc Tho have all
been Politburo members for twenty-one years (since 1951. ), i. e. , since
Truman was President. Le Thanh Nghi and Hoang Van (loan have been
Politburo members for sixteen years, or since 1956 -- President Eisenhower's
first term; Pham Ilung and Nguyen Duy Trinh for fifteen years, or since
1957 -- the first year of President Eisenhower's second terns.
=The two alternate members are somewhat younger, but not much. Van
Tien Dung is 55 and Tran Quoc I-loan presumed to be about the same age.
Including them would lower the average age slightly to 61. 5 (assuming that
Moan is -indeed 55). Nguyen Van Linh is believed to be about 59. If he is
added to the nine known full members, the average age of the ten is 62. 6.
If the two alternates are then included (at 55), the average age of the entire
dozen becomes 61.3.
---The average tenure on the Politburo of the nine known full members is 21. 3
years. Tran Quoc Hoan and Van Tien Dung were named alternate members
in 1960, i. c., twelve years ago. If Nguyen Van Linh is indeed a full member,
he is by far the most junior in term of service since he is alleged to have been
promoted to Politburo membership in 1967, only five years ago.
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5. Ethnocentricity heavily laced with xenophobia is another
pronounced common trait of the Lao Dong Party's current top leaders.
Most of them speak French, some fluently; but unlike Ho Chi Minh,
none of them has spent any appreciable time abroad, especially in the
non-Communist west. As a string of senior Soviet and Chinese leaders
would almost certainly attest (at least in private), the Lao Dong leadership
takes a very dim, suspicious view of foreigners -- all foreigners -- and
has a very exaggerated notion of Vietnam's importance in the overall
scheme of world affairs. The leadership's innate predilections in this
regard have been greatly strengthened by the events of the past twenty
years --. particularly the Sino-Soviet split, which enabled Ho (with great
finesse) to play Moscow and Peking off against each other in a way that had
a profound effect on the outlook, and egos, of his Politburo colleagues and
successors, who lack Ho's personal touch, background and perspective.
Turned inward, this xenophobic ethnocentricity makes it extraordinarily
difficult for the Politburo's members to conceive of Vietnam as anything
but a single political entity united under their Party's rule. To all of them,
the very idea of a "South Vietnam" where their Party's voice is not dominant
is an anathema. This is particularly true in the case of three (possibly
four) of the Politburo's most important members, who come from what we (but
never they) call "South Vietnam": Le Duan, who heads the Party apparatus
and comes from Quang Tri;> Pham Van Dong, who runs the DRV state structure
and comes from Quang Ngai; and Pham Hung, who runs COSVN and comes
from the Mekong delta province of Vinh Long.= < The other top Party leaders
would be equally wedded to the ultimate goal of a unified!Vietnam under
Party rule, but might differ on the extent to which virtually all other
considerations should be subordinated to pursuit of its early achievement.
^Truong Chinh did of course spend several years with the Chinese Communists
during the 1930s, hence his name -- which is Vietnamese for "Long March.
Other members have traveled, some fairly often, but on relatively brief
trips and almost entirely to other Communist countries.
--`If Nguyen Van Linh, Pham Hung' s COSVN deputy, is indeed. a Politburo
member, he makes the fourth, since he was brought up in the Saigon
area.
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6. The Lao Dong's dozen-odd top decision makers obviously all
share a common background of revolutionary experience, discipline and
struggle. Perhaps less obvious but at least equally important, they all
share a common revolutionary dogma. Here we come to a key ingredient
of their common outlook that is extremely difficult for those formed in
the western intellectual tradition of post-eighteenth century "rationalism"
to comprehend. We can, and do, glibly acknowledge that the Politburo's
members are dedicated, even fanatic Marxist-Leninists. We often fail
to appreciate, however, the full consequences of this fact; namely that
the Politburo's decisions are strongly influenced by what might be termed
"religious" considerations of a kind that have not really been operative
with western statesmen since the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.
Giap and the NVA commanders molded in his image approach war much
more in the spirit of a Tilly or a Wallenstein than that of a Wellington,
a Rommel or even a Koutouzov. The Politburo members' Weltanschauung
bears much closer affinities to that of the dour elders of Calvin's sixteenth
century Geneva theocracy than to that of any we stern state's cabinet or
National Security Council.
7. The Lao Dong' s top leaders genuinely envisage Marxism-
Leninism as a process which, when correctly followed, yields absolute
truth. They see their cause as running with the gray.;- of History (with
Hegel's capital H), which to them means that -- by definition -- it cannot
successfully be resisted and is ultimately certain to prevail. Also, the
Politburo regards dissent -- i. e. , error -- very much as did Calvin or
St. Ignatius Loyola. Its members do not look on their domestic political
opponents or rivals the way Democrats view Republicans, Laborites view
Conservatives, or even Socialists view Gaullists. To the Party, political
dissent and domestic (including South Vietnamese) opposition -- again by
definition -- is a mark of ignorance or evil or both. Dissent and dissenters
are to be extirpated, not accommodated. Except for temporary tactical
considerations, Truth can never be, expected to tolerate Error, Heresy
or Heretics.
8. This is not to say that the Party's leaders are not or cannot
be pragmatic. They clearly have been and certainly are. But their
pragmatism is rooted in their theology and their long personal and
institutional experience. For one thing, the Party has persisted for four
decades during which a host of opponents, both domestic and foreign, have
come and gone: the Japanese, the Chinese Nationalists, a whole series of
French governments and six U. S. Presidents, not to mention Bao Dal,
Diem, Big Minh, Khanh, Quat, Ky and now Thieu. This has understandably
bred and fostered the conviction that the Party's institutional staying power
is considerably greater than that of any given group of domestic or foreign
opponents.
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9. At several points over the past four decades, the Party has
been in potentially serious trouble if not on the verge of defeat or
collapse. Each tin-me it has been saved or given a new chance by some
deus ex machina. The advent of Leon Blum and the Front Populaire gave
it a much needed respite from the Surete in the mid-1930s and at the end
of that decade the Japanese put the French on ice for five critical years.
