HOW CAN THE AGENCY WIN CONGRESSIONAL ACCEPTANCE OF THE DIRECTOR'S INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS LEGISLATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81-00261R000100050002-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 27, 2000
• Sequence Number: 2
• Content Type: MF

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ISSUES AND ANSWERS SERIES: PROBLEM NO. XIII
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: How Can the Agency Win Congressional Acceptance
of the Director's Intelligence Sources and Methods
Legislation
A. Recommendation: The Agency should use every possible forum
to seek the endorsement of individual Members of Congress and relevant
committees for this legislation.
Because the proposed legislation is of a highly controversial
nature, the Agency must seek every opportunity available to win support
of prominent Members of Congress for this proposal. Particularly
valuable would be the endorsement of Members of Congress who have
been critical of the Agency in the past, and who have a strong record
for advocating the protection of the constitutional rights of American
citizens. Within the next few months at least three major opportunities
are present. Both the House and Senate Select Committees will be
issuing reports on their findings and their recommendations for changes
in the Agency's legislative charter. Given the ideological make-up
of these two Committees and the image of some Members of the Committees
as staunch critics of the way intelligence has been conducted in the
past, endorsement by these groups would greatly increase the chance
for passage of the legislation. In addition, the Senate Committee on.
Government Operations will be holding hearings on congressional
oversight of CIA in January. The Government Operations Committee
may feel it does not have the jurisdiction to report a criminal statute
as part of its bill for altered congressional oversight. However, their
recommendation that the appropriate committee report such legislation
would significantly aid the chances for passage.
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The Director should also request time with the existing Armed
Services and Appropriations oversight committees in order to solicit
their favorable recommendations for the proposal. Other prominent
Members of Congress, such as the leadership of each party, should
be approached on an individual basis.
B. Recommendation: The Agency should pull out all stops in presenting
arguments on the need for this legislation, and specifically, should consider
dramatizing the disclosures of Philip Agee to win support for the proposal.
Following are arguments which should be presented to win
support for the proposal. i
1. Philip Agee - The campaign to win supporters with the
intelligence sources and methods proposal has been severaly handicapped
by the lack of tangible examples of the kinds of problems the Agency
faces in this regard, and the impotence of present safeguards. The
phrase "intelligence sources and methods" is itself very vague and it
is difficult for the Congress, the press, and the general public to
grasp what is really at stake. The best example (hopefully) the Agency
will ever have is former Agency employee Philip Agee. Agee has not
been portrayed in the press as this Agency views him--an ex-employee ..
who has endangered numerous lives by publishing a list of every
Agency employee and every cooperating foreigner of whom he was
aware. The fact that Agee openly acknowledges the assistance of the
Cuban intelligence service and identifies himself as a "revolutionary
socialist" (the same phrase Fidel Castro has used in describing himself)
should convince the American people of his motives.
The inadequacy of the present espionage law as a deterrent to
disclosure could be dramatized by using Agee as an example. We
could stress that these laws were written for the "traditional" defector,
one who is paid $50, 000 by a foreign intelligence service and communi-
cates his information solely and directly to that intelligence service.
The law cannot deal with the "modern" defector, one who chooses to
just as effectively devastate this country's intelligence activities by
publishing his knowledge in a book, collecting $250, 000 in royalties,
and becoming a cause celebre in certain circles. Up to this time, the
Age.-icy has been reluctant to openly attack Agee, apparently because
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it does not want to give credibility or publicity to his book, and it
feels there is some advantage in keeping him guessing regarding the
U.S. Government's plans to prosecute him. The decision must be
made whether these benefits might not be exceeded by the boost that
brandishing his case would give to helping insure that no one else
in his position escapes prosecution.
2. Discussions of the postulated Joint Committee on Intelligence
inevitably involve the example of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
(JCAE). Our testimony before committees and individual Members
should strongly suggest that one reason for the success of this Committee
in maintaining the secrecy of its information is the accompanying stiff
criminal statute prohibiting disclosure of Restricted Data. We should.
make the point that a joint committee on intelligence cannot hope to
equal the JCAE's record without a new criminal statute, and we should
point out that Congress' image as a responsible body will be sadly
tarnished by frequent disclosures from a joint intelligence committee.
3. The protection which the draft bill would mean for the con-
tinuing viability of the intelligence effort in support of Government
decision-making and thus to the national security.
4. The ways in which the proposed legislation would remedy
the inadequacy of current statutory provisions to protect intelligence
sources and methods. Stress the Catch-22 dilemma in which the Govern-
ment now finds itself when it must reveal extremely sensitive material
in open court or forego prosecution.
