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December 14, 2016
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October 15, 2002
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November 26, 1976
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Approved For Relea le 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP81-00896R000'Rf0280gG4-4-? OTR F-;,#sU? 2 6 NOV 016 VIA IHPO #ATlO i rticlo from countersp makes unpleasan At by point basis contrasting "what I said"' isit;to Austin, the attitudes manifestett by questioners mmadric and civic groups. As I noted in the memorandum preared after my fro **skopttcisu to hostility." The most difficult for at to handle dealt with the usual bugaboos-- inatilon attempts Park has already survived, the resultant vuched upon by Counters Instead, they feature t Korea, which at the imefelt was a minor uart of y (The line of questioning had been, "'Why is it the CIA so frequently lined u with repressive dictators like ST4TINTL Park?" Mir response had been au attempt to outline historic geographic factors which have led the South koreans to take a harder internal line than we, a comfortable half- world away, feel is necessary. I cited the number of sssas- FOR: Assistant to the Director Donald P. Gregg Deputy Director for operations Training Director of Training Deputy Director for Administration Deputy Director for Operations Balancing the Risks and Benefits of Public Appearances Before Academic Groups p through which to assess the risks and benefits ,ult from public appearances by Agency officers rinted," I believe the article Is more useful n Of-the Agency. These as ects of my talk are of power in South Korea--something they have Uty** in Blue hhouse and the great need for a o Coup ors y distortions, if brought to the be South Kores, could make the job of the that much more difficult. This I regret deeply. Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP81-00896R000100280004-4 The point is, however, that any time an Agency officer gives responsible answers to tough questions posed in a public forum, the door is open for those opposed to the Agency to twist what has been said into something of potential .eabar- rassuent to us. On the other hand, if we do not offer responsible replies to our questioners, our public appear- ances may be counter-productive. A t the Counters article, I STAT called to alerte had had no word of the article an a said that he had seen nothing on my appearance in the Texas Universit newspaper. (A student STA INTL reporter attended the talk.) reported that Dr. Weintraub, who invited me to spew , had remained posi- tive about my appearance, and that no negative feedback had ST TINTL been received. also reported that ten to twelve -high quality applications' for CIA employment had been received either from those who attended the talk or from those who had heard about it. (Two applications ISTATINTL cited specifically were from black students at the law ST TINTL school.) said he remained enthusiastic about future appearances by Agency speakers and hoped to set one up at either LSU or Tulane early in 1977. (1 have alrea.d TINTL STATINTL Approved For Rele a 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP81-00896R0001'0280004-4 SUBJECT: balancing the Risks and Benefits of Public Appearances Before Academic-Groups received an invitation to speak at USC in December-1 I 4. 1 believe that the paragraphs above set the dilemma quite clearly--my appearance in Austin has resulted in a ST TINTL possible roblem for but has also brought in some high quality applicants and improved some student of this sort and to do my level best to give the Counters genre as little as possible to work on. If we cent nue-w th such appearances, I believe we must recognize that more articles like the one in Counterspy are a distinct and unpleasant possibility. 