Chinese Nationalist and U. S. concentration on the goal of harassing and
ultimately defeating Japan provided fresh opportunities in the early
forties, greatly augmented by the chaos. that followed Japan's precipitate
surrender. Mao's conquest of China in 1949 (giving the Vietnamese
Communists a common border with an increasingly helpful ally) saved the
Party from indefinite containment and probably defeat at the hands of the
then returned French. The erosion of French will and its collapse after
Dien Bien Phu gave them partial victory in a struggle they might not have
been able to continue much longer (if Khruschev's alleged mernoires are
to be believed). The southern struggle's burgeoning problems in 1961
and 1962 dissipated in the rising discord among South Vietnam's non and
anti-Communist factions, culminating in the overthrow of Diem. Domestic
political pressures and events in the United States ameliorated the disastrous
internal consequences of their 1968 offensives. And even now, when faced
with a mix of problems as severe as any they have ever had to cope with,
the Pal-1-y' s leaders see the candidate of one of America' s two major parties
actively campaigning for President on a platform calling for immediate
U. S. disengagement from Indochina and the cessation of all aid to the Party's
major internal rival.
10. The above record has not transformed the Politburo into a
collection of Micawbers. Its members do not plod ahead in adversity
childishly hoping that "something will turn up. " Instead, they read the
record of the past four decades as vindication of their Marxist theology.
The Party is moving with the tide of History. Its opponents, by definition,
are not. Its opponents therefore must -- again by definition -- be beset with
"internal contradictions" which, by rigorous ("correct") analysis, the
Party can exploit to avoid crippling defeat and, eventually, achieve ultimate
victory. But the Party's leaders also believe that one can stay with the
stream of History only by carefully studying and "correctly" applying Her
lessons -- which means recognizing (though never admitting) past mistakes
and avoiding any subsequent repetition. This is one reason why the Politburo
is so chary of even discussing, let alone accepting, any compromise negotiated
settlement even one that, from our perspective, looks very generous and
gives the Party a far better than even chance of ultimately dominating South
Vietnam. The Party tried the negotiated settlement route once before ---
in 1954 -- with odds that at the time seemed to verge on 100% in favor of
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complete, early success. Despite the apparent odds, that gamble proved
out in fact to be a disastrous failure. Furthermore, the leader who had to
cope directly with the immediate consequences of that failure was Le Duan,
who ran the Southern Region from 1952 through 1956. History, in short,
has taught that a negotiated settlement that does not virtually guarantee
success is a potentially dangerous pitfall, a trap that History indicates
should be avoided. Ergo (at least in considerable measure) the Politburo's
current intransigence on the subject of Thieu.
11. None of the above means that the Politburo's members are
infinitely wise, resilient, resourceful or determined. They are very
fallible human beings of limited breadth, often victims of their own dogma,
who in the past have made several major errors of judgment. It does mean,
however, that the background and attitudes with which they approach their
policy decisions are quite different from and in many respects alien to the
perspective and attitudes with which we approach our decisions. The
Politburo is composed of aging and Asian revolutionary theologues, not
relatively young systems analysts schooled in western universities. They
do not think of themselves as playing political chess, hence they are not wont
to look at the situation, ponder the loss of key pieces or assets (e. g. , their
ports) and opt to resign or offer a draw. That is simply not the way they
reason or act. Instead, as they deba.-l-e and determine their political
and military policies over the near and medium future, the Politburo's members
will assess the total mix of the various kinds of considerations outlined in
the remainder of this memorandum - - weighing the mix from their perspective,
not our S.
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II. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE BASE
12. One set of considerations the Politburo obviously must
weigh carefully involves the various factors affecting the strength,
resiliency and viability of North Vietnam -- both as a functioning
political entity in itself and as a base from which continued revolutionary
struggle in the south can be supported. In Communist terminology,
this involves assessing those factors which enable North Vietnam to
function as "the great rear" for the southern struggle.
13. Party Discipline in the North. Since the Party apparatus
is the regime's main instrument for guiding and motivating the populace,
Party discipline and responsiveness is one of the Politburo's constant
concerns. Much has been demanded of Party cadres and members over
the years. By and large, they seem to have responded satisfactorily;
but the regime's current propaganda makes it clear that they are going
to be called on for exceptional efforts in the coming months. Simultaneously,
perhaps in part as a warning to potential malingerers or wrong-thinking
"revisionists" within the Party, the regime's security apparatus has
recently been given greater prominence. The new demands are sure to
cause some grumbling in Party ranks, and implementation as usual
will not always be efficient. Still, the discipline of the Party as a whole
seems unlikely to deteriorate to any great extent -- probably not to the
point -where the regime considers its control seriously weakened, and
almost certainly not to the point where a groundswell of Party discontent
could make it impossible for the Politburo to continue its current war
policy.
14. Popular Morale. "Public opinion" obviously does not have
the political force or impact in a Communist state -- particularly North
Vietnam -- that it does in a Western democracy such as the United States,
Furthermore, over the past two decades, the Party has been very careful,
thorough and efficient in gaining control over the entire population,
silencing (or liquidating) potential critics and eliminating non-Party
channels for voicing dissent. The internal press and radio are Party/
state monopolies. There is no such thing as public debate save for the
discussion conducted in Party journals staying well within Party-dictated
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bounds. Nonetheless, public opinion -- broadly defined -- is something
the Party cannot entirely ignore. In 1956, for example, popular revulsion
at the excesses of the so-called "Land Reform" program became a decisive
factor the Party had to recognize, particularly when this revulsion
ignited a genuinely spontaneous, and highly embarrassing, peasant
revolt in Ho Chi Minh's native province of Nghe An. The Nghe An revolt
was swiftly and ruthlessly suppressed by the NVA, but the Party was
forced to trim its policy. The "Land Reform" program was called off.
Ho and Giap made public apologies, and Truong Chinh lost his position
as Party First Secretary, though not his position on the Politburo.
15. In the current phase of struggle, the North Vietnamese
populace has remained responsive to the regime's directives through years
of hardship and privation. This responsiveness is due in part to a genuine
devotion to the "revolution"; in part to the regime's tight control and its
ability to conceal some of the costs of the war from the people; and in
part also to the modest nature of the material needs that must be satisfied.
Acclimated to generations of near- subsistence living and inured to
privation in earlier phases of the war, the people have tended to
contemplate the prospect of further belt-tightening with apparent stoicism.
