Hanoi's Intentions

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T01719R000400120002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 29, 2004
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: February 9, 1973
• Content Type: IM

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Secret
Intelligence Memorandum
Hanoi's Intentions Over the Next Three to Six Months
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9 February 1973
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
9 February 1973
HANOI'S INTENTIONS OVER THE NEXT THREE TO SIX MONTHS*
1. Any assessment of "Hanoi's intentions" made
in mid-February 1973 must be keyed to some definite
time frame. There is no evidence that the Lao Dong
Politburo ("Hanoi") has abandoned its long term goal
of reunifying Vietnam under Communist rule and,
similarly, no sign--certainly no outward sign--that
the Politburo is prepared to accept for the indeter-
minate future any "two Germanies" or "two Koreas"
type of situation in Vietnam.
2. Whether or not the Politburo has privately
decided to postpone active pursuit of the goal of
reunification and, say, concentrate for the time be-
ing on rebuilding the "northern base," the Politburo
has probably made some decisions on general strategic
priorities over the next year or two. Nonetheless,
it has probably not decided what specific courses of
action it may be necessary to take. Given the equities
involved and factors that have to be weighed, it is
too early to make any such decisions. They will have
to be framed in light of such things as the military,
political and economic trends that develop within South
Vietnam over the next six months or so--on the impact
of this spring's and early summer's events on the rela-
tive fortunes and resultant prospects of the GVN and
the PRG--on the postures of the U.S., Communist China,
and the U.S.S.R., and on other regional and interna-
tional developments.
3. The short run picture, however, is somewhat
clearer. If, as requested, we limit ourselves to the
next three to six months certain things can be said
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with some confidence about Hanoi's current position
and factors therein that will shape the DRV's prob-
able moves over this near term period.* Hanoi does
need a respite and does want to devote considerable
attention and effort to reconstruction in the North.
It cannot yet have any confidence that, if provoked,
the U.S. (i.e., President Nixon) would not again
respond sharply, at least with air power. Six months
is not enough time to finish rebuilding the battered
southern infrastructure or fully test opportunities
for making political and psychological gains in the
new situation evolving in post-cease-fire South Viet-
nam. Thus, Hanoi will probably want to play its hand
cautiously--and, on the whole, quietly--over the next
few months. Furthermore, the constraints operative
on Hanoi derive in part from a web of international
relationships which, though fragile, look strong enough
to endure for the next six months.
4. This is not to suggest that the Communists
intend to observe the cease-fire with total fidelity.
There will probably be renewed flurries of intensified
fighting as the ICCS fans out into the countryside,
with the VC/NVA (and GVN forces) seeking to make last
minute improvements in their tactical positions. The
Communists probably do not now plan, however, to
initiate any large or even medium scale hostilities
over the near term, though such plans would, of course,
remain subject to review. If, for example, the Commu-
nist position relative to the GVN should begin to de-
teriorate dangerously, the Communists might feel im-
pelled to resort to drastic remedies.
5. Barring developments of the kind just cited, the
Communists do not appear to be under any compelling pres-
sure to resume major military hostilities. There is
nothing critical about their position in the South un-
der present circumstances. The Paris agreement gave
Hanoi its minimum essential positions: removal of the
The situation in North Vietnam with regard to man-
power recruitment, logistical activity, and economic
priorities suggests a continuing high degree of mili-
tary preparedness sufficient to protect the option of
resuming military struggle. An analysis of these fac-
tors and their significance as clues to Communist in-
tentions is attached as an annex.
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Americans and provisions for maintenance of substan-
tial armed forces in the South to insure the protec-
tion and preservation of the Communist infrastructure--
or at least its professional cadre--in secure areas.
Operating from these secure areas, the Party can send
its agents on their political, psychological, and ter-
rorist missions throughout South Vietnam without seri-
ous risk to its own survival. Hanoi will probably
take advantage of the cease-fire respite to rest and
refit its troops, to rebuild and improve the Communist
political apparatus in the South, and to obtain a bet-
ter fix on the impact of the agreement on the GVN's
determination and viability.
