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Document Creation Date: 
December 14, 2016
Document Release Date: 
May 14, 2003
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October 18, 1978
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Approved FoQelease 2003/07/31 : CIA-RDP81-00140020007 MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, National Foreign Assessment Center FROM: John F. Blake ~I Registry P1 Deputy Director for Administration ~YE ~fL SUBJECT: Records About Drug Experimentation File REFERENCE: Multiple adse from DDA, dtd 16 Aug 78 Subject: MKULTRA - Program to Identify Subjects of Agency-Sponsored Drug Testing (DDA 78-2930/2) 1. The Agency is committed to identify, find and notify per- sons who may still suffer adverse effects from drugs that were admin- istered to them without their knowledge as part of Agency sponsored drug testing programs. People who have been involved in searches per- taining to known projects (MKULTRA/MKSEARCH, BLUEBIRD/ARTICHOKE, and OFTEN/CHICKWIT) are confident that all records relating to those pro- jects have been found. Nevertheless, a nagging uncertainty lingers in some quarters that there may yet be some unidentified project buried somewhere in the archives that no one knows anything about. To begin with, we need to be as certain as it is possible to be that all records pertaining in anyway to any drug testing program spon- sored by the Agency have been, surfaced. 2. During the past year or so, for one reason or another, components of the Agency have conducted exhaustive searches through all of their records, in their offices as well as at the Agency Archives and Records Center. In order to avoid repeating research that has al- ready been done, we need to know what has been done and how confident we can be that all records pertaining to drug activity have been found. Accordingly, you are requested to, submit to the Deputy Director for Administration by 1 November 1978 a report describing the records search as it has been, or is being,conducted in your office. We are particularly interested, of course, in the attention given to drug re- lated activities and the degree of certainty you feel that if there were any records pertaining to such activities, they would have been found. It is requested specifically that you include in your report a statement of the degree of confidence you feel that no records pertain- ing to drug activities remain undisclosed. If you feel further search OGC Has Reviewed DOJ review(s) completed. Approved For Release 2003/07/31 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000200070001-5 f ? Approved Fo Eelease 2003/07/31 : CIA-RDP81-0014OR000200070001-5 is required to give comfortable assurance, your estimate of the volume of records that will have to be reviewed and the man hours that will be needed to complete such a search should be included in your report. John F. Blake Distribution: Orig - Addse 1 DDA Subj 1 - DDA Chrono 1 - JFB Chrono 1 - SA/DDA SA/DDAI (16 Oct 78) Approved For Release 2003/07/31 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000200070001-5 SICNDER ILL C ' TI OFFICI L OUTING SLIP J,t~fa /d /6 TO 1 E ADDRESS DATE 1 ITIALS A F 01 OCT 197i . Blake 10/16/78 2 3 4 5 6 ACTION DIRECT REPLY PREPARE REPLY APPROVAL DISPATCH RECOMMENDATION COMMENT FILE RETURN CONCURRENCE INFORMATION SIGNATURE Remarks : The call for reports on records searches sent out a couple of weeks ago overlooked NFAC. The attached will fill that void. Probably Osrwould be the only NFAC office that might have anything related. Your signature is requested. FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO. DATE c t A p FORM No. 237 Use previous editions (40) 1-67 I STAT SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM UNCLASSIFIED " ('-''?'FIDENTIAL S CRET I'irve oK a ease 07131 :-RDP81-00142 0 000700 1- OFFICIAL ROUT INO S,~YP ,{~ T I TO NAME AND ADDRESS DA)TE NITIALS 1 Deputy Director for Administration 7 SEP 2 7D 24 Hqs 4 5 6 ACTION DIRECT REPLY PREPARE REPLY APPROVAL DISPATCH RECOMMENDATION COMMENT FILE RETURN CONCURRENCE INFORMATION SIGNATURE Att: DDA 78-2930/4 Remarks: FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER ADD FROM: NAME DATE . pecial Assistant 4E27Hs 26 Sep 78 Ap UNCLASSIFIED ( 2ONFIDENILIAL )-67 L M0. 237 Use previous er~ition FOAM IOny SECRET (40) "Suggest you read & then you, Bob, myself anyone else of your choosing sit down & chat. /s/Jack Blake" DDA:JFB:kmg (27 Sep 78) Distribution: Orig RS - OGC w/Orig Att ..Y- DDA Subj w/att 1 - DDA Chrono 1 - JFB Chrono Att: Memo dtd 26 Sep 78 to DDA frhPSAp ~h ern Approvedl~t3 #ZelPar #M6iffin.t8tA_bP81 =II D2R 00200070001-5 (DDA 78-~9 Approved Fon (ease 2003/07/31 : CIA-RDP81-0014 Fie DDA 78-2930/4 26 September 1978 STAT b. Are we concerned only with notifying unwitting subjects where there is reason to believe that they may still be adversely affected by their involvement in the drug testing program, or are we concerned also with persons who may have been subjected to testing with drugs not likely to produce long-term aftereffects? c. Are we concerned with all CIA-sponsored drug testing on human subjects or only those programs where CIA involvement was so direct as to clearly establish an Agency liability for putting the subjects into danger? d. Who should conduct whatever program is undertaken? MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Administration I SUBJECT: Drug Experimentation - The Problem REFERENCE: Multiple addressee memo fr DDA dated 16 Aug 78, subj: MKULTRA - Program to Identify Subjects of Agency-sponsored Drug Testing 1. This memorandum attempts to ascribe a dimension to the problem of notifying subjects of Agency-sponsored drug testing. In order to do that it is necessary first to answer a few questions. a. Are we concerned only with MKULTRA; are we concerned with MKULTRA, MKSEARCH, BLUEBIRD/ARTICHOKE, and OFTEN/CHICK- WIT; or are we concerned with all of these plus any that may not yet have been surfaced? Approved For Release 2003/07/31 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000200070001-5 Special Assistant Approved For Release 2003/07/31 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000200070001-5 2. What records must be searched? a. The Attorney General opinion mentions only the MKULTRA project, but probably the opinion was being responsive to our request which was couched in MKULTRA terms., The General Counsel's summary of the Attorney General opinion says: "All Agency documents relating to drug testing on human subjects which are available should be reviewed. This would include BLUEBIRD/ARTICHOKE, MKSEARCH, OFTEN/ CHICKWIT, and other drug testing