4 faculty perceptions of what the Agency is like today. S. I an perfectly willing to continue to make appearances /S/ Donald P. Gregg Attachment Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-FDP81-00896R000100280004-4 Approved For ReleMe 2003/01/27: CIA-RDP81-00896R00T00280004-4 ILLEGIB Orig & I - Addressee w/att .ter? Distributx:n, 1 - DDA, w/att 1 - DDO, w/att 1 _ {1TP Rnai ctrv Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP81-00896R000100280004-4 Donald r cjny rovea! CI . C&ddd On October 6, 1976, an upper echelon CIA agent, speak- ing at the University of Texas, warned that if President Park runs for another six year term, as he is expected to do, he will probably not live to serve out his term. The CIA agent left it open whether the CIA would support a coup against Park like the one in which Diem was assasinated in Viet- nam. The agent was Don Gregg whose background for sounding such a warning includes being, the CIA chief of station in Korea until last year. Gregg spent 18 of his 25 years in the CIA in Asia. Ten of those years were spent in Japan, the rest in the Marianas, Vietnam, Burma, and Korea. I ? The occasion for these surprisingly candid remarks was a trip to Austin, Texas to give a lecture for a course on "Policy .'Makers in Government" directed by Dr. Sidney Weintraub. Gregg had expressed an interest in meeting with foreign students and the Center for Asian Studies was pre- vailed upon to provide a meeting place. Gregg had much to say about his work in South Korea and about General Park. He stated that South Korea must depend on the American CIA to provide intelligence infor- mation about the North. Gregg personally feels that the best thing which Park could do would be to resign. Ile could then be a national hero and also be responsible for South Korea's first peaceful change of government. How- ever, the CIA feels that a coup right now might encourage the North to attack, so they continue to provide Park with information about coup attempts. Whether they will con- tinue to do so in the future is unclear. Gregg had high praise for U. General James F. 'Holly' Hollingsworth, former allied commander along the DMZ in Korea. An article which appeared in the Wall Street Journal recently (January 13, 1976, p. 1) pictured Hollingsworth as' an old-style general whose primal instinct was to kill com- mies. Follingsworth claimed that lie could end another, Korean \Var in nine days, four days of 'real violence' and five days to clean up. Gregg said he agreed with Hollings- worth's assessment of a nine day war, and stated that the WSJ article was an accurate description of Hollingsworth. Gregg told an 'amusing' story about how the U.S. once caught the South Koreans with sophisticated weaponry which they were not supposed to have. Gregg reported his information to a U.S. Admiral who promptly confionted the Korean Admiral with the charge. Of course the Korean denied it and the U.S. Admiral believed him. The U.S. Admiral then proceeded to chew Gregg out about his *sources'. Gregg suggested that atrial surveys be made to see if ~ "11) "j-, t4 4car~ By Steve McGuire the Koreans. were building a berth for the weapon. Sure enough they were and the U.S. then confronted the Koreans with the evidence. Gregg evidently thought that placing sophisticated weapons in Korea's hands was real funny. We are lucky that they did not decide to use them. The CIA evidently wants to keep Park and his boys from getting too far out of hand. They can have their fun as long as they do not get carried away. The CIA was involved in saving the life of an opposition leader in Korea who was on a fast boat headed out for the bay with rocks tied around his feet. In another incident the Korean CIA head was removed after he committed a brutal murder of a professor. Regarding Cuba, and the attempts to kill Castro by the CIA-backed Mafia hit men, Gregg said that he once asked why Richard Helms failed to tell the Warren Commission about the CIA plots against Castro. Gregg was told that Helms kept quiet because Bobby Kennedy knew about the attempts but said nothing, so Helms did likewise. Gregg characterized Kissinger as a man who likes intelli- gence information. Since the end of the Vietnam War, Kiss- inger has been one of the CIA's most 'avid customers'. Kissinger disliked the CIA during the Vietnam War because they kept telling Kissinger that the South Vietnamese were going to lose. The CIA was a major sour . e of information during the Angolan conflict. Gregg stated that the CIA was only involved in a reporting role until after Cuba became involved. However, in order to get into Angola to provide reports, as Gregg put it, training some military troops was a quid pro quo for being allowed near the action. Gregg claimed ignorance of the rumors that Saipan was a' major nuclear weapons base. He said that the Mariannas were not overflowing with CIA men, and that the CIA was not involved in