6. Much greater emphasis seems certain to be
placed on political action than has been the case in
recent years. The Communists, employing popular
front tactics and downplaying Communism, will seek
to refurbish an image seriously damaged by the Hue
massacre and similar acts of brutality. They will
picture themselves as standing for peace and recon-
ciliation against a still bellicose GVN; they will
attack such GVN weak points as corruption and social
injustices and advocate demobilization (of the GVN
forces), the return of refugees to their ancestral
lands, and release of all political prisoners. They
are not likely to agree to elections run by the
present GVN--certainly not any "a or b" kind of
referendum or plebiscite--but they will try to place
on the GVN all blame for the probable failure of the
two South Vietnamese parties to reach agreement on
holding elections. These positions seem well cal-
culated to appeal to those elements of the popula-
tion, exemplified by the An Quang Buddhists, who feel
little commitment to either side, though they have
tended in recent years to regard the GVN as the
lesser evil.
7. The issue that seems to have the best chance
of undermining Hanoi's commitment to the cease-fire
is the central question, carefully left cloudy in the
agreement, of South Vietnam's political future. Over
the next three to six months, the resolution of this
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issue is unlikely to proceed far enough to require
a basic decision by Hanoi on further direct involve-
ment in the South. Over the longer term, if the
negotiations between the two South Vietnamese par-
ties break down completely, the North Vietnamese
might deem it necessary to intervene in the South
in a way that contravened the accords. A success-
ful police-type operation by the Thieu.government
against major Viet Cong assets might produce the
same reaction. Hanoi's course of action under such
circumstances would be influenced by a host of varia-
bles: its perception of the balance of forces be-
tween Saigon and the Viet Cong and hence of the need
to intervene, the effectiveness of the supervisory
mechanism, the specific points at issue between the
two South Vietnamese sides, and the sort of messages
received from the big powers, to name a few.
8. One area where Hanoi almost certainly will
be concentrating a good deal of effort is its rela-
tions with Washington. The Communists probably be-
lieve they have little to lose and a good deal to
gain in this sphere. In particular they might hope
to disrupt Washington's relationship with Saigon;
they might also believe that by cultivating the US
they could enhance whatever leverage they have in a
big-power context.
9. If Hanoi itself is reasonably firm for the
outset in its commitment to the agreement's cease-
fire provisions, the question naturally arises
whether the Viet Cong might jump the traces on their
own. It has been apparent for several months, of
course, that if the North Vietnamese were more re-
luctant than Moscow and Peking to see a settlement
come about, the PRG was more reluctant than the Hanoi
leadership. Events in South Vietnam could evolve to
a point where the Viet Cong felt a resumption of
hostilities was their best option (or, even, an es-
sential one). This, however, seems unlikely over the
next six months. The Viet Cong almost certainly be-
lieve their most urgent task is to rebuild their
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assets, both military and political; they may also
be thinking that their chances of success will im-
prove with time. Assuming our reading of their cur-
rent capabilities is correct, therefore, and assuming
that events do not back them into a corner, the odds
still appear to be against a large-scale unilateral
violation of the accords by the Viet Cong within the
next six months.
10. Turning to Laos, present intense NVA of-
fensive actions there seem designed to improve the
Pathet Lao bargaining position. Once a cease-fire
agreement for Laos has been reached, we would expect
a sharp reduction in military activity. Allowing
for a possible last minute surge of fighting, there
will probably be few if any major attacks in Laos
during the following six months.