5. The limitations of the proposed statute, e.g. it does not apply stressed to the press, or to congressional testimony,-
and they BritishlO bic aI Secrets Act
differences between this proposal must also be emphasized.
6. The similarities between the draft legislation and a number
of other criminal statutes should be mentioned. There are 17 statutes
making it a criminal offense to disclose various kinds of unclassified
information in possession of Government a ecieS, Cinclin ode magedisclosure
of Department of Commerce information, diplomatic
crop information, patent information, and Selective Service records.
7. The economic cost to the United States which could be avoided
by enacting this legislation. These costs include those for counteractions
to mitigate the damage, and to affect advantages to the opposition. They
include costs of replacement personnel, enlistment of new and substitute
sources, reliance on costly non-human sources and methods of intelligence
gathering, and increased security measures. Moreover, the costs that would result from inadequate intelligence should be mentioned.
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C. Recommendation: The Agency must be prepared to accept fallback
positions granting additional defenses to prosecution, or further restricting
the class of people to whom the legislation applies.
Discussion
Additional Defense - One stated objection to the bill is that it
is intended to, and in fact would, prevent and punish the disclosure of
illegal or improper Agency activites. Senator Mondale emphasized
this in a June 26 Senate floor speech concerning the recommendations
of the Rockefeller Commission. He concurred with many of the recommenda-i
tions, but he heatedly attacked the Commission's endorsement of the
sources and methods legislation. Mondale said,
"The irony of this recommendation is that it would probably
in the future prevent the public from knowing about transgressions
and violations of the law of the kind we are now investigating here
before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence . To reveal
the spying on Americans, the opening of their mail, ~the bugging
of their phones, or plots to assassinate foreign leaders all
could put you in jail ... How much of the information in the
[Rockefeller Commission] Report, I wonder, was secret or top
secret only a few months ago. Without public disclosure, most
of the abuses documented in the report would never have been
corrected. Yet this law proposed by the Commission could help
insure that public scrutiny would never happen again. "
Senator Mondale's point, although overstated, can be expected
to figure prominently in debate on the legislation. We must convince
Congress, the press, and the public that the legislation cannot be
used to cover up illegal or improper activities. Although numerous
safeguards are written into the bill, these deal primarily with the question
of proper classification, not legality. There is no express avenue in
the bill whereby a person covered by the bill can disclose on his own
initiative to a responsible outside official information relating to an
intelligence source or method which he believes to be illegal. A fall-
back position which would meet Senator Mondale's point head-on is
to amend the bill to provide that an employee who in good faith believes
an intelligence activity of the CIA (amounting to an intelligence source
or method) is illegal or 'beyond the charter of the Agency, should exhaust
all internal remedies available to him for a review of this matter. If
he is not satisfied with the internal determination, the employee may,
in a secure manner, report his suspicions to members or designated
staff members of the President's Foreign Intelligence; Advisory Board
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or the committees of Congress exercising legislative oversight. Such
a provision would provide the employee additional opportunities to
obtain external review of the activity, and yet would not jeopardize
the intelligence source or method involved.
Narrowing Affected Classes of People - Some objection has been
raised on the grounds that the bill may be used to interfere with
proprietary interest of U.S. business and contractor personnel because
of its application to contractors, their employees, who become possessed
of intelligence sources and methods information during the course of
contractor performance with the United States Government. This concern
may make it necessary to consider either eliminating the contractor
class from the bill or providing lesser penalties for violation.
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THE FUTURE OF INTELLIGENCE
(Presentation by the DCI before the House Select Committee
investigating intelligence, Friday, 12 December 1975)
Outline
Introduction
Concerns for the Future
Basic Essentials for Effective Intelligence Activity
Legislative Needs
Jurisdictional Problem Areas
The Balance
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BASIC ESSENTIALS FOR EFFECTIVE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
The basic essentials of an effective national intelligence
activity are relatively few in number, but each is important.
The ten essential ingredients I would like to stress are these:
a. A budget of sufficient size to enable employment
of adequate numbers of personnel and to make possible
acquisition and operational use of the expensive technical
systems which experience has demonstrated are essential for
the acquisition of needed information.
b. Statutory authority and other arrangements which
will assure the protection of sensitive intelligence sources
and methods and will clearly define the authorities and
limitations applicable to intelligence activities.
c. Security classification systems which enable the
proper dissemination of intelligence information and at
the same time assure that what should be secret remains
secret.
d. Organization and coordination mechanisms which will
give confidence to policy levels of the Executive Branch
and to the Congress that the intelligence which is provided
to them is accurate as to its factual base and as free from
bias in its estimative judgments as is humanly possible.
e. Continuing access to policy levels of the Govern-
ment by senior intelligence officials to assure that the
Intelligence Community is fully aware of the information
needs of the Government to which it must be responsive.
f. Public trust and confidence that intelligence
activities are being conducted within the limits imposed
by the United States Constitution and by statutes and
Executive Branch directives.
g. Public acceptance of intelligence as a career
worthy of the best talents of the country. Anything short
of this will not make intelligence an attractive career
for the kinds of young men and women who must enter the
profession if the intelligence needs of the United States
are to be met in the future.