squelching dissent on the islands. From 1953 to 1963, Gregg was involved in covert activities in Japan. Japan was a case where, as Gregg put it, the CIA 'did their job right'. Apparently meaning that. the radical left opposition, such as the Communist Party of Japan,'was kept from acquiring popular support. The CIA, employing one of their favorite techniques, provided sup- port for moderate left opposition parties such as the Socialists and the Social Democrats. While engaged in these covert activities, Gregg was employed as a civilian working for the Department of Army and an employee of the American Embassy. Later, Gregg worked directly with the Japanese police. Between the years 1970 to 1972, Gregg served in Vietnam, where he began his CIA career in 1952. He was the head of Bien lloa section, but made no mention of Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP81-00896R000100280004-4 Approved For Relea&v 2003/01/27: CIA-RDP81-00896R0004,QO280004-4 )peration Phoenix, Regarding CIA involvement In the overthrow of ?llende's regime in Chile, Gregg said that the election of a Marxist in South America posed a threat to the U.S. govern- nent's design for South America. It was essential that ,llende be overthrown as a lesson to other Third World ountries that the U.S. will not tolerate any Communist overnments which it feels threaten U.S. interests. On internatidnal terrorism Gregg felt that Lib, a was the patron saint' of the terrorists. According to Gregg, Libya ppears to be the country which is providing a substantial art of the financial and moral support for the terrorists (irougliout the world. After the general meeting with Don Gregg a number of 'rofessors gathered in the plush surroundings of the Uni.. ersity of Texas faculty club for a cocktail party. Don regg and Bill Wood served as both the guests of honor and he hosts. After drinks someone asks, "Whats your sign, )on?" "Sagittarius," he said. "I knew it,'a fire sign, a sign of adventure." Don adds, "I don't regret my twenty-five years in' the T.I.A. After all, what did the rest of my classmates do in hat time, just divorces and dull jobs. I joined up because it' ,as the thing to do at that time." In .tile midst of the polite chit-chat the C.I.A. gets down o "brass tacks". Dr. Jannuzi, director of the Center for Asian Studies, is collared and given the hard sell, to allow he C.I.A. to train their people at the Center. Jannuzi quivocates a bit, "We can't give them any special treat- ient. Wouldn't a place nearer Virginia he more con- enient?" Nervous at the obvious jeopardy in which such an rrangement would put the reputation of the Center, he pparently resists their blandishments. Dr. Sidney Weintaub, who had invited Don Gregg to peak at the L.I.J. School of Public Affairs, catches people o remind everyone of the excellent opportunity to meet nd interact with policy makers. Dr. Weintraub had been approached twice by Bill Wood with the'offer of a speaker from the C.I.A. including one time shortly after \ein- traub's arrival (Fall 1976). Bill Wood, the personnel director of the local C.I.A.* office is everywhere with a cherry hello and a, "I don't be- lieve we've inet." No one escapes being asked: "Do you think this sort of thing is worth while?" The universal answer is affirmative, although some for different reasons than others. The process, begun earlier, in the afternoon, discussion session of stressing the idea that the C.I.A. is basically an "alright" group of people devoted to peace and democracy, 'continues unabated. There might have been occasional cases of overzealousness but now the "company" has matured.' The less public process of establishing liaison with the academic comtiiunity engaged in foreign area studies also continues unabated. The foreign area studies centers repre- sent valuable sources of training and expertise to the C.I.A. and the centers'are highly dependent upon an always uncer- tain grant funding. Grant support is a powerful inducement even when balanced against the pall of suspicion that would accrue in due time to all of the center's associates and students. That this might be morally wrong, that area specialists should not be agents of a particular government, and that they may be accordingly shut out of their coun- tries of interest, is not brought tip. Bill Wood, always his effervescent self, attempts to recruit where possible, "When you-'get to