11. On the issue of withdrawal, however, in
many circles--including most of the western press--
there is a certain evident confusion between the
concept of "cease-fire" and the concept or under-
standing of what is called for in the Paris agree-
ment--"cease-fire" and U.S. withdrawal seems to be
widely, if erroneously, regarded as the agreement's
only major components. The Communists will certainly
insist on U.S. withdrawal and will probably observe--
by and large--the agreement's cease-fire provisions,
at least over the next three to six months. On the
issue of Communist withdrawal, however, the North
Vietnamese are unlikely to honor fully the provisions
of the Paris agreement calling for a total withdrawal
of their military forces from Laos (and Cambodia),
though some combat units may be pulled back from the
front lines and others withdrawn to North Vietnam.
Nor is it likely that they intend to dismantle the
Ho Chi Minh Trail Here
also, however, there may well be some withdrawals,
and these could be sizable since the Communists
presumably would not require the present heavy lo-
gistical flow and would not have to cope with bombing
attacks. Nonetheless, Hanoi will almost certainly
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keep enough forces in the area to maintain a sub-
stantial military presence and sustain the essential
viability of the infiltration and logistics networks.
12. Several considerations argue for maintenance
of a strong NVA presence in Laos and Cambodia and
for ignoring the Paris agreement's limitation of
resupply to supervised "one for one" exchanges of
used or worn out equipment.
a) By withdrawing all its forces from
Laos and Cambodia, Hanoi would seriously cur-
tail its options for future action through-
out South Vietnam, including the option of
promptly resuming large-scale warfare.
b) Such withdrawal--and/or genuine
curtailment of resupply to the legal limits
permitted by the Paris agreement--could
have a devastating impact on Viet Cong
and PRG morale.
c) Hanoi certainly recognizes that
strict enforcement of the Paris agreement's
withdrawal and resupply provisions would
severely diminish the Viet Cong/PRG's
prospects. The record of the Communists
behavior over the past two decades strongly
suggests that they will not necessarily
feel themselves constrained by the letter
(or spirit) of the Paris agreement in
this sphere and that, instead, they will
test and probe to see how far they can
actually go without provoking American
retaliation.
13. The situation in Cambodia is more com-
plicated than the situation in Vietnam or even Laos.
Hanoi might find a Cambodian cease-fire acceptable.
But the Khmer Communists, who are now doing most of
the fighting, show no dispostion to strike a deal.
This could change, however, since the KC still de-
pend heavily on the North Vietnamese for logistical
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support. In any event, the KC do not now appear
strong enough to overthrow the GKR by themselves, so
that something akin to the present situation, or
perhaps a fragile cease-fire, seems the most likely
outlook for Cambodia over the next three to six
months. Whatever the arrangements made among Cam-
bodians, Hanoi seems certain to maintain, as in Laos,
some presence in eastern Cambodia.
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ANNEX
Current North Vietnamese Military Manpower Situation,
Logistical Activities, and Economic Priorities
1. Throughout the war in Indochina, research
on North Vietnam's military and economic resources
has provided insight into the enemy's strategic mili-
tary intentions. Because such resources have gen-
erally been well in excess of actual requirements,
the estimative process has had to take many factors
into account beyond those related to raw military
capability alone. Analysis of capabilities has
provided a reasonable view of what the enemy could
and. could not do, but only a limited perspective of
what he might do.
2. In the current very fluid situation, it is
possible to make only the most tenuous judgments
about North Vietnams resource allocation plans,
but the traditional bellwethers of military pre-
paredness--manpower recruitment, logistical activity,
and economic priorities--do permit a few conclusions
concerning North Vietnam's military outlook in the
very near term. The following discussion concerns
these three aspects of military capability and what
they tell us about North Vietnam's intentions over
the next three to six months.
3. The overall view expressed in this memoran-
dum is that North Vietnam has yet to make a clear
and unequivocal commitment to foreclosing the option
of resuming military struggle. Indeed, there are
many signs that Hanoi continues to pursue a delib-
erate (though not frenetic) policy of military pre-
paredness. Although none of our evidence points
to the kind of manpower and logistic buildup observed
prior to the 1968 Tet Offensive and the 1972 Spring
Offensive, such activity as we do observe does not
preclude resumption of large scale military endeavors
by North Vietnam. Countering this evidence, there
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are considerable signs of growing interest in economic
reconstruction and related "peacetime" pursuits in
North Vietnam, though--understandably--very little
actual performance has yet been seen.