16. Nonetheless, pressures on morale since the start of the
March 1972 offensive have been acute. The intensity of the U. S. bombing,
and especially the mining of North Vietnamese ports, almost certainly
came as a shock. The cities have been evacuated for the second time
in a decade, and the steady trickle of inhabitants back into urban areas
attests to the hardships evacuation causes. The government's efforts
to control food distribution more tightly have also probably inspired
some unhappiness among the peasantry. Although the populace probably
knows very little about the details of the offensive itself, sufficient
information seems to have seeped through to paint a general picture of
high Communist casualties and only modest gains. Finally, the regime
has made it clear to the populace at large as well as to the Party members
that further hardships are in store in the coming months. The recent
general mobilization order will undoubtedly be read as a sign that the
government's future demands will cut closer to the bone than before.
There are some elements in the current situation that tend to stiffen
morale -- for instance anger over the U. S. bombing campaign -- but
those probably are not enough to offset the negative factors.
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17. Faced with this sort of pressure, the regime will almost
certainly have to rely more heavily on the stick than on the carrot to
get what it wants out of the people. Indeed, a general tightening of North
Vietnamese control mechanisms has been in progress for months.
Unless it gets psychologically exploitable military successes in the
south or other developments occur that can be sold to the home front
as signs of major success (e. g. , a respite from bombing), the Politburo
will have to keep a weather eye on popular morale in North Vietnam if
it wants to persist in present policies. There are as yet no signs,
however, of the kind of morale problems that of themselves could
pressure the DRV regime into a change in policy.
18. Manpower. Being an essential resource in any war effort,
manpower is obviously a matter of continuing, major Politburo concern.
In terms of raw manpower resources, it would appear that Hanoi could
sustain the war in South Vietnam at its current level of intensity for
several years. There are approximately 400, 000 men between the ages
of 17 and 25 in North Vietnam's manpower pool who are physically fit
and available for military duty. In addition, Hanoi can induct and train
the more than 100, 000 men reaching draft age each year without lowering
this reserve. While enemy losses cannot be determ._ed with any degree
of certainty, the evidence that we do have suggests that the Communists
have replaced most of their losses. According to captured North
Vietnamese troops, most of the replacements fall within the 17--to- 25 age
group, suggesting that Hanoi has not had to improvise to meet its
manpower needs or to accept marginally qualified people. Infiltration
statistics indicate that approximately 100, 000 replacements have moved
south through the infiltration pipeline since last October.
19. Despite the availability of sufficient manpower in raw
numerical terms, however, Hanoi is facing significant difficulties with
its manpower in a qualitative sense. This year's extraordinary campaign
has seriously weakened the whole structure of the NVA, a force carefully
built up during the intervening period since the heavy fighting of 1968.
Almost all infantry regiments have seen very heavy combat, and many
of them have lost such a large share of cadre and experienced troops
as to be considered combat- ineffective as regiments, even though we
continue to see elements from them engaged. A number of marginal
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regiments -- territorial regiments, training regiments, and hastily
formed regiments -- were also used this year. Many units have, for
all practical purposes, been destroyed. Large numbers of difficult-
to -organize- and- train units have also been largely destroyed. Notably,
the armored regiments appear used up, and artillery and AAA units
have also been subjected to greater losses than ever before. Hanoi
probably would need at least 18 months after this year's hard campaign
to reorganize, train, and refit its army and get it back near the level
of proficiency with which it began this year's campaign on 30 March.
20. Another major manpower constraint for Hanoi results from
the fact that the north is no longer a safe sanctuary area for battered
NVA combat units. As a result of the resumption of bombing, Hanoi
can no longer as easily and safely move its major combat forces out
of South Vietnam into rear bases in North Vietnam to rebuild and refit.
Hanoi may attempt more of its rejuvenations of combat units in the future
on or near the battlefield. The Communist. divisions that have already
gone through refitting this spring in South Vietnam following heavy losses
have not returned to their former strength. None of them has performed
well after refitting.
21. Hanoi's recent commitment of two former training regiments
with raw recruits to combat in northern South Vietnam will also reduce,
at least temporarily, its ability to turn out additional adequately trained
infantry troops. The loss may be small in terms of Hanoi's total
training capabilities, and part of it probably can be made up by other
units. If the two regiments operated on a three-month training cycle,
they probably trained only 12 battalions for infiltration this past dry
season before they themselves moved south. This is only a small part
of the more than 200 such battalions that were sent through the infiltration
system during the dry season. Nevertheless, the fact that Hanoi has
reached the point of using even a few of its training units in combat
indicates that the North Vietnamese military leadership itself regards
its manpower problems as fairly serious, and is willing to risk some
degradation of future training capabilities in an effort to meet its present
requirements.
`=The two regiments are the 48B and 64B regiments of the 320th Training
Division. They have been fightir,.g in northern MR 1 since late June.
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22. The U. S. Interdiction Campaign. Another factor bearing
heavily on decision-making in North Vietnam in coming months will be the
views and attitudes of North Vietnam's leaders concerning the present U. S,
interdiction campaign. The North Vietnamese almost certainly expect the
campaign to continue through the U. S. elections in November; they probably
believe it will last a good deal longer than that if President Nixon. is re-
elected. As we estimated earlier, in purely material terms the interdiction
campaign poses obstacles to the Communist war effort that are very serious
but probably not insurmountable. ~1< The Communists probably have sufficient
stocks of military equipment in and near South Vietnam to support periodic
high levels of offensive action for several months. We lack sufficient data
to determine precisely current levels of imports, but there is good evidence
that substantial amounts of supplies are moving across the Sino-North Viet-
namese border. If the North Vietnamese can provide for most of their food
needs from internal sources, we estimate that they have the capability to
move sufficient tonnages overland from China to satisfy at least their
minimum. import requirements and to continue supporting the war in the
south at a high level.
23. On the food problem, the North Vietnamese probably have on
hand enough food to meet their needs until the tenth-.month crop is harvested
in October of this year. At that point, much depends on the harvest. If it
is good, the North Vietnamese will have sufficient food from domestic
sources to get through until the early spring of 1.973. If the tenth-month
harvest is poor - - because of severe flooding such as that which occurred
last year or for other reasons -- the North Vietnamese could face food
shortages'~by the end of this year. Any imports of food which Hanoi succeeds
in obtaining would, of course, postpone or alleviate such shortages.
