Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
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Document Creation Date: 
December 9, 2016
Document Release Date: 
September 27, 2000
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Publication Date: 
October 24, 1975
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PDF icon CIA-RDP81-00261R000100050065-9.pdf180.25 KB
Approved FoQVelease 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP 02.61:F 00010005006 i-9 2 n. OCT 1975 MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Community SUBJECT e Issue options and Actions This memorandum outlines reactions to the various papers handed out at the meeting on 20 October. nctions of the Senior US Forei n Intelli ence officer Role and Fu papers on this general subject, and this' comment There were two pap '~a Lf to the one titled as above. The formula I. A. 1.b(i).k- I ualifications, as follows: limits itself fits my own preferences, with some q ~.._. I. The Special Assistant to the President must have that goes beyond the -mere Special Assistant special status, role, whatever the title. This is met by later options. A. Full membership on the NSC and chairman of the NSCICpr0Vide status and support for his authority. ent over management and 1. The role of Executive Ag though not as operating direction of collection programs, that head, gives the necessary handle on vital programs might otherwise be subordinated to departmental require-_ ments. b. Review and approval of budgets does not include the task of developing such budgets- as envisioned in sub- paragraph a. The function of approval establishes the the need for a vast necessary. control, without involving staff beyond a.n IC-type organization. be (1) Development and issuance of guidance should oe g elaborated to make-it sure that it is a guiding, subs2xn~ed and approving role, It is felt that subparagraph (2) is in 1, above, which would make the new post Executive Agent for national systems. Approved For Release 2001103/04- :CIA-RDP81-00261 R 0 .00Q50?fi -3fl _. Approved For` elease 01%03/04: CIA-RDP8'1!0261 R0001 00050065-9 (a) The new senior officer can have the NIOs, with a proper staff drawn from the community on a rotational assignment basis. That structure could serve the coordination and approval function. 1. There is no real conflict between the intelligence role and that of covert action under the 40 Committee. The relationship between Intelligence artificially separ t than. is unavoidable, and should not b. Maintenance of his own IG Staff sounds better in theory than it would prove in practice. It is not budgetary information or management information -- both of which are subject to reporting but "abuse" type information probably of interest here. That is best discovered by internal groups familiar with where to look. 1/ The new post should be the chief spokesman, short of the President. "Otherwise, there is no central voice, which is needed. a/ Chairing both USIB and IRAC (neither of which should be terminated at this time) reinforces the position and the operating influence of the new post. Joint Committee on Intelligence A Joint Intelligence Committee has a number of advantages. In seeking to take advantage of them, it is noted that representation from the various committees with a proprietary interest in intelligence may not of itself meet the requirements of those committees for some special. demonstration of interest. Consideration should be given to some special language that addresses this problem. If not, and if the readily controversies that arise during the perioof been adjustment are not one extra resolved, we might find only that there has a committee without reducing other Congressional commitments. Approved For Release 2001/03/04: dIA-RDP81-00261 R000100050065-9 Approved Fo elease 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP810-00261 R000100050065-9 GAO Audit The paper does not really take into account how I understand GAO operates. Were GAO to interest itself only in how the CIA edit System sk works there would be no real problem, as disclosures of the sort that cause problems. made possible the. Touche-Ross review of Agency audit procedure. Further, GAO does not usually conduct a full audit. Rather, it be attracted to the big money tests and selects. It undoubtedly will areas -- which conforms with its track of record ~ch as handling Qf special interest from a control point operational money. These are the sensitive areas, and will raise the as the do from GAO's way of going at things. basic issues, arising y The reference to "Comprehensive Fiscal ditd"l~w~g ~ is arxdapproach, doesn't note what GAO means by "program ~ eheir whereby GAO looks into the substantive foxpro ream s and management. This poses significant questions I problem of GAO's audit of the Agency. The paper had best be broadened in order to look closely at just what GAO's audit of CIA means. National and Other Intelli ence Estimates Options Number 2$ with a fleshed-out NIO Staff, working forth e makes a lot of sense, assuming new Senior Intelligence s~foir such a senior officer. there is to be a new p I have no useful new approaches to how better we can tell the intelligence story. 25X1A Distribution: Orig. Addressee I 5 SGhrono 25X1A t #rgXjg fjpr Release 2001 /03/. 4: C A-RDP81-00261 R000100050065-9 A._//IC pam:5527 (23 Oct 75)