Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
December 9, 2016
Document Release Date: 
September 27, 2000
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
December 3, 1975
Content Type: 
PDF icon CIA-RDP81-00261R000100050035-2.pdf340.95 KB
Approved ForRelea Y1iOsn ' dI' -RDP8 0261 ROCW M050035-2 3 December 1975 SUBJECT: Principles and Standards for Review of HSC Draft Papers HSC Staff members have indicated their concern review by the Agency of those that the technical security ortions of their report intended for publication in un- P ublic as classified form will be viewed by the media and p some form of censorship. They are concerned that the Agency will presume on the opportunity not only to attempt to in- fluence the report, but will employ "security" to suppress ' ns of the report that are only critical or embarrassing. portlo subject to the We have reminded them that the Agency is s's commitment that security will not be used to President roblems. suppress criticisms that do not constitute security p ale The problem will be a practical exercise in protecting sources and methods. While unclassified pub- telligence so event, lication of the report entails som& exposures in any nc 's review must be professional, sound and de- the Age y ible. The purpose of this memorandum is to discuss the fens approach that is to be taken. It has been coordinated with the Deputy Directors. DRAFT Approved For Release 2001/03/30 : CIA-RDP81-00261 R000100050035-2 Approved For PiWease 2O0 1;10` 8ik? `_CI6"-1 81-8 161 R0001 00050035-2 2. As a general practice, we will continue to propose ;/sanitization or paraphrasing (1) to protect sensitive sources and methods, (2) protect foreign liaison relations, and (3) and protect the names of cooperating individuals and commercial and other organizations. Sample situations in which security questions may arise are below: a. General summary statements of operational activity (e. g. , "there is a pattern of CIA activity will not be ob- jected to on security grounds alone. Specific re- .ferences, however, singling out countries and so describing persons that they can be identified, would be questioned. b. Descriptions of operational techniques (where employed) should be considered carefully to ensure that they do not reveal operational methods to a degree that they would be harmful. c. Specific identification of Agency employees below the top command level, or descriptions that make their identity readily ascertainable (e.g., "COS Zamboango in 1950") will be questioned. d. Specific mention of proprietary-type entities is objectionable, as would be descriptions Approved For Release 2001/03/30 : CIA-RDP81-00261 R000100050035-2 Approved For Re as 1/q CIAJRDP81-0 1 R000100050035-2 that would locate and identify them. A .general discussion of the existence of proprietaries cannot be objected to, but a detailed review of holding company arrangements, proprietary funding and management techniques, as well as specific overseas operations in connection with them, is to be questioned. Generalized descriptions can well serve the purpose of informing the reader and should be sought in lieu of the more detailed descriptions. In limited instances where publicity or other consideration make it reasonable, specific identification will be accepted (e.g., "the Air America complex"). e. Description of cover arrangements should be kept very general, avoiding any detail that would reveal local strengths or serve to pinpoint individuals, or that permit compromise of cooperating cover organ- izations. f. Reference to classified intelligence reports and studies, in the report, should be studied care- fully to ensure that they do not reveal intelligence sources and methods. In some instances, a given piece of information may be known to only a very few indi- viduals, and publication of it in unclassified form Approved For Release 2001/03/30 : CIA-RDP81-00261 R0001 00050035-2 ". 3 '~9 sue' ; 1VY ;1J m. ~j. -RDP80261 8000100050035-2 Approved For,,Jel 6@ In would permit identification of the source. other instances, certain information could be known only through technical systems for col- lection. It is doubtful that any one bit of intelligence would. contribute much to most dis- cussions, generalized summaries sufficing to make whatever points the HSC has in mind, but there may be instances in which this problem is presented. , Reference to specific intelligence gaps g that will reveal U.S. capabilities in areas im- portant to the national interest. h. Appraisals of the performance characteristics of Communist or other foreign military equipment should dered before agreement for release in be carefully consi unclassified form. If the information has been re- leased officially there is no reason to object to its ort, unless publication in the unclassified HSC rep if textual treatment raises other