Recent Communist Military and Economic Assistance to North Vietnam

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T01719R000400250003-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 28, 2000
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: May 10, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

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No Foreign Dissem
Sensitive
Recent Communist Military
and Economic Assistance to North Vietnam
NSA Declassification/Release Instructions on File.
Top Secret
Handle via
TCS No. 3243/73
Talent-Keyhole- Comint
10 May 1973
Channels Jointly
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INVOLVEDRCES
AND
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TCS-3243/73
10 May 1973
RECENT COMMUNIST MILITARY
AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO NORTH VIETNAM
Conclusions
There is virtually no direct information on
military imports by North Vietnam since the signing
of the Paris Aqreement
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NSA
But beyond that, there have been only a few re-
ports -- second- and third-hand -- of supplies
moving through China to North Vietnam. Conversely,
a few Communist diplomats (whose access to such
information is debatable) have said that both the
PRC and the USSR are cutting back on military aid.
Independent evidence is consistent with a con-
tinuation of military aid at high levels, but is
not conclusive. The current high level of North
Vietnam's logistical activity directed toward
building military stocks in Laos, Cambodia, and
South Vietnam suggests that Hanoi is not hurting
for military equipment. Traditionally, such a
high level of activity at the lower end of the
logistic funnel has been accompanied by a corres-
ponding high level of activity at the top of the
funnel -- military aid from the USSR and the PRC --
but there is no conclusive proof that such is
presently the case. Indeed, the present activity
could be a readjustment of internal stockpiles.
In sum, the evidence with respect to current
levels of military aid is sketchy and ambiguous.
There have been some propaganda and public state-
ments out of Hanoi that can be read as signs of
No Foreign Dissem
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concern* in terms of available evidence on move-
ment and delivery, however, there are no clear
signs that military aid is continuing at pre-
cease-fire levels and no clear signs that such
aid has been curtailed.
There is no doubt that Soviet and Chinese
economic assistance is continuing. Both the USSR
and the PRC continue to be responsive to Hanoi's
economic needs, shipping large amounts of food,
petroleum, and other economic goods into North
Vietnam at levels comparable to the period just
prior to the cease-fire. Furthermore, both coun-
tries have made firm plans for additional major
economic assistance in the immediate months ahead.
Since the cease-fire, the PRC has sent about 160
technicians to North Vietnam to help in the re-
building effort.
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Military Assistance
1. Over the years, there has been little direct
evidence of foreign military aid deliveries to North
Vietnam, which are made almost entirely by overlan
transport
aid estimates have been based primaril on indirect
evidence from a variety of sources.
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itary
However, deter-
mination of imports of small arms and ammunition
could be made only on the basis of observed use of
such ordnance in actual combat, plus estimates of
losses from Allied air and ground actions and esti-
mated expenditures for training in rear base areas.
2. Historically, this information has permitted
us to make rough estimates of trends in military aid.
Before 1972, the peak of military aid to North Viet-
nam was reached in 1967 with the import of large
quantities of small arms and ammunition (principally
from the PRC) and SAMs and antiaircraft artillery
(from the USSR). The level of military aid trailed
off through the next three years but began to move
up again in 1971 and rose sharply in 1972.
Direct Evidence
Nonetheless, there has been some fragmentary
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evidence that the USSR and the PRC are continuing
to send aid, presumably under the terms of agree-
ments signed with North Vietnam late last year.
4. Thus far in 1973 abou 1,900 trucks have 25X1D1a
been detected in North Vietnam NSA
from other Communist countries -- as shown in the
following tabulation:
USSR
China
Eastern
Europe
Total
Total
1,100
590
240
1,930
Jan
10
180
40
230
Feb
360
410
....
770
Mar
430
....
200
630
Apr
300
?...
....
300
This total is roughly comparable to the 1,900 trucks
observed being delivered during the same period
last year when the Communists were gearing up for
their offensive. Although some of these trucks may
be destined for the civilian economy, there is little
doubt that many are going to military units.
5. On 14 April, ELINT from the Hanoi area re-
vealed the probable initial presence of the FLAP-
WHEEL radar in North Vietnam. Although we have no
direct information on when this radar arrived in
North Vietnam, Hanoi has traditionally deployed new
equipment as soon as it has been received and is
operational. This radar is a fire-control radar
generally associated with the 57-mm antiaircraft gun.
