Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
December 9, 2016
Document Release Date: 
September 27, 2000
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
October 6, 1975
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PDF icon CIA-RDP81-00261R000100050016-3.pdf248.78 KB
r, J!ItlL~, Approved For RoMase 2001 /03/30: CIA-RDP81-( 61 R0001 00050016-3 6 October 1975 ACTION PLAN A. ASSESSMENT (THE PROBLEM): 1. CIA is caught in the middle of a classic tug of war between Executive and Legislative Branches. a. Legislative is on the offensive. T,0 -M,, CCmA b. CIA is on the defensive. 2. Principal news media inclined to support of the Legislative Branch rather than Executive. a. The offensive is newsier. 3. Certain figures in Congress see political advantage in maximizing past abuses and real or imagined deficiencies, despite possible cost to national foreign intelligence establishment, a l evuation, and analysis and intelligence as covert activities is a feature of the problem and likely to get more so. 6. Greatest dangers to the Agency during this period are: a. Compromise of sensitive intelligence, sources and methods. b. Weakening of effectiveness as regards current and future intelligence responsibilities because of preoccupation by senior management with Congress and the press. a. They are not the majority but they're the most visible. 4. The offensive in Congress (and the press) takes two forms. a. Past abuses, illegalities, etc. , and the need to protect against recurrence (so far, the Church Committee stresses this). b. Attacks on the competence and effectiveness of CIA (the Pike Committee's concern with alleged failures). 5. The distinction (or confusion) between intelligence as information,, } C. Lowered morale-in Agency recruitment prab] ens ?po ential t4U. Approved For Release 661403/3p.,.-4pN-00261 R000100050016-3 Approved For Releaft 20Lt~:~l~ibO~1b261R000100050016-3 d. Development of overly proscriptive and/or. unsound legisla- tion under which the Agency will have to operate in the future. e. Loss of confidence on part of friendly foreign intelligence services and of Americans - private or official is essential. whose cooperation Working "tc/E/r rrn ., Ass umptions ~T'~'G~ tatty D C t 9.W.+.r 5~ -" 1? Oversight and accountability functions within the Executive and Legislative Branches will be strengthene 2? Covert action mi,c,,,,-, _ a -- will continue. 9 rl " y rtuced from past levels past levels 3. A central intelligence organization preserved, in some form can and will be a. The task is to emerge with a workable institution, without doing irreparable damage in the process. Current Situation 25X1A (To be covered daily) Projection 25X1A (To be covered periodically) B. Objectives Lehman (Being developed) C El . ements of Strate (To be developed further) l* Target Determines Aire a? Who or what is our target? (1) Ultimately,, it is a majority of the Con will initiate gress who .legislation or pass on the Presidentrs proposals. `I ,0 5.'k C=c. (2) In an intermediate sense, it is a few public figures and groups who can/will be listened to by Congress. b. We need dditiona.l active support (1) The critical elements represented by the moderate center and the reasonable .left or liberals within both parties L