[SECURITY COMPARTMENTATION]
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP81-00142R000600070007-5
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
21
Document Creation Date:
December 14, 2016
Document Release Date:
January 2, 2003
Sequence Number:
7
Case Number:
Publication Date:
March 24, 1978
Content Type:
MF
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
![]() | 834.87 KB |
Body:
STAT Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000600070007-5
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000600070007-5
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP81-00142RQA06000700
IA Regis~]I
File -~ ,---~
STAT
Director of Security
Atts: DDA 78-0870, -/1
STAT
II
Will you please have your appropriate
officer start to familiarize himself with the
attached package. We are planning a course of
action to have the Security Committee transferred
over here sometime after the 14th of March. The
attached matter will obviously have to receive
early-on consideration.
STAT
Deputy Director for Administration
__
I
1
DDA:JFBlake:kmg (6 Mar 78)
Distribution:
Orig RS - D/Sec w/atts
.T'- DDA Subj w/atts
1 - DDA Chrono w/DDA 78-0870/1
1 - JFB Chrono H
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000600070007-5
Approved Foriii @Ieese '2003/02/27: CIA-RDP81-00142 0:600070007-5
DDA 78-0870/1
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: John F. Blake
Deputy Director for Administration
will recall, it was agreed at our session at the
that the Security Committee would move from the IC Staff
to me. I have taken no visible action on this matter as yet because it
is my understanding that you will be briefing the NFIB on 14 March on
various community organizational matters. I did not want to get out in
front of you on this matter. The same reasoning holds for having taken
no action on establishing the additional title "Deputy to the DCI for
Support." Once your 14 March briefing is accomplished, we will proceed
on both matters.
2. I write you this note at this time because, in connection with
your signing a memo to General Tighe on "Security Compartmentation," you
appended the following note:
"Did we not assign Security Committee to Jack & isn't
he the best one to take charge & march off--he's neither
a collector or producer?"
I have discussed my approach on this matter with and he is
in agreement to keeping the Security Committee until shortly after
14 March.
T
Distribution:
Ori g - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - ER
1 - D/DCI/RM
1 - D/Sec w/ref
,,I-- DDA Subj w/ref (DDA 78-0870)
1 - DDA Chrono
Ref: Memo dtd 2 Mar 78 to DDCI,
D/DCI/RM and DDA fr ES, subj:
Security Compartmentation
A} prAePd P6FQ Qease-2OD3/d'2/27 C'1A"-RDP8VOO t4ZRtX 0600070007-5
Approved For lease 2003/02/27 CIA-RDP81-00f4 D6G0?7 007-5.
2 March 1978
25X1A
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy to the Director for Resource Management
Deputy Director for Administration;
SUBJECT Security Compartm.entation
1. In reviewing the attached package.from the Acting
Chairman of the Security Committee and signing off on the
accompanying letter to Director, DIA,General Tighe, the
Director wrote the following note to each of you:
."Did we not assign Security Committee to
Jack & isn't he'the best one to take charge
& march off--he's neither a collector or
producer?"
By this memorandum I am asking Messrs. Blake and
to consult and advise the DCI via DDCI.
B. vans
Executive Secretary
Attachment
As stated
Approved For Release 2003/02/27: CIA-RDP81-00142Rr000600070007-5--- ----
25X1
Approved For I ase 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP81-00142PA@0600070007-5
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Security Committee
SECOM-D-306
27 January 1978
MEMORANDUM FOR:
xecu.ive ecre ary, NFIB
Acting Chairman
SUBJECT: Security Compartmentation F-1
REFERENCE: DCI/IC 78-5006, dated 12 January 1978, subject:
Proposed DCID on Compartmentation
1. his responds to your request (reference) for an identi-
fication o issues and problems bearing on compartmentation, and a
description of who is doing what about them.
2. II As you noted, General Tighe's recent memorandum
soliciting DCI support for early NFIB action on a proposed DCID on
compartmentation is but one of several recent expressions of concern
from Defense about the pace of pending actions on compartmentation.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff brought up the subject for discussion during
their 20 January 1978 meeting with the DCI.
25X1
3. 1 1 The proposed :ompartmentation DCID derives from a
1976 initiative by Defense, presented as a means of redressing the
balance between protection and utility of intelligence information.