It is a marked improvement over the earlier gen-
eration FIRECAN radar in that it is capable of per-
forming its own acquisition, has an onboard com-
puter, and is able to operate more effectively in
a jamming environment. Taken with the heavy de-
liveries of SA-3 equipment detected just before
the cease-fire, these deliveries underscore Soviet
intent to further update North Vietnam's air defense
capabilities. Because of the sophisticated nature
of this equipment, the Soviets will almost certainly
have to provide continued training and material
assistance (in the form of spare parts, etc.) if
Hanoi is to make full use of their equipment.
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- In April, two Soviet ships delivered six
MI-10 helicopters to Haiphong. These craft --
with a lift capability of some 13 tons each --
have a variety of applications, including con-
struction work and passenger and freight hauling.
7. Finally, there has been a smattering of
reported observations of military shipments. An
ARVN prisoner of war recently returned from North
Vietnam reported that he was told by other POWs
that they had observed convoys of trucks carrying
military supplies near the Chinese border as late
as February 1973. Another source reported in late
March observing at Nan-ping, in southern China,
trucks loaded with food and weapons moving toward
North Vietnam.
Indirect Evidence
8. There is no doubt that a great deal of Com- 25X1D0a
munist military logistic activity has been taking
place throughout Indochina since the cease-fire.
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Throughout the war,
the North Vietnamese have practiced a supply
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stockpiling policy which requires that, for every
type of ordnance or military equipment provided to
the front line forces, they maintain very large
stockpiles in rear base areas. It could be argued
that the current activity would not be taking place
if Hanoi did not feel confident of receiving con-
tinued military aid.
9. Moreover, there have been no indications
in the post-cease-fire period that the Communists
have found it necessary to conserve supplies while
rebuilding their military capability in South
Vietnam. Relatively heavy firing from field artil-
lery and other weapons has continued during the
cease-fire, and ten new SA-2 sites have been estab-
lished near Khe Sanh.
10. There has been conflicting information as
to what Communist forces deployed in Laos or South
Vietnam are being told to expect in the way of
future supplies
Whatever
e case, there is strong indirect evidence that
the Communists will at least try to maintain and
strengthen the present areas and force structure
they hold and maintain in South Vietnam.
11. Recent North Vietnamese propaganda contains
at least some hints that the North Vietnamese
leadership is still concerned over the amount of
support and aid that its Communist allies are
willing to provide. In the May Day speech, Pham
Van Dong seemed to be addressing this topic when
he stated that "we strive to secure the assistance
in many fields from the USSR, China, and other
socialist countries." While not as strong as
earlier statements, the North Vietnamese do appear
to be calling for greater assurances of support
and aid from the Communist bloc. An article in the
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North Vietnamese party newspaper last month also
hinted that both the Chinese and Soviets were still
putting pressure on Hanoi to honor the agreement.
So far, however, these expressions of concern have
been scattered and fairly muted.
12. In any case, whether or not North Vietnam
and its allies intend to abide by the spirit of
the cease-fire and curtail military imports, it
seems likely that there will be (if there has not
already been) a slackening of such imports in the
months ahead. For one thing, with the halt in US
air operations over North Vietnam, Hanoi's require-
merit for AAA ammunition, SAMs, and other types of
air defense equipment has fallen to only a fraction
of its previous level. These are the most bulky
and expensive items in Hanoi's military aid bill
and the most easily detected. It is also likely
that, as the rainy season approaches and with
ammunition and weapons caches already built up to
massive levels in Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam,
the movement of supplies into these areas will de-
cline. Even if Hanoi's allies are willing to
sponsor the buildup and maintenance of relatively
large weapons inventories, such imports in the
future -- assuming no large-scale resumption of
hostilities -- might not exceed the low levels
observed during the 1969-71 period.
Economic Assistance
Overview
13. North Vietnam's major Communist aid donors
have continued to provide economic aid to Hanoi
since the cease-fire under the terms of the 1973
aid and trade agreements. This aid has included
both commodity assistance to sustain the economy
and technical assistance for the reconstruction
effort now under way.
14. By any measure, the flow of imports from
Communist suppliers since the cease-fire has been
quite large. The total deliveries to North Vietnam
during February-April 1973 -- some 565,000 tons of
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general cargo, food, fertilizer, and petroleum* --
were essentially unchanged from the three months
prior to the cease-fire. The recent flow is not
far below the 615,000 tons of the comparable period
in 1972, in spite of the fact that the port of
Haiphong was in full operation at that time.