24. Other factors will also affect the judgment of North Vietnamese
leaders on the question of whether the actual flow of overland imports is
sufficient for their needs. If they were unsure of future Soviet and Chinese aid
levels, for instance, they might be more chary in their commitment of the
material already at hand. (The converse -- an increase in their military
efforts over the short run in hopes of both having maximum impact on the U. S.
election campaign and putting the squeeze on their suppliers in Moscow and
Peking -- would be less likely but still possible.) A turn for the worse in the
Communist offensive from I-Ianoi's point of view might also lead the Politburo
to husband its resources, although this is only one of many variables it would
have to consider in reaching such a decision.
=See CIA Intelligence Memorandum entitled "The Impact of Events Since
8 May 1972 on North Vietnamese Capabilities to Continue the War, " 3 July
1972, TCS No. 3895/72, TOP SECRET SENSITIVE
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III. THE SITUATION IN THE SOUTH
25. In addition to the situation in the "Great Rear Base" of
North Vietnam, Hanoi's leaders will obviously pay careful attention to
a whole range of considerations concerning events in South Vietnam --
as seen through their own eyes -- over the next few months. Their
judgments about the strengths and weaknesses of the Saigon government,
the ability of the Viet Gong apparatus to maintain itself in the south, and
the course of the war itself in South Vietnam will all influence the
decision-making processes of the dozen men who rule the north.
26. The_Saigon Government. In weighing the question of where
they stand in the south, the Communists almost certainly start with the
premise that the Thieu government, however unpopular it may be, is
fairly solidly in control. They are aware that President Thieu and his
top commanders were severely criticized for the military reverses South
Vietnamese forces suffered in the early part of the current offensive, and
that, almost simultaneously, an economic recession and domestic opposition
to Thieu's request for emergency decree powers created further strains
on his government. But the government was still able to act with
reasonable effectiveness in all of these situations and none developed into
a serious threat to its stability.
27. In looking ahead over the next several months, the Communists
almost certainly do not expect an internal crisis in the south that could
shake the Thieu government from its foundations, barring a major
South Vietnamese military setback or some sign of a serious weakening of
U. S. resolve. Most of the political factions that have caused headaches
for Saigon in the past have been docile of late, and unwilling to rock the
boat much in the latest enemy offensive. Even if these factions were
not now quiescent, the Communists must recognize from past experience
that they cannot count on gaining much more than local advantage from
internal political upheavals such as the Buddhist struggle movements.
28. Nevertheless, the Communists undoubtedly view the govern-
ment in Saigon as conta.ini:ng inherent weaknesses ("contradictions")
stemming from its lack of strong popular identification and ideological
cement and from what they see as its almost total, dependence on. the U. S.
for its longer term survival. Although the Communists may hold a
distorted vier of the extent to which the Thieu government is or is not
actually accepted in the south, they probably do not give much weight to
this factor in the immediate circumstances. More likely, they regard
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prospects for eroding or eliminating Thieu and his apparatus as related
to the support Saigon receives from the U, S, They may hope that Saigon
could be severely shaken by some development in the U S. election
campaign or some action of the U. S. Congress. They probably believe
that their best chance of causing the downfall of Thieu or his abandonment
by the U. S. is to make some major move in the military sphere or in the
negotiating sphere. They would try to take advantage of any unforeseen
event such as Thieu's death, although they would most likely approach
a new situation with some caution rather than with some immediate or
bold new initiative.
29. The Communist Apparatus in the South. In assessing where
they can go in the south, the Communists must be quite conscious of the
limitations of their assets, both military and political. At present,
without the presence of North Vietnamese main force units, the Viet
Gong local forces and guerrillas are no match for Saigon's armed
forces and territorials, and the Party's politico-administrative cadres
(often overlapping with guerrilla cadres) are no match for Saigon's
administrative structure. Although these Viet Cong structures have
recovered somewhat since Tet 1968, qualitatively as well as quantitatively,
the Saigon government's gains in pacification over the past few years
have greatly circum.sci;hed the areas in which Viet Cong cadres and forces
can operate with impunity. In addition, the government's Phung Hoang
program has served as a constant harassment to Viet Cong subversive
operations. Indeed, while the enemy's main forces were pulled back in
enclaves or operating across the border for a prolonged period, Communist
political cadres themselves were forced to pull back or to face the prospect
of gradual stagnation and retrenchment. Although the Communists may
have hoped to change this trend with their offensive this spring, agent
reports reflect a continuing dissatisfaction of higher party echelons with
the performance of the Viet Cong local forces and cadres in support of main
force operations.
30. Two main factors must enter into Hanoi's consideration about
the future of its political and guerrilla forces in the south: the role that
these assets can play in the present situation and the question of protecting
and developing them for the future. Short of outright takeover and control
by the north itself, these political and military cadres are the Communists'
principal hope of exercising political power in the south. In several areas
during the cui?rent offensive, the cadres surfaced quickly to organize and
administer local. populations in territory seized by Communist forces. If
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they surface prematurely, however, they run .the risk of destruction.
Over the longer run, in any political settlement of the war the preserva-
tion of these forces from non-Communist retaliation and the assurance
of an environment in which they can operate and expand are vital conditions
for the Hanoi leadership. These forces are the means by which the
Communists hope to share in and eventually monopolize political power
in the south.
31. Such considerations may not in themselves be determining
factors in whether or not Hanoi continues fighting or negotiates a peace,
but they are clearly of paramount importance in its decision-making
process. Rebuilding the cadre structure in the south is a long-term
proposition and Hanoi has no intention of sacrificing it needlessly, es-
pecially as it considers possible cease-fire arrangements or post-
war political arrangements.
32. Developments in the Military Struggle. The course of the
war in the coming weeks will be an extremely important factor in the
future decisions of the North Vietnamese leadership. The touchstone
of the Vietnamese Communist attitude toward the war has always been
the theologically-rooted belief that Communist chances of victory will
improve with time, that eventually the Party' s staying power will prevail
as its enemies founder on their inherent "contradictions. " This belief,
persisting to date through both success and adversity, has consistently
made Hanoi unwilling to bargain in meaningful fashion since the negotiations
got underway in 1968. As long as Hanoi continues to believe that time
is on its side, a real softening in the Communist position is unlikely.
The question, of course, is whether anything in the current situation
might contribute to a change in this basic attitude.