That initiative was referred to the Security Committee. Sharp divi-
sions in the Community have stalled action at our level on trying to
develop a directive establishing clear policies on what should be
compartmented and effective procedures for doing so. Those with a
"collection" orientation generally favor the status quo, under which
the DCI collection committees or program managers both assert what
needs to be compartmented and develop the protective measures they
deem appropriate. Those with a "user" orientation want a change
which would provide a better balance between a collector's assertions
on restrictive security measures and the users' needs to get the
collected information in a manner which permits its full and timely
application. The "users" generally view present arrangements as
institutionalizing a bias in favor of strict protection and unrecep-
tive to Community needs for access under readily. manageable conditions. 25X7
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 CIA-RDP81-00142R00060
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 CIA-RDP81-00142R000600070007-5
SUBJECT: Security Compartmentation
A majority on the Security Committee sought to attain this improved
balance through having the proposed DCID make the Committee itself
responsible for determining what needs to be compartmented. A copy
of their proposed DCID is attached for information (see Attachment A).
The Committee Staff, believing that neither it nor the Committee as a
collegial body has the technical expertise to make such a determina-
tion, proposed a different approach without much success. That approach
is that: (1) those intimately knowledgeable of the collection environ-
ment ro ose information elements for compartmentation; (2) the Security.
Committee comment on the feasibility of protecting the information at
both compartmented and non-compartmented classified levels; (3) Community
agencies with interests in using the information comment on the impact
the compartmentation proposal would have on their responsibilities;
(4) a senior staff advisor to the DCI review these inputs from an overall
Community point of view and recommend a balanced position to the DCI for
final approval; and (5) the Security Committee play the leading role in
developing the administrative procedures to apply the DCI's decision.
4. The slow pace of action on the proposed compartmenta-
tion DCID is u ortunately paralleled in other actions underway which
bear on compartmentation in some manner. Some of the delay is due to
the complexity of the subject and to the need for wide-ranging coordina-
tion. In other cases, different problems have contributed to slow
action. In any event, the lack of much in the way of specific accom-
plishment fuels the concerns expressed by DIA. Significant pending
actions bearing on compartmentation include:
a. Simplification of security policy for space
intelligence matters. A proposal on this was developed by
an ad hoc Community group convened by the DCI in January
1976. Specific recommendations were sent to the President
by the DCI in November 1976, but were held over and subsumed
in the space policy review (PRM--23). The security recommen-
dations from that are very close to the November 1976 ones,
but are not yet final pending further consideration of the
draft Presidential Directive. Until this is acted upon, no
changes can be made in the system of security controls for
intelligence satellite product. The Security Committee staff
provided support on security issues involved in this effort.
b. I evision of Executive Order 11652 on security
classification. The new draft Order developed in response
to PRM-29 will require, among other things, that intelligence
compartments be continued or established only upon pgrsona-1>
DCI ap~ro~, after consideration of the balance between
protection and use and assessment of attendant security
factors. Compartments will also be subject to periodic
2
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000600070007-5
25X1
Ji LJslP.
Approved FeibRelease 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP81-00142,8000600070007-5
SUBJECT: Security Compartmentation n
review requirements leading to cancellation, change, or re-
affirmation. A mechanism to support the DCI in these regards
is needed. A Security Committee staff member participated
in the PRM-29 effort and was one of the drafters for the new
Order.
. C. Central computer data base to record and
manage compartmented accesses. The NFIB concurred in a con-
cept for such (the 4C's System) in 1975, but disagreement on
funding precluded implementation; funding is still an issue.
Further examination of the concept suggests that its manage-
ment benefits are well worth the cost. The Security Committee
is staffing a new proposal on this system for DCI consideration.
d. Uniform administrative system for compartmented
data. e security Committee developed, and the NFIB has for
comment, a proposed DCID to bring all administrative procedures
for handling and controlling such data together into one regu-
lation. Some agency comments on the proposal counsel delay
until the new Executive Order on security classification is
approved.
e. Updating of Community security policy on travel
and assignment of persons with compartmented access. Strong
Community differences on the subject have delayed decision.
Legal issues were raised and explored. The Security Committee
has developed, and the NFIB has for comment, an up-to-date
proposed DCID on this matter. Comments show that Community
differences will have to be resolved by DCI decision.
f. IiUpdating of tf.e TALENT-KEYHOLE Manual. COi1IREX
has comp e e a several-year-long effort to draft a revision
of the manual, consolidating all existing provisions bearing
on T-K matters, and will shortly seek DCI approval for the
changes involved.
g. II Updating of the Communication Intelligence
Security Regulations. The SIGINT Committee has been working
for about a year on a draft revision of this directive. More
review and coordination is needed.