conducted without regard to specific project designations, not just those specifically related to MKULTRA which were discovered last summer." b. The record of Congressional hearings leaves open to- interpretation the question of whether Congressional interest relates only to MKULTRA, the other named projects, or goes beyond all of these. The Congress apparently now believes it has heard all there is to hear about drug experimentation involving human subjects that has ever been undertaken by CIA. CIA witnesses are as confident as they can reasonably be that they haave told Congress everything known about the named projects, and that these projects do in fact represent all of the drug related activities ever undertaken by the Agency. Nevertheless, a nagging uncertainty lingers in some quarters that there may yet be some project buried somewhere in the archives that no one knows anything about. c. When the MKULTRA records were surfaced last summer there was undertaken a concerted search through the Records Center. A major effort was made by the Operations Directorate to ensure that nothing relating to drugs, or other potentially embarrassing activity, would remain undiscovered. Exhaustive searches have been, and continue to be, made in response to FOIA requests. Total record searches have been in progress for some time directed toward bringing Agency records holdings into conformity with schedules approved by the Archivist of the United States. Instructions given to the searchers in these efforts include specific guidance about particular subjects to be surfaced if encountered during any of the reviews. These guidelines identify specifically the projects known to have been related to drug activities, but they also include drugs as a generic subject to be immediately surfaced and reported upon. d. Efforts that have been or are being made to review exhaustively the record holdings of the Agency appear to be sufficient to ensure that nothing relating to drug activities remains undisclosed. Any further or separate effort by a Approved For Release 2003/07/31 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000200070001-5 too, Ift#14, Approved Folease 2003/07/31 : CIA-RDP81-00142$WW0200070001-5 Task Force concerned exclusively with drug activity would be duplicative and potentially conflicting with efforts already made or under way. The possibility of honest human error can never be eliminated absolutely no matter how many reviewers may review the reviews of reviewers. To relieve whatever nagging uncertainty may continue to linger, however, it may be useful to call for a progress and status report on record searches from the Deputy Directors giving their assurances that there are no records that have not been or will not be reviewed, and that they are as confident as they can reasonably be, short of absolute certification that no human errors have been committed, that all records relative to drug activity have been surfaced. e. If it is agreed that any perceived need for a general records search has been or is being satisfied, it remains to be determined what additional searches through the records of the named projects may be necessary. This question will be considered in later paragraphs in conjunction with discussing the method of proceeding. 3. Who do we have to notify? a. In his summary of the Attorney General Opinion, the CIA General Counsel notes that an earlier draft of the Justice opinion favored notification of unwitting persons who were subjected to tests of drugs not likely to produce long-term aftereffects. The General Counsel observes that discussion of this aspect of the problem was removed from the final version of the Justice opinion, reportedly at the instruction of the Attorney General. The General Counsel suggests that the question of whether to notify people who were administered drugs that could not be reasonably expected to produce harmful long- term aftereffects should be answered by the Agency as a matter of policy. b. The Attorney General opinion says that there is no law known to the Department of Justice that would require notice "for the sort of surreptitious intrusions which occurred in the MKULTRA drug-testing program. Nor is there any common law principle or constitutional provision requiring notification. Moreover, "the passage of time, coupled with the availability of defenses against any actions that might be filed, suggest that notice in most cases would be a hollow act." Despite these conclusions, however, the Attorney General opines that a different situation exists where an individual's involvement in the program can reasonably be determined to have resulted in continuing adverse effects on his health. The basis for imposing this quali ication Approved For Release 2003/07/31 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000200070001-5 Approved For Release 2003/07/31 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000200070001-5 on the previously stated conclusions is an elusive guiding principle of the law of torts which states that "a duty exists where reasonable men would recognize it and agree that it exists," or, stating the same principle in another way, "a duty arises where, in the general level of moral judgment of the community some action ordinarily ought to be done." c. As presently constructed, argumentation in the Justice opinion would not seem to support a conclusion favoring notification of individuals other than those who can be reasonably expected to be still adversely affected. As stated in the opinion, neither case law, common law, nor constitutional law support a requirement to notify anybody; only the elusive guiding principle that a duty exists where reasonable men agree that it exists,.supports the requirement for notification. Moreover, during the Joint Hearing before the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Research of the Committee on Human Relations, Senator Chafee said "the second point I am interested in. . . is that the Agency is doing all it can in cooperation with other branches of the Government to go about tracking down the identity of'those who were in some way adversely affected, and see what can be done to fulfill the government's responsibilities in that respect." (Emphasis added.) The Justice opinion and the record of Congressional hearings appear to be supportive of a decision in the Agency to limit rather than expand the categories of subjects to be notified. Finally, one wonders what positive good could come from informing someone that he had been administered some harmless drug without his knowledge 25 years ago; how such information could contribute to the current well-being or peace of mind of the individual. d. On the basis of this discussion, it seems reasonable to conclude that the notification program should be limited to unwitting subjects where it can be reasonably determined that their health may still be adversely affected by their prior involvement in drug testing programs. 