ISSUE OPTIONS AND ACTIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81-00261R000100050065-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 27, 2000
• Sequence Number: 65
• Publication Date: October 24, 1975
• Content Type: MF

Approved FoQVelease 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP 02.61:F 00010005006 i-9
2 n. OCT 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy to the DCI for
the Intelligence Community
SUBJECT e Issue options and Actions
This memorandum outlines reactions to the various papers
handed out at the meeting on 20 October.
nctions of the Senior US Forei n Intelli ence officer
Role and Fu
papers on this general subject, and this' comment
There were two pap
'~a
Lf to the one titled as above. The formula I. A. 1.b(i).k- I
ualifications, as follows:
limits itself
fits my own preferences, with some q
~.._. I. The Special Assistant to the President must have
that goes beyond the -mere Special Assistant
special status,
role, whatever the title. This is met by later options.
A. Full membership on the NSC and chairman of the
NSCICpr0Vide status and support for his authority.
ent over management and
1. The role of Executive Ag though not as operating
direction of collection programs, that
head, gives the necessary handle on vital programs
might otherwise be subordinated to departmental require-_
ments.
b. Review and approval of budgets does not include
the task of developing such budgets- as envisioned in sub-
paragraph a. The function of approval establishes the
the need for a vast
necessary. control, without involving
staff beyond a.n IC-type organization.
be
(1) Development and issuance of guidance should oe g
elaborated to make-it sure that it is a guiding, subs2xn~ed
and approving role, It is felt that subparagraph (2) is
in 1, above, which would make the new post Executive Agent
for national systems.
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(a) The new senior officer can have the NIOs, with a
proper staff drawn from the community on a rotational
assignment basis. That structure could serve the
coordination and approval function.
1. There is no real conflict between the intelligence
role and that of covert action under the 40 Committee.
The relationship between Intelligence
artificially separ t than. is
unavoidable, and should not
b. Maintenance of his own IG Staff sounds better in
theory than it would prove in practice. It is not budgetary
information or management information -- both of which are
subject to reporting but "abuse" type information probably
of interest here. That is best discovered by internal groups
familiar with where to look.
1/ The new post should be the chief spokesman, short
of the President. "Otherwise, there is no central voice, which
is needed.
a/ Chairing both USIB and IRAC (neither of which should
be terminated at this time) reinforces the position and the
operating influence of the new post.
Joint Committee on Intelligence
A Joint Intelligence Committee has a number of advantages. In
seeking to take advantage of them, it is noted that representation
from the various committees with a proprietary interest in intelligence
may not of itself meet the requirements of those committees for some
special. demonstration of interest. Consideration should be given to
some special language that addresses this problem. If not, and if the
readily
controversies that arise during the perioof been adjustment are not
one extra
resolved, we might find only that there has a
committee without reducing other Congressional commitments.
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GAO Audit
The paper does not really take into account how I understand
GAO operates.
Were GAO to interest itself only in how the CIA edit System
sk
works there would be no real problem, as
disclosures of the sort that cause problems. made possible the.
Touche-Ross review of Agency audit procedure.
Further, GAO does not usually conduct a full audit. Rather, it
be attracted to the big money
tests and selects. It undoubtedly will
areas -- which conforms with its track of record ~ch as handling Qf
special interest from a control point operational money. These are the sensitive areas, and will raise the
as the do from GAO's way of going at things.
basic issues, arising y
The reference to "Comprehensive Fiscal ditd"l~w~g ~ is arxdapproach,
doesn't note what GAO means by "program
~ eheir
whereby GAO looks into the substantive foxpro ream s and
management. This poses significant questions I
problem of GAO's audit of the Agency.
The paper had best be broadened in order to look closely at just
what GAO's audit of CIA means.
National and Other Intelli ence Estimates
Options Number 2$ with a fleshed-out NIO Staff, working forth e
makes a lot of sense, assuming
new Senior Intelligence s~foir such a senior officer.
there is to be a new p
I have no useful new approaches to how better we can tell the
intelligence story.
25X1A
Distribution:
Orig. Addressee
I 5 SGhrono 25X1A
t #rgXjg fjpr Release 2001 /03/. 4: C A-RDP81-00261 R000100050065-9
A._//IC pam:5527 (23 Oct 75)