YOUR PAPER NO. VI REGARDING LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81-00261R000100050042-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 6, 2000
• Sequence Number: 42
• Publication Date: December 11, 1975
• Content Type: MF

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DDA 75-5901
*OGC Has Reviewed*
1'75
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy General Counsel
SUBJECT Your Paper No. VI Regarding Legislative
Proposals
Further reflections on your paper have stimulated the
following comments:
--Re activity 15 on Impact of Restriction, the last
sentence--It seems to be a gratuitous offer which
although is normally our procedure there may be
situations which would merit "probing into other
matters." Since we do not have to, why say it.
--Re activity 20, Impact of Restriction--Word "confidential
documents" should. read "cia ssified documents."
--Re activity 27--It is a very broad and sweeping statement
and we submit difficult to defend as written.
--Re activity 38--Could be extended to include authority
to covertly pay employees, covertly report payroll
information, covertly report and remit taxes
--Re activity 40--Change to read "CIA requires continued
authority to ace~om lash the secure movement of funds, etc.
--Re activity 40, Impact of Restriction--Change wording to
read "The procurement or exchange of foreign currencies
through monetary agents domestically and abroad is the
only, etc." _ _
--Re activity 43, Impact of Restriction--Would suggest
this
strengthening the impact noting
water withoutforcibly
provision. we are dead in the
note that we must have this authority.
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--Re page 22, paragraph 5--There :might be occasions when
we would want to prepare a psychological profile on a
U. S. citizen who has defected and in turn redefected
back. We can think of no organization other than the
CIA which would have the capability of providing. such
a profile. Believe it is essential we have that
opportunity.
John N. McMahon
Associate Deputy Director
for
Administration
Distribution:
Orig I - Deputy General Counsel ?
DDA Subject w/background Subject paper"
1 - DDA Chrono
1 - JNM Chrono
ADDA:JNMcMahon:kmg (11 Dec 75)
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ISSUE, OPTIONS P AND ACTIONS
PAPER NO. VI
Issue:
and effectively address, legislative activities pr
How can this Agency prepare for,
e oposals which would seek to insure that
rights telligenc can citiz ns?re
conducted with due respect for constitutional of Ameri
Con ressional Committee Posits:
ha been thgenerated, amourit
o it
In view of the scope of the congressional inv sti s
which
me which has been spent, and the publicity
would be difficult, on political grounds alone, for the Congress to avoid
actin some legislation, if only to reassure the American people that their
en g h is now "in control"
is are being protected and that the legislative "t' eas by both the House and
rights on abu
of the situation. In addition, the fo-ta.
Senate Select Committees is strong. indication that corrective legislation is
contemplated.
Opts=' als
1. This Agency can attempt to anticipate ence activities and can examine the
establishing restrictions on foreign in g have on the effectiveness
impact which such legislative restricteffort would A number of possible bills
of the United States foreign intelligence
are listed in section A of the attached memorandum. posin
legis 2. Given the creativity of the Congress is bprole bills than to definelpore
it seems less profitable to speculate about po Unite
State A interests which either involve
ro o ed legi lat the could then bes or
- P
gency involve United States citizens . Any proposed
bill
measured against this core list and only to the extent that a impacted on such
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core interests would this Agency actively seek a revision of that bill. In
addition, the Agency might seek legislation expressly authorizing certain
of these core activities. These core activities or interests and the impact of
legislative restrictions are presented in section B.of the attached memorandum.
3. This Agency might adopt an active rather than a reactive stance
toward possible legislation. Instead of merely evaluating the impact of
legislative proposals, the Agency itself might suggest legislation which would
serve the interest of Congress by reassuring the American people that the
intelligence community is operating within carefully controlled boundaries
while at the same time ensuring that legislation does not erode this Agency's
capability to perform its statutory duties. The kinds of legislation which this
Agency might recommend are very briefly outlined in section C of the attached
memorandum.
Proposed Action:
1. The Deputy Directors should order the list of core activities into
five levels of importance. These judgments when aggregated would indicate
with a fair degree of precision the relative value or importance of each activity
and assist the DCI and the Office of Legislative Counsel to undertake an
educational effort proportional to the importance of the activity. The ranked
list could then be given to the Director to be used, as the opportunity arises,
to articulate and explain the authorities which this Agency requires. The
list should also be sent to the Office of Legislative Counsel to be used 'as an
aid in commenting on proposed legislation.
2. The proposed legislation in section C should be reviewed and possibly
expanded. When a final list is compiled, the Office of General Counsel and the
Office of Legislative Counsel in consultation with the directorates should be
authorized to frame legislation pursuant to Option 3.
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MEMORANDUM: Attachment to Issue, Options, and Actions Paper No. VI
A , possible Legislation
In view of the public attention which has alreay been
in an effortaln
intelligence, activities, it is reasonable to assume
to ensure that the constitutional rights
act v tiesrn atlea s the may
intelligence citizens
attempt to pass legislation restricting ifollowing ways:
1. Insofar as a great many activities have been ju
DCI the responsibility
basis of the proviso in 50 U. S. C. 403 (d) (3) giving the e for protecting intelligence sources
this and methods, such
introduced narrowly restricting
responsibility to the FBI.