4. What programs are of concern? a. Despite the conclusion that there is a duty to notify subjects who may still suffer adverse effects from the drug-testing program, the Justice opinion notes that "this duty may not attach in certain circumstances,".and discusses three such circumstances. (1) A duty to notify may not exist "where there are sound government reasons for not doing so." The Justice opinion says that it knows of no such reason, and the Approved For Release 2003/07/31 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000200070001-5 Approved Fo lease 2003/07/31 : CIA-RDP81-00142 e00200070001-5 summary prepared by the CIA General Counsel says that such an exception would appear to be unavailable because the Director has committed himself to pursue a policy of notification. Moreover, the Congress clearly expects that the Agency will undertake such a program. (2) A duty to notify may not exist if the subjects already have been given actual notice. The Justice opinion says, however, that "if there is any doubt as to the individual's actual notice of his participation. . . , or of the particular testing he underwent, such information should be conveyed to that individual." The General Counsel's summary interprets "the particular testing he underwent" to mean "the subject was made aware of all relevant aspects of the experiment, e.g., identity of the drugs, dosages, etc." However, this exception may be interpreted, it should be entirely consistent with the interpretation of the overall problem. That is, if an individual was the subject of experimentation with drugs capable of producing long-term aftereffects from which he may still be suffering and there is any doubt about his awareness that he was participating in such experiments, he should be notified. (3) The Justice opinion says there may be "no responsibility on the government to notify MKULTRA subjects if, under current law, it would not be held responsible for the dangers which might still affect the MKULTRA subjects. This circumstanice could come about in light of the fact that most of the MKULTRA programs were not conducted directly by CIA, but by private institutions. As such, the CIA itself could conceivably have been so peripherally involved in a particular project, or so unaware of the tests actually being conducted, that it would not be held liable for putting the MKULTRA subjects into danger; no duty of notification would therefore devolve on the CIA. However, since these issues will. most probably present close questions, and since we do not believe that an administrative decision should easily preclude notice,. a determina- tion on this matter should be made only after a thorough evaluation of the law and the facts pertinent to a particular project and a decision that the CIA could not arguably be held responsible for that project." The General Counsel's summary of the Justice opinion dismisses the potential applicability of this exception with the words, "By and large, given the nature of the testing programs and the CIA role, this exception would appear to be inapplicable." Just as an administrative decision should not easily preclude notice, neither should such a decision easily require it. The Justice view that a determination on this matter should be made only after a thorough evaluation of the law and pertinent facts seems eminently reasonable. People in the Agency 5 Approved For Release 2003/07/31 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000200070001-5 Approved For Release 2003/07/31 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000200070001-5 who have been most thoroughly immersed in the record searches relating to the CIA participation in drug research and experimentation are persuaded that there may indeed be several, if not most, of the MKULTRA projects where this exception might apply. My own review of some sample files suggests at the very least that the potential applicability of this exception should not be dismissed casually. b. This discussion leads to the conclusion that there is no policy reason for not undertaking a program to notify subjects of the drug-testing program who may still suffer adverse effects from drugs that were administered to them without their knowledge, where there is doubt about whether they were sufficiently informed, and where it can be established that CIA must bear the primary responsibility for putting the subjects into danger. 5. Who should conduct the program? a. The General Counsel suggests that HEW be asked to assume the major burden of responsibility for determining what institutions should be contacted, contacting them, reviewing their records and locating subjects. The basis for suggesting HEW determine which institutions to contact is not clear. Based on discussion in earlier paragraphs, it would seem reasonable to presume that the only institutions to be contacted should be those where it has been established that CIA must bear primary.responsibility for the tests that were conducted. There is no apparent reason to contact institutions where the responsibility for the tests clearly is theirs, unless we decide to tell them that we have made such a determination. In either event, according to the Justice opinion, determination of liability "should be made only after a thorough evaluation of the law and the facts pertinent to a particular project." It would seem unfair and outside the proper role of HEW to ask them to make this kind of determination. Such a determination should be made in the first instance by the General Counsel. If consultation is desired, the Department of Justice would be the more likely consultant. b. Part of the reason the General Counsel suggests that assistance of HEW should be solicited is that if. CIA conducts such a program alone, it may be charges " suppressed evidence, influenced recollections, or failed to pursue or consider adequately any informa- tion which might arise." On the other hand, if it is necessary to ask the Department of HEW to review the pharmacological aspects of the drugs used, and later to intercede with private institutions, and if it is necessary to ask the Department of Justice to review the responsibility of CIA for projects undertaken by some of those institutions, one has to wonder how much responsibility for the final product those departments will be willing to