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4. In a word, Hanoi currently exhibits a cautious
attitude. If the need should arise for a pursuit of
its political objectives by military means, the re-
sources are still in place and ready. Whether or
not they will be used depends on political factors
unrelated to the resources situation, notably the
probable consequences. At the least, the judgment
must by now be firmly implanted in the minds of North
Vietnam's leaders that any blatant resumption of main
force military activities might lead to prompt, and
massive retaliation by the US.
Logistics
5. The Communists' logistic position in South
Vietnam, while strong, has not yet been rebuilt to
the peak attained just before the 1972 Spring Of-
fensive. The current logistic effort, however, prob-
ably is ahead of that achieved by this time last dry
season and, if sustained for the next several months,
the North Vietnamese would be capable of logistically
supporting a major military activity throughout much
of South Vietnam. Although post cease-fire reporting
has been inconsistent, we believe that significant
supply movements are continuing.
6. Beginning on 28 January, detected logistic
activity in the Vinh area was curtailed sharply.
By 2 February, however, vehicle and rail activity
had returned to significant levels.
To date, there have been no indications that the
logistical system built along the Ho Chi Minh Trail
and its extensions is being dismantled. In any event,
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the North Vietnamese probably could withdraw as much
as 50% of their logistic personnel and still maintain
a high level of resupply in a non-bombing environment.
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8. There is evidence of Communist supply move-
ments across South Vietnam's borders farther south.
Vehicles are also moving supplies soutli roug am-
bodia to COSVN and on into South Vietnam. On 4 Feb-
ruary 75 loaded trucks were observed moving south
from Cambodian border base areas toward the Tay Ninh
Province/GVN MR-3 area. Moreover, in Communist-con-
trolled parts of Quang Ngai Province, there are re-
cent indications that over-the-beach infiltration of
supplies is occurring. To reduce the logistics burden
from external sources, the Communists apparently in-
tend to meet more of their requirements internally
than in the past, by improving access to local mar-
kets and by manufacturing small ordnance items in
workshops in southern South Vietnam.
9. In North Vietnam the Communists have under-
taken other measures to ensure the continuing viability
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of their logistic system. Between 15 and 23 January,
they restored through rail service from the China bor-
der to Vinh.
I IFina y, the
North Vietnamese are resuming maritime activities--
domestic and international. All of these developments
should enhance North Vietnam's short- and long-term
logistic capabilities.
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10. In summary, the North Vietnamese logistic
system has been operating in high gear for several
months, and there does not appear to have been a marked
slowdown coincident with the cease-fire. 25X1
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I I The result is that substantial quan-
tities of supplies have already filtered into most
parts of South Vietnam, and as the peak dry season
months progress, a sustained effort would place the
North Vietnamese in a very strong logistic position.
Manpower
11. Manpower indicators, both in North Vietnam
and throughout Indochina, suggest that North Vietnam
intends to maintain a strong military posture while
warily observing cease-fire developments. Most evi-
dence suggests that Hanoi's likely path in South
Vietnam for the immediate future will be keyed to
defense and consolidation of occupied areas, strength-
ening of the infrastructure, command reorganization,
and maintenance of a capability to resume main force
offensive activity, should that decision be taken. The
principal constraints under which North Vietnam operates
are not those of manpower availability or forces in-
place but are considerations of possible US retaliation
for serious and protracted cease-fire violations.
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Capabilities
12. In North Vietnam, available evidence suggests
a rather normal pattern of recruiting practices fol-
lowing the cease-fire agreement. The traditional
December-January induction phase apparently con-
tinued through mid-January in some provinces, with
only minor dislocation resulting from LINEBACKER II.