the job hunting stage give mega call down at the Federal Building." In gen- eral, the urbane, sophisticated approach seems to have an almost narcotic effect on the fascinated faculty. In conclusion, Gregg maintained that the CIA', through- out its history, was only doing what it was told to do. This includes both the 'legal and illegal' acts which the CIA com- mitted in the name of democracy. After all, Gregg noted, the CIA is really in the 'people business'. We know that, and that's what bothers us, because we do not know which people. .......... -'...... -,- _., prison conditions described as "inade- Chancellor Schmidt's words after Mein- -o carry out similar, if less ideologically quite" to "purposefully cruel." hoes arrest when he called Mcinhof and omplete, political actions. One woman died from cancer because the Red Ariny.Fraction "the most serious Early in June 1972, acting on a series prison doctors refused to diagnose her challenge in the 26-year history of our ?f tips, police trapped most key members symptoms. Holger Meins died from in- democracy." f the Red Army Fraction; Baader, adequate medical attention during CowaerSpyeditor WinslowPeck, con. aspc.,' and another leader Ilolger forced feeding after a long hunger strike tributieg editor Philip Agee, and two teins, were captured in a dawn raid on by RAF prisoners. Meinhof and others former Military Intelligence officers, K. heir Frankfurt hiding place and Ensslin were subjected to "sensory deprivation" Barton Osborn and Gary Thomas, were as apprehended while shopping in a -a new form of torture, in specialized the first witnesses called by the defense in lamhurg store. cells, preventing all human contact. Meinhors trial last summer. They tried On June IS, Fritz Roderwald, in whose Many people have recurring hallucina- to testily on the use of German soil for ouse Meinhof had been hiding, called tions from such treatment. Meinhof her- the conduct of the war in Indochina. The `ie police inspector in charge of the Ilan- self was in a sensory deprivation cell for defense hoped it might mitigate the sen ver Baader Meinhof Koinmando (a one six-month period and then again for tences of Mcinhof and her companions irce resembling American SWAT teams two weeks last Christmas, but by all ac- who were moved to protest U.S. aggres. a most German cities) and turned her counts had a touidi mind. sion in Vietnam. But the court's presi- a. Roderwald, a 33-year-old teacher, But the RAF organized inside the dent prevented the testimony and said it ante to regret his decision and turned dozen jails the government sent them to. would only assist the "terrorists." He vet the reward nio~yy _ tt vp6~ le&eie(W3/A4fi3-~c CIA-RIDP&te0Q806f Od0-tOd2~A1004b4re could be no de- 'irike Mcinhof Dc se unc. Accor - European left and it is for this reason fense whatsoever in a case such as this. , i., f, ,. 1 ,, ((!. ;.:' ,,r-fn,r I.,.r ; , . , ' 1 C 17 . I' 1 l 1.1.1 . 1 . G CLAS51 F1 to ' 'TE r " oroved For easel 2013/01/27 : CIA-RDP81-O0866Fi 010Y 6b64-4 ROU-r -fir= AND RFCC D 5ti-17ET SUBJECT: (Optional) Balancing th.~ Appearance Donald P. Gregg DD/OT/OTR TO: (Officer designotion, room number, and building) ) X a Director ofTraining ^ SECRET 211-1 November 1976 COMMENTS (Nr,mber each comment to show from whom to whom. Drcv- a line across column after each comment.) As you are aware, Don 7D18 Hqs Gregg is an influentially 4. ,A/DCI j~F04 Hqs ~. (. ;~ ~ E{ g i r l oFFICFR'S INtI!A.! 5 capable briefer who does an excellent .job representing the Agency. We have discussed an some detail the briefing that led to the Counterspy article, and I am convinced that Donts presentation and subsequent answers to ques- tions were handled with candor tempered with the ijecessary amount of dis- creetness. It is suggested that the benefits derived from these orientation briefings far outwei h the g damage done by irresponsible articles, such as the one appearing in Counterspy- It is strongly recommen e that we continue with the oren- tations, ensuring that we critically select the briefers based upon the particular situation and sophistication FORM 3-62 ~) rector of Training Harry E. Fitzwater Approved For Releas6 2003/01/27: CL4-RD.P$1O0896R000100280004-4 +5 0 USE PREVIOUS SECRET ~, A INTERNAL EDITIONS ^ ~.. r I FIDENTIAL fl USE ONLY of the audience. This has been done in the past for briefings provided by OTR El UNCLASSIFIED