accept without accepting it all. That is to say, will they be willing to accept full responsibility for the results of Approved For Release 2003/07/34 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000200070001-5 Approved Fo Iease 2003/07/31 : CIA-RDP81-0014NiWO0200070001-5 their analysis if their analysis is based upon research done by employees of the CIA. If we do not ask them to do the whole thing, they will always be in a position to say they did the best they could with what was given to them, leaving the usual implication that we screened out everything we didn't want them to see. The question then is whether results obtained under these circumstances would enjoy any greater credibility than would results if we ran the whole program ourselves. c. We cannot continue forever to run scared, assuming that the rest of the world will look askance at everything we do simply because we are the ones who have done it. Sooner or later there has to be a change in that pattern. CIA cannot escape responsibility for the programs as originally conceived. Hence, it seems clear that CIA must assume responsibility for determining what notification is necessary and taking prudent action to accomplish that purpose. In short, CIA must assume responsibility for whatever program is instituted. It would not be reasonable to ask another agency, HEW or Justice, to assume that responsibility for us. We should, however, call upon those two departments for whatever assistance we deem necessary to permit us to fulfill our responsibility. Credibility will have to depend upon how prudently we use their services and how well we perform the overall task. 6. How to proceed. a. The DDA should address a memorandum to the other Deputy Directors, the Executive Secretary for the Office of the Director and Independent Offices, and to Office Directors in the Directorate of Administration asking for a report of progress and status of the general records searches that have been conducted and what, if anything, remains to be done. Their assurances should be solicited that, in the absence of human error, there are no pockets of records relating to drug activity that remain undisclosed. If they are unable or unwilling to give such assurances, they should be asked to describe actions they-will take to satisfy themselves that they can give them. It should be possible to get these reports within 15-30 days, and it is expected they will dispense with any further consideration of a need for supplementary overall searches for records of drug activity. b. People who have reviewed BLUEBIRD/ARTICHOKE are confident that U.S. citizens were not involved in drug experimentation. The purpose of the program was to find information about interrogation supplements, primarily hypnosis, but drugs that were used were used on foreign nationals--POW's and defectors, and are not likely to have produced long-term aftereffects still affecting the health of the Approved For Release 2003/07/31 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000200070001-5 Approved For Release 2003/07/31 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000200070001-5 individuals. The Director of Security should be asked for verification of these statements. Exclusion of the BLUEBIRD/ ARTICHOKE subjects from the notification program, should then be feasible. c. CHICKWIT was a program to acquire information about foreign pharmaceuticals. No testing was involved. The DDS&T should be asked for a verification of these statements, with the consequent exclusion of CHICKWIT from any further consideration. d. Most of the testing in the OFTEN project was done on animals, according to testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Research in September 1977. CIA testimony at these hearings stated that the project was stopped in January 1973, before any human testing was conducted. DoD testimony on the same day stated that final tests were conducted in June.1973. The only results reported to CIA related to the animal tests. The June tests apparently involved the adhesive application to the skin of human volunteers of a substance identified as EA-3167. Both CIA and DoD disclaim responsibility for the June tests. Regardless of which agency may be responsible, if the criteria in the Attorney General's opinion apply, there is an obligation on the part of the Government. There needs to be a pharmacological evaluation of EA-3167 to determine the potential for creation of long-term aftereffects through its application by adhesive to the skin. If such a potential ,exists, there needs to be a determination of whether the human volunteers were sufficiently aware of the possible effects. The DDS&T should be asked to ascertain the potential long-term effect of an application to the skin of the drug used in OFTEN. The Director of Medical Services should be asked to validate the findings, consulting with HEW if he deems it appropriate. A report of these findings should be submitted within two weeks. If there is such a potential, the DDS&T should ascertain from the Army the degree of awareness of the volunteers and report-the findings within 30 days. Subsequent actions will be dependent upon the findings. e. MKSEARCH was a project to develop, test, and evaluate capabilities in the covert use of biological, chemical and radioactive material systems and techniques for producing predictable human behavioral or physiological changes. No tests were conducted on unwitting humans. The DDS&T should be asked for a verification of these statements with the consequent exclusion of MKSEARCH from any further separate research effort. f. There are no MKULTRA records which reveal the identities of any of the subjects of tests conducted in the safehouses and there is no practical or prudent initiative the Agency can take to identify or find them. The circumstances of the safehouse program-as they are known or Approved For Release 2003/07/31 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000200070001-5 ter ' Approved Fo~ease 2003/07/31 : CIA-RDP81-0014 0200070001-5 speculated to have been are such that the subjects are likely to have entered them anonymously or under assumed name in any case. The subjects of safehouse testing probably can only become known through inquiries that have been, or may be, directed to the Agency as a result of publicity already given the drug program or that it will receive when the anticipated Marks' book is published. We should accept this premise and. the premise that there is no other practical or prudent initiative the Agency can take, and concentrate our efforts on the remainder of the MKULTRA program. g. Using the analysis of records already completed by the IG, OGC and OTS, the Director of Technical Service should be requested to review MKULTRA documentation to set. aside projects which clearly do not involve drug testing on unwitting human subjects. The remainder should be reviewed to identify those where CIA clearly is responsible, clearly is not responsible, responsibility is uncertain; and where subjects clearly were witting, unwitting, or "wittingness" is uncertain. h. The General Counsel should then be requested to review these files for assignment of responsibility, and the Director of Medical Services should review them to assess the long-term effects of the drugs, seeking guidance. or confirmation of their conclusions from Justice and HEW as they deem appropriate. i. As soon as we have agreed upon our approach to the problem we should present a complete description of it to the Cpngress as a matter of information. 