THE IMPACT OF A COMMUNIST CAMBODIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T01719R000400280001-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 23, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 15, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

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*.W~ 144K
15 May 1973
A Communist takeover in Cambodia would have the
following results.:
-- It would be very unsettling politically and
psychologically to the South Vietnamese govern-
ment and the South Vietnamese population.
The GVN would feel increasingly isolated and
beleagured. It would regard a Communist
Cambodia as evidence of U.S. determination
to disengage from Indochina and a sign of U.S. unwillingness to insist on Communist compliance
with the provisions of the Paris Agreements.
-- The U.S. position in Thailand would also be
adversely affected, because Bangkok views
U.S. policy in Cambodia as a gauge of the
reliability of the U.S. commitment to Thai
security.
-- The fall of Cambodia would markedly ease the
logistic problems of the Communists in
supplying their military forces in South
Vietnam.
It would in sum. make it easier for Hanoi to
achieve its goal of taking over South Vietnam,
either by the. political struggle.route or by
a return to military struggle.
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1. Political and Psychological Implications: The most
damaging consequences of a Communist victory in Cambodia
would be the political and psychological fallout in South Vietnam
and other neighboring countries. The immediate effect on Saigon
would be highly unsettling, producing a feeling within the GVN o
greater vulnerability and isolation. The GVN accepted the Paris
Agreements with reluctance and only under considerable U.S.
pressure. To the GVN,. Article 20 -- stating that all signing parties
would refrain from using the territory of Cambodia and Laos to
encroach on others! sovereignty and security -- was a central
element of the agreement, without which the GVN would have been
adamantly unwilling to sign an agreement that turned a blind
eye. to the presence of North Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam.
Communist acquisition of control over Cambodia would be read
in Saigon as a sign that Article 20 had been abandoned and the
GVN betrayed.
Saigon would make no precipitate moves, but South
Vietnamese leaders would be concerned that U.S. failure to
prevent a Communist takeover in Cambodia would presage total
U.S. disengagement from Indochina and a U.S. unwillingness
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to insist on Communist compliance with the Paris Agreements.
Even though the immediate military threat to South Vietnam might
not be markedly increased, GVN military leaders would be very
fearful about the longer term threat to a Communist-surrounded
South Vietnam. On the diplomatic front, South Vietnam would
almost certainly request new U.S. guarantees of economic and
military assistance, and new assurances of U.S. air support in
the :event of a major Communist attack. Saigon would react with
even greater alarm if Hanoi began to ship large amounts of heavy
military equipment into Cambodia or to develop and use Cambodian
air facilities.
3. The Effects in Laos and Thailand: The fall of Cambodia
would clearly be discouraging to non-Communists in Laos, although
the immediate impact on political events there would be fairly small.
The Laos settlement agreement has already guaranteed the Communists
indefinite control of eastern Laos and a major role in a new
coalition government.
4. The political and psychological fallout in Thailand;
however, would be. much greater. For obvious reasons, Bangkok
has a sizable stake in neighboring Cambodia and Laos and has
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made it clear that it looks to the U.S. to prevent a Communist
takeover in either country. In other words, Bangkok views U.S.
policy in Cambodia as a gauge of the reliability of the U.S.
commitment to Thai security. If Cambodia, shorn of U.S. support,
went under to the Communists, Bangkok's first instinctive reaction
would be to fall back on its alliance with the U . S. and look to
Washington for protection. It would not be likely to take any
major military action, such as moving its forces into western
I
Cambodia without guarantees full U.S. support.
5. A Communist Cambodia, however, would prompt a basic
reexamination of Thailand's close political and military ties with
the U.S. If, in Thai eyes, the U.S. "allowed" Cambodia to fall,
Bangkok, for one thing, would take a harder look at the relative
advantages and disadvantages of allowing U.S. air bases to
remain in Thailand. The Thai leadership would want to see
some new and concrete assurances of U.S. support -- probably in
the form of greatly increased economic and military aid. T
date, the Thai government has for the most part ignored growing
domestic pressure to reconsider the U.S. alliance and move to a
non-aligned policy. If, in the aftermath of a Communist victory
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in Cambodia, the U.S. cannot respond sufficiently with new
aid and commitments to satisfy Thai doubts, these pressures
would escalate and jeopardize the existing close cooperation
between Washington and Bangkok.
6. Easing of Communist Logistic Burdens: The greatest
military gain accruing to the Communists from their control of
Cambodia would be an easing of their heavy logistical burden.
No longer would Communist fortunes in southern South Vietnam
depend so heavily on the long and costly overland supply corridor
through southern Laos and Cambodia. They could begin to
shift more of their logistic effort to a sea supply route through
southern Cambodia. There is nothing to prevent small-scale
sea supply through Cambodia at present since the Communists
control or have easy access to much of the Cambodian coastline
and interior adjacent to South Vietnam. A larger effort, however,
would require an end to the fighti ng in Cambodia and the acquisition
of Cambodia's port facilities.
7. The development of a Cambodian sea supply route could
in time give the Communists much greater flexibility in developing
and implementing their future military strategy in Vietnam.
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Large amounts of war material, including the heavy weapons
needed to mount a major offensive, could be brought in through
the port of Kompong Som much more quickly and with much less
warning than if delivered overland from the north. This was
precisely the advantage that the Communists enjoyed for several
years prior to Sihanouk's ouster in March 1970, when Kompong
Som was the main port of entry for North Vietnamese military
supplies consigned to southern South Vietnam. Hanoi's ability
to make extensive use of Kompong Som in this manner would depend,
of course, on the willingness of Peking and Moscow to provide
the material and possibly the shipping for such an effort. It would
also depend on Kompong Som's immunity from air attack or
naval quarantine.
8. The Communists would by no means abandon their
overland routes from the-north. Indeed, they have already
improved their capability to resupply their forces in northern
South Vietnam directly across the DMZ, and are apparently at
work on developing routes that would allow them to resupply
southern South Vietnam while bypassing Cambodia and Laos.
The development of a Cambodian sea supply route, however, would
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simplify Communist military imports and assist this effort to phase
out or deemphasize their dependence on the existing Ho Chi Minh
trail system. The largest part of the North Vietnamese force
structure in southern Laos -- which is logistics related -- could
be withdrawn without waiting for the development of overland
supply routes through South Vietnam to the south.
9. Immediate Military Impact on South Vietnam: Although
a Communist takeover in Cambodia would not immediately shift
the balance of military power in a major way, it would still improve
the position of VC/NVA forces significantly. The Vietnamese
Communists currently are estimated to have about 5,000 regular
combat troops in Cambodia, most of whom are already targetted
against South Vietnam. (This total also includes, however, sapper
and artillery elements operating with Khmer Communist units
and an unknown number of advisors.) A cessation of hostilities
in Cambodia would free almost all of these troops for deployment to
South Vietnam. Since the NVA/VC combat strength in South Vietnam's
Military Regions (MR) 3 and 4 -- the areas to which the units in
Cambodia most likely would be deployed -- is now estimated to
total about 54,000 troops, this would be an augmentation of some
ten percent.
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10. In the longer term, the Communists would have access
to a jet airbase at Phnom Penh, as well as several smaller airfields
closer to the border which could be used to provide air support
in South Vietnam. Moreover, the Communists might acquire a
substantial inventory of Cambodian government helicopters and
propeller-driven tactical aircraft, naval craft, artillery, and other
hardware. In addition, the sizable amounts of arms and ammunition
stockpiled by the Communists in Cambodia, which is designated
for the fighting there, could be made available to Communist
forces in South Vietnam.
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