33. This year, the Communists launched an all-out military
offensive, and clearly hoped that their success would be greater than has
in fact been the case. It is equally clear that they did not anticipate the
strength and magnitude of the U. S. reaction. Although U. S. air and
naval power has played a major role in blunting the enemy's offensive,
South Vietnamese forces on the ground -- albeit with some notable
exceptions -- have generally fought doggedly and with considerable
competence. North Vietnamese propaganda often alleges that without
the backing of U. S. airpower the ARVN could not stand up against
Communist forces. In their own minds, however, Hanoi's leaders pre-
sumably have a fairly realistic picture of the effectiveness of the South
Vietnamese Armed. Forces at this point.
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34. At the same time, Communist preparations to continue a
high level of military activity, at least in certain parts of South Vietnam,
.make it evident that the North Vietnamese have not yet decided that their
1972 military campaign as a whole is going badly for then. They have
not reached the point of cutting their losses, and they clearly plan at
least one more round of major military activity. The inference to be
derived from this is that they still believe time is on their side.
35. Assuming there is another heavy round of combat over the
next two or three months, it is impossible to judge at present whether
the results of that combat would lead to a change in Hanoi's attitude on
the war. On the one hand, the Communists' past record strongly
suggests that their confidence in ultimate victory is not likely to be
undermined solely by current developments on the battlefield. On the
other hand, as the rest of this memorandum indicates, Hanoi's leader-
ship is now under more pressure than it probably has ever been in the
past from a combination of events far broader in scope than the course
of the military battle itself. In the context of these other pressures,
it is possible that a setback to Hanoi on the battlefield in coming weeks
could contribute in a major way to a decision by North Vietnam to revise
its present policy for conducting the war -- though not its ultimate ob-
jectives.
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36. Sixao-Soviet Support. Totally dependent on military and
economic assistance from the Soviet Union and China to carry out the
war in South Vietnam effectively, the North Vietnamese leaders are
acutely sensitive to any signs of diminishing interest on the part of their
allies. They also are highly vulnerable to any pressure that suggests
a serious curtailment of this logistical support. Hanoi's obvious dismay
and anger at the Soviets' failure either to challenge the American
blockade of the ports or to cancel the Moscow summit in protest, and,
later, irritation with Chinese delaying tactics in arranging alternate
means of delivery for Soviet cargo were clear reflections of this
vulnerability. Current resupply efforts and the recently concluded
agreement with Peking for supplementary economic and military aid
have undoubtedly reassured Hanoi that the basic commitment of its allies
is still in force.
37. Hanoi probably is reasonably confident that this commitment
will continue. It knows that neither Moscow nor Peking wants to risk
being tagged as the instrument of Nc_,th Vietnam's defeat. And their
continuing rivalry for regional influence, which has worked to Hanoi's
benefit in the past, still argues against either abandoning the field to the
other. Hanoi may anticipate, however, far more niggardly support than
in the past. Moscow's apparent embarrassment over the scale and
nature of the current offensive -- for which it (knowingly or not) provided
the hardware -- and the more muted signs of Chinese disapproval with
NV.A tactics must leave Hanoi's leaders far less confident that they can
request and receive the shopping list necessary for a repeat performance,
Indeed, Hanoi may see a warning in the Soviets' refusal to provide their
Egyptian ally with unlimited arms support.
38. Political pressures devoid of such logistical constraints are
not likely to have a compelling impact on Hanoi's planning. The North
Vietnamese have never taken their allies totally into their confidence,
basically because they have little trust in either of them. Hanoi is well
aware that its allies place higher priority on their current maneuvering
with the U, S. than on the war, and suspects that their advice does not
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necessarily have North Vietnamese interests at heart. The recent
summit meetings have only reinforced Hanoi's fear of great-power
connivance which could undercut North Vietnam's basic objectives.
Both Moscow and Peking have now rather bluntly pointed out the benefits
of negotiating a compromise settlement that would lead to an American
military withdrawal. Hanoi's reaction has ranged from deafness to
hostility. As long as Moscow and Peking are unwilling to impose
logistical restraints, Hanoi is not likely to heed their fraternal advice
for compromise.
39. If -- at some point -- the North Vietnamese were faced with
the prospect of greatly reduced Soviet and Chinese military aid, there
would immediately be a major new element in the mix of considerations
which influence decision-making in Hanoi. The important thing here
would be Hanoi's reading of Moscow's and Peking's intent. ` If North
Vietnam ever came to believe that its allies did not intend to provide
sufficient supplies to continue the war at a high level, its leaders would
almost certainly recognize that they could not continue fighting the type
of war which they have been waging in 1972. They would feel compelled
to change their policy -- either by making major concessions in
negotiations or by reverting to a much more austere level. of hostilities.
It should be emphasized that we have absolutely no evidence that either
Moscow or Peking do intend to cut back on their military assistance to
North Vietnam, and we doubt that either nation would believe that it had
enough flexibility in its relations with Hanoi or with each other to initiate
such a cut-back, This is one area, however, where there is a potential
for great leverage to be exerted on Hanoi.
40. The International Environment. Despite their uncompromising
stance, the North Vietnamese leaders undoubtedly view the changing
international environment with considerable disquiet. They have found
a sympathetic international image a useful asset, not only for generating
The U. S. interdiction program probably will prevent North Vietnam from
receiving a significant portion of its normal imports; but our evidence
indicates that provided the USSR and China bring the goods to the Sino-
North Vietnamese border, enough goods will get through to supply Hanoi
with its military requirements and at least its minimum economic needs.
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further pressure on the U. S. , but also in promoting their role as the
vanguard of the anti-imperialist struggle -- a point used in soliciting
aid Front their Communist allies. But the maneuverings between the
U. S. and China and the USSR have not only overshadowed Vietnam: and
diluted Hanoi's ability to command attention and sympathy, but its once
steadfast allies are showing increasing impatience with the war.
41. Hanoi's leaders face the danger that their rigid unwillingness
to compromise their goals may seem increasingly out of step with the
new trend in world politics toward compromise and accommodation.
Their anger and self-righteous indignation with Peking and Moscow's
summit diplomacy is inescapable, even though their allies' summitry
could later be rationalized as a kind of behavior peculiar to great powers
and perhaps inevitable in terms of their broader interests. But the
disclosure of secret talks between the two Koreas must have been a
particularly jolting blow. Hanoi's leaders have often expressed a
special kinship with Pyongyang, whose war and long-.uncompromising
posture seemed so analogous to their own. Watching Kim 11-sung
commit the revisionist heresy of opening a dialogue with President Park
cannot fail to produce o profound sense of unease around the Politburo
table in Hanoi.