7. Size of the problem. a. If the actions proposed above are acceptable there will be a need for intensive review of only a portion of the MKULTRA records in the custody of the Office of Technical Service, a total of about 35 file folders. It appears, from a very preliminary estimate, that at most only about 16 institutions may be involved. The number of researchers that may have to be interviewed, and the number of subjects they may have to be sought cannot be determined until the preliminary steps have been taken. Only then will we be in a position to know exactly what assistance we may require from the Departments of Justice and HEW. Nevertheless, it may be desirable to approach them now with a general explanation of the overall problem, seek their endorsement of our approach to its solution, get an expression of their willingness to lend assistance at such time as we may request it, and request a designation of the people they select to be our points of contact. Approved For Release 2003/07/31 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000200070001-5 Approved For Release 2003/07/31 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000200070001-5 b. If the actions proposed are acceptable, they can be completed by the affected components in coordination with the undersigned and there will be no need to create a special task force at this time. I will prepare for your signature, or mine if you prefer, the correspondence necessary to get started and will work with the people already designated in the various components toward completion of the task. If it becomes apparent that more help is needed, be assured you will hear from me. Approved For Release 2003/07/31 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000200070001-5 -ApprA!V##hcwiEAe 070001-5 UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECR OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP R O NAME AND ADDRESS DATE INITIALS 1 it ctor of Central Intelligg 7n 5607 HQs gej UL 1976 2 U 19 5 - 4 PDA A 2 AUG 6 1 "1 . [ ACTION DIRECT REPLY PREPARE REPLY APPROVAL DISPATCH RECOMMENDATION COMMENT FILE RETURN CONCURRENCE INFORMATION SIGNATURE Remarks: 7 PA Exec Registry Shows that OGC's 24 Jul Paper to DCI Office on 2 Jul 78. ~~ lam/ r~i FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER FROM: NAME. ADDRESS AND PHONE NO. DATE Deputy Dirprtor for Administration v r Releas 2003/07/31 : CIA-RDP81-0 t?2R000~ UNCLA CONFIDENTIAL SECRET Use previous editions (40) FOAM NO. TV Approved ForTease 2003/07/31 :CIA-RDP81-00142002000700 nn A 25 July 1978 MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence FROM: John F. Blake Deputy Director for Administration cecutive Registry 1. I write to comment on Tony Lapham's paper of 24 July 1978 to you on "MKULTRA - Program to Identify Subjects of Agency- Sponsored Drug Testing." 2. I believe this is a very solid paper, which from Tony is not at all an unusual product. 3. In a more specific sense I address myself to paragraph 15 and the idea expressed there that "it would appear to be necessary organizationally to take a staff or task force approach." Tony goes on to suggest that "for this purpose an OMS official may be best suited to heading this effort." While I believe I understand why my learned, legal colleague made that observation, I believe an equally viable alternative is to have a senior general duty staff officer undertake the organization and direction of this undertaking. In making this alternate recommendation, I have a specific individual in mind and would be willing to make him available for such time as is necessary to see this onerous task through. 25X1 John F. Blake Distribution: Orig - DCI 1 - DDCI 1 - ER 1 - GC 1 - DDA Approved For Release 2003/07/31 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000200070001-5 Approved For tease 2003/07/31 : CIDP9~-Ofq'R0070001-5 24 July 1978 MEMORANDUM FOR : Director of Central Intelligence Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Anthony A. Lapham General Counsel. SUBJECT . MKULTRA - Program to Identify Subjects of Agency-Sponsored Drug Testing 1. Action Requested: It is requested that you review the portions of this memorandum which summarize the opinion of the Justice Department to the effect that the United States Government has an obligation to attempt: to identify, locate, and notify persons who unwittingly may have been subjected to, and continue to suffer harm from, drug--testincc activities sponsored by this Agency in the past, and that you consider the approach 'described below to implement that opinion. 2. Background: A. Summary of the Opinion. On 17 July 1978 the Depart- ment of Justice responded finally and officially to our 22 September 1977 request for guidance concerning the exis- tence, extent and nature of any legal or other responsibility on the part of the U.S. Government to persons who were sub- jected to CIA-sponsored drug-testing in the 1950s and 1960s.. (A copy of our request is attached for your information as Tab A. A copy of the Justice opinion and a covering letter which summarizes that opinion in some detail are attached as Tab B.) 3. Briefly stated, the opinion concludes that the government does have an obligation, supported by general principles of tort law, to attempt to identify, locate.,, and notify unwitting persons whose health might continue to be affected adversely as a result of those portions of the Agency activities in question which may reasonably be deter- mined to have resulted in such long-term present---day conse- quences. You should be aware that the prior drafts of this opinion which we have seen concluded in addition that there existed a policy judgment to be made by CIA, although Justice DECLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROM ATTACHMENT. Approved For Release 2003/07/31 CIA-RDP81-00142 C 11 11 i:iT^t ~' a~j I all - 25X1 fav,o.r.ed prdcceeding this regard, as to whet' unwitting ,Persons wt pfJ ~ N7 ,a L;Z9# 0 @ Af749Q1 CIA, which however could not reasonably be expected to have produced long-term effects, also should be found and notified of this fact. The discussion of this policy area was removed from the final opinion, reportedly on the instructions of Judge Bell. Although the opinion now is limited to the legal aspects of this problem and finds a duty to notify only persons who may suffer continuing health consequences, it is of course still open to you to determine that a larger number of persons meeting different criteria should be included in the notification program. 