5. A factor that does not contribute to timely action on
security ma ers is the division of responsibility for the subject, both
by directive and by practice. With regard to compartmentation:
a.1I DCID 1/11, the Security Committee's charter, assigns
a mission to "review special security and compartmentation
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/02/27.:?CIA-RDP81-00142R000600070007-5
J
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 CIA-RDP81-00142R000600070007-5
SUBJECT: Security Compartmentation
procedures and develop proposals for any necessary changes
to achieve optimum use of intelligence consistent with pro-
tection of sensitive intelligence sources and methods." Not-
withstanding that, a recent proposal to subdivide a lI
compartment into two separate ones was not assigned o e
Security Committee for action.
b. II COMIREX, which is primarily responsible for advis-
ing on the collection, processing, and exploitation of imagery,
is alscr-tasked by its charter (DCID 1/13) to develop "special
security-control"-procedures for imagery product. They, not
the Security Committee, develop the administrative directives
specifying how such product is to be protected.
c. I the SIGINT Committee, which is primarily-respon-
sible for advising on the collection and use of SIGINT, is
tasked by its charter (DCID 6/1) to study and prepare recom-
mendations on the "degree and type of security protection" to
be afforded SIGINT and on associated administrative procedures.
d. I I An ad hoc group, not the Security Committee,
was tasked last year to review security and compartmentation
from an overall Community standpoint and to develop implemen-
tation plans for improvements. This, the Senior Security
Study Group, was set up in response to a suggestion by the
then Director, DIA, who believed that such would accelerate
the pace of meaningful action on compartmentation.
6. II Both policy and practice show that the DCI does not
have a single focal point for Community security policy matters, as
opposed to a single security advisor for operational security matters
bearing on CIA. The concerns increasingly voiced by Defense are of
Community character. They appear to seek an institutional approach
which would give both.the substance and the appearance of balanced
consideration of the competing parochial interests of separate
Community entities. Some arrangement to that effect will be needed
to comply with the revision of E.O. 11652, which will require the
protective features of present and proposed compartments to be balanced
against the "full spectrum of needs to use the information" involved.
It would seem that that balance would not be served by permitting
either collectors or consumers to have a preponderant role in recommend-
ing security policy. Both have to contribute to the process, because
no one else can speak with their experience and technical knowledge.
But someone without a vested interest in the outcome should be closely
involved in the balancing process and in the follow-through administra-
tion after the DCI has made his decision.
25X1
25X1A
4
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000600070007-5
Approvedr Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP81-00442R000600070007-5
SUBJECT: Security Compartmentation
7. ttached for your consideration is a suggested reply
(Attachment for the DCI to send General Tighe. It states a plan to
schedule an NFIB discussion on compartmentation, on the assumption that
the DCI would believe such necessary and desirable. If the DCI concurs
in such an approach, we will prepare a talking paper for his use.
Attachments:
A. Proposed DCID on Compartmentation
B. DCI'Memo to D/DIA
5
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000600070007-5
If-
STAT
25X1A
25X1 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000600070007-5
Next 4 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000600070007-5
Approved F Release 2003/02/27: CIA-RDP81-001 8000600070007-5
NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD
MEMORANDUM FOR: Lieutenant General Eugene F. Tighe, Jr.,
USAF
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
SUBJECT: Security Compartmentation
REFERENCE: S-8334-RSS-4B, dated 3 January 1978,
subject: Proposed DCID on
Comp.artmentation
I IYour memorandum (see reference) raises some
vali points about the progress of various actions
bearing on security compartmentation. The proposed
compartmentation DCID you noted is but one of several
draft directives on this general subject which require
resolution. Since the delays in coming to grips with
these issues seem to reflect underlying philosophical
differences in the Community on how to deal with the
need for and impact of compartmentation, I plan to
schedule an NFIB discussion on the subject on 14 March.
That should help us determine what organizational
arrangements and assignments of responsibility we will
need to balance the full range of Community interests
in the protection and use of sensitive intelligence.
STANSFIELD TURNER
Chairman
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 20O3/92i27 CIA-RDP81-00142R000600070007-5
Approved Kw'KFei&LsfOdkdT-I ek PSAI '2000600070007-5
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301 . %J
`3 JAN 1971
S-8334-RSS-4B
MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD
SUBJECT: Proposed DCID on Compartmentation (U)
1. (U) The purpose of this memorandum is to solicit your support
so that early actions may be taken by the National Foreign Intell-
igence Board (NFIB) on the subject draft DCID.