42. Hanoi may react to these developments to the point of
renewing its efforts to appear reasonable but not to the point of offering
any substantial compromises. The "diplomatic struggle, " however,
remains a secondary tactical adjunct to the basic military and political
conflict in South Vietnam, and it is unlikely that the international
developments discussed in the preceding paragraph will have a decisive
influence on Hanoi's thinking in the near future.
43, The U. S. Electoral Situation. Hanoi's leaders will pay
close attention to the state o_ 'electoral politics in the U. S. during the
coming months, but they will do so with their own sense of perspective.
Hanoi views all U. S, politicians with suspicion and is leery about whether
any If. S. president actually would carry out his campaign "promises. "
Thus, even though Hanoi has implied a "preference" for Senator McGovern
and hopes that anti-war sentiment will be a factor in the campaign, the
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policy makers in North Vietnam are probably predisposed to view
such developments as potential windfalls and not as something to bank
on.
44. If over the next few months Hanoi's leaders came to believe
that the McGovern candidacy had a reasonable chance of being successful,
they would be even more inclined to stay on their present course, They
would reason that their prospects under a new administration pledged
to end U. S. involvement in Indochina would be greater than under the
present administration, Given these circumstances, the leaders in
Hanoi would prefer to wait out the election and then see what tack the
new president took.
45. Hanoi's current assessment, however, is almost certainly
that President Nixon is likely to be returned to office. If this continues
to be the case, Hanoi, perhaps seconded by Moscow and Peking, might
consider floating some new negotiating formula in. an effort to probe the
U. S. willingness to reach a settlement. Hanoi might reason that
during the heat of a presidential campaign, the Administration would be
more willing to give ground than it would afterwards. Hanoi's leaders
would be unlikely to make a basic policy shift based solely on their
expectations of the outcome of the U. S, presidential election; but
in combination with some of the other factors discussed in this memorandum,
it is possible that developments in the U. S. election campaign could
contribute to a change of policy in Hanoi.
46. The U, S. Negotiating Position. From Hanoi's vantage,
negotiations are only one tactic- to be employed in the quest for control
of Vietnam. Moreover, the North Vietnamese leaders view negotiations
with some distaste. They believe that they were euchred once before at
the bargaining table, and they are loath to leave much to chance this time
around. For example, regardless of the military respite it might gain,
Hanoi would find it exceedingly difficult to accept a negotiated settlement
which did not give the Communists a clear shot at gaining control in South
Vietnam. Considering the amount of material and human resources
invested in the struggle, the North Vietnamese leaders might not consider
half a loaf better than none, particularly if it meant acknowledging failure
to achieve their objectives.
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47. This is not to say that there are no changes in the U. S.
negotiating stance which could lead Hanoi to consider modifying its
own position. The pressures on Hanoi have increased over the past
year, and it would certainly welcome an end to U. S. bombing and
interdiction operations against North Vietnam. In the absence of
critical problems affecting the situation on the battlefield or North
Vietnam itself, Hanoi's reaction to a new U. S. negotiating initiative
would turn primarily on the effects of the U. S. proposal on Communist
prospects in South Vietnam, And to Hanoi this basically comes down to
the distribution of power. Thus, unless Hanoi felt itself under intense
pressure on the battlefield or from within North Vietnam, it would be
unlikely to alter its policies solely on the basis of a new U. S. negotiating
position, unless that position indicated that the U.S. were willing to
see the removal of the present GVN or to make other concessions which
seemed likely to pull the props out from under Thieu.'s regime.
V. STRIKING THE BALANCE
tR. In deciding the Lao Dong Party's optimum strategy over the
weeks, months and years ahead, the members of its ruling Politburo
must obviously strike some kind of balance among and between the
considerations outlined above. Any such balance perforce involves
judgmental weighting of the various factors involved. The need to protect
and preserve the current social structure in North Vietnam and the
Party's position therein, for example, must be weighed against the desire
to acquire political control over the south. Are these two goals in even
potential conflict? If so, how much can or should the former be
jeapordized in pursuit of the latter --- or vice versa? Are there
practical political limits to the hardships and sacrifices that can be
demanded of the North Vietnamese people? How reliable are Hanoi's
two major Communist allies in the changing climate of world politics,
with detente in the air, with both China and the Soviet Union developing
bilateral interests with the United States? How slight or great is the
risk of the NVA's being undisguisably and humiliatingly defeated on the
ground by the ARVN if the Communists persist in big unit battles ?
Conversely, what is the likelihood that the NVA can inflict defeats on
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the ARVN sufficiently decisive to have significant political impact in
South Vietnam and abroad? Is the GVN likely to get stronger or weaker
with the passage of time? How long can the U. S. politically sustain a
major involvement in Indochinese affairs and how is its range of options
likely to be affected by the current electoral contest? How responsive
and resilient are the Party's cadre and apparatus? Would they understand
and accept a major shift in strategy after the leadership's recent
exhortations to all out action and promises of dramatic success? What
are the probable risks and gains involved in pursuing present policies
as opposed to those involved in alternate strategies -- such as a show
of negotiating flexibility or a move to a lower scale, protracted war type
of effort?
49. This is an illustrative --- and far from exhaustive -- enumeration
of the kind of questions the Politburo must ponder collectively and each
of its members, privately. It is within such a total context that Politburo
members, jointly and severally, will weigh specific items of intelligence
or observed fact (e. g. , supply stock levels, manpower losses and import
input flows) -- weighing them, however, from their perspective and
in terms of their perception of politic,-i1 dynamics. No given datum or
set of facts is likely, of itself, to be decisive. For example, there is
almost certainly no given loss rate, stock level or import threshold that
would, of itself, dictate any given Politburo member's ultimate policy
recommendation.
50. Such questions are almost certainly already being at least
privately pondered by the Politburo's individual members. Logic would
suggest that the Politburo will probably engage in. some sort of collective
review of the total situation in late August or early September. By that
time, near term trends in most of the Party's key areas of concern
should be conclusive enough to support at least interim judgments. By
then, for example, this season's high water will have crested, there
either will or will not have been major flooding, the Party can make a
reasonably solid estimate of the tenth-month crop and, hence, can get a.
fair fix on its probable domestic food situation for the next nine-odd months.
