Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
December 9, 2016
Document Release Date: 
September 27, 2000
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
November 4, 1975
Content Type: 
PDF icon CIA-RDP81-00261R000100050053-2.pdf121.25 KB
25X1A Approved For Release 2001/03/30 : CIA-RDP81-00261 R0001 00050053-2 Approved For Release 2001/03/30 : CIA-RDP81-00261 R000100050053-2 STATINTL Approved For F. ieasA( U}1 M 9 CIA 1U 00100050053-2 e. The Office of Security and the FBI are repre- sented on the USIB Security Committee by members from their respective organizations. This requires at least monthly meetings between representatives of the two organizations. quarters of the FBI. This liaison involves the sharing ot information concerning counterintelligence matters of mutual and joint concern. In addition, Office of Security name checks are conducted on individuals of interest to the FBI and=where information is located on these individuals the FBI is provided with a formal response. The FBI continues to have direct access to a KGB defector for whom the Office of Security serves as the focal point for access. h. The vast majority of business handled between the Personnel Security and Investigations Directorate (PSI) of the Office of Security and FBI liaison officers relates to expedite name checks. PSI receives and responds to requests from the Bureau in situations where time is of the essence. Similarly, this Office will levy its own name check requirements in those cases where there is some urgency. PSI also handles all fingerprint cards on staff applicants, contractors, employees, and industrial-type cases. As a standard procedure, PSI receives and processes Bureau reports on terrorism and impersonation matters. 2 Approved For Relea 2Q01/03/$0 : CIA-RDP a 1 000100050053-2 002 dr]s :straiive - lllerr, 0 - UMY Approved For R I 0-: 8000100050053-2 i. The PSI Directorate also serves as the focal point in the handling of personnel security problem cases where there is FBI interest or jurisdiction because of the possible violation of federal statutes. 3. None of the above activities contradict the intent or letter of the proposed Executive Order establishing restrictions on intelligence activity or the proposed NSCID No. 9, relative to the CIA foreign intelligence and clandestine operations affecting U. S. citizens. Further- more, the continuance of these activities is vital to the Office of Security if it is to continue to fulfill its responsibility to the CIA. If NSCID No. 9 is issued as proposed, it might be necessary to establish liaison with more senior officials of the Bureau, particularly in the field of approved electronic surveillance and support to the FBI in carrying out its responsibilities as they relate to foreign intelligence and counterintelligence against foreign nationals. STATINTL < bert W. tambino Di ector of security Approved For Rel 'flW1 8000100050053-2 IT, ffiQ.. 0 :