Limited evidence suggests that the spring induction
phase--which normally commences in March-April--will
be held as scheduled. For example, a 17 January
Hanoi Moi article stated that "youth were making
themselves physically fit to be ready to leave for
military service during the spring inductions."
Currently, there does not appear
recruitment program, supporting
to
the
be a "cr
view tha
ash"
t Hanoi
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is "watching and waiting."
Thus, the infiltration flow has, at least temporarily,
been halted. This suggests that Hanoi is now ob-
serving the cease-fire infiltration prohibition; how-
ever, this flow could resume at any time. The troops
inducted during the December-January conscription phase
will be trained and available for infiltration during
the current 3- to 6-month period.
14. Given the current Communist order of battle
and force distribution, VC/NVA forces in South Viet-
nam have a reduced capability over the next three to
six months to initiate major offensive operations
similar to those of the spring of 1972. This appears
to be the case throughout South Vietnam, except for
northern MR-l, where enemy combat forces are
esti-
mated to be at about the same level as
their
peak
1972
offensive strength. This is not to say
that
the Com-
munists could n
ot score some temporary
gains
by seizing
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additional territory if they chose to violate the
cease-fire, but VC/NVA forces probably would not
be able to take and hold any major, well-defended
GVN target--as exemplified by the recent military
confrontation over Tay Ninh City.
Intentions
Military
15. At the present time, the signs indicating
North Vietnam's possible courses of action in the
near future are mixed. There is evidence of inten-
tions to make use of the military forces in place in
South Vietnam to build a political base for a struggle
in that sphere; there is equally good evidence of
planning for military contingencies.
16. Throughout South Vietnam the VC and NVA
forces are basically in a defensive military posture.
What limited information we have suggests that Com-
munist intentions in the near term are to strengthen
command structures of units now deployed and to hold
onto territory now occupied. Communist local forces
apparently intend to continue to take advantage of
targets of opportunity in populated areas. Beyond
this, there is no current evidence to suggest more
elaborate military plans in the next three to six
months. However, in many parts of South Vietnam--
particularly MRs 1 and 2--substantial main force of-
fensive activity could be launched with little or no
advanced warning.
Political
17. Throughout South Vietnam there have been
indications that the Communists are devoting a sub-
stantial portion of their efforts to rebuilding the
VC political apparatus, and the North Vietnamese are
assisting in this effort. In Phu Yen Province, for
example, the VC are selecting their most trusted
"hard-core" cadre to become permanent residents of a
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particular hamlet or village. The primary objec-
tive is to ensure a greater degree of VC political
control during the cease-fire period. In Quang
Ngai Province, the Communists have created anew
organization tasked with the responsibility for
waging a political struggle during the early stages
of the cease-fire period. Entitled the "Vietnamese
People's United Committee in South Vietnam," this
apparatus is'to encompass a number of previously
established sections of the VC political organiza-
tion at the district level and below, such as those
for security, military proselyting, and propaganda.
Efforts such as these are undoubtedly being launched
in other provinces of the country and probably will
intensify in coming months.
18. A COSVN resolution issued late in January
has focused on the importance of the political
struggle, emphasizing such political activities as
local proselyting and subverting the GVN's local
militia forces. However, the resolution also
emphasizes the continued development of the Com-
munist combat forces in case hostilities resume or
clashes with ARVN occur.
Economic
19. In inspecting economic factors that might
provide evidence of North Vietnam's intentions, it
is important to remember that the Vietnam cease-
fire is a new learning experience for Hanoi. The
sorts of contingencies for which Hanoi will plan
over the next 3 to 6 months will be constantly sifted
and re-evaluated in the light of the emerging new
relationships with Washington and Saigon.
20. At the present time--understandably--North
Vietnam has yet to get a large-scale industrial recon-
struction program off the ground. We have seen some
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evidence of the return of a few technicians from
other Communist countries and the makeshift repair
of vital electric power facilities, but as yet no
signs that major rebuilding is under way.