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h. A research and development program adequate
to keep pace with the increasing complexity of -
intelligence problems and to assure full exploitation of
all possible means of acquiring information and then using
it to best advantage once it is acquired.
(NEED TWO MORE)
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 LEG.I 3'LA.1 IVE PROPOSALS? HOW BEST TO MAKE CONTRIBUTIONS?
X. WHAT SHOULD BE DCI"S PHILOSOPHY ON SECRECY? HOW AND TO
WHOM SHOULD IT BE EXPRESSED? HOW SHOULD PRESENT
CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM BE OVERHAULED?
XI. WHAT ORGANIZATIONAL IMPROVEMENTS CAN BE MADE TO IMPROVE
THE INTERNAL COMMAND AND CONTROL OF CIA?
XI I. SHOULD GAO HAVE AUDIT AUTHORITY OVER ALL CIA FUNDS? IF SO,
HOW SHOULD SUCH AUDITS BE CONTROLLED TO AVOID DISCLOSURE
SOURCES AND METHODS?
X I I I . HOW DO WE GET SOURCES AND METHODS PROTECTIVE LEG I SLA TI ONN
PASSED?
X IV. WHAT I S THE PROPER CIA--FBI RELATIONSHIP? WHAT ARE THE
PROPER CIA RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER AGENCIES: USES,
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WHAT SHOULD BE THE POSITION, ROLE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE
SENIOR U. S. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE OFFICER?
11. HOW SHOULD STRENGTHENED EXECUTIVE BRANCH OVERSIGHT OF
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES BE EXERCISED?
III. BY WHAT MECHANISM COULD CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY BEST BE EXERCISED?
IV. HOW TO INSURE RETENTION OF COVERT ACTION CAPABILITY? +(
WHERE SHOULD THIS CAPABILITY RESIDE?
1
V. WHAT IS TO BE MECHANISM FOR PRODUCTION. OF NIEs? l
VI. HOW CAN EXECUTIVE & LEGISLATIVE BRANCHES BEST BE ASSURED
THAT FOREIGN INTEL ACTIVITIES ARE CONDUCTED WITH DUE
RESPECT TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF AMERICAN CITIZENS?
VII. HOW CAN CONGRESSIONAL NEED FOR SUBSTANTIVE FOREIGN INTEL
,.IX. WHAT. I S. AGENCY POSITION ON VARIOUS DRAFT ADMINISTRATION
..,,,B.EST:,.BL ACC.OI`IIMQDATED"?
:VII I. HOW CAN WE TELL THE INTELLIGENCE STORY BETTER?
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PREPARED S-~ T1~TEMG NOON OVERSIGHT
TA
I. O enin Pleasantries
Importance of oversight
CIA wants good oversight
-- Matter for Congress, but DCI will share his views
II. History of Agency Oversight Traced
- Armed Services gained in 1947
Appropriations committees' role
Recent role of International Relations and foreign
- Relations Committees
- Section 662 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974
Select Committees on Intelligence
Intensity of oversight reflective of national and.
congressional attitudes
Efforts to alter oversight structure
Current oversight by our four committees
III. issues
Agency full cooperation with oversight committees, now
.Aand in the futur e
committee relationship but committee
Key issue not Agency/
K
Congress relationship
Proliferation of operational information throughout Congress
IV. Future Oversi-ht
oversight prrinesciples
Future oversight should be based on two
_-Concentration of
in minimum number of committees necessary
for effective oversight;
_-Adoption of procedures controlling access to
operatioral information within Congress
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IV. Continued
--These principles are essential because of the number
of committees now requesting access to operational
information
Jurisdictional exclusivity and, concentration of responsibility
will make for better oversight and more secure environment
for operational information.
Rules and procedures in Congress necessary to protect
essential secrets
Access to operational information brings corresponding
responsibility to protect it
-- Rules should limit access to opraoversiglittcommittees
membership and staff of
Rules should require consultation with Agency before
publication of information by the committee
V. Sources and Methods
as
-- Sources and Methods legislation should be
oversight
part of strengthening congressional
-- analogy with Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy and Restricted Data statute
- While we are relatively open, we need some secrets. Sources
and Methods statute necessary to protect these secrets.
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