By then, Hanoi should have a fairly solid idea of what medium to long
term logistical arrangements its Soviet and Chinese allies are, or are
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not, going to make to offset the loss of seaborne imports -- and how
adequate these arrangements are likely to be in Hanoi's terms. By
September, the pattern of what North Vietnamese Army touts .are, or
are not, going to be able to achieve on South Vietnamese battlefields
should be reasonably clear, along with the likelihood, or lack thereof,
of the Communists' making more than transient inroads into the GVN's
control of South Vietnam's rural population. By then it should be
reasonably evident whether the events of the spring and summer have
left the GVN apparently weaker or stronger than it was in mid-March
before the Communist offensive was launched. By then, the American
electoral picture should be perceptibly clearer, to a degree permitting
much more confident estimates of how close the race is likely to be
if not who is likely to win -- and to what extent domestic U. S. attitudes
toward Vietnam are likely to have a major political impact on either
the election's outcome or President Nixon's policies, especially his
negotiating posture. Also, by then -- in light of what has happened in
the other areas of concern -- the Politburo should have a reasonably
clear fix on the probable morale impact of alternative policy choices
on its Army, its Party cadre, and its people.
51. If it does indeed conduct a late August-early September
bidding review, the Politburo will have essentially three broad policy
options: (1) continue on approximately its present course of m military
pressure with periodic big-unit high points, coupled with intransigence
on the negotiating front, (2) revert to a perceptibly lower, protracted
war scale of military effort, again without substantive alteration in
its political/negotiating position, or (3) make a material change in its
current position regarding cease-fire and the conditions for a negotiated
settlement. The first, in essence, is a "press on to victory" scenario
more or less ignoring (or at least accepting) the costs thereby entailed.
The second is a strategy keyed to conserving both human and material
assets and playing for the long haul, The third option puts a premium
on winding up the military phase of the struggle -- at least for the time
being -- with a subsequent concentration on competition in the political
arena.
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52, it is almost impossible to estimate now which of these
three broad options might look most attractive (or least unattractive)
to either the whole Politburo or a dominant majority thereof four to
six weeks hence. Much will depend on the actual events, in various
quarters, of those intervening weeks. The first or "press on" option
would clearly involve the greatest short to medium term cost, since
if it is followed the bombing of the north would presumably continue
and battlefield losses would run higher than they would run under either
of the other two. On, the other hand, it holds the greatest apparent
promise of an early victory which, if achieved --- e. g. , by a perceptible
unravelling of GVN effectiveness or a major U, S. negotiating concession could be plausibly used to justify any costs entailed. Furthermore,
it has bureaucratic inertia going for it. In any bureaucracy, including
a Communist Party, it is easier to resolve a debate by modifying a current
policy or continuing it "for the time being" than to agree on a major
change.
53,. The second and third options -- lower profile protracted
war or a new negotiating approach, perhaps including cease-fire -- would
both have the advantage, of reducing near term costs, dramatically so if
either could be exploited to end the bombing of the north and/or closure
of the ports. From a "face" point of view, however, with all the
consequences thereby entailed -- including impact on Army, Party
cadre and popular morale, not to mention the morale of the GVN and
the ARVN -- the adoption of either of these options would inevitably
be read as at least a tacit admission that the 1972 offensive had failed
and that the- U. S. /GVN counter-action (including the bombing and mining)
had had a considerable measure of success. The low profile /protracted
war option would more or less indefinitely postpone the long promised
day of ultimate victory, which would be bound to depress the morale of
the Party and its supporters, particularly in. the south. The negotiation/
cease-fire/move to the political arena option would entail accepting risks
that up to now the Politburo has evinced an adamant reluctance to take,
54. At this point, the human factor comes back into the equation.
As explained in this memorandum's opening section, the policy decisions
of " F.lanoi" are made by a dozen-odd top. Party leaders, lifelong subscribers
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to the doctrine of "democratic centralism" who make a fetish of
presenting a united, common front to the world outside the Politburo
meeting room. Though all of the same generation, with a shared
revolutionary background and subscribing to a common dogma, these
dozen top leaders are not automata. Even within their common frame-
work, each has his private opinions, private ambitions and private
feelings with respect to his colleagues and their policy positions. Each
will have his own private view of how he shades and weights the complex,
interacting factors the Politburo must collectively consider.
55. Also, there are certain historical factors very germane to
any future Politburo policy debates, factors of which all the Politburo's
full and alternate members are very much aware. First, there is clear
Party precedent for a top leader's losing his position when the policies
he had advocated produce unacceptable results. In 1956, Truong Chinh
lost his First Secretaryship -- and the mantle of IIo's almost certain
successor -- because of the consequences of the Land Reform program
he had advocated and directed. Furtherrhore, he lost his position to
Le Duan -- and Truong Chinh would not be human, certainly not
Vietnamese, if this did not still rankle. No matter i.t,:w he ultimately
casts his policy vote, Truong Chinh cannot be blind to the fact that
Le Duan is as much the architect and director of the southern struggle
as he himself was of "Land Reform. "
56. Secondly, there is the ghost of Ho Chi Minh, While Ho was
alive, no one on the Politburo would have dared (or wanted) dispute a
decision to which he had given his blessing. He could tack, jibe or come
about without any risk of mutinous mutterings from his officers, watch
hands or Party crew. He could, and did, fight or talk or do both
simultaneously -- collaborate with the French to crush and liquidate
non-Communist Vietnamese nationalists, dissolve the overt Party to
better fight the French, institute Land Reform, apologize for Land
Reform, accept the Geneva settlement, resume armed struggle, all
without missing a beat or ever being personally called to account by his
mesmerized lieutenants. But Ho has been dead for almost three years
and his chair still sits empty at the head of the Politburo table.
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As First Secretary, Le Duan is first among his surviving Politburo
equals, but he is not the Party Chairman. The fact that Ho Is position
as Chairman remains unfilled after three years strongly suggests that
no member of the Politburo has sufficient primacy or support to be
confirmed as Ho's successor and probably means that each of those.
who want Ho's mantle recognizes that he cannot now reach for it without
risking a fight that could jeapordize if not destroy the Party. The fact
of non-succession probably also means that Ho's chair is not going to
be filled until the eventual outcome of the southern struggle becomes
more discernably clear.