21. Whether or not the North Vietnamese in-
tend to work generally within the frame of the peace
settlement, they will probably begin their recon-
struction efforts by surveying damage and determining
what machinery has been saved or can be salvaged.
Should they conclude that consolidating the cur-
rently dispersed industry is an acceptable risk,
they would then need to choose sites for the use of
the surviving equipment, assemble work forces for
both cleanup and subsequent plant operation, and
relocate some transportation equipment for factory
supply and distribution. Such a major program would,
at a minimum, take 3 or 4 months, even if done
hastily.
22. As the North Vietnamese become more ac-
customed to freedom from bombing and mining, cer-
tain more clearly defined courses of action re-
flecting a commitment to peacetime planning may
emerge. For example, if the DRV intends to adhere
to the broad terms of the cease-fire, they would
likely feel it safe to redevelop extractive in-
dustries for mineral exports. They would then
probably invite Japanese and other non-Communist
raw material buyers to discuss seriously repair
and expansion of existing facilities. Other pro-
jects that might at least get under way in the next
6 months, if the North Vietnamese are really con-
fident that there will be no more US bombing and/
or mining, would include: resuming work on the Bac
Giang Chemical Fertilizer Plant, which was at an
advanced stage of construction in 1965 but has since
lain idle; repairing damage at the Viet Tri Chemical
Complex, the Thai Nguyen Iron and Steel Combine, and
textile plants at Nam Dinh and Hanoi; going ahead
with plans to build a new capital city, on which
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work was initiated in 1971. At this admittedly
early point, none of.the above steps has been
observed..
23. We should, of course, bear in mind that
North Vietnamese officials and media have already
commenced speaking in glowing terms of reconstruction.
Similarly, Hanoi has already begun to solicit eco-
nomic aid for reconstruction. This sort of activity,
however, is not conclusive. Much of the machinery
and equipment needs in a reconstruction period are
consistent with remobilization for warfare, and there
is no serious domestic cost to broad discussion of
reconstruction.
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10 February 1973
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
1. Attached is the printed version of the memorandum on Hanoi's
intentions that we sent to the White House as part of the package sent
down on the evening of 9 February.
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2. Per your suggestion, we talked to Latimer on 9 February and
I have talked to him again this morning (10 February). Our pitch was that
the situation in Laos had certainly not improved in the last few days and
in fact the battlefield situation -- especially in MR's I, III and IV -- had
gotten precipitously more parlous, though, not (yet) to the point of coiiepse.
y
Latimer has assured us that this is the line the NSC Staff has been giving
Henry over the past several days. It is also the line that the Mission 25X1
has been emphasizing ii, its briefs right 25X1
up to the moment of Kissinger's departure for Hanoi.
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4. Latimer assured me that Kissinger is very much on notice about
the diceyness of the situation with Laos and such notice is amply documented
in the record. Actually, the Laos situation -- at least in MR IV -- is a
trifle brighter today, partly as a result of a visit by General Vogt (and
senior staff) to Pakse which had the happy consequence of unsnarling some
air support problems.
5. In addition to the problems in Laos, there has been quite heavy
action around Quang Tri where, on 9 February, GVN Marine and air borne
positions took more than 1400 rounds of artillery and mortar fire. If this
kind of activity continues sporadically during next week (and I believe it
probably will), I plan to send Henry a private note warning him bluntly
that the North Vietnamese -- in every sphere -- are going to press up to the
point where we react. Their behavior will be similar to behavior all parents
have experienced in their adolescent offspring: pushing in every direction
to ascertain if there are indeed limits to parental tolerance and, if so, just
where those limits are.
George A. Carver, Jr.
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs
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9 FEB 1973
PLEASE RELAY THE FOLLOWING PERSONAL MESSAGE TO DR. KISSINGER:
1. After musing on our 6 February telephone conversation and taking
counsel with some of my colleagues, I offer the following views, which my
colleagues also share, an why the DRV leadership wanted to have you come to
Hanoi.