4. After concluding that such a duty to notify exists, at least where further harm may be thus avoided, the opinion notes that any effort to fulfill this- duty must be circumspect because of existing legal constraints and a"concern for avoiding damaging intrusions into the privacy of these individuals. Accordingly, such an effort must be limited generally to an examination of federal records and the records of the institutions which were involved where such records have survived and are not protected by law from disclosure, and other documents not subject to limited disclosure such as telephone books and voter registration lists. "To the greatest extent practicable" this effort should be conducted, it is the Justice Department's opinion, without the use of personal interviews with fC-mily members, - former neighbors, employers or friends since such interviews would cause further embarrassment and loss of privacy to identified subjects. 5. We have determined, and Justice has agreed tin. this opinion, that this Agency is not in a position, without special legislation, to offer indemnification to any institution or associated individual against liability which may be incurred as a consequence of their involvement in these activities and their agreement to cooperate with. the govern- ment by making their records available and facilitating the identification of test subjects. In addition, notes Justice, in some cases the institutions themselves may be precluded by law or professional ethic from allowing the government to review their records for these purposes. 6. As to what may be done for confirmed test subjects who are identified and located, the Justice Department con- clusion is that a simple notification of involvement may be made along with an offer to provide available information to the subject's physician. Neither this Agency nor any other federal agency appears to have authority, again in the absence of special legislation, to provide medical treatment or to pay the costs of private treatment in this regard. The sole recourse for persons suffering medical expenses. as a result of governmental activities is to file claims and institute litigation under the Federal Tort Claims Act.. Approved For Release 2003/07/31 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000200070001-5 2 - Jib Approved Forl3wlease 2003/07/31 : CIA-RDP81-00142iWO200070001-5 7.. The Justice opinion concludes that CIA has lawful authority to conduct this program, within the constraints described above, but notes that CIA may legitimately approach any other federal agency for assistance it may be authorized and equipped to provide. As is discussed further below, it may be necessary or advisable to call upon HEti'1 or DOD for help in this effort. 8. Finally, the Justice Department opinion points out several circumstances in which the duty to conduct such a notification program may not apply. One such circumstance exists where there are sound policy reasons not to notify such persons. The exception would appear to be unavailable in this instance, particularly since you have already cor- mitted the Agency to supporting such a program. The second. circumstance would exist were CIA so peripherally involved or ignorant of the nature of the testing as to be not aware of or responsible for any resulting harm to the subjects. By and large, given the nature. of the testing programs and. the CIA role, this exception also would appear to be inapplic- able. Finally, a factor which may apply to exclude certain groups of individuals is that no duty to notify exists where the subject had actual notice of participation in a testing program, although presumably this circumstance would not obviate 'the duty unless the subject was made aware of all relevant aspects of the experiment, e.g., identity of the drug?i_nvolved,dosages, etc. B. Implementation it 8. A number of matters require decisions before this opinion may be implemented. In addition to the policy determinations concerning the categories of persons to be included and whether to approach HEW or another federal entity to request assistance, there are numerous questions concerning how the Agency should best organize itself to initiate and maintain such an effort. The paragraphs which follow present for your consideration my thoughts on how to approach this matter. 9. While CIA must of course play an important part in such a program, it may not be the entity best suited for the undertaking. Due to the fragmentary nature of the surviving CIA records, we do not have sufficient information either to allow identification of any test subjects or to develop sufficiently specific details to be very useful to treating physicians in a medical sense. Thus, there will have to be very heavy reliance upon records which may be availabla at the various institutions, by and large academic in nature, which were involved in these activities. As you are aware, however, CIA enjoys a somewhat less than favorable standing, partially as a result of the MKULTRA disclosures themselves, in the eyes of the very institutions whose records must be Approved For Release 2003/07/31 : CIA-RDP>1-00142R000200070001-5 -0014 relied upo ip c o rd truss erto t to nave -even a maairgQiOnal c: once of success. For this reason, and to assist in the process of properly evaluating existing Agency records to determine in the first instance which institutions it will be necessary to contact, Secretary Califano should be requested to make available the good offices and assistance of HEIR; in evalu- ating the existing information concerning the PIKULTR?1 projects, in approaching appropriate institutions and requesting their cooperation, in examining the records of any institutions which agree to help, and in providing assistance to any subjects who may be located. CIA has, of course, been in contact with most of the institutions identified in the MKULTRA documents during the past several months. Although these communications generally have been courteous, further correspondence from CIA cannot be expected to be received warmly by officials who have been wrestling with the media and inquisitive students as a result of the MKULTRA dis- closures. Further,-we would be in this case asking these institutions to undertake affirmative efforts to review their records, to make those records available to our investi- gators, and to expose themselves and their personnel-to potential civil liability arising from litigation by ident.