15. The continued responsiveness of Hanoi's
Communist suppliers can be judged from their actions
since the cease-fire. Direct Soviet shipping to
Haiphong was resumed long before that port could
be declared safe for international shipping.
China's support for Hanoi is evident from the very
large delivery schedules which have been negotiated
each month since the cease-fire. There is a con-
tinued heavy use of overland routes even though
the port of Haiphong is becoming fully operational.
Although there is undoubtedly a strong need to
rebuild stocks and an extensive demand for machinery
and equipment for reconstruction, the current rate
of flow of imports and maintenance of the less
efficient overland routes suggests also that Hanoi
(with the help of its allies) is.buying the maxi-
mum possible insurance against a resumption of
hostilities. A clearer reading of this point will
be possible only with the passage of time.
Seaborne Imports
16. North Vietnam resumed seaborne imports as
quickly as possible following the cease-fire.
Some 337,000 tons of cargo have arrived since then,
almost as much as was sent to North Vietnam via
the Chinese ports in the three months preceding the
signing of the accord (see Table 1). Deliveries
have increased month by month, mainly on the
strength of imports from the USSR. In all, the
Soviets have supplied some 212,000 tons, or nearly
65% of the total, while the PRC has sent some
81,000 tons.
17. Food imports, which were down for the three-
month period, remained the single largest component
Including an an estimate for petroleum moved through
the PRC-North Vietnam pipeline system constructed
since mid-1972.
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Table 1
North Vietnam's Seaborne Imports, by Origins
Thousand Metric Tons
Three Months
Pre-Cease-Fire
Post-Cease-Fire 1973
Feb-Apr
(Nov 1972-Jan 1973) Total Feb
Mar
Apr
1972
Total
361
337
88
115
135
605
USSR
271
212
49
70
92
304
PRC
35
81
19
29
32
209
Other
55
45
20
16
11
92
Food
126
116
25
39
53
188
USSR
79
62
10
26
26
94
PRC
....
35
3
13
19
56
Other
47
19
12
....
8
38
Petroleum
122
71
15
27
28
107
USSR
120
70
15
26
28
93
PRC
....
....
....
....
....
14
Other
2
1
....
1
....
....
Fertilizer
22
35
12
8
14
58
USSR
22
29
9
5
14
50
PRC
....
3
....
3
....
3
Other
....
3
3
....
....
5
General Cargo
and Uniden-
tified
91
115
36
41
40
252
USSR
50
51
15
13
24
67
PRC
35
43
16
13
13
136
Other
6
21
5
15
3
49
1. Including deliveries to PRC ports for North Vietnam. Because of rounding, components may not
add to the totals shown.
at 116,000 tons. Seaborne petroleum imports,
virtually all of which have come from the USSR
over the years, are down sharply since the cease-
fire (although there is considerable evidence that
large amounts of petroleum continue to be delivered
overland via the PRC-North Vietnam pipeline). Other
seaborne imports include fertilizer, machinery
and equipment, vehicles, and helicopters.
18. Since late February, foreign ships have,
with one exception, taken their cargoes directly
to North Vietnam, nearly all to the Haiphong area,
instead of to Chinese ports for transshipment
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overland. Haiphong, however, has not yet returned
to full capacity, because US mine-clearing remains
uncompleted and silting has reduced channel depths.
Large dry cargo ships and some smaller ones con-
tinue to discharge at least part of their cargoes
onto lighters at an anchorage outside of the harbor.
Haiphong is also having some difficulty handling
Soviet tankers. The USSR has moved to help alle-
viate tanker congestion in Haiphong in recent weeks
as a large Soviet tanker has been sent to Haiphong
to act as floating storage. For its part,. the PRC
is scheduled to transfer two small tankers to North
Vietnam in June possibly for similar use.
Overland Imports
19. The heavy pace of overland imports estab-
lished in 1972 has continued virtually unabated
since the cease-fire. Although deliveries noted
thus far in April total only some 6,600 tons,*
shipments in February and March amounted to 26,000
and 47,000 tons, respectively (see Table 2).
Monthly overland shipments during the preceding
nine months (when the ports were mined) averaged
some 27,000 tons, and for the three months prior
to the cease-fire they averaged about 29,000 tons.
By comparison, total shipments observed during
February-April 1972, before the ports were mined,
were roughly 11,000 tons.
20. The USSR continued to be the dominant sup-
plier of North Vietnam's observed overland imports,
providing 82% of the total since the cease-fire.
