TELLING THE INTELLIGENCE STORY

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP81-00261R000100050020-8
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
3
Document Creation Date: 
December 9, 2016
Document Release Date: 
September 27, 2000
Sequence Number: 
20
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
October 30, 1975
Content Type: 
MF
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PDF icon CIA-RDP81-00261R000100050020-8.pdf205.13 KB
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Approved For I lease 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP81 -W261 R0001 00050020-8 October 30, 1975 MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence SUBJECT . Telling the Intelligence Story 1. Problem How can we tell the intelligence story better? 2. Position of the Congressional Committees None anticipated. 3. Discus ion a? Publicity on the CIA in the last year has not resulted in arounded story, Much attention has been focused on specific sensational bits and pieces of information. Agency efforts to puL these events into perspective Publicity given the original allegations and b. Altering this situation will require patience and a gradual approach. It will also require a more open and forthcoming attitude in the Agency's dealings with the media, which provide our only significant access to the American public. In large measure the Agency will have to await appro- priate invitat4 s and opportunities. We .should then focus on subjects that allow us to tell a rounded story. c. There:: are several specific approaches we can follow with the media: -- We can collaborate with the media when asked to do so in developing feature articles, articles for publication on selected topics, or television features. Sample topics Tab The Directorates should be polled, for.o.ther u __..vs._. i.ec-- We can'provide more backgrounders for columnists and editorial writers Th substantive background brie ED iest pr fingseshouuldgbemexpanderoving d.aslopportunities arise. We,should focus particularly on the suhiect of the future bf the CIA and the Intelligence Communit . however, requires that there be enc on the future r , an agree upon Aff ~ .1 the .Stud}A ForiW@r2OO 04uQ!ANRD-IjUsQ0 .' q ' 50020-8 eporz. 4? Approved For Ftease, ?0QiIJ 3/04: CIA-RDP81-0V261 R0001 00050020-8 Aft. --We can plan a somewhat expanded rate of acceptance of offers of public appearances id ac speeches by senior Agency officials. Presentations can. be tailored to fit the occasion. Senior Agency officers other than the DCI and DDCI sito,u.ld.?be made available more frequently to help carry this load. ~....... ~.... , ...._ --We can make public unique CIA contributions to the advancement of technology and keeping the peace. Already f:7) extant film on "The Corona Story" could be cut and edited for public showing or new film, stories or fenfli-e c A , produced. This reopens "the fact of" issu d. Two groups not related to the media could also be used selectively to help tell the true story of intelligence. --We can approach respected senior statesmen for }-, assistance either directl or indirectly through, for example, people such as ' Such asitd ssance coul takethe X1 form of statements in i.cating the important contribution of ? ._ --- --- intelli enc g e Ot retalnlna ' --- "` '-vat 'v.t L L LlupUI La an objective and u bi d a n ase source of national. ~ intelligence. Alternatively, selected senior statesmen could ~re Ic' simply be briefed on the current difficulties without any direct - request for t eir help. A list of such people would have to be C G developed in c nsultation with. the Deputy Directors and the approach to each person worked out on an individual basis. --qe can provide judicious assistance to selected former Aenc l y emp oyees and rtih gerees wo want to defend the CIA in books, articles, or public appearances. "Judicious" and "selected" are the operative words. 4. Recommendations a. That--.the DCI decide which of the options listed in paragraphs 3 c and d above should be pursued. b. That the Assistant to the Director be instructed to implement the selected programs in consultation with the appropriate Directorates. ,~Aoproved For Samuel V. Wilson Lieut pant General, USA. ChairmAn, Ad-?Hoc Task Group easa 200'F/03104":-CIA-Rb'81--00261-R000l-ODO5OU2U--8 Approved For (ease 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP81 261 R000100050020-8 Sample Topics for Feature Articles, Backgrounders, or Television Features 1. The Operations Center: The functioning of the CIA Operations Center and its role in ensuring that the right in- formation gets to the right people--fast--is not classified. With proper security precautions, it should be possible to make a genuinely interesting feature for television placement on a program such as Sixty Minutes. The feature would largely have to be developed by outsiders. _ 2. Personality Interviews: Interviews with senior Agency of icials or' personality profiles" could be arranged. The interviewer, his intended audience, and the official would have to be matched on a highly selective basis. 3. Current intelligence: The process of producing... daily current intelligence is unclassified. A feature-- Z> perhaps centered around a specific analyst--could be tailored V' either for a s c_olarly publication or done in an upbeat manner for film or te_evision. The feature could be done.'by an out- sider given access to appropriate DDI officers. 4. Acad mic Skills: A feature story could be prepared pp,by -an outsi`er cn the spread of academic skills in CIA. The ..__story could be dcne for a scholarly publication or could be filmed for use in college recruitment. ' 5.' Counter-intelligence: The CI Staff is developing and coordinatir_g an unclas-s-M ed paper explaining the positive side of counter-intelligence work, using a few sanitized composite case studies. The paper can be used to develop a feature article or as the basis for public presentations before selected audiences, such as the Brookings Executive Seminar. The Defector Program might also lend itself to such treatment. 6. Backgreunders: These will largely have to respond to the issue of the moment, e.g., Sam Adams' charges of in- telligence misfeasance or malfeasance regarding Vietnamese order of?battle figures; the notion that intelligence can be expected to predict with precision coups or revolutions, particularly in f i dl r en y countries; or the importance of maintaining access to fragile communications intelligence and the damage that can be done by revealing the seemingly harmless "four little words." The DDs and ADDs and other senior officers could begin to provide such backgrounders as quickly as, possible following th d e evelopment of the issue. jll tom' .''... *i? rovd r ae'leasq,20011'164 r _,OrF c-RDP8 26.E R000100050020-8