-- fiable test subjects. 10. In addition, CIA may be open to charges, if it conducts such a program alone, that it suppressed evidence, influenced recollections, or failed to pursue or consider adequately any information which might arise. While the institutional exposure to liability cannot be eliminated, we can alleviate the adverse reaction which might be expected to result from further contact by CIA and also reduce the basis for charges of bad faith against the Agency by coop- erating in this effort with HEW. The Agency mus,t participate in the identification of the institutions to be contacted, and, based upon our prior correspondence, the preparation of the initial requests for help. Those requests, however,, should come from an "untainted" third party such as HEW to assure the most favorable response. Furthermore, since NEW has been involved in promulgating guidelines to govern. human experimentation by the entire federal government, it would seem to be the most appropriate agency to assist not only in contacting the institutions but also in determining which projects most likely would have resulted in long-term ill effects on the health of the subjects and thus which insti- tutions should be contacted. Similarly, the impartial advice and assistance of HEW representatives would be valuable in ensuring and evidencing that such a program has been conducted fairly, impartially, and thoroughly. Furthermore, as is noted in the Justice opinion, there are limited circum- stances in which HEW may be enabled to provide medical assistance, such as a "follow-up research program" or a pre- litigation medical examination, and any prospect of such assistance would be heightened by early HEW involvement. Approved For Release 2003/07/31 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000200070001-5 11. A rdakel F - let 200=7M[' C A RbPbD0%moa& booY.u should direct that the Agency component most familiar with the'surviv_:_ng MKULTRA papers, probably the Office of Technical Services (OTS), begin reviewing all drug research documents to identify, insofar as is possible, the activities which involved drug testing on humans; the specific dates, places, researchers, amounts and sources of money; the specific nature of the testing, dosages, all drugs used, any recorded effects; the status of the subjects (i.e., student volunteers, inmate volunteers, hospital patients, etc.), the population from which these subjects were drawn (Georgetown University Hospital, Atlanta Federal Penitentiary, etc..), the identities of any subjects, and any other information of relevance to the determination of whether adverse effects might result and where the subjects might be located. We have tentatively divided the projects into various categories based upon summary information supplied to us last summer and a copy of this breakdown is attached as Tab C for your information and as a starting point for OTS. This listing should be verified and supplemented by a close review of the documents themselves. 12. All Agency documents relating to drug testing on human subjects which are available should be reviewed.. This would include BLUEBIRD/ARTICHOKE, MKSEARCH, OFTEN/CHICKWIT, and other drug-testing conducted without regard to specific: project designations, not'just those specifically related to MKULTRA which were discovered last summer. To the-extent the Office of Security or any other Agency component is more familiar with any of these collections than is OTS, that other component should be assigned the same review respon- sibilities as to those papers. Further, it is my unqerstand- ing that the Information and Privacy Staff is the Agency entity charged with accumulating requests-and inquiries from persons who claim to have been test subjects. This informa- tion should be correlated with the project breakdowns by OTS and other components to determine whether, according to alleged dates and places of involvement, these inquiries include any credible claims which should be investigated. The final compilation will be necessary for a determination as to which institutions should be contacted and requested to help in this effort. 13. Appropriate Agency personnel familiar with these materials should assist HEW representatives in evaluating this information and in drafting correspondence to the appropriate institutions. These letters should describe the goals of this effort, identify the circumstances of the testing as specifically as is possible, alert the institutions to.their own potential liabilities and to the indemnification Approved For Release 2003/07/31 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000200070001-5 probleiAppe vdd a se 8$/07/atc?:IAaRDPBif' Go D20DUOg0tt?farma- tion,. including access to the institutional records whenever possible. It seems to me that it is going to be very diff i- cult, if not impossible, to protect the identities of-the researchers involved from any institution which agrees to assist us in this effort and which requests such information as an aid to locating the records in question. As you know, up to this point we have striven to protect the identities of the researchers from disclosure either to the public or to the institutions. However, a continued policy of non- disclosure in the present context could prevent access to the only available sources of information necessary to sus- tain the notification program, thus frustrating its purposes and further exposing CIA to the charge of deliberately crip- pling the entire effort. To the extent-that the identities of researchers are to be disclosed, I believe the researchers. themselves must be notified-as the first order of business, and some special problems and unpleasant exchanges can probably be anticipated in this regard. 