2. (S) Various working groups involved have expended considerable
time and effort in the development of this DCID. Review by the
NFIB at this time would be in consonance with and supportive of.
SIGINT Committee revision of DCID 6/3 and the COMIREX rewrite
of the TK manual. Both these on-going efforts would be enhanced
by early approval of subject DCID.
3. (S) DIA 'continues to view the compartmentation question as
one of the intelligence community's most vexing problems. DIA
and the Services are working now within current guidelines to
ensure maximum dissemination of intelligence to appropriate users
without compromise of sensitive sources and methods. Your recent
decision to develop an improved computerized data base is viewed
as a forward step in maintaining the whole system of accesses to
the various SCI compartments. It is believed that early resolution
of the compartmentation issue would enhance responsiveness and
dissemination of intelligence to major military commands worldwide.
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 CIA-R
X 1
THE DIRECTOR OE CENT :AL. IN (E:LLIGENCE
Approve r Release 204810212 +.:ECIA-RD'P81-06 2R000600070007-5
of Legislutiv~ Counszl
OLC 78--0528/a [ ~=
27 February 1978
IA-Z. Thorn s X. Latimer, Staff Director
per-=anent Select Co ittee on f ste1l aenee
Hcr,~.se of, 2 epresentat yes
Vfas3~.ingto D. C `; 2O5L
Dear Toni:
7978 , eacera%zxg ~oYrjpar'c e ted telligence progrars arid your
conves sat-ion with on this subject. - -
in `orxr_ tzon.,
. -- STATINTL
NYC clearly -tmdersta.:ad and appreciate the concern in assuring
that there is a pxoper balance between a xequir?em.erit for specially
compartment; rl clearances and the need for' efficient use. of ntel.ligence
target date which w s requested.
This is to confirm that a report is being prepared detailing a .
survey of all compartmented systems and including access Iists for
intelligence activities of -which the Director is aware of or has coani.zar(: e,
and every effort vrili be made to complete the report by the 1 April_
'STATI NTL
STATI NTL
Acting Legislative Counsel
1 - 0LC/Chrono
OLC/PI,C/Lsn (22 Feb 78) )
Retyped:LLI/baa (27 Feb 78
Distribution:
Orig - Adse
1 -- ER
1 -- IC Staff
1 - OLC/Subj
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000600070007-5
I
CIA-RDP81-O 4*2R000600070007-5
,Diming Slip
2
DDCI
ACTION
INFO
X.T._
x
DATE
INITIAL
3
D/DCIJIC
X
4
DDS i
5
DDI
6
DDA
-
_~
7
DDO
8
D/DCI/N1
9
GC
10
LC
x
11
IG -
12
Compt
13 ?
D/Pers
14
D/S
x
15
DTR
16
A/OCI/?A
117
AO/DCI
i8
CJIPS
19
DCi/SS
20
21
22
SUSPr.NSE
To 10: Per my ca't T to hi s
office will take the lead in prepar; ng
this study, in concert with your office
and the Office of Security.
STATINTL
STATINTL
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP81-0 ?142R000600070007-5
25X1 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000600070007-5
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000600070007-5
Approved J ep`~ a QO I02/2 '--: CIA RDP_8_1-00 OQQSOO 70007-5
NFiB -9.2/60
13 February 19/8
i Ei ORA~NDUM FOR: National Foreign In Ile, 117 ge :-ice Bo:aar d
xecu v retary, national Foreign
Intelligence Board
SUBJECT: Sensitive Compartmented Information
(SCI) Policy II
1. The attached memorandum from the Chairman
is forwc for your consideration.
2. We are tentatively proposing 14 ;eiarch as
the dater NFIB to address the general subject of
security of sensitive compartmented information. The
meeting is likely to locus on, but It not be limii;ed
to, discussion of:
a. The proposed DCID on Compartrrentation;
b. Administrative procedures for handling
and controlling compartmented data;
c. Pol icy, on travel and assignment of persons
with compartmented access;
d. Proposed DCID 1/16 on Computer Security.
You are invited to forward to the Executive Secretary in
advance of the meeting any general comments on the subject
of compartmented information policy which you have not
already made on one of the specific topics.
25X1A
Attachment: a/s
I dc.-;c s:i f; cation sc6r'_ cf ?.O. 11;5:
I Au:o:n .._cfly css i?;z, ch
? Cole I:-:a-,c.z z; S!e :o ~.?'