Implications for Communist Conduct of the Congressional Restrictions on U.S. Military Activity in Indochina

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T01719R000400330001-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 23, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 10, 1973
• Content Type: MEMO

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10 July 1973
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Implications for Communist Conduct of the Congressional
Restrictions on U. S. Military Activity in Indochina
1. President Nixon's acceptance of a Congressional ban on
obligating or expending funds to finance the involvement of United
States military forces in hostilities" throughout Indochina could be
viewed in Hanoi as a green light for large-scale Communist military
initiatives in South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. At a minimum,
Hanoi will carefully reassess its position and prospects in light of
this development within the United States. Nonetheless, a considered
analysis suggests that they will probably hold to their current approach
in South Vietnam and Laos for another six months at least. In
Cambodia, it seems likely that the Khmer and Vietnamese Communists .
will pursue a very hard line on negotiations while deferring at least
through the end of the rainy season any effort to win a purely military
Classified by 009438
Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E. 0. 11652
exemption category SB(2), (3)
Automatically Declassified on
Date Impossible to Determine
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Vietnam and Laos
2. Hanoi accepted the Paris Agreements in January and the
supplementary understandings in June after long and careful con-
sideration of its own situation. The impact of U. S. bombing and
the threat of its resumption by the President was, of course, an
important factor in the decision to reach these agreements. Now
Hanoi recognizes that renewal of the bombing hinges not on the
President's action alone, but on the consent of Congress. Hanoi
may judge that this consent would be most difficult to obtain and
that it will now enjoy considerably greater latitude for military action.
Nevertheless, Hanoi displays continued suspicion and distrust of U. S.
intentions and will retain important doubts as to what the U. S. would
actually do in the event of blatant violations of the Paris Agreements.
There are, in addition, other deterrents to stepped up communist
military action in South Vietnam, at least for the next six months or so. *
*The North Vietnamese probably would react strongly with military
forces now positioned near the South Vietnamese border should Saigon
attempt, following the 15 August ban, to send any of its combat units
into Cambodia in support of the FANK.
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--South Vietnamese forces are themselves relatively strong.
This tends to rule out as counter-productive anything less
than an all-out Communist offensive which also involves
serious risks.
- -The Communist structure in both North and South Vietnam
is now being instructed to undertake other tasks, It would
take some time and effort to turn it around.
--Neither China nor the USSR has any interest in supporting
a resumption of large-scale hostilities in Indochina and
Hanoi is well aware of this.
3. In Laos, the North Vietnamese appear satisfied with present
Communist holdings and content eventually to accept a political structure
which will give them a considerable measure of influence in the territory
of the Lao government and over political affairs in Laos.. We think it
unlikely they will deviate from this strategic course as a result of the
projected ban on U. S. military operations throughout Indochina.
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Nonetheless, given the weakness of the RLG's overall military position,
the communists probably will delay political agreement until they have
extracted additional concessions from Souvanna. Certainly the RLG
is now vulnerable to such a communist approach.
4. Cambodia is a special case since the analysis depends heavily
on the nature of any understandings which may now exist between and
among the interested parties -- the US, Phnom Penh, Hanoi, Peking,
Moscow, Sihanouk, and the Khmer insurgents.
5. If the broad terms of a cease-fire agreement or political
settlement have beer} agreed between the U. S. , Hanoi, Peking, and
Sihanouk, then the cessation of U. S. military action would have little
effect in Cambodia. These terms would have reflected the broader
interests of Peking, the U. S. and Hanoi, and these interests would
not change as of August 15.
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6. The external evidence suggests, however, that negotiations
for a Cambodian cease-fire or political settlement still have a long way
to go. If this is so, the bargaining position of the GKR and the U. S.
has been greatly weakened. The Communists are in position to continue
the gradual application of force until the end of the bombing, and then
exploit the psychological and military consequences of this event.
Hanoi, might expect that with only a moderate step-up in military action
by the Khmer resistance, FANK resistance would be so reduced that the
U. S. and Phnom Penh governments would be forced to accept Communist
terms.
7. These terms have been clearly spelled out by the enemy
principals for the past several months -- an end to U. S. military involve-
ment, direct U. S. dealings with Sihanouk, and acceptance of a Sihanouk-
led coalition which would exclude Lon Nol and most of his senior colleagues.
Contrary to Vietnam, there has been no sign of any willingness to depart
from these principles or to separate political from military conditions,
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almost certainly because Hanoi, along with the other enemy principals,
has estimated that the U. S. could not sustain its combat support for
long. There seems little reason now to hope for a softening of enemy
terms.
8. Although a moderate military step-up may occur, there
are significant political and military reasons which would argue
against efforts by Hanoi and the Khmer Communists to achieve a
final military solution rather than a political settlement.
--The logistics and other support are probably not in forward
positions in quantities sufficient for a sustained insurgent offensive
and could not be readily moved into place until after the monsoon rains
end in October.
- -Hanoi would fear that a sharp step-up of purely military
efforts might strengthen the Administration's hand at home and inter-
nationally in dealing with the Cambodian problem.
*Hanoi's interest in US aid probably does not provide much leverage in
this situation. While threats of ARVN intervention may help to limit
communist military actions against Phnom Penh, the threat is probably
viewed by Hanoi as less credible in a negotiations situation.
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--Hanoi probably also would wish to avoid the problems stem-
ming from an ARVN intervention in Cambodia.
--The Chinese would probably not favor an all-out effort, since
this would probably diminish the role of Sihanouk and his non-Communist
followers in a coalition.
On the other side of the coin, there are certain positive advantages
for the Khmer and Vietnamese Communists which would follow from the
establishment of a coalition facade in Phnom Penh through the process
of negotiations rather than by purely military means.
--The useful civil infrastructure might be preserved. The
communists probably lack sufficient administrative cadre to replace
this structure.
- -Internal stability would be easier to reestablish. The new
government. would have more legitimacy in the public's eyes.
--The new government would have greater legitimacy inter-
nationally. The risk of isolation could be avoided and contacts for trade,
aid, etc., could be more easily established.
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9. The possible impact on Communist conduct of any tensions
which may exist between Sihanouk and his followers and the Hanoi-backed
Khmer Communist faction is not clear. The Khmer Communists might
desire a purely military solution in order to limit Sihanouk's opportunities
for influence and prestige. Sihanouk's preference-- despite his rhetoric..
- would probably be for a negotiated end to the conflict which maximized
his prestige and ability to maneuver. In this situation, the decision on
strategy would appear to rest with the respective champions -- Hanoi
and Peking. The Chinese cannot be counted on to do much arm,-twisting
in Hanoi, but the course of events over the last six months indicates that
their powers of gentle persuasion are significant.
10. Over the short run, at least, these considerations argue in
favor of Hanoi continuing to show interest in negotiations rather than
choosing a military path to'itotal" victory. However, Communist terms
will remain stiff, since they believe time is on their side. To give
emphasis to this point, Hanoi will probably be willing to provide the
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logistics necessary for a moderate increase in fighting by the insurgents
after 15 August, if no truce has been achieved by that time. Beyond.the
end of the rainy season in October/November, if the Cambodian
government continues to hold on, and the negotiating track does not
produce at least a coalition, the Communists could be expected to increase
military pressure.
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