57. When Ho died on 3 September 1969, the Party's policy/
strategy line was set and relatively unambiguous: intransigence at the
negotiating table coupled with continued, protracted-war type military
pressure in and on South Vietnam, the latter involving essentially
economy of force tactics interspersed with occasional high points
involving battalion- regimental (but not divisional) size attacks. The shift
to big-unit war signalled by the December 1971 offensive in Laos and
the 30 March 1972 offensive in South Vietnam was the first major policy
change aipted and implemented after Ho Is death. Any bidding review
involving questions about this new policy's wisdom or success sufficiently
trenchant to prompt a serious discussion of alternatives will pose the
Lao Dong leadership with a kind of problem it has never before had
to face.
58. The strategic line has, of course, shifted on many earlier
occasions during the Party's four decades of struggle. The Tet 68
offensive was a shift to big-unit combat, abandoned after February 1969
in favor of a return to protracted war. But the 1972 situation is different
from the 1968-69 situation in at least two major respects: In 1969 it
could be plausibly argued that despite a lack of success (and attendant
problems thereby generated) on the ground in South Vietnam, the 1968-
69 offensives were a net plus because they had forced the Americans to stop
bombing, knocked President Johnson out of office, gotten negotiations
started at no significant political cost to the DRV, crystallized and intensified
U. S. domestic opposition to the war, and forced the U. S. Government
onto the path of progressive disengagement. Secondly, in 1969 Ho was
still alive to terminate any acrimonious debate and give his blessing to
the policy of retrenchment involved in the, return to a lower military profile.
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59. Any policy debates entered into now will have to be conducted
without a final arbiter whose rulings all. participants will unhesitatingly
accept. If events of the next few weeks, or next several months, should
unfold in ways adverse to Hanoi' s interests, those who advocated the
offensive strategy will be open to the charge that their policy has not
succeeded and, instead, got the bombing resumed in a way worse than
before, got the ports closed to boot, and generated difficulties with
Hanoi' s Communist allies of a kind never heretofore experienced.
60. If a Politburo bidding review conducted within the next two
months, or at any subsequent time, quickly produces a consensus
judgment that current policies are yielding sufficient net benefits to
warrant their continuation, then no serious rifts are likely to emerge
within the top Party leadership. This would almost certainly be the
case if, say, the ARVN were to suffer several major defeats, the U. S.
were to make a significant negotiating move indicating a willingness to
accommodate Hanoi's adamant position on Thieu, the U. S. were to stop
the bombing without insisting on a major, tangible quid pro quo, or
reasonably solid evidence pointed to a rising tide of public opposition to
the war within the United States at least: potentially capable of getting
Senator McGovern elected or inducing a major change in President Nixon's
Indochina policies. On the other hand. any bidding review that produced
serious Politburo disagreement on the wisdom of continuing present
policies and prompted a genuine debate over alternatives could be extremely
divisive --- even if the decision ultimately reached. was to stay on the
present course.
61. The now dormant but potentially explosive issue which, if
ever joined, could split the Politburo in two is the basic question of
priorities alluded to above: If a choice has to be made, which takes
precedence -- preserving and building a Communist state in the North
or pursuing the revolutionary struggle for control. of the South'? Over the
past years, there has been much speculation -- most of it fruitless and
some of it sheer nonsense -- over alleged factions within the Politburo
(e. g. , hard-liners versus soft-liners, pro-Soviets versus pro-Chinese).
Things are just not that neat or tidy in this group of a. dozen men of common
outlook and background who have worked closely together in a common cause
for decades. Nonetheless, there has long been. some evidence of at least
a latent polarization between what might be loosely termed "North Vietnam
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firsters" probably grouped around Truong Chinh and what might be
called "Southern struggle firsters" almost certainly grouped around
Le Duan.=` The evidence also suggests, however, a strong desire on
everyone's part to mute any such polarization by keeping this specific
priority issue safely under the rug.
62. Without Ho present to insist that it stay there, this basic
priorities issue could probably not be kept under the rug in any major
Politburo debate over alternative policies prompted by a strong argument
that the current policy was not producing results commensurate with
its risks and costs. Any such policy debate, in turn, would almost
inevitably soon involve or encompass personalities and a sharp struggle
for personal primacy on the part of at least some of the Politburo's
members, a struggle which the other members would find difficult to
smother and from which they would probably find it even more difficult
to stay aloof.
63. In this context, Pham Van Dong's health could prove to be
the catalyst precipitating precisely the kind of debate the Politburo wants
least. Not only is he a senior member of the Politburo, he also -- as
Premier -- is the operating head of the State structure. Were he to die
in the near future, he would have to be replaced fairly soon with a
designated successor. (Any excessive delay would be swiftly read by
For example, in a book entitled Democratic Republic of Vietnam written
by Pham. Hung (now field director of the war in the south) and published
in Moscow in 1960, Pham Hung -- in a passage praising the January 1959
15th Party Plenum (which ratified the decision to escalate the southern
struggle into a full scale "war of national liberation") --- makes the
following remark: "We should dwell on those errors which were committed
during the period of building socialism in North Vietnam, (i. e. , 1954-
1956, while Truong Chinh was First Secretary), namely: a slackening of
attention towards problems pertaining to the national-democratic revolution
in South Vietnam, a gap between the socialist revolution in the North and
the national democratic revolution in the south. It is also incorrect to
consider the opinion that the socialist revolution is significant only with
respect to the north. "
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the Party cadre as a sure sign of major divisions in the top leadership.
The inclinations of whoever was picked would inevitably have a major
impact on the present balance and interlocking web of relationships
within the Politburo, hence any unavoidable need for making such a
choice might inevitably open Pandora's box.
64. We are not suggesting or predicting that the Politburo is on
the verge of a divisive split with potentially major impact on the whole
Indochina situation. We have simply tried to describe the many factors,
forces and considerations influencing the dozen odd men who, in the
final analysis, make "Hanoi's" decisions. Far from the least of these
is the intricate balance of interlocking relationships between these
dozen men themselves. Any major change in these relationships
i. e. , new faces at the Politburo table, the absence of faces now there
or even a significant rearrangement of the current occupants' chairs --
could lead to, or itself signify, a major change in North Vietnamese
policy.
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