issues of security; led it is in the public domain, but has not been confirmed by official publication, its inclusion in the report should be considered carefully. Publication of es- timated performance characteristics may reveal tech- nical collection capabilities. it may be that Approved For Release 2001/03/30 CIA-RDP81-00261 R000100050035-2 Approved For`&elea~'I/~130 -RDP8'i%9b2618000100050035-2 publication of performance characteristics would come in discussion of a current policy issue (e.g., the BACKFIRE bomber), which would raise additional questions of classification. i. Reporting on recent or current foreign capabilities and intentions, and estimates of these, should be reviewed closely for discussion with the HSC Staff. National policy-level materials, which may compromise national interests, must be handled specially. j. Specific organizational descriptions, coupled with manpower and budgetary figures, must be studied carefully. In this context, any detailed summary of overseas organization and activities must be reviewed for unintended disclosures, or obvious revelations. k. Inclusion of non-CIA paper, coming from the Executive level of government, should be iden- tified for appropriate clearance. 1. The interests of other government agencies and departments will be kept in mind, to ensure that their interests are considered for coordination.. The above list of questions is intended as a sample of the sort of issues that may arise. The nature of the subject matter is such that a comprehensive list cannot be pre- pared in advance, and the issues will have to be dealt wit ApPfo ) Rerease 2001/03/30 : CIA-RDP81-00261 R000100050035-2 Approved For1?leasQj/OP j. RDP81261 R0001 00050035-2 3. As there is some concern on the part of the HSC Staff members that the security review agreed between Chairman Pike and the President may constitute some form of censorship, care should be exercised to raise only real issues of security, where it is proposed that the draft is intended for unclassified publication. The manner in which the Agency handles its security review also will have an effect on the attitude of the HSC Staff members, so state- ments of security reservations must be sober and professional, with clear alternatives being offered for how the. question can be resolved. The Agency's purpose is to facilitate publication of a properly sanitized, declassified report, where unclassified publication is intended. 4. A relatively consistent response by the Agency will facilitate exchanges with HSC Staff members. The above discussion is intended to contribute to this. Addi- tionally, it will also help if the Agency's format for conveying its comments is consistent. To this end, comments should be made on a separate paper, each comment keyed to the page and line of the draft, first stating the problem raised by the statement in question, why its unclassified publication in that form is subject to reservation, and proposing either a way to resolve the problem editorially by rephrasing the passage, or simply be deleting certain Approved For Release 2001/0313%: CIA-RDP81-00261 R000100050035-2 Approved For Re eas6 X061 /b'-3ih'o ": c iAiRDP81 -261 R0001 00050035-2 specific statements where they do not impair the thrust of the paper or the flow or writing.. This would serve as the basis for discussions with HSC Staff members, giving them a complete statement on each issue in order to prepare for further exchanges. 5. It is anticipated that working sessions will be arranged following the initial review, to address the questions raised by the comments. 6. The HSC Staff people have indicated an interest in Agency comments on the factual accuracy of the drafts, although it is not yet clear that the Agency will be re- quested to conduct such a review. This question is sure to arise in the review of reports planned for unclassified publication, but the preparation of classified reports by the HSC do not require review by the Agency. There is nothing at present to prevent the Agency from offering comments on factual accuracy or, for that matter,'on con- clusions when the opportunity presents itself; however, the HSC is not obliged to accept these comments. Any factual corrections that are offered should be handled as are the security comments, separately, soberly and pro- fessionally. Approved For Release 2001/03/30 : CIA-RDP81-00261 R000100050035-2 I Approved For4&ele sbe'2 01/ 3 0; [A-RDP8'itdb261R000100050035-2 7. The Review Staff will undertake to coordinate the distribution of papers for review' to monitor progress, and assist in working reviews of comments with HSC Staff members that follow the review. Approved For Release 2001/03/30 : CIA-RDP81-00261 R0001 00050035-2 R ,u t z'si S w 5 ~_ Approved Fo4Release 2001/03/30 : CIA-RDP800261 R000100050035-2 Approved For Release 2001/03/30 : CIA-RDP81-00261 R000100050035-2