2. Legislation may be proposed which would expand the right of
privacy of CIA applicants, employees, and agents. Such legislation
strict
may restrict CIA's right to polygraph applicants
CIA's right torex.arnine
CIA's right to do psychological testing; striction or control the outside activities ofr employees,
or eliminate the DCI'es term nation
on marriage to foreign nationals;
authority [50 U.S.C. 403(c)] and provide for presence of counsel in
any administrative or disciplinary
the CIA personnelasecurityeprogram?.
Such legislation would cripple 3. Concern with privacy issues might also lead to on laegis7atth dividual.
prohibiting CIA from obtaining financial information
If such language included foreeg inn nationals,
acti vt sowoutold be restricted.
Agency intelligence and count gence
4. Legislation may be proposed which would restrict CIA contacts
with, or recruitment of, certain inamen individuals
guarantee of freedoms o frel gion,
In order to protect the First Am gua o
cloth. CIA may be forbidden to recruit or~1en any way ClA maybe ffor the
li dden tor'
In order to protect the freedom of tpress, , to covertly
recruit or in any way use reporters
books or other typesrof pubs cations .
contribute to, publish, or distribute Similarly, the political sensitivity of CIA contact with other groups, such
as students and academic scholars, may ldionadditi n l le
owl t se
restrictions. In the aggregate, such res
Agency's recruitment base, reduce cover possibilities, and make
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intelligence and counterintelligence activities more difficult.
5, Concern that the constitutional grestricting CIA relationships
violated by CIA could also lead to legislation
with law enforcement agencies, for example, prohibiting CIA. from passing
information about the activities of Uforbidding n authorities
CIA from collecting any
Legislation might also be proposed
information on U.S. citizens, whether or not such information
legislation would at the verysleast
collected in the United States. handicap CIA's ability to carry out its counterintelligence responsibilities.
6. Legislation designed to protect surve lanc t acg vitiesl byt CIA
be proposed which would prohibit technical such activity
Specific language might prohibit all such activity, prohibit directed against U.S. citizens, or g to aeqwarrant based upon
activities only be conducted pursuant judicial
probable cause. Such measures would to varying degrees damage CIA's
intelligence collection capability. ntribution 7. Legislation might be proposed
IOa number of Agency
legislation c o ad damage
domestic organizations. Such g
activities, including cover arrangements.
The impact of such legislative bill. Some of these gen aal of
course, on the precise language of the
concepts, however, have been the subject of bills which have been
previously proposed. The impact of these bills has been exa lneatived
the result of such analysis is available from the. Office of Legis
Counsel.
B ? Core Activities
Below are listed 43 activities which are significant ienough to be e labeled
ear toduct
"core interests" or "core activities." They include
violate
the U.S. or involving s some of citizens
which may seem " i rr gular" or "suspicious" to
to violate or be technical
constitutional rights,
the average citizen, and some of which may appear
cas
activiti violations of statute or administrative regulations.
world be required~n orderes
these activities have been identified by
are presently legal, in some few cases, legislation to legitimate the activity. In all cases
the various components as important in order for this Agency to accomplish
its mission .
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service from the State Department or from the Secret Service; (d) With
the approval of the Director of Central Intelligence and in accordance
with procedural guidelines of the Attorney General, when the occasion
does not permit Federal Bureau of Investigation assistance, in order
to carry out custodial responsibilities with reference to a defector
in the United States.
Impact of Restriction: At present only couriers and guards transporting
.confidenti9l documents and materials may be authorized to carry firearms.
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Activity 24: CIA requires continued authority to provide specialize
equipment or technical knowledge for use by any other Federal
department or agency.
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Activity 31: The DCI requires continued authority to summarily reject an
applicant or to discharge an employee.
Impact of Restriction: This is extremely important to the security
of the Agency, both to avoid possible revelation of classified
information in appeal hearings and to retain a capability for
exercising control over the issuance of security approvals for
Agency information, particularly if substantially lower clearance
criteria are established in the future.
Activity 32: Legislation is required to provide criminal sanctions
for the unauthorized disclosure of classified foreign intelligence
information and intelligence sources and methods; to provide for
effective injunctive authority; and to provide for penalties for
impersonation of a CIA officer or use of the initials CIA with the intent
to mislead or defraud.
Impact of Restriction: Continuation of the DCI's statutory
responsibility to protect -intelligence sources and methods is
critical to the security of Agency operations. At present,
however, this responsibility does not include any specific authority
to implement that responsibility. The legislation suggested
above would help the DCI to carry out his statutory responsibilities.
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If it becomes clear that explicit legislative restrictions on CIA activities
are inevitable, this Agency might propose the following measures which might
reassure the American people without seriously eroding the Agency's ability
to carry out the statutory responsibilities.
1. The CIA shall not conduct training or furnish equipment to local
law enforcement personnel or organizations in the United States.
2. The CIA shall not undertake clandestine operations in the United
States directed at the collection of intelligence information on domestic
installcitizens except
affairs or the activities of United States
of employee
ons and t iconn
the protection of its personnel
or other security investigations.
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3. The CIA shall not conduct physical surveillance in the United
States of U.S. citizens or organizations except against employees of the
Central Intelligence Agency or persons who work on behalf of the Central
Intelligence Agency.
4. The CIA shall not conduct electronic surveillance or engage in
surreptitious entries in the United States.
5. The CIA shall not prepare psychological profiles on United
States citizens other than employees of the Central Intelligence Aency.
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