14. CIA and HEW personnel also will have to cooperate in following up and coping with any unforeseen problems which might arise in this effort. Institutions which agree to help would have to be contacted by representatives of HEW and the Agency's Office of Security for the purpose of amassing as much information as possible about identifiable subjects of the testing. The Office of Security would be responsible for utilizing open sources such as telephone directories, in accordance with the Justice opinion, to attempt to identify and locate persons who may have been subjected to Agency-sponsored drug testing. Contact with any subject located should be made by, HEW and CIA. representa- tives jointly. Unless HEW is prepared to furnish. further assistance of some sort, it would appear that the most that can or should be done for identified subjects is to supply them or their physicians with all pertinent data concerning the tests so as to facilitate treatment. 1,1y Office will, of course, be involved in the development of a policy for dealing with and for disposing of the administrative claims and litigation which may be expected to develop from this effort. 15. It is entirely possible that, depending upon. the determinations which are made as to the categories of persons to be notified and the likelihood of long-term effects from the various drugs involved, the actual numbers of persons to be located and notified, and thus the numbers of institu- tions to be contacted, may be very small. However, in order to accomplish the analysis effort which must precede these determinations and because of the potential. size and scope of this project,'it would appear to be necessary organiza- tionally to take a staff or task force approach and have Approved For Release 2003/07/31 : d A-RDP81-00142R000200070001-5 Approved For13Mease 2003/07/31 : CIA-RDP81-00142IBO0200070001-5 specific Agency personnel designated by the various components involved as primarily responsible for the coordination and accomplishment of the many functions which relate to this program, and for maintaining contact with the HEW representa- tives. Such a group, in order to be at all successful, must have direction, and for this purpose an OMS official may be best suited to heading this effort. 16. If HEW declines the request, we will, have to reconsider that aspect of the program. An alternative course of action would be to call upon the military services which have had some experience in recent years in the initia- tion and conduct of similar programs to review the claims of servicemen who participated in programs.. However, I believe the responsibilities proposed for OTS, the Office of Security, OMS, and this Office in this memo- randum randum are appropriate and should proceed unchanged regard- less of HEW's reaction. 17. Recommendation: Copies of this paper.have been submitted to the components mentioned in order that they may furnish you with their views concerning the wisdom and consequences of these recommendations.. The scope and form of this program should be 'the subject of further discussion. at a meeting called by you or the DDCI and you may wish to reserve decision on these matters until after such a dis- cussion. 25X1 Antony A. Lapham Attachments Approved For Release 2003/07/31 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000200070001-5 Approved ForVaiease 2003/07/31 : CIA-RDP81-00142!&00200070001-5 SUBJECT: MK':ULTRA - Program to Identify Subjects of Agency-Sponsored Drug Testing OGC/ARC/1v Distribution: Orig-Addressee 1-DDCI 1-ER 1-OGC Approved For Release 2003/07/31 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000200070001-5 ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET SUBJECT: (Optional) MKULTRA - Program to Identify Subjects of Agency,-"n , h; Drug Testing } - 7 FROM: John F. Blake EXTENSION NO. 1, j 3 78-2930/3 DDA tio Di f Ad i ist D t t rec or or m n ra n epu y 7D 24 Hqs ATE 23 Aug 1978 TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building) DATE OFFICER'S COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom RECEIVED FORWARDED INITIALS to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.) 1. Deputy Director of Central Intel l igenc Fr ~~- D 6011 t I 7 qs 2 paper on our progr n my recen . to identify subjects of Agency- sponsored drug testing, you appende i t h f ll ng no e: o ow e t 25 3. _ "I told HEW U/S Oa t f rom us was coming reques 4 soon. Can we get it out ASAP. II s. : AU 2 G 19/3 Both Tony Lapham and myself are 4 of the opinion that it is too early et h HEW W do t . no as y e to approac 6. possess a sufficient description of the size of the undertaking to HEW i f l i t t o . ng p c ure present a mean u I have sprung a senior staff office loose to undertake this project and ki M d hi ay, s tas ng on on he commences 8. 28 August. f ll i d h o t o ow n I can, however, e 9. STAT if you like. I can phone your riend establish m rela- tionship w1 you, and tell 10 STAT I would like to be able to c 6 - him when we have our facts better ' ~, 11. lined up. 12. John F. Blake 13. Att: /DDCI h/w note DDA 78-293 /2 w 14. Distribution: Orig RS - DDCI 1 - ER 1s 1 - D D A FORM USE PREVI 3-62 610 EDITIONS ^ SECRET [] CONFIDENTIAL TAT 1711 USE;,, N,LY UNCLASSIFIED 1 Approved Foyle U r '1J31 CSI DP81-0014 O00200070?x tine Registry .JT DDA 78-2930/2 16 August 1978 MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Science and Technology Inspector General Director of Technical Service Director of Security Director of Medical Services FROM: John F. Blake Deputy Director for Administration SUBJECT: MKULTRA - Program to-Identify Subjects of Agency-Sponsored Drug Testing REFERENCE: Memo dtd 24 Jul 78 to DCI via DDCI fr GC, same subj 1. Reference memorandum, a copy of which is attached for your information, contained recommendations to the DCI by the General Counsel on how to proceed on subject. The DCI has approved the recom- mendations. The General Counsel and myself, having mutually reviewed the almost infinite scope of this activity have agreed that the organization and conduct of this undertaking will be under my cogni- zance and, additionally, I will appoint a senior staff officer to be responsible for the matter. 2. The purpose of this memorandum is to inform you that I have 25X1 appointed as the MKULTRA locator program coordinator. At this time I would ask each addressee to no ify m office by phone identifying their referent on this matter. will then establish contact with that referent in order to acquaint himself with the file holdings and records that exist. 3. Our initial endeavors will be to try to size the scope of the problem. After that has been accomplished, we will implement the General Counsel's recommendation that a task force be created. It may be necessary to ask you to post a full-time detail for an unspecified period to the task force. Approved For Rel a DP81-0012 Q0 Q 001 7 DOWG KADE UPON REMOVAL OF ATT 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release