THE CIVIL SERVICE REFORM BILL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81-00142R000400040019-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 28, 2001
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: June 13, 1978
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Release 2002/05/23: CIA-RDP00142R00040
OGC 78-3926
13 June 1978
File
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Administration
STATINTL
SUBJECT : The Civil Service Reform Bill
1. On 12 June 1978,1 of the Office of Legislative Counsel
and myself met with staff members of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee
to discuss the sections of the working draft of the Civil Service Reform Bill which
would have to be amended to completely exempt the Central Intelligence Agency.
The Committee staff was represented by Richard Wegman, Chief Counsel and
Staff Director; Paul Rosenthal, Counsel to the Committee; and Paul Hoff, Counsel
to the Committee.
2. From the start of the meeting, it was clear that the Committee staff was
interested in providing the Agency with a complete exemption from the bill. The
staffers appeared genuinely surprised when we pointed out that certain sections
of the draft bill would be applicable to CIA. They indicated that it was their
intent to completely exempt the Agency and they agreed to amend the draft bill
as we suggested to reflect this intent. Further, they revealed that the whistle-
blower amendment introduced by Senator Chiles would revise the whistleblower
provisions of the draft bill and exempt the Agency from the scope of such provisions.
3. Prior to the Chiles amendment, the whistleblower provisions of the
draft bill would have authorized the Special Counsel of the proposed Merit Systems
Protection Board to receive any substantive allegations of illegality, wrongdoing,
or gross waste. Upon receiving such an allegation, the Special Counsel would
have referred the matter to the head of the agency concerned, who would have
been required to conduct a complete investigation and to report detailed findings
to the Special Counsel and the Comptroller General. The Special Counsel would
then have been authorized to disseminate the report to any committees of Congress
he would have deemed appropriate. Moreover, the Comptroller General would
have been authorized to conduct his own investigation of the underlying
allegations contained in the report.
STATINTL
L
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4. The Chiles amendment eliminates the requirement that the agency head
must report to the Special Counsel and the Comptroller General. Any substantive
allegations received by the Special Counsel would merely be forwarded to the
agency head and the Comptroller General for investigation. However, the Chiles
amendment would limit the authority of the Special Counsel to receive substantive
allegations. The Special Counsel would not be authorized to receive allegations
concerning information protected from disclosure by Executive order or statute.
If substantive allegations concerning protected information are made, the Special
Counsel would have no authority to refer such allegations to the agency or the
Comptroller General. Thus, any disclosures of protected information made to the
Special Counsel would be "unauthorized disclosures," and CIA could treat them
as such. Language in the Committee report would make this clear. Though the
Committee staff does not want in any way to enhance the Agency's ability to protect
its information, neither does the Committee staff want to impair that ability. Under
the Chiles amendment, the status quo as regards the protection of Agency
information would be maintained.
5. While the Chiles amendment would solve one problem, another problem
remains. This problem requires a policy decision to be made concerning the
extent of the jurisdiction that the Agency would be willing to concede to the
Comptroller General, if any. The Committee staff indicated that if a CIA employee
were to make a substantive allegation concerning unprotected information, then
the Special Counsel could refer the matter to the Director of Central Intelligence
and the Comptroller General. That raises the fundamental question of whether
the Agency would want to allow the Comptroller General to have any jurisdiction
over any Agency matters as a general principle. At this point in time, Agency
policy concerning the General Accounting Office is being reassessed, so any
position the Agency takes on this issue will be significant. The Agency has
basically two options from which to choose.
6. The first option would be to accept the Chiles amendment as is. Under
this option, the Comptroller General would be authorized to investigate substantive
allegations made by CIA employees to the Special Counsel when the allegations
concern unprotected information. But even if the allegations concerned unprotected
information, the resulting investigation might require that the investigators be given
access to protected information. The Committee's Chief Counsel gave as an example
of an allegation concerning unprotected information the allegation that there were
"rats in the CIA cafeteria. " However, a Comptroller General investigation of this
allegation could require GAO access to information which might be protected, such
as blueprints of the Agency's headquarters building. To foreclose this possibility,
OLC has indicated that it could be explicitly stated in the language of the Committee
report that this statute would not authorize GAO to gain access to protected
information in the course of any investigation into allegations concerning unprotected
information.
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7. Option one would appear to be the most politically acceptable option.
If the Agency were to press for an exemption from the authority of GAO to
investigate allegations concerning unprotected information, the Committee
staff could easily consider the Agency's position to be unreasonable. More-
over, to take such a hard line position on this issue, in light of the Committee
staff having bent over backwards to accommodate the Agency on other issues,
could alienate the Committee staff and jeopardize our other exemptions.
8. The second option would be to seek a complete exemption from all
GAO investigations that would be authorized by the Chiles amendment. It
should be noted that the Agency would be setting a precedent if it were to
agree to GAO investigations of any Agency matters, even if the allegations
concerned unprotected information. If the Agency accepts GAO jurisdiction
in this area, it might be more difficult for the Agency to prevent GAO from
expanding its jurisdiction into other areas of Agency activity. It may be
worth the political risks to preserve the general principle of non-interference
by GAO in Agency matters.
9. The Committee staff has asked for a memorandum which would contain
language suggested by the Agency for the Committee report. If you choose
option one to resolve the GAO situation, we would also want to include in our
suggested report language a clear statement indicating that this statute would
not authorize GAO to gain access to protected information in the course of any
investigation into allegations concerning unprotected information. It is
recommended that you choose one of the above-mentioned options as soon
as possible so that the appropriate steps can be taken to protect the CIA
equities involved in this issue.
STATINTL
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