2. The Politburo's motives probably cover a fairly broad spectrum,
ranging from simple human curiosity to more elaborate and arcane raisons
d'etat. I would not be at all surprised if Le Duc Tho wanted to show you off
(perhaps thus providing proof for some of the tales he has been relating), I
also suspect that his Hanoi associates have a genuine desire to see you for
themselves, at close range and in the flesh.
3.' On a larger, less personal scale, Hanoi's objectives lie much
more in the realm of symbolism and atmospherics than concrete content or
immediate substance. The North Vietnamese probably think they have a better
chance of nailing down questions of postwar political and economic relations
with the U.S. by talking directly with you, but symbolic and atmospheric
considerations (not efficiency or ease) would have shaped their preference for
Hanoi as the site for these discussions.
4. When you and President Nixon visited Peking, I am sure your
hosts were exquisitely courteous. I am equally sure that they knew full well
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that -- no matter what was actually said or done during your visit -- this visit
would be instantly and instinctively construed by Chinese (of all political
persuasions) throughout the world as barbarian chiefs coming to pay tribute
to the celestial emperor at the seat of civilization -- which, to most Chinese,
is the right and proper thing for barbarians to do when the stars are running
on their true courses and the universe aligned in proper order. Hanoi's rulers
will be playing similar themes, at least in a muted minor key. No matter to what
extent your hosts honor their pre-visit promises regarding minimum publicity,
you had better be resigned to the fact that they will play your visit -- at least
to Vietnamese audiences, who will be predisposed to read the symbols in this
fashion. anyway -- as proof of Hanoi's "victory" which you have come to ac-
knowledge. Be equally assured that any aid agreements which emanate from
your visit (or can be made to look as if they did) will be at least internally
advertised as "reparations" or a defeated enemy's "tribute" .
. 5 . Another plus for your visit, in Hanoi's eyes, is that it is bound
to irritate Saigon and fan the paranoid suspicions for which our allies --
like virtually all Vietnamese -- have an ineradicable penchant. Though this
may not have been in the cards when the visit was first broached by your
hosts, as things have worked out, Saigon gets Vice President Agnew but
Hanoi gets Henry Kissinger.
6. In addition to wanting to score points on (and nettle) Saigon, Hanoi
also wants to show off to (and, perhaps, preen before) Moscow and Peking.
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Indeed, one may legitimately wonder if Hanoi would not like to cultivate a
measure of bilateral relations with Washington that could serve as a kind of
anchor to windward if relations were to chill between Hanoi and (reciprocally)
its two primary communist patrons, particularly Peking. While Hanoi very much
wants to project to South Vietnam the suggestion that the latter's fate is being
settled by other, more powerful parties behind South Vietnam's back, Hanoi
is very sensitive to any atmospheric (let alone substantive) hint that the DRV's
fate is being arranged by big powers through relationships in which Hanoi does
not directly participate.
5. Finally (though this probably does not exhaust the range of
operative motives), Hanoi wants to set a symbolic seal on the Paris agreement or at least its interpretation thereof, The DRV's leaders probably attach great
importance to the visit -- and will be closely scrutinizing its evolution -- as
an omen of US intentions regarding Indochina. The North Vietnamese --- in their
propaganda and among themselves -- have consistently pointed to US disengage-
ment from the Indochina struggle as the chief accomplishment of the recently
completed negotiations. Just as consistently, however, they have evinced
nagging residual doubts about our sincerity on this score. Thus they probably
welcome the visit for the reassurance they hope it will connote, but their concerns
are not likely to be completely allayed. Indeed, if you take this occasion to
remind your hosts that we will not be satisfied with battlefield quiet alone but
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really expect all foreign forces -- theirs included -- to be withdrawn from Laos
and Cambodia, and the Paris agreement's resupply provisions to be strictly
adhered to, you will undoubtedly find your hosts' cordiality perceptibly
strained.
Best regards,
George
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