Foodstuffs account for 83% of the tonnage of Soviet
deliveries, but Moscow also provides substantial
quantities of trucks, petroleum, construction-
related explosives, and other goods. Chinese
deliveries, consisting mainly of foodstuffs,
vehicles, and explosives, account for another 11%,
while Eastern Europe and other Communist countries
provide the remainder.
10
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North Vietnam: Overland Imports Noted
by Commodity and Origin
NSA
Three Months
Post-Cease-Fire1973
Pre- Cease-Fire
Feb-Apr
(Nov 1972 - Jan 1973)
Total
Feb
Mar
Apr
1972
Total
86,781
79,284
26,038
46,631
6,615
11,151
USSR
55,942
65,142
23,102
39,148
2,892
8,969
PRC
12,175
8,785
2,330
3,576
2,879
2,182
Other
18,664
5,357
606
3,907
844
....
Food
70,071
61,886
20,182
40,044
1,660
705
USSR
48,572
54,030
19,921
34,109
....
....
PRC
6,899
4,473
261
2,927
1,285
705
Other
14,600
3,383
....
3,008
375
....
Petroleum
5,877
3,672
1,551
1,603
518
USSR
5,494
3,244
1,471
1,470
303
....
PRC
....
136
....
....
136
Other
383
292
80
133
79
....
Fertilizer
779
....
....
....
USSR
429
....
....
....
....
....
PRC
350
....
....
Metals
3,419
1,632
526
825
281
....
USSR
67
....
....
....
....
PRC
....
90
....
90
....
....
Other
3,352
1,542
526
735
281
....
Machinery
890
275
180
38
57
....
USSR
513
57
....
....
57
....
PRC
311
199
180
19
....
....
Other
66
19
....
19
....
....
Explosives
48
1,440
.... .
522
918
611
USSR
48
932
....
522
410
305
PRC
....
508
....
....
508
306
Vehicles
3,593
6,430
2,850
2,192
1,388
8,625
USSR
120
4,790
1,210
2,192
1,388
8,625
PRC
3,473
1,640
1,640
....
....
....
Miscellaneous
2,104
3,949
749
1,407
1,793
1,210
USSR
699
2,089
500
855
734
39
PRC
1,142
1,739
249
540
950
1,171
Other
263
121
....
12
109
....
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21. Rail transportation has accounted for the
bulk of observed overland deliveries, but the
pipeline system to the PRC constructed since the
mining of the ports constitutes another major
element in North Vietnam's resupply capability.
The pipeline system has undoubtedly permitted Hanoi
to maintain its petroleum consumption levels even
when the ports were closed and represents a means
of resupply that can assure a virtually uninter-
rupted flow of petroleum deliveries if the United
States should again close Haiphong.
Trade Negotiations and Plans
22. Ongoing trade negotiations reflect not
only Hanoi's dependence on its Communist suppliers
for a wide variety of essential supplies but also
the willingness of these sources to continue large-
le s
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Reconstruction Assistance
25. There has been a resumption of Soviet and
Chinese technical assistance to North Vietnam since
the cease-fire, although not yet on a massive
scale. Most reconstruction work halted last June
following the renewal of bombing and the departure
of foreign technicians and has not yet resumed.
Since the cease-fire, however, both Moscow and
Peking have made arrangements to send technicians
to North Vietnam, have accepted North Vietnamese
trainees for instruction in various fields, and
have arranged to send equipment and materials to
a number of construction projects.
26. Moscow, for instance, reported plans to
send 11 coal mining specialists to North Vietnam
in March and also agreed to send unspecified num-
bers of specialists in such varied fields as
electric powerplant construction, marine equipment,
pier construction, and public health. In addition,
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the USSR contracted to train North Vietnamese
bridge, road, and port construction teams, as well
as drivers, river pilots, and three groups of
surveyors.
27. Chinese assistance is represented by the
arrival of about 160 specialists since the cease-
fire, including 15 to work on restoration of the
Thai Nguyen Iron and Steel Complex, 27 for the new
100-mw thermal powerplant under construction at
Ninh Binh, eight for the Bac Giang chemical complex
and another project, and about 110 others for
unspecified projects. The PRC has also agreed to
accept substantial numbers of North Vietnamese
trainees for instruction in various specialties,
including 60 agricultural trainees and four con-
struction trainees scheduled to travel to the PRC
in late March and April.
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