INTERPRETATION OF GOMULKA'S REASSUMPTION OF POWER/DANGER IN OVERESTIMATING DAMAGE TO USSR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81-00280R000200090016-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 8, 2011
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: November 8, 1956
• Content Type: REPORT

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/08
CIA-RDP81-0028OR000200090016-0
 S-i,-v-R _E' __T
INFORMATION REPORT
PREPARED AND DISSEMINATED BY
.CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Power/Danger in Overestimating Damage to NO. OF PAGES No. OF E-^?
2 50X1-HUM
USSR
Tbf- material contains information affecting the
National Defense of the United Stales within the
meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U. S. C.
Secs. 793 and 794. the transmission or revelation
of which in any manner to an unauthorized per-
DATE DISTRIBUTED
Interpretation of Gomull:a's Reacsumption of e 77,-. /-fa (o
the events of the last few weeks leading to the e ection o1
a as First Secretary of the United ';lorkers'Party and the remov-
iladyslaw Go .ul',
al of Marshal Konstantin K Ro' o rov '~, are of the greatest significance and de-
serve the attention they have received in the West. Osome;what more doubtful
however, whether they should be interpreted as the beginning of Poland,'s return
to independence, if by Poland is meant the broad mass of the Polish people.
Rather these events appear to have insured a modicum of inde-
pendence to the eo.Lish om.-unists who, with relatively few exceptions, are anti
Russian and, along with the non-Communist Poles, have almost as strong a dislike
for the Russians as for the Germans. If the Polish people, including the
working class, had their say, they would undoubtedly have reinstated Go-ultra to
his rightful place in the Communist Party, but they would have given the Social-
ists a much stronger representation in the top management of Party and50X1-HUM
2. If should be realized that Gommull:a still will not have a majority of the now
Politburo behind him, although his strength in Poland and even in the Poliab
Poland and refused to defend a position which was already lost. On the other
hand, Ocha:b has been reelected to t_'e new Politburo with a larger vote wen
than that given to Go-mill-ca and :gust be seriously reckoned with in the 50X1-HUM.
futu_r?- In the politburo. Ochab will generally be able to count on the support
of Aleksander Za-radc'ci, Roman Jerzy '`ora?- s'i and Stefan Jedrvcno?,'-
=~. Gomul?-a, on the other hand, has only one member of the Politburo committed
to him in the person of Ignacy T?'1^a-Snvizls'.ci. In addition, he should be able to
count on support from the two Socialists, Joz,ef Qvran'--ie~,i.cz and Adams Ranac'di.
Thus, even if the Socialists are going to back Gomulka as the lesser of two
evils, Gomulka may find himself in a minority in the policy-making and all
important Politburo. 50X1-HUM
it would be unwise for the West to bank on Gomulka too strongly.
Regardless of his stand vis-a-vis the Soviets, he is still a Com._unist and may
yet be forced by economic circumstances to play to some extent the Soviet game
even though he -,-,on in the political and perhaps military field. On the other
hand, the Socialists appear to deserve the full backing of the '.'-7- in the
_a
present Circumstance.- both becau?e They cologically in difficult
position end occat:;. con eI c ron., olac'_. _t
uoc r ^ ant in t- c ._ e . ? _ vc :in, bas -.o
' 7 Dv .,
- or - 7 1
ic...-__. in o:1-~70ns of no.we-, _ n !ola d
One of the negative aspects of the recent Polish events is their effect on the
Soviet Communist Party. aevel_ mcnts in Poland will tend to
50X1-HUM
DISTRIBUTiON
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,Vj STATE I I ARMY NA`JY AIR r,..V Oli
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/08 CIA RDP81 002808000200090016 0
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the "soft" policy initiated by Khrushchev. For :;he.moment, there.iust be reverbera-
tions in the Soviet Presidium, and it likely that Khrushche himself
will lose his lofty position. Therea er, however, the Soviet Party is likely to
